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Propositions 
1. Limiting the study of an irrigation system to the domain of 
irrigation water management only is reductionist as it fails to see 
decisive structures in the domains of financial management and 
the management of physical works. It leads to ovedy optimistic 
accounts of the possibilities for sustainable management and good 
governance, (this thesis) 
2. In the Philippines, the downward accountability of irrigation 
agency staff to users is less of a problem than the upward 
accountability of the users towards the irrigation agency, (this 
thesis) 
3. Rent-seeking analysis and neo-institutionalism are two different 
manifestations of the 'science of suspicion' (Sabel 1997). This is 
not just an academic issue, as the most suspicious people make the 
biggest dupes (Tendler, 1997). 
4. The title of the authoritative book 'Seeing Like a State' (Scott 
1998) should have been 'Seeing like Some States'. Other states, 
and I believe them to be the majority, fail to see in a coherent way, 
let alone possess the capacity to act coherently and decisively. 
5. Norman Long's 'encounters at the interface' concept, that guided 
much Wageningen research in policy and development studies, 
presupposes a far too strong boundary between state and society. 
The life worlds of 'state' and 'society' actors are blurred and inter-
linked to the extent that is hard to distinguish the one from the 
other 
6. The real tragedy of the commons is not caused by the common's 
properties, but rather by the fact that mismanagement does not 
stop nature from producing and water from flowing. 
Propositions 
7. The surprise of the BBC's World Service about the Iraqis setting 
fire to the headquarters of an 'a-political' agency as the Ministry of 
Irrigation shows that the BBC journalists know little about British 
colonial history and that westerners in general do not grasp the 
characteristics of "hydraulic societies' (cf. Wittfogel 1957). 
8. Those questioning the validity of the 'garbage-can theory of 
organisational choice' (Morgan 1990) should take a look at the 
overwhelming evidence supporting this theory produced by rural 
households (mis-) using irrigation canals. 
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1 
This book investigates the management of an irrigation system in 
the Philippines and the impact of reform policies on its 
management. The ^Philippine experience' has long been a model 
for irrigation management reforms throughout Asia. Both the 
reforms of the NIA, the National Irrigation Administration, and 
the participatory approach for farmers' involvement in system 
management were widely argued to be successful and worthwhile 
to be copied elsewhere. This book examines the impact of these 
policies and critically engages with its claimed successes. 
Policy studies in irrigation management tend to be rather 
functionalistic. They often look at what goes in - the policies - and 
what comes out - the results. The study presented in this book 
took a different approach. Eighteen months of fieldwork in an 
irrigation system enabled me to open up the blackbox of irrigation 
system management. The book takes a close look at how people 
organise themselves, how they manage an irrigation system and 
deal with reform, and why they choose to do so. Moreover, it 
examines how these practices are embedded in wider state-society 
relations. 
By doing so, a fascinating wodd comes into sight. It is, basically, 
a wodd of struggle involving the NIA engineers and fieldworkers, 
farmer leaders and local politicians. The most visible struggle is 
about the distribution of scarce water in this large-scale canal 
system. During the dry season people go out, often at night, to 
secure water in the main system. Farmer leaders build alliances with 
local politicians and NIA staff to bring the water to their areas. 
Then there is struggle about the allocation of scarce funds for 
physical works like de-silting canals and re-gravelling roads. As 
some people are more equal or effective than others, the 
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management of the system produces bountiful harvests as well as 
withering crops, both passable and unpassable roads, and both 
successful and failed political campaigns. 
There is more to physical works then just getting your road or 
canal fixed. The book explores a complicated arena in which deals 
are made over lucrative work contracts. It involves higher-level 
politicians and is interwoven with the career possibilities of the 
NIA engineers. Finally, there is a struggle over wages. Since the 
NIA became financially autonomous in the eady 1980s, NIA 
personnel need to earn their own wages through fee collection 
from the farmer water users. As the NIA services went down over 
the years, making farmers pay took a lot of effort and strategizing 
on the side of the NIA managers and fieldworkers. 
These struggles are understood in the context of three different 
but inter-related types of policy reforms that changed the 
management of the system. I show how the different local actors 
give meaning to these policies and how they adopt, resist or 
transform them. Firstly, starting in the eady 1980s streamlining 
policies forced the NIA to drastically downsize its number of staff. 
Secondly, the change to financial autonomy induced cost-cutting as 
well as different measures to increase the income of the NLA's 
organisation managing the system. Finally, so-called turn over 
policies contracted out management tasks to farmers organised in 
associations and federations. Though these policies did not work 
out as planned, they had a great impact on the management of the 
system and the relations between the different actors. I examine the 
everyday realities of these policy interventions and discuss how 
effective they are. 
The system studied is located in the Central Luzon Plain, about 
one hundred kilometres north of Manila. It is one of the four sub-
systems - locally called the 4 t h District - of the largest irrigation 
project in the Philippines, the Upper Pampanga River Integrated 
Irrigation System (UPRIIS). A huge reservoir checked by the 
Pantabangan Dam and local rivers bring year-round water to the 
fertile lands of the province of Nueva Ecija, and a part of Bulacan 
and Pampanga province. The area is part of one of the major rice 
bowls of the Philippines (see map 1.1). 
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MAP 1.1: The UPRIIS system and the studied 4 * District located in the 
Pampanga river basin 
Source: NIA 1975: 30 
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Main Motivations 
My main motivation to write this book is practical. I am concerned 
about the plight of large-scale gravity systems in the Philippines as 
well as in other developing countries, and in the end, about the well 
being of their users and the economies depending on these 
systems. Hence, my concerns are related to policies to improve the 
management of these systems. Part of my concern is academic. The 
analytical understanding of irrigation management is important to 
how practical problems are understood and tackled. Hence, this 
book tries to contribute to irrigation management studies as an 
interdisciplinary field. 
Before elaborating on these concerns, let me first put them in 
perspective. I am rather positive about large-scale gravity irrigation. 
Though many of the environmental and social concerns around the 
construction of large dams or large systems are legitimate (Wodd 
Commission on Dams 2000), I do not object in principle to such 
large-scale ventures. On the contrary, it is amazing to see the 
magnitude of economic life brought about by such a simple 
technology like gravity irrigation. The UPRIIS system, which is 
nothing more than a reservoir, a number of dams in local rivers 
and a whole lot of earthen canals, forms the basis of life for 
hundreds of thousands of rural people. Also, I am rather positive 
about the NLA, the irrigation administration of the Philippines. Its 
openness to change, and the fact that it has many committed 
people among its managers and fieldworkers, gives good reason to 
be optimistic about future improvements of the management of 
these systems. 
Having said this, there is much to be concerned about. Firstly, 
there is the decline of the NLA. While President Marcos quickly 
built up the NLA organisation during the martial law years of the 
1970s, its budget and staff number fell dramatically during the 
1980s and 1990s. Alongside this decline, the agency-managed 
national irrigation systems - amounting to 50% of the irrigated area 
in the Philippines - deteriorated in physical as well as managerial 
terms (cf. Kikuchi etaL 1998). At the inauguration of Pantabangan 
Dam in 1974, Amnon Golan of the Wodd Bank classified the NIA 
as "the finest irrigation agency in the whole of Asia and in any 
developing country in the Wodd" (NIA 1990). It is unfortunately a 
statement that refers to the NLA's glorious past In more recent 
years, the NIA and its national systems were - and still are - in 
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serious trouble. 
In itself, this system deterioration is bad enough. Worse though, 
this has been a story largely untold. It is almost as if there are two 
different realities. The reality of international irrigation policy 
discourse, which tells positive stories about farmer empowerment 
and system efficiency due to turn over and the fine results of the 
NIA's financially autonomous status (Gonzales 1993; 
NIACONSULT 1993; Svendsen 1993). Then there is the real 
wodd of harsh realities. These two worlds are not unrelated. The 
NIA's downsizing and the unbalanced cuts in the operational 
budgets of the national systems have been legitimised by the 
positive policy accounts of turn over and financial autonomy. I do 
not question the sincerity of those propagating these policies. With 
hindsight, it is easy to be critical. However, I do think it is due time 
to give recognition to this other, harsher reality. 
Secondly, the question of turn over remains a central concern to 
irrigation management in the Philippines as well as in other Asian 
countries. During the 1980s, the so-called Thilippine experience' 
has been sold in the wodd as a success story of bureaucratic 
transformation and farmer participation (Korten and Siy 1989). 
Then, in the mid-1990s, the Wodd Bank dismissed the NLA. The 
NIA's transformative capacity was argued to be at the pace of a 
turtle (Sun and Groenfeldt 1995). Instead, the Bank made Mexico's 
'Speedy-Gonzales' style of management reforms into the new 
global example for the twenty-first century. 
Though there might be validity in the Bank's judgement, it is not 
a very helpful approach: neither to the Philippines, nor for many 
other Asian countries to which the Asian model of joint or 
participatory management rather than the American-Mexican 
model of irrigation management transfer is still reality (Meinzen-
Dick a aL 7994, 1997). How to go about the turn over of 
management in the Philippines, as well as in the other Asian 
countries? This is not an easy question. There is a need for 
approaches that go beyond populist pro-farmer solutions that are 
still dominant in many reform programs (cf. Raby 1997). This book 
hopes to revive the discussion on management turn over in the 
Philippines. At the substantive level, it brings back the political as 
well as ad^ninistrative parts of the state into the discussion. More 
specifically it puts forward the state fieldworker as a crucial actor in 
irrigation management (cf. Van der Zaag 1992). 
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It is my belief that the academic wodd has much to contribute 
to the quest for better management of large-scale systems. It is 
rather worrying that the policy wodd has to base its judgements on 
a rather meagre stock of analytical studies on irrigation 
management. There is not just a need for more studies, but more 
importandy, for a certain type of studies. Often, contributions 
remain at the descriptive level or look at outputs rather than at 
processes. Moreover, policy studies usually stay within the confines 
of the policy framework, and thus fail to see how certain changes 
came about, or why that was the case (see for instance the 
contributions to a turn over conference held in Wuhan 1994, in: 
Johnson etaL 1995). 
Other contributions are written from a neo-institutional 
perspective. Though these might from time to time be illuminating 
(Repetto 1986 on rent-seeking) or put forward a sympathetic 
community-centered approach (Ostrom 1992), these have serious 
limitations as well. These frozen, static accounts of irrigation 
realities, based on a limited set of fixed preferences of its actors, 
leave too much out of the equation (Migdal 2001; Mollinga 2001). 
They cannot grasp the complex realities of irrigation management 
and the life-wodds of its actors. 
Hence, there is a need for a more detailed and contextualized 
understanding of irrigation management. This book contributes to 
this need. It especially sheds light on its socio-political dimension. 
It shows the central role of local politicians in the irrigation 
management of the District studied, and challenges the idea that 
they can or even should be kept out of the management of large 
systems. It also shows that both the NIA engineers and 
fieldworkers are actors deeply entrenched the local societies of 
their work. Hence, the ties between the NIA and farmers water 
users are not only based on fees or formal organisations, but on 
political patronage, economic interests and relations of kin- and 
friendship as well. In short, this study stresses the importance of a 
more embedded view on irrigation management 
Conceptual Framework 
How to conceptualise this 'contextualised understanding of 
irrigation management'? Fortunately, I do not start from scratch. 
Since the 1980s, students and staff members of the Irrigation and 
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Water Engineering (TWE) Group of the Wageningen Agricultural 
University have been developing such an approach. This has led to 
a clear framework for an interdisciplinary approach to irrigation 
management (Vincent 2001, 1997; Mollinga 1998). Central 
elements of this approach are the conceptualisation of irrigation as 
a combined sociotechnical phenomenon, and a focus on 
management practices as embedded in wider structures (for further 
detail, see below). Taking this approach as a starting point, this 
section outlines the conceptual framework used in the analysis of 
irrigation management in the UPRIIS system. 
The everyday politics of irrigation management 
I understand irrigation management in the UPRIIS system as a 
struggle over three vital but contested resources: water, works and 
fees (wages). I examine these struggles by focussing on the 
'everyday polities' of irrigation management. This is defined as: 
(...) the debates, conflicts, decisions, and co-operation among 
individuals, groups and organisations regarding the control, 
allocation and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying 
these activities. (Kerkvliet 1990:11) 
This 'everyday politics' perspective has two conceptual 
advantages. Firsdy, it is an active concept referring to managerial 
processes. Many irrigation studies do not do so. These either take a 
structural or formalistic approach (Nijman 1993) or examine 
management in terms of an input-output model, using a number of 
performance measurement criteria (Bos et al 1994). As outlined 
above, the management process thus remains a blackbox in these 
approaches. To actually analyse system management, it is needed to 
examine people's day-to-day practices and strategies. 
The second advantage is that 'politics' refers to social power 
relations. Politics is usually associated with party or state politics, 
but I refer here to its broader meaning of "any activity concerned 
with the acquisition of power", or "manoeuvres or factors leading 
up to or influencing (something)" (The New Collins Dictionary 
1982). 
This focus on social power and everyday politics is a common 
one in studies on resource management in rural Luzon.1 It is also a 
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perspective that has been used to study large-scale irrigation 
management in other countries. Wade and Chambers (1980) were 
among the first to put forward a Nvater is politics' perspective. In 
their discussion of main system management in Indian canal 
systems, they argued that 
water is politics. (...) Technical disciplines, pardy from self-defence, 
treat water allocation as though it were a purely technical matter. In 
consequence, the real wodd of influence, inducements and threats 
is left out of the analysis. (Wade and Chambers 1980: A-lll) 
Later on, others followed2. 
When it comes to irrigation management studies in the 
Philippines however, this book is the first - to my knowledge — to 
take such an approach. Irrigation management in UPRIIS has been 
the subject of a good many consultancy reports, several M.Sc. 
studies and at least 3 Ph.D. studies.3 All of these studies stayed well 
within a more conventional perspective on irrigation management. 
This conventional perspective is one that models irrigation 
management along a Weberian line of thinking in functional, 
formal and non-political terms. One of the eady contributions that 
fit this perspective was Uphoffs 3-dimensional cube, in which 
irrigation management is seen as a large number of concrete tasks 
(Uphoff 1986). A more sophisticated version of this approach 
defines irrigation management not as tasks but as decision-making 
processes in which the involved actors need to decide on a large 
sequence of activities (Nijman 1993). 
Decision-making in this conventional perspective is seen as an 
administrative activity taken care of by a management authority 
that makes use of resources to realise certain objectives. There is a 
real socio-political wodd in which management is taking place, but 
it is defined as external to the management process. Like the 
climate or the water availability, politics and culture belong to a set 
of externally conditioning factors to be dealt with by the 
management Qurriens and de Jong 1989; Small and Svendsen 
1992). 
Of course, such formal management set-ups do exist. Nor do I 
deny that such models have practical use as ideal-typical models of 
governance. For instance, it is only sensible to manage by 
objectives. Likewise, it may be a good starting-point for irrigation 
managers to define politicians as outside intruders whose 
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interventions need to be neutralised. However, the analytical value 
of these formal models is very limited when it comes to the 
UPRIIS case. 
To show the limitations of the conventional view on irrigation 
management and the need for a more embedded approach, I will 
critically discuss the findings of one of the eadier studies conducted 
in the UPRIIS system. At the same time, it serves as an 
introduction to the everyday politics of UPRLIS-style irrigation 
management 
The everyday politics of operation dulo 
The study I discuss as an example is about an experiment on main 
system management, conducted during the 1974 and 1975 dry 
seasons. It was carried out in the Penaranda river irrigation system 
that later became the 4 t h UPRIIS District, which is the subject of 
this book (for further detail, see chapter 2). The purpose of the 
experiment was to implement and evaluate a package of 
management practices to improve the distribution of water along a 
main lateral, and thus to improve the irrigated area and average 
yields (Valera and Wickham 1976: 3). The study became famous in 
the international irrigation scene, as it was one of the first studies 
that showed that poor water management first and foremost needs 
to be solved at the level of the main system, rather than at the field 
level (Chambers 1988: 109). The International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) carried it out, in collaboration with the NLA. 
The experiment introduced water scheduling between the off-
takes of the main lateral of one of the system's Zones. Also, it 
made farmers in the tail-end areas of this Zone start their land-
preparation ahead of those in the mid- and upstream areas. It 
became locally known as operation dulo {dub means 'below' or 'far-
end"). To do so, the canal system of the Zone was divided in four 
management sections and a watermaster supervised each section. 
The experiment was very successful. The serious problems of water 
stress in the tail-end sections were neady solved and the total rice 
production in the Zone rose sharply (Valera and Wickham 1976). 
This IRRI study indeed gives you the impression that politics is 
external to the management process, and that management only 
involves consensual forms of decision-making. Although the 
experiment met some initial resistance of upstream farmers, 
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informal discussions in the field sufficed to ensure that: "farmers in 
the upper reaches of the lateral gradually came to support the new 
scheme once they were assured of an adequate share of water even 
in times of water shortage" (ibid:. 4). 
However, the reality pictured by Valera and Wickham is a 
filtered one. In the years immediately preceding this experiment, 
Brian Fegan conducted an anthropological Ph.D. study in one of 
the tail-end villages of the Zone in which the experiment took 
place. His version of reality is a very different one. He points out 
that tail-end farmers were involved in severe struggles over water, 
to the extent that it had shaped social relationships in the area. 
Long series of violent clashes between families or kindreds, parts of 
villages and whole villages if plotted on a map of the irrigation 
system, indicate that though the incidents occurred at drinking 
parties, festivals, basket-ball games, courting, transplanting, etc., the 
enemies belong to adjacent areas upstream and downstream from 
each other on the irrigation system. (Fegan 1979:132) 
He furthermore points out that farmers made every effort to evade 
what controls and inspection exist, to get access to the water, and 
put pressure on the NIA's watermasters ranging from persuasion 
based on ties of kinship, friendship, locality and political alliances, 
through offers of bribery, to occasional threats of violence. Fegan 
also described bribery and the use of powerful politicians as 
strategies applied by local political leaders to influence the main 
system management practices of the NIA District engineers. 
Apparently, the IRRI success in drastically changing the main 
system management practices must be contributed to its power to 
overrule local relations. My own findings however, indicate that 
IRRI needed a little more than just persuading upstream farmers, 
and was not able to fully overrule local political realities. Because of 
the experiment they came into conflict with the mayor of a 
municipality covering the upstream area of the Zone. Their 
experiment hampered the water supply to a large rice estate of the 
mayor's family, located along the main lateral of the Zone. This 
area was difficult to irrigate and needed the full closure of one the 
larger checks in the main lateral. The check was considered the 
territory of the mayor's family, not to be touched without their 
consent. The IRRI experiment challenged his control over this 
major check. 
Introduction 11 
As one of the former section supervisors appointed by the IRRI 
told me, the mayor made it very clear that his rule should not be 
taken for granted. At one nighty the mayor's brother - who was 
considered to be a trigger-happy toughguy - and his gang, entered 
the quarters of the four section supervisors. Being drunk, he 
engaged them into a fistfight. The mayor saw his opportunity and 
acted upon it The next day, he sent policemen and put the 
supervisors in jail for molesting his brother and his gang. The NLA 
had to negotiate with the mayor for their release and they were 
transferred to another job. The IRRI experiment could continue, 
but without threatening the mayor's interests. None of this was 
reported in the article of Valera and Wickham. 
This case study thus demonstrates the need for an approach to 
irrigation management in UPRIIS that includes the socio-political 
wodd in its analysis. As this book will show, water was still a 
contested resource during 1996-97, about 25 years after the IRRI 
experiment Often, these contests took the form of political 
struggle or even violence. This is not to say that irrigation 
management is only about struggle. As will be shown, effective 
partnerships emerged in the management of water, works and fees 
that were based on mutual agreement and friendly and co-operative 
relationships. Still, these are seen as different manifestations of 
everyday politics, in the sense that people manoeuvre to get access 
to scarce resources at the expense of others. Hence, in the different 
contests over resource allocation and distribution, mediating 
institutions emerge that may work on different principles. To 
understand such institutions, a framework is required that 
integrates socio-political as well as cultural relations into the 
analysis of irrigation management 
The state in irrigation management 
One of the major focus points of this book is about the role of the 
state - both the bureaucracy and the political system - in irrigation 
management4 Given the central role of irrigation bureaucracies in 
managing large-scale systems and implementing management 
reforms, one would expect that each and every study puts the state 
-and its relations to society - at the core of its analysis. This, 
however, is not the case. Despite its obvious importance, the state 
is very much absent in irrigation management studies.5 
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A few good exceptions are the studies conducted by Mick 
Moore (1989) and Robert Wade (1982a, 1988) on the well-managed 
systems in respectively Taiwan and South Korea. In somewhat 
lesser detail, Siriwardena (1989) and Uphoff (1992) shed light on 
the Sri Lankan irrigation bureaucracy. Other studies that pay 
attention to the state in irrigation management are Mollinga (1998) 
and Ramamurthy (1995) on Indian systems and Van der Zaag 
(1992) on Mexico. However, the analyses of the latter contributions 
open only a part of the blackbox. They analyse the doings of state 
workers and/or engineers in water management However, the 
office life of these fieldworkers and engineers, their socio-political 
embeddedness in society and the overall concerns of the state's 
managing bodies remain more or less obscure.6 
My contributions are the following. Firsdy, I analyse the various 
ways in which the political system is tied in with die supposedly 
administrative domain of irrigation management. It is shown that 
this goes way beyond political interference in NIA matters. The 
'political' and the 'administrative' are interrelated to the extent that 
is hard to separate one from the other. 
Secondly, I take a close look at how the NIA fieldworkers shape 
their work. They cannot be dismissed as irrelevant lower-level 
bureaucrats. These so-called 'street-level-bureaucrats' (Lipsky 1980) 
or frondine workers, these people are policy-makers themselves. 
Given their boundary-spanning role as frondine workers, they are 
caught in between the pressures from the office as well as the water 
users. In this position, they actively shape irrigation management 
and policy reforms like turn over (for further conceptual detail, see 
chapter 5). 
Thirdly, I go beyond an understanding of the irrigation 
engineers as 'technocrats' or "bureaucrats', and analyse them as 
societal actors. Like the fieldworkers, they are deeply embedded in 
the local societies of their work. This is not just because of their 
social (family) history, but also because of the way they give shape 
to their work. To make a difference as managers of a District, to 
survive and/or to accumulate wealth, it is shown that they 
construct networks with NIA actors, farmer leaders as well as local 
and higher-level politicians. 
Fourthly, these local relations are examined as part of Philippine 
state-society. This allows me to understand how and why 'the 
political' is so pervasively present in the management of the 
Irrigation District. The weakness of the Philippine central state (cf. 
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Mgdal 1988; May 1998; Kerkviiet 1998) is seen as a major 
explanatory factor for the District's irrigation dynamics. Such an 
analysis also opens up the possibilities for a more comparative 
understanding of large-scale irrigation management in various 
countries. It may help to see why systems in the strong South 
Korean and Taiwanese states are well managed, and why 'disorder' 
is found in weaker states like the Philippines. 
This state analysis also contributes to the general understanding 
of resource management in the rural areas of the Philippines. Many 
of the contributions from the political sciences are focused on 
electoral struggles of politicians and/or on the more spectacular 
parts of their controversial endeavours (see for instance the 
different contributions in McCoy 1994 and Rocamora 1995). So 
far, there has been little thorough study done on the more 
mundane involvement of politicians in public resource 
management. In addition, there have been few studies that closely 
examined how government agencies like the NIA are operating in 
the field, and how they for instance have dealt with the severe 
budget cuts of the 1980s and 1990s.7 
At the policy level, this book may be seen as a warning against 
overiy enthusiastic beliefs in decentralised forms of governance by 
elected officials. An effective state, according to Evans (1995), is 
both embedded in local society and autonomous from the 
dominant social groupings over which it reigns. This book shows 
that the embedded part of local governance in the Philippines is 
(more than) OK, but that the level of state autonomy is terribly 
low. 
I have some difficulties with the presendy popular concept of 
'accountability' in the study of relations between irrigation agencies 
and water users. In itself, the focus on accountability is a positive 
development. It reflects the fact that irrigation studies have 'moved 
upwards', i.e. away from the earlier focus on field and tertiary unit 
management. Nowadays, studies also examine main system 
management. Also, it shows some willingness to take a critical look 
at the behaviour of irrigation bureaucracies. Moreover, as 
accountability is about 'answerability' and 'controlling the actions 
of one party by another party', it thus is about power relations (Vos 
2002: 23). Hence, the concept of accountability is an improvement 
on the previously popular but powerfree notion of 'farmer 
participation'. 
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However, the accountability studies are usually restricted to 
questioning the responsive behaviour of irrigation bureaucracies 
towards the water users. This is referred to as 'downward 
accountability' (Small and Carruthers 1991; Merrey 1996). The 
undedying assumption is that much of the problems in irrigation 
management are caused by the lack of voice of water users to hold 
unresponsive bureaucrats accountable for their doings. This, I 
think, gready exaggerates the powers of these agencies, and 
underestimates the problems caused by water users and their 
political representatives. There are real limits to the powers of 
bureaucracies like the NIA. In many cases the question of whether 
irrigation management bureaucracies are accountable to their 
clients may be far less to the point than the question of whether 
these agencies have the necessary room for manoeuvre to exert 
sufficient control over their clientele. 
Moreover the accountability model reduces the participants to 
two: the irrigation engineers versus the farmer water users.8 It 
leaves out of account the fieldworkers as well as fourth party 
interveners: non-farmer local politicians and influentials. This study 
thus presents a two-way and four party examination of 
accountability. It explores the checks and balances available to the 
managing entity to control the behaviour of (parts/groups) of the 
water users. Furthermore, it examines the accountability relations 
between the fieldworkers and the engineers, as well as between 
these engineers and local politicians. 
My other problem with the accountability studies is the biased 
focus on the bad governance of irrigation bureaucracies. They seem 
to be largely informed by mistrust. The seminal study of Robert 
Wade (1982) on institutionalised bribery as a key mechanism in the 
management of Indian canal systems has given good reason for this 
mistrust. Repetto's contribution (1986) used Wade's case study to 
build up a general theory around rent-seeking behaviour in public 
irrigation systems. Although criticised (Moore 1989), his rent-
seeking framework — apdy called 'the science of suspicion' (Sabel 
1997) - has strengthened the view that irrigation reform is needed 
to limit "the damage the public sector can do in developing 
countries" (Tendler 1997:1). 
Though there may be good reasons for mistrust, there is more 
to the behaviour of state officials than just rent-seeking and 
shirking (though this does shape behaviour in the UPRLIS case, see 
chapter 7). Whether we like it or not, as both the market and the 
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community fail to provide (all) the answers for good governance 
(Moore 1989), the state will continue to play a central role in the 
management of large-scale systems. Even in cases of full 
management transfer to farmer or private bodies, states remain 
important as controlling and regulatory bodies (Vermillion and 
Sagardoy 1999). Hence, it makes good sense to explore positive 
behaviour of state agents as well. This study thus also tries to 
understand the undedying motivations and ambitions of both NIA 
engineers and fieldworkers that give direction to their work. Given 
the present-day dominance of rather cynical, rent-seeking type of 
assumptions about people's behaviour, this, to me, seems a 
refreshing starting-point for research. 
The analysis of accountability relations in this book furthermore 
goes beyond its formal manifestations. Many of the discussions and 
policy prescriptions on accountability - often informed by a neo-
institutional perspective (see for instance Malano and Van 
Hofwegen 1999) - are rather formalistic in nature. They fit into a 
Weberian view of rational organisations in which 
responsibilities and authorities are cleady defined and ordered, and 
practices and decisions accurately reflected in written 
documentation. It presupposes a clear division between the 
authorities and the accountable actor and assumes that 
accountability takes place through formal mechanisms (Hilhorst 
2000:136). 
Indeed, policy prescriptions in die field of irrigation management 
usually put their trust in formal organisational structures (meetings, 
elections of the board), formal forms of accounting (on contracts, 
see Murray-Rust and Snellen 1993) or formal financial structures 
(farmer-financed irrigation and financially autonomous agencies, 
see Small and Carruthers 1991). 
However, as this book will show, accountability mechanisms are 
not necessarily limited to the formal structures of irrigation 
management. Mollinga (1995: 3) points to existence of political 
accountability mechanisms in irrigation management in South 
India. Politicians are effectively employed by both water users and 
irrigation staff to gain control over the doings of other actors in 
irrigation. Hilhorst (2000: 137) points to existence of moral or 
everyday forms of accountability, in which actors are held 
accountable on the basis of moral obligations or everyday pressures 
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put on people. Hence, accountability relations are not confined to 
formal organisational mechanisms, and thus are understood in this 
book in the context of wider cultural and socio-political structures. 
More specifically, it is shown how relations of political patronage 
and brokerage as well as friendship and kinship shape 
accountability relations (see chapters 4 and 6). 
Arenas of struggle and accommodation in irrigation management 
How then to conceptualise the state in the irrigation management 
of the UPRIIS system? My approach draws on the work of Joel 
Migdal (1988, 1994, 2001). Mgdal propagates a 'state-in-society' 
approach to analyse patterns of social power and change. State and 
society are not two separate, unrelated entities, but they constitute 
each other: "states may help mold, but are also continuously molded 
by, the societies in which they are embedded" (Migdal 1994:6). 
The second starting-point of this approach is that states do not 
hold a monopoly on power, and that the state is not the only 
institution that tries to influence daily behaviour. 
states are fragmented and face a multitude of social organisations -
families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic businesses, 
tabes, political parties, and patron-client dyads- that maintain and 
vie for the power to set the rules guiding people's behaviour. 
(Migdal 2001:3) 
There are thus real limits to the powers of state agents, like the 
engineers managing the UPRIIS Districts. Especially because they 
often operate in field offices far away from the state centres of 
power, their ruling does not carry very far. This point has been 
proven by Grindle's seminal study on slate agents implementing 
policies in rural Mexico. They found themselves operating in a 
complex web of different state and non-state actors making their 
life very difficult The only way to survive then was to "negotiate 
the maze of pressures and cross-pressures generated by all these 
groups" (Grindle 1980:239). 
In such environments, irrigation managers cannot act as 
administrators who stick to formal rules and regulations and act 
according to operational plans. To make things happen — and to 
survive - they will have to act strategically, and constantly adopt to 
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changing situations. This tallies with business management 
literature that describe the mode of conduct of (successful) 
managers operating in complex, uncertain and dynamic 
environments as 'groping along', 'muddling through' and learning-
by-doing' (Behn 1988; for an example of such behaviour in 
irrigation management, see Manzungu 1999). 
However, it is not only the state agent that needs to negotiate. In 
fact, usually no single actor has the upper hand. The reason is that 
each social actor does not only have to compete with the 
bureaucracy, but also with other non-state rival groupings. 
Leaders attempt to mobilise followers and exercise power in 
environments, in which leaders of other groups are doing the same. 
(...) Attempts at domination are invariably met with opposition by 
others also seeking to dominate or by those trying to avoid 
domination (Migdal 1994:21) 
The consequence of such a situation is that any actor can only 
achieve its goals by creating alliances, and accepting 
accommodations. In line with Migdal, then, I understand the 
irrigation management arena of UPRIIS as 
an arena of domination and opposition, where various social forces 
engage one another over material and symbolic issues, vying for 
supremacy through struggles and accommodations, clashes and 
alliances, {ibid:. 21). 
Which specific social groups are operating in the irrigation 
arena, and which specific issues are at stake, are empirical 
questions. This will differ for different irrigation systems, for 
different countries and at different points in time. For clarity 
though, I have sketched out the arena as I think it is shaped in the 
case of the UPRIIS 4 * Irrigation District (figure 1.1). 
This schematic picture of the irrigation management arena of 
the District raises a few points. Firsdy, the arena actually consists of 
multiple, partly ovedapping, inter-related 'sub-arena's, or to put it 
in more conceptual terms, different 'domains of interaction' 
(Vfllareal 1994: 207). There are different resources at stake that 
people struggle about. Obviously, not all resources are equally 
important to the different actors, nor are the rules of the game or 
the alliances created. Hence, the properties of the sub-arenas of 
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struggle or domains of interaction regarding 'works', *water' and 
'fees' are not necessarily similar to each other. On the other hand, 
they are not independent either. For instance, this study will show 
that the power relations between fieldworkers and farmer leaders in 
the management of water, partly shape - and are shaped by - their 
relations in the domain of fee collection. 
FIGURE 1.1: Policy inflow into the local arena of struggle and 
accommodation over irrigation resources 
Policy reforms Management domains and key actors 
Secondly, the actors discerned in the figure are abstract 
categories. In real life, it may very well be that the emerging 
alliances are composed of actors coming from several of these 
different categories. Hence, in the daily politics of irrigation 
management, certain politicians may have formed an alliance with a 
faction of the District engineers, trying to get control over certain 
resources. They might very well be in competition with alliances 
composed of other segments of the political and/or administrative 
system. Thus, the analysis needs to focus on real organisational 
processes, to understand which actors actually join forces to further 
their goals, and why others remain separate. 
Another useful concept to understand state-society relations in 
the irrigation management of UPRIIS is the concept of "blurred 
boundaries' (Gupta 1995). This concept indicates that there is no 
strict or clear boundary between the state and society. The state is 
part of society, and state officials are its members. Irrigation 
management literature does often not recognise this point. 
Engineers are pictured to be state officials, stricdy separated from 
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the societal category, the farmer water users (see for instance 
Vermillion 1991). This is particularly true for contributions based 
on a neo-institutional perspective, which come up with highly 
stylised pictures in which the action is frozen, and in which the 
individual is presented as "an integrated personality, with clear 
preferences that are hierarchically ordered and that motivate one to 
act" (Migdal 2001:37). 
Viewing the state as a social boundary, separating it from non-
state actors goes all the way back to Weber. For Weber, the 
separation of the public and the private was a hallmark of the 
modem, bureaucratised state. On his discussion on the separation 
of public and private law, for instance, he argued: 
It presupposes the conceptual separation of the state as abstract 
bearer of sovereign prerogatives and the creator of legal norms', 
from all personal 'authorisations' of individuals. (Gerth and Mills 
1958:7). 
In day-to-day reality though, the social boundaries between the 
state and the non-state, between the public and the private are 
*blurred', sometimes to the extent that it becomes difficult to 
separate one from the other (Gupta 1995: 379). This is perhaps 
clearest for the lower ranks of irrigation bureaucracies, the 
fieldworkers. The 'roles' of a state representative and that of a 
farmer water user often meet in the very same person. As this study 
will show however, also engineers might own tracts of irrigated 
land, might be part of patron-client dyads, and/or may have 
entered — either during or outside of office hours - into a joint 
venture with a farmer-cum-businessman. In short, there is a lot of 
'NIA-in-society', and likewise, a lot of'society-in-NIA'. 
Embeddedness 
It is clear from the above that I make use of an actor-oriented 
approach to understand the everyday politics of irrigation 
management, by exploring people's practices and strategies, and 
trying to come to grasp their life-wodd, to understand their 
undedying values and motivations (Long 1989). However, this type 
of studies runs a real danger of becoming too voluntaristic. 
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The danger is 
to overemphasise the freedom which social acton have to choose 
and construct their organisational arrangements and to 
underemphasise the constraining influence of overarching 
structures of power and control ingrained within the institutional 
structure of the wider society. (Reed 1992: 92). 
To balance this, irrigation management practices need to be 
analysed as embedded in wider structures. For irrigation studies, 
three different types of structures have been distinguished: 
• The agro-ecological system and the technical infrastructure; 
• The agrarian structure; 
• The state and the institutions of society (from Mollinga 1998: 
19). 
Most attention in this study goes to the embeddedness of the 
management practices in the wider structures of the state and state-
society relations. The structure and character of the Philippine 
political system is examined, and related to the day-to-day 
problems in the Irrigation District. Also, the agro-ecology and 
irrigation technology are examined (see further below). Admittedly, 
the agrarian structure largely remains a blackbox in this thesis. In 
the following chapter a short discussion of Central Luzon's 
agrarian structure is provided. However, this does not allow for a 
substantiated view on irrigation management practices as 
embedded in the structures of the agrarian society. Unfortunately, a 
single Ph.D. researcher cannot do everything. 
Policy-as-process 
To be able to understand the ways in which the implementation of 
the irrigation reform policies affect the politics of irrigation 
management in the District, I depart from conventional policy 
analyses. Conventional forms of policy analyses conceptualise 
public policy as a linear mechanical procedure from plan to 
implementation to outcomes. Policy evaluation studies conducted 
within this framework typically identify gaps between aims and 
outcomes and come up with a diagnosis of what is amiss and a 
recipe for improvements.A major problem with this type of policy 
analysis is that it evaluates policies in terms of the original policy 
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objectives. It thus blackboxes what different actors, like 
governments, actually do with policies in the implementation 
process: 
Rather than assume that governments attempt to maximise social or 
national welfare but fail to do so, it might be more suitable to 
assume that governments have quite different objectives and 
generally succeed in achieving them. Rather than criticising 
governments for failing to attain, or offering advice on how to 
attain a non-goal, it would be instructive if more time would be 
devoted to analysing what governments actually do and why. 
(Griffin 1975, pp. 2, as quoted in day and Schaffer 1984:2) 
Hence, it is more appropriate to understand policy 
implementation as a negotiated process, or as a social interaction 
shaped by the various participants (Mooij 1996, see also Grindle 
1980). As Schaffer (1984: 189) states "policy is what it does", or to 
put it in actor-oriented vocabulary, 'policy is what people do with 
it'. I thus examine how local actors involved in the irrigation 
management of the District, give meaning to the reform policies, 
how they shape, embrace, accommodate, resist, or disregard it. 
Sociotechnical perspective 
An important shortcoming of many studies on irrigation 
management is that it is treated from either a technical or social 
disciplinary perspective. Engineering views on irrigation 
management tend to be technocratic and fail to see the human 
dimension. Likewise, the human sciences come up with studies that 
fail to see the importance of the physical dimension of irrigation 
systems shaping human behaviour (Vincent 2001; Eshuis a aL 
1990). A comprehensive understanding of irrigation thus requires 
addressing both dimensions simultaneously, and not consecutively 
and separately, as is usually done. 
The basic point is that "irrigation technologies not only mediate 
people's relationships with bio-physical processes, but also shape 
the people-people relationships that are part of irrigation." 
(Mollinga 1998: 14). The physical properties of systems can play a 
determining factor in the ways people organise themselves, as well 
as in processes of social change. Hence, the physical properties of 
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Research question 
This conceptual framework brings me to the central question that I 
try to answer in this book. It reads as follows: 
How did local actors integrate irrigation reform policies (rum over, 
financial autonomy and streamlining) into the everyday politics of 
irrigation management of a UPRIIS Irrigation District during the 
mid-nineties? 
irrigation systems may become contested during the design and 
construction phase, but may also be re-designed when used. 
The following physical properties of gravity systems have 
proven to be particulady relevant Firsdy, the type of water control 
structures may shape -and be shaped by- struggles over water 
between different groups of farmers as well as state-water user 
relationships (Bolding et al 1995). Moreover, the extent to which 
these structures can be regulated is an important factor in the way 
water is distributed and controlled throughout the system (Horst 
1998). Secondly, downstream controlled systems versus upstream 
controlled systems structure social relations in different ways (Vbs 
2002). 
Thirdly, the particular layout of the canal system is important, as 
it structures the ways in which different groups of water users 
relate to each other, both in a spatial and temporal sense (Carlstein 
1982; Uphoff et al 1991). The space-time characteristics of an 
irrigation system are not just the setting of people's behaviour. 
These space-time characteristics are strategically used, contested 
and adapted by people in their daily practices, and may shape 
patterns of social differentiation (Molllinga 1998:23 and 89-121). 
This study contributes to the understanding of this latter, spatial 
dimension of irrigation management It is shown how re-use 
systems in tail-end areas are ingeniously connected to the irrigation 
canal system and thus further complicate the struggle for scarce 
water. Also, it is explored how irrigation management dynamics are 
the result of the ways in which the canal layout criss-crosses 
political-aciministrative boundaries. 
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Research Methodology 
The methodology chosen to address the research question and the 
concerns oudined above was the intensive study of one particular 
case, i.e. one of the four Irrigation Districts of the UPRIIS system, 
(on the case study method, see Burawoy 1991; van Velsen 1967). In 
this case study, I mostiy made use of qualitative methods of 
inquiry. 
I opted for this in-depth type of study method, because - as 
oudined above - of the descriptive and/ or quantitative character 
of the available irrigation management and reform studies. These 
studies are useful as they provide a general idea on management of 
national systems and the impact of the policies (see for instance 
Jopillo and de los Reyes 1988). However, they fail to explain why 
and how certain outcomes come about (exceptions are Kikuchi et 
aL 1998; Oorthuizen and Sloot 1993). Hence, what is lacking are 
detailed and comprehensive studies on the way the systems are 
actually managed, how reform is actually taking place, and how 
both management and reform practices need to be explained. It is 
my belief that a larger number of in-depth studies on real people 
and real problems provide a more realistic basis for policy debates 
on the desired management reforms needed to improve the use of 
these systems. 
The study tried to build 'grounded theory' rather than testing 
theoretically informed hypotheses (Strauss and Corbin 1990; 
Eisenhardt 1989). The reason to do so was that this study ventured 
into relatively new and unknown terrain. Irrigation studies 
nowadays look at main system management and have also started 
to include the irrigation bureaucracy into their analyses. However, 
these emphases are recent, and have not yet developed into 
theoretically coherent frameworks of analysis. As Mollinga (1998: 
4) apdy put it for his study on irrigation management in South 
India, "the causal connections that needed to be brought to the 
surface were, at least to this researcher, far from obvious." 
Choice of location 
UPRIIS was chosen as the area of study for three reasons. Firsdy, 
the irrigation system as well as the political economy of the area has 
been relatively well studied during the 1970s and 1980s.9 This 
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provided me with a useful background understanding of the area. 
Secondly, UPRIIS has always been a showcase for irrigation in 
the Philippines. It is one of the largest systems in the country, and 
was considered to be its first modem system. This allowed me to 
study how management -and its reforms- were actually given shape 
in a system that was supposed to be an example for the rest of the 
country. Thirdly, its location was conveniendy close to Manila, 
which fulfilled one of the conditions of my family life. 
The study focussed mainly on one of the four Districts of 
UPRIIS, the so-called 4 * District. The selected District was chosen 
because of a relatively severe problem of water scarcity. Though 
scarcity is found throughout UPRIIS, its extent was more 
problematic in the selected District I figured that this situation 
would make the politics over water allocation and distribution 
relatively intense, and thus particulady visible. Also, both municipal 
and provincial boundaries were located within the District's 
boundaries. This, I thought, would help me to decipher the 
embeddedness of irrigation management in electoral struggles. For 
comparative reasons, around one month of field research was spent 
in the 1 s t District of UPRIIS. 
Within the District, irrigation management was studied in two 
different Zones (i.e. Zone 1 and Zone 2, see map 1.2). Examining 
two cases is helpful to come to terms with reality as it forces one to 
explain the occurrence of different phenomena in the two areas 
(Long and van der Ploeg 1994). More specifically, it allowed me to 
compare and explain the everyday politics of management in these 
two Zones that - as it turned out - had differential access to water 
as well as other resources.10 
Within each of the two Zones, I focussed my analysis on a 
watermaster division, and the LAs located within these divisions. A 
watermaster division is the area of responsibility of a NLA 
watermaster, ranging from 750 - 1500 hectares. Both were located 
at the mid-stream of the Zones, as I assumed that these locations 
show the most intensive levels of interaction over water (cf. Wade 
1988a). This focus gave me an in-depth understanding of the 
practices, ideas and interests of the frondine workers (the 
watermaster and his or her field men), as well as the farmer leaders 
in the areas. 
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MAP 1.2: foci of study in the 4 * District of UPRIIS 
Source cf. NIA-UPRIIS, 4* District 1983 
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Methods in field research 
The study made use of social-anthropological research techniques 
like participant observation, unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews, life histories and situational analyses (Bertaux 1981). 
Each situational analysis provides a close-up view of social 
interaction and problem solving, in order to elucidate how the 
social relations work out in everyday, problematic situations (Long 
1989). 
As I made use of an actor-oriented approach (Long 1989), much 
of the study was about following actors and understanding their 
everyday practices and strategies. More precisely, I observed the 
ways in which different actors interacted over the mobilisation and 
allocation of water, works and fees. This combination of resources 
and actors largely determined the pace and locales of my study. For 
each resource, I examined the everyday politics of 'instructive 
events'. 
The fieldwork was conducted from January 1996 until the end 
of 1997. This allowed me to examine the politics of water 
allocation and distribution for four consecutive irrigation seasons 
(dry 1996, wet 1996, dry 1997 and wet 1997). The actors' doings 
brought me to examine struggles and negotiations over water at the 
main and lateral level, both during day- and nighttime (Chambers 
1988). To understand the dynamics of these struggles over water, I 
had to observe gate settings over large distances (up to 30 
kilometres). Moreover, I participated in numerous informal as well 
as formal gatherings in which water allocation and distribution was 
often a Tiot' issue. 
In the same manner, I could observe and analyse several cycles 
of fee collection as well as the cycle of the mobilisation and 
allocation of several programs for works. I thus joined NLA 
collectors in their tedious collection work, and also monitored the 
schedules of the NLA's heavy equipment in their assignments in the 
District. Moreover, I participated in meetings of the District 
engineers in which they discussed their works program. 
As I was particularly interested in the process and outcomes of 
the turn over policy program, the two research assistants and I 
observed meetings and training sessions of the leaders of the IAs 
and federations, as well as the gatherings with the NLA 
fieldworkers or engineers. 
Much of the in-depth understanding of this study has been 
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derived from a limited number of key informants, which I was able 
to find among the NIA's engineers and fieldworkers, as well as 
among politicians and farmer leaders. They helped me a great deal 
in understanding the tactics of 'the other side' and reconstructing 
past events (cf. Fetterman 1989; Schwartzman 1993). 
Studying the politics of water is relatively easy, as one can 
actually observe water flows. One can even reconstruct events on 
the day after the night before. However, water politics is full of 
rumour and allegations about people's (non-)doings, which are 
often deliberately spread by people from rival alliances. These key 
informants helped me to understand the meaning of these 
rumours, and how to trace their origins. Key informants were also 
useful to get access to information about the more 'hidden, back-
room' politics of irrigation management, like the rent-seeking 
efforts on work contracts or the promotional struggles over vacant 
engineering positions. 
One of the main problems with this kind of method is that one 
becomes easily associated with one of the rival alliances. Though I 
took great care to manoeuvre between the different sides, this 
could not be avoided all together. At the end of the day, however, 
it is my belief that getting close to key figures in one of the alliances 
is more instructive than remaining at a distance all together. 
FIGURE 1.2: Distribution of research time over different actors 
Concretely, the fieldwork of the two assistants and myself 
resulted in a total of over four hundred semi-structured interviews 
or minutes of observed formal or informal meetings, with an 
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The study furthermore made ample use of secondary data 
gathered by the NIA's District office. The District collected useful 
(though not always reliable) data on agriculture, water management, 
fee collection, and the District's finances as well as personnel 
numbers. 
Limitations of the research 
One limitation has been mentioned already: the study did not relate 
the irrigation practices in the District to the wider agrarian 
structure. Another limitation is that the everyday politics of lower 
level water management were not examined in detail. Hence, the 
internal politics of an IA and its relations to village politics remain a 
blackbox. This was a deliberate choice. The usual practice in many 
irrigation studies is to start at the village or field level, and then 
move upwards. These studies then tend to become thin when it 
comes to main system management and the socio-political wodd of 
the engineers and the irrigation bureaucracy. To avoid this pitfall, I 
therefore chose to start higher-up in the system. 
If I could do the study again, I would put even more emphasis 
on the higher levels of irrigation politics. As it is now, the 
average length of around 1,5-2 hours. The approximate attention 
given to the different resources and actors at stake are given in 
figure 1.2. and 1.3. 
FIGURE 1.3: Distribution of research time over different resources 
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understanding of especially the UPRIIS level leadership -and its 
multiplex relations to the provincial elite - largely escape the 
attention of this study. 
Ethics and politics of this research 
I am aware that the findings in this book might become a resource 
in future irrigation politics in UPRIIS, and as such might do harm 
to some of the local actors. Though I changed the names of people 
as well as the locations, the events, places and people will still be 
traceable by informed actors. I still think it is justified to present 
these in-depth findings on the District's dynamics and people's 
doings. People interviewed were fully aware of my purposes in 
talking to them. Not telling the (full) story would probably be 
disappointing to the many people who devoted so much of their 
time and patience in making me understand the real and full 
picture. Many of them felt it to be a story worth being told. Apart 
from this, I can only hope that the study's impart on individuals 
will be limited. As the analysed events took place six years ago, it 
seems to be legitimate to assume that much of the discussed 
irrigation politics have lost its potential for 'dirty polities'. 
With regard to the politics of the policy worid, I want to stress 
here that this study should be seen as a general contribution to our 
understanding of irrigation management and its reform policies. I 
hope no policy maker will take the easy way out by concluding that 
these problems are specific to the UPRIIS or to the NIA. The last 
thing irrigation management in UPRIIS and the Philippines needs, 
is a (further) turning away from its realities by (international 
donors and policy makers. 
Outline of the Chapters 
After this introduction, chapter 2 opens with a concise 
introduction of the management structures of the NIA, and the 
three management reform policies evaluated in this book. It also 
introduces the context of the District, by sketching the agrarian 
history and state-society relations in Central Luzon. Readers not 
familiar with either the NIA or Central Luzon may need this 
information to be able to situate the rest of the book. 
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Chapter 3 ,4 and 5 all deal with water management. Chapter 3 is 
an introduction to the water management of the District It 
describes the physical properties of the system as well as the 
organisational set-up. The magnitude of water scarcity is discussed 
as well as its major causes. The core of the chapter discusses the 
major strategies employed by water users in the struggle for scarce 
water. It is shown that these struggles not only focus on the use of 
the system, but also involve the re-design of its physical 
characteristics. 
Chapter 4 analyses the everyday politics of the water struggles. It 
delineates the socio-political dimensions of water management in 
the main system of the District. It is thus about power: who has 
control over water and why. It discusses the alliances that emerge 
in the struggle for water, and analyses the bases for different actors 
to join forces. It is shown that political patronage and brokerage, 
kin and friendship and the threat of force all play a major role in 
the management of water. The chapter also discusses the role 
played by the farmer organisations in water management that were 
set up as part of the turn over policy program. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the NIA fieldworkers. It analyses how 
these frondine workers survive and give shape to their daily work 
in the contested and politicised arena of water management. 
Furthermore, it makes clear how these people respond to the 
different reform policies. More specifically, it shows how they re-
organised their relations to farmers in response to the turn over 
and streamlining policies, and thus gave meaning to the idea of 
'joint management'. 
Chapter 6 examines the impact of financial cutbacks and 
reforms on the management of the District. To understand the 
reduced access of the NIA towards government funds, its relation 
to government is put in a historical perspective. The chapter then 
oudines in detail the different measures taken by the District's 
management to improve its income and to reduce its costs. Theory 
has it that the financially autonomous status of the District 
supposedly improves its management and empowers farmers vis-a-
vis the agency. The chapter shows how and why the assumptions 
of this theory fail to meet the dynamics in the District studied. 
Chapter 7 looks into the arena of physical works. Much of the 
chapter is devoted to the politics of contracting. Rent-seeking 
practices are examined. It is also analysed how high-level politicians 
are involved in the struggle for lucrative contracts, through their 
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hold over the promotion and transfer of the NIA engineers. The 
chapter then looks into the way in which works are allocated within 
the District, and the influence farmer organisations have on these 
allocative practices. Finally, the chapter traces the existing 
mechanisms for control of the quality of the works implemented in 
the District, and evaluates whether the farmer organisations were 
able to get a say over quality control. 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of this book. It provides a summary 
answer to the central research question. It wonders how it is 
possible that policy discourse on irrigation reform is so far away 
from actual practices on the ground, and it discusses the 
constraints and opportunities for future management reform. It 
argues for the need to strengthen the accountability of farmer 
water users to the NIA rather than the other way around, and the 
empowerment of the NLA's frondine workers. 
The epilogue (chapter 9) provides a short account of the major 
events and developments in the management of the 4* UPRIIS 
District during the 1998-2003 period. It is based on a two weeks re-
visit to the District during January 2003. 
Notes 
1 On land and tenancy struggles, see Wolters (1984) and Fegan (1979). On 
resource struggles in Luzon in general, see Kerkvliet (1990) and 
Resurrection and Sajor (1997). 
2 On Indian canal systems see Moflinga (1998) and Ramamurthy (1995). 
On Mexico, Rap (forthcoming). Merrey (1986), discussing a canal system 
in Pakistan, was one of the first to show the importance of integrating 
cultural relations in the examination of irrigation management 
3 These Ph.D. studies were Wickham (1971), Svendsen (1983) and 
Wensley(1989). 
4 This study focuses on the state's role in the management of systems, and 
does not look into more general questions on the relations between 
Philippine state formation and irrigation development For such a more 
general discussion on the Philippines, see Boyce (1993). For such studies 
on other countries, see for instance Van Halsema (2002) and Gflmartin 
(1994) on colonial irrigation development in the Indus Basin and Attwood 
(1987) on India. 
5 Irrigation has been central to historical debates about the rise and fall of 
pre-colonial states and societies. Wittfogel (1957) triggered this "hydraulic 
society debate'. He put forward a grand theory arguing that pre-colonial 
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despotic regimes in Asia and the Mediterranean had been able to build up 
and maintain their power through the construction and management of 
large-scale irrigation schemes. Through their control over water works, 
the tyrants and engineering bureaucracies of these 'hydraulic states' were 
able to control and exploit the peasantry. Though Wittfogel's thesis has 
been convincingly and heavily criticised (see for instance Bray 1986 and 
Ludden 1989), historians seem to agree that in many cases, state 
formation and large-scale irrigation (management) go hand in hand 
(Oorthuizen 1995). 
6 The state is also largely absent in the wide literature on farmer-managed 
irrigation systems (Coward 1986). This is perhaps somewhat 
understandable, but not correct In for instance the case of farmer-
managed tank irrigation in South India, the managerial set-up cannot be 
understood simply in terms of an absence of the state, but rather should 
be seen as the outcome of specific state interests and historically shaped 
state-society relations (Mosse 1997). 
7 An exception is the excellent study of Van der Top (1998) on the 
operations of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(the DENR) in relation to (illegal) logging in Cagayan Valley. The other 
exception is the study of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). 
This government agency has been the subject of many studies given the 
highly politicised issue of land reform. See for instance the work of Putzel 
(1992) and Borras (2001). 
8 Two recent studies that examined accountability relations in irrigation 
management in a much more comprehensive manner are Vos (2002) and 
Kloezen (2002). Vos provides a detailed account of the multiple ways in 
which different societal institutions shape accountability relations in two 
Peruvian large-scale canal irrigation systems. FQoezen's analysis of two 
large-scale canal systems in Mexico distinguishes between different forms 
of accountability, i.e. operational, financial, and political accountability. 
9 On the technical side, see the earlier reference to the three Ph.D. studies. 
On the social side, see the references given in chapter 2. 
1 0 Zone 3 of the District was excluded from the study because the time 
frame and the resources available did not allow me to investigate it 
2 
This chapter is a prelude to later chapters: an exploration of 
people's struggles in irrigation management. It provides 
background information useful to situate and understand these 
struggles. It is written for those readers that are not yet familiar 
with either UPRLIS and its reform policies, or with the turbulent 
social history of the people living in the irrigated areas. 
The UPRHS Organisation and the Reform Policies 
The UPRLIS system is classified as a so-called 'national system', 
which means that is being managed and maintained by the NIA. In 
contrast, 'communal systems', which are usually small systems, are 
operated and maintained by farmer organisations. The NIA's role 
in 'communal systems' is limited to their construction and/or 
rehabilitation. 
The NIA manages more than ninety 'national systems', in total 
covering around 700,000 hectares. The service area of most of 
these systems is around 2,000 hectares only. Irrigation 
superintendents and field staff reporting to one of the NIA's 
regional offices manage these systems. With a service area of 
100,000 hectares, UPRLIS stand out as a very large management 
unit Together with the equally large Magat reservoir system in 
northern Luzon, these two systems cover neady 30% of the 
irrigated area of the national systems. Given the size of these two 
systems, they do not fall under a regional office, but report direcdy 
to the NIA's central office. 
The UPRLIS system is a centrally managed system. The 
Operations Manager, who is assisted by a number of Division 
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Chiefs, heads the UPRIIS office. This office is in charge of overall 
planning and management of the UPRIIS system. It controls most 
of the work with regard to projects, manages the reservoir and 
allocates its water towards the four Irrigation Districts (see figure 
2.1). 
FIGURE 2.1: Organisational set-up of the UPRIIS system 
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Source. NIA-UPRHS annual report 1994) 
Each District office is in charge of the management of one of 
the four Irrigation Districts. Each Irrigation District covers an area 
of around 25,000 hectares. Each District diverts water from one or 
more local rivers, but all four are supplemented with reservoir 
water that reaches the Districts through feeder canals. 
A District Chief heads the District offices. The Maintenance 
Engineer, who is in charge of the maintenance section, takes care 
of me preparation of Programs of Works (POWs) to be submitted 
to the UPRIIS office and finally the central office for approval and 
funding. Also, his unit manages the heavy equipment used for canal 
de-silting and road grading and re-gravelling, and checks the quality 
of contracted works. 
The Operational Engineer is in charge of water management, 
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fee billing and collection and the development of the IAs and their 
federations. For water management, the hierarchy is as follows. A 
Zone Engineer, who commands a number of watermasters, each in 
charge of a so-called Division, heads each Zone. A ditchtender 
assists each watermaster. Moreover, the Zone Engineer also 
commands a few gatekeepers that manage crucial headgates (see 
figure 2.2)} 
FIGURE 2.2 Organisational set-up of a District office 
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TABLE 2.1: Key-data on NIA-UPRIIS, 4* District 
Service area (2002) (hectare) 
District 23,400 
Zone 1: 10,800 
Zone 2: 5,200 
Zone 3: 7,400 
Benefited area (1990-2001 average) 
Wet season: 17,000 
Dry season: 11,600 
Number of NIA staff, IAs and farmers (2002) 
Total staff number: 71 
Field start- 39 
Zone Engineers: 3 
Watermasters: 19 
Gatekeepers & ditchtenders: 17 
Number of IAs 78 
Farmer water users: 11,000 
Length and number offadMes (2002) (km) 
Total length of canals 467 
Main canals 42 
Laterals 114 
Sub-laterals 311 
Canal roads 540 
Number of turn out structures 700 
Financial data 
Total O&M income (2001) 21 Million 
Fee collection efficiency (1990-2001 average) 5 7 % 
Source. NIA-UPRIIS 1993; NIA-UPRIIS, 4 * District 2002a 
Policy no. 1: management turn over 
Management turn over policies were implemented in UPRIIS as 
part of the Wodd Bank-funded Irrigation Operation Support 
Program (IOSP-1) that started in 1989. These policies aimed to 
organise farmers into associations and federations, and to make 
these organisations responsible for certain management tasks that 
To complete this brief introduction on the managerial set-up of 
the Irrigation District, I give some data on District IV that gives an 
idea of the resources of the NIA's office, and the magnitude of its 
tasks. 
The Policies and People ofUPRIIS 37 
were previously carried out by the NIA. Until today, turn over 
policies are part of donor-funded programs in the Philippines, and 
are still being implemented in UPRIIS (for further discussion, see 
chapter 9, the epilogue). 
The history of these turn over policies is a rich one, and 
involved many struggles within the NIA and the donor- and 
lending institutions. I will give a brief account of this history (for 
further detail, see Bagadion 1989; Korten 1989; Panella, 
formcoming). 
Until around 1985, a powerful group in the NIA that was 
formed around assistant-ackiunistrator Bagadion, was able to 
experiment and implement a number of rather far-reaching reforms 
in the way the NIA handled its construction- or rehabilitation 
projects in the communal sector. This became known as 'the 
participatory approach' that became a model for change in other 
Asian countries as well. A key role in this approach was given to 
community organisers that were fielded in the project areas for a 
long time to organise the farmer-beneficiaries. 
This group — including the organisers - seemed to have been 
inspired by two types of philosophy. Firsdy, there was a strong 
belief in the capability of farmer communities to organise 
themselves. This was partly based on romantic views of local 
culture in rural communities, i.e. baya-nihan (the spirit of helping 
each other) and pakikisama (the importance of maintaining smooth 
interpersonal relations) (Raby 1997: 4; Castillo 1983). The idea that 
farmer communities could very well take care of their own affairs 
was fed by studies of traditional farmer-managed schemes in the 
mountains of northern Luzon, the Zanjera systems (Lewis 1971; Siy 
1982). 
The second type of philosophy was focussed on farmer 
organisation and empowerment, as a way of fighting the anti-
Marcos and anti-authoritarian struggle. As one of the former 
organisers put it "it was as close to activism that one could get 
without going underground" (Panella, forthcoming). Organising 
tenant farmers was seen as way to empower them vis-a-vis the state 
(i.e. the NIA) as well as to liberate them from the semi-feudal 
structures that kept them without a voice (fllo and Volante 1984; 
Jopillo 1985). 
From 1986 onwards, after the ousting of Marcos, the reform-
oriented group within the NIA lost its power, and the reform 
programs were no longer aiming for substantial change in NIA -
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farmer relationships. The early programs designed for national 
systems tried to build up strong farmer associations that would be 
given real authority in the management of the systems, and which 
would have access to considerable funds. Moreover, the IAs would 
enter into a progressive deal with the NIA: after having built up 
experience in stage I, the IAs would enter into the stage II and 
finally the stage III level of full turn over. This however, did not 
push through. Consequendy, the Wodd Bank funded IOSP 
program that brought turn over to the UPRIIS system had 
weakened NLA's earlier programs and retrogressed farmer's 
participation from broader managerial experience on system's 
operation and maintenance into narrowly defined tasks (Korten 
1993). 
FIGURE 2.3: The joint-management set-up of NIA, the IAs and their 
federations 
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Source.: NIA-UPRHS 1991 
The turn over policies that were introduced by the IOSP 
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program - and that have not changed a great deal since then -, do 
not come close to the turn over policies that were implemented in 
countries like Mexico (FQoezen 2002) or Turkey (Svendsen and 
Nott 1997). The more apt term for the management model that 
was introduced in UPRIIS would be 'participatory management', or 
at best 'joint management'. Throughout this book however, I do 
use the term turn over as this happens to be the local term for the 
program. The reform model pushed for by the NIA is rather 
similar to those pushed for by irrigation agencies throughout much 
of Asia (on this 'Asian model', see Meinzen-Dick 1997). 
The turn over program in UPRIIS organised the water users 
into associations and federations. The lowest level are the so-called 
Farmer Irrigation Associations (henceforth IAs). These are non-
stock, non-profit, non-partisan and government-registered 
organisations. The LA board is made up of board members who are 
elected by the farmers of a turnout area. The general assembly of 
the LA determines - through election - who among them becomes 
the President of the LA, as well as who will be given some other 
official positions within the IA. The LA is supposed to take care of 
the management of its area, below the turnouts. This includes 
water distribution and maintenance of the farm ditches. 
The IAs are furthermore federated at sub-lateral level, Zone 
level, District level and even UPRIIS level.2 The board of these 
federations is elected by the IA Presidents who are represented at 
these different federated levels (see figure 2.3). At these different 
levels, the board members are to assist the NLA staff in decision-
making and the actual management of the system. However, the 
federations lack clear responsibilities and authority, and do not 
have access to funds other than small contributions from the IAs. 
The IAs could enter into so-called turn over contracts with the 
NIA. Under the type I contract, the Maintenance Turn over 
Contract (MTO), the IA is contracted by the NIA to undertake 
monthly maintenance of a stretch of sub-lateral canal. After 
inspection, the IA is remunerated for its work by the NIA 
(P1400/3.5 kilometres of canal, in 1997. This amount was still 
being paid in 2003). 
Under the type II contract, the IAs enters into a so-called 
Irrigation Service Fee collection contract (ISF contract) with the 
NIA. This contract requires the IAs to assist the NIA collectors in 
collection, by distributing bills and remitting actual collections to 
the NIA deputised collector. In return, the IA may keep a certain 
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percentage of the collected amount, provided it reaches a minimal 
level (see table 2.2). 
TABLE 2.2: IA incentives for fee collection 
Collection efficiency (%) Incentives tothelA (%) 
< 5 0 0 
5 0 - 6 0 2 
6 0 - 7 0 5 
7 0 - 9 0 10 
90-100 15 
Back-accounts 25 
Source. Wodd Bank 1996: annex 8, p. 6 
By 1996, the 4 * District had 78 IAs, of which virtually all (76) 
had entered into a collection contract, while a part (20) had entered 
into a canal-cleaning contract. 
Under the IOSP program, the organising and training process of 
the IAs and federations was taken very seriously. Five Institutional 
Development Organisers - college graduates - were employed in 
the District for three years, to supervise the organising process. 
Moreover, the District hired a so-called Farmer Irrigator Organiser 
(FIO) for every one or two IA's to assist the watermasters in 
organising the IAs under his jurisdiction. This person was 
supposed to be an irrigator resident in the community who was 
recruited for one year for a stipend of P500 per month. During this 
year, he was to update the parcellary maps of the IAs, and -
together with the watermaster - organise the farmers into turnout 
groups and the IA, and motivate them to enter into the turn over 
contracts. Moreover, IA leaders - though in practice mosdy limited 
to the IA Presidents - were given three types of training - each 
lasting two or three days - on leadership, system management and 
financial management. 
After the IOSP-1 program was finished in 1991, one 
Institutional Development Organiser remained employed in the 
District office. It was his task to advice the NLA's engineers on 
institutional development and to assist the fieldworkers in keeping 
the IAs and federations 'alive'. 
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In short, the turn over policies implemented in die District 
aimed to create joint NIA-IA management, in which the water 
users associations and federations would participate in decision-
making and water management, while taking care of canal cleaning 
and fee collection. This book examines the impact of these policies 
on irrigation management, and people's access to water (chapter 3, 
4 and 5), fees (chapter 6) and physical works (chapter 7). 
Policy no. 2: Stteamlining 
The second set of policies examined in this book are the so-called 
'streamlining policies'. These policies aimed to cut costs by 
reducing the number of NIA staff employed by the agency. 
Streamlining policies started at the beginning of the 1980s, and 
continued to be implemented in UPRIIS until today. 
These policies were pushed by central government. It 
implemented streamlining of its bureaucracy in response to its 
fiscal crisis that started in the beginning of the 1980s. However, 
even during the mid-nineties the government carried on with its 
'attrition law' that forebade agencies to hire new staff, and/or to 
fill-up vacant positions. 
The Philippine government's motivation for these policies was 
based on neo-liberal views on a lean and mean' state. Moreover, 
anti-authoritarian feelings inspired such policy making during 
especially the post-Marcos adtninistration of President Aquino, 
whose key slogan was Teople's Power'. The bureaucracy had to be 
'cleansed' from anti-democratic elements, and government 
corporations - like the NIA - had to be closed down or at least set 
free from Marcos cronies. The new Philippine constitution aimed 
at reducing the government's central executive powers and 
strengthening those of Congress as well as local government. The 
local government code passed in 1991 indeed decentralised much 
of the powers of the central state to local governments (Tapales 
1992). 
The NIA itself also implemented stteamlining policies to solve 
its serious financial problems that started in the 1980s. The turn 
over contracts to the IAs were to make this reduction of NIA staff 
possible. Streamlining had a dramatic impact on the District's 
staffing-levels. The total NIA District staff fell from 275 in 1982 to 
70 in January 2003 (see further chapter 6). 
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Policy no. 3: Financial autonomy 
The third policy reform that is explored in this book for its 
consequences on the District's management, was the change 
towards financial autonomy. The NIA, as a government 
corporation, is supposed to earn its own income by collecting fee 
payments of farmer-beneficiaries. Though it was centrally funded 
during much of the Marcos era, government stopped subsidising 
the NIA's operational expenditures at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Since lhat time, the 4 * District still gets government funds to 
maintain and rehabilitate existing systems and construct new ones. 
However, except for some occasional and limited operational 
subsidies, the District has to self-finance the salaries and benefits of 
its irrigation management staff, as well as other operational 
expenses like motorbikes, gasoline and office electricity bills. 
In other words, the District needs to be 'financially viable'. To 
achieve this, the NIA implemented several policies. Firsdy, it re-
organised its accounting system and thus created separate cost 
centres, so-called 'responsibility centres' for each national system. 
This change made the status of fee collections and O&M 
expenditure for each system visible to both system managers and 
central office supervisors. UPRIIS is treated as one responsibility 
centre by NIA-Manila, but within UPRIIS each District has its own 
budget When money is short in a District, salaries and benefits to 
its staff will be delayed. Other Districts might help out, but they 
would first prioritise the income needs of their own staff. 
Secondly, the NIA introduced 'Viability Incentive Grants', that 
provided bonuses for NIA staff in Districts, provinces or regions 
that were able keep its budget in the black. Thirdly, administrative 
measures as well as various collection strategies were developed to 
increase the fee collection from farmer water users. Fourthly, 
several cost-cutting measures were implemented to reduce 
expenditures and thus to attain financial viability. 
As will be shown in this book, the need of the District for 
financial viability has had a profound impact on the way the system 
is managed, and also shaped the various struggles between farmers, 
NIA and politicians over water and fees. It will furthermore 
become clear that the three policies oudined here were in practice 
interrelated to the extent that it becomes hard to separate one from 
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the other. Management turn over, for instance, was implemented to 
allow for staff streamlining, while both were part of the District's 
efforts to become financially viable. These inter-relations will be 
further explored in the various chapters. 
The Agrarian Structure in UPRHS: a Short History 
The UPRIIS area is one of the archipelago's key rice granaries. It 
covers the larger part of the fertile plains of the province of Nueva 
Ecija, and small parts of the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga. 
Due to land reform, the green revolution, the extension of 
irrigation and its proximity to Manila, it became one of the most 
densely populated and prosperous agricultural regions in the 
country. 
It is one of Central Luzon's key rural areas, of which "Its people 
are the best educated and most politically sophisticated villagers 
and townsmen in the Philippines" (Fegan 1985: 164). By the late 
1970s, the agrarian structure in its villages was composed of "small, 
essentially independent peasants farming their own fields and wage 
labourers who worked seasonally for these small producers" 
(Kerkvliet 2002: xvi). Since that time, this class composition has 
essentially remained the same, although population growth and the 
stagnation of growth in the rice sector has led to a rapid increase of 
the group of landless labourers. 
In addition, an increasing proportion of households are no 
longer direcdy depending on agriculture but on small businesses or 
employment in transport, construction, buying and selling and 
remittances from members working away in the town proper, in 
other towns, in Manila and even abroad. Even the farmer and 
landless labourer households have members working away in dry 
season in construction, transport and logging. 
It is, of course, not a people without history. What follows is a 
brief account of the dynamic history of agrarian relations in the 
UPRHS area. I distinguish three periods. The first period describes 
the emergence of the hacienda system. It is followed by a 
discussion of rural unrest and revolt around the Second Wodd 
War, while the third period looks at the period of agrarian reform 
and the green revolution that started in the 1960s. 
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Frontier agriculture and the hacienda system 
The agrarian history of the UPRIIS areas is a young one. Its 
agricultural development started in its most southern part closest to 
Manila. The eady Spanish regime had a belt of friar estates and 
church estates close to Manila, the most northedy of which were 
located in Bulacan. Further inland were Spanish cattle ranches, and 
between about 1780 and 1880 the Tobacco Monopoly controlled 
parts of southern Nueva Ecija. Capitalist expansion in rice and 
sugar farming spread north from the town of San Miguel de 
Mayumo. 
It was established in 1725, as the first free town beyond the belt 
of church and friar estates (Fegan 1982: 94). By the end of the 18* 
century, the largest hacienda in San Miguel shifted from raising 
catde for the Manila market to raising rainfed and some irrigated 
rice. However, the rest of what later became the UPRIIS area was 
still largely un-inhabited marshland of tropical forests, swamps and 
lakes until the 1840s (McLennan 1982: 64). 
From the 1840s until around 1900 in the south and the 1930s in 
the north of the UPRIIS area, can be characterised as a period of 
frontier agriculture. Small farmers, both Tagalogs from the South 
and Ilocano's from the northwest, moved into the area and cleared 
the land. The newcomers from Ilocos, sometimes coming with 
whole communities, moved to a frontier barrio or town. They first 
setded in and sharecropped or laboured on the land of relatives 
who had preceded them to the frontier. As soon as they had 
accumulated enough savings to buy a water buffalo and other 
necessities, they sought out land to claim on their own. They would 
live from products gathered from the forest, and eventually from 
the rice grown on their cleared piece of land (McLennan 1982: 65). 
Though being pioneer setders, the majority did not become the 
owner of the land. Wealthy Spanish and Chinese mestizo families 
used their capital, legal knowledge and political and bureaucratic 
connections to acquire large tracts of land. In the town of San 
Miguel, these were the Dons and Kapitans, an elite class drawn from 
two elements: remnants of the old colonial principalia and the new 
Chinese mestizo families who diversified from trading catde and 
commercial crops of sugar and rice into land-owning. Already 
during the 19* century, they sent their sons to universities in 
Manila and abroad, where "they became intellectual citizens of 
Europe, earning themselves the unofficial tide ilustrado, or 
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enlightened" (Fegan 1982: 98). They were able to acquire large 
haciendas in what would later become the UPRIIS area and were to 
form the gentry elite class of Nueva Ecija. 
In the beginning, when the frontier still existed and population 
was still relatively low, tenancy was mosdy based on a fixed rent 
Landowners used the farmers to clear the land. In return, the 
tenants did not have to pay rent for the first few years. Many others 
though, "settled on uncleared hacienda land and learned of their 
mistake only after investing labour in clearing the land" (McLennan 
1982:71). 
As soon as the end of the frontier was reached and the demand 
for tenancy among the growing population increased, landowners 
shifted to a share tenancy system. Landowners provided more or 
less capital or farm inputs to the tenants, in return for which they 
were entided to 50% of the harvest. Hence, landowners developed 
an interest in the productivity of the land. In San Miguel, this 
started already before the turn of the 20* century. Throughout 
Nueva Ecija in what would become the UPRIIS area, share tenancy 
became the dominant arrangement from the mid-twenties onwards. 
The relations became highly exploitative and business-like. 
While landlords used to be patrons to their tenants, they soon 
became absentee landlords managing their estates through 
overseers. The tenants were charged exorbitant interests on capital 
loans, could no longer borrow rice for free to feed their family 
before the next harvest, and/or were evicted in case of disease or 
old age (Kerkvliet 1977: 1-25). Hence, before the Second Wodd 
War the agrarian structure had become composed of a politico-
economic elite of large and affluent hacenderos (landlords) and a class 
of impoverished and indebted tenant households. 
Rural unrest, war and peasant rebellion 
The peasants of what was later to become the UPRIIS area, as well 
as their colleagues in most of Central Luzon, struggled for a better 
future. Already at the turn of the century, tenants organised 
themselves on both nationalist anti-colonial lines and on anti-
landlord lines, the two often ovedapping. They used both legal and 
illegal means to defend their rights, fight the malpractices of the 
hacenderos and demand better treatment. By the mid-fifties the 
Central Luzon tenant unions had communist-socialist leadership 
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and military arms and experience from their recent role as the 
Hukbalahap (anti-Japanese resistance movement). They turned into 
a massive peasant movement that rose against the hacenderos and 
their military allies in the so-called Huk- rebellion. 
The reasons that the tenants reached such high levels of 
organisation were threefold. Firsdy, people organised because they 
felt they were losing ground. The loss of the landholders' patronage 
and the increasingly harsh conditions of the tenancy contracts were 
seen as highly unjust developments (Kerkvliet 1977: 1-25). 
Secondly, organising was gready facilitated by the fact that many 
villages consisted of one homogeneous class of tenant farmers 
(Fegan 1985:165). Thirdly, people organised to defend themselves 
against repression and terror of the overseers of landlords, the 
Japanese occupation forces, as well as the Philippine Constabulary 
and Military Police (Kerkvliet 1977). 
The eady peasant organisations were informed by folk-catholic 
and folk-Marxist ideas (Fegan 1982:106-111). Although several key 
peasant leaders joined the communist party founded in 1930, the 
mainstream of the movement was geared towards protest and 
reform rather than rebellion or revolution. Their means of protest 
were both violent and non-violent It could range from petitioning, 
striking, or court action to burning fields, attacking strike-breakers 
or killing a local landlord or one of his overseers. Before the war, 
its movements were able to organise mass-rallies, and win mayoral 
positions in municipal elections (Kerkvliet 1977: 43-44). 
Nevertheless, both the local and national government mosdy 
supported and to a large extent ovedapped with the land-owning 
elite. The Philippine Constabulary (PC) was practically an army for 
the landed elite, while also the municipal police, appointed by the 
mayor who was typically a landlord, helped to harass peasant 
leaders and break strikes (ibid.: 54). 
When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in 1941, the peasant 
organisations became the backbone of the Hubalahap, in short the 
Huk. This guerrilla army was heavily based on the leftist-led pre-
war KPMP national confederation of peasant unions. It received 
massive support from the villagers of Central Luzon, partly because 
of nationalistic sentiments and partly out of revenge for harm 
inflicted by the Japanese army on their family, kin and/or co-
villagers (ibid:. 66-68). The Huk guerrillas were involved in intense 
fighting with the Japanese. By the end of the war, the Huk army 
exceeded ten thousand persons. Many of them came from the 
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villages that were later covered by the UPRLTS system. 
When the war was over, the Huks to their surprise found that 
the American as well as Philippine military forces turned against 
them. Being branded as communists, they were forcefully 
disarmed, chased and imprisoned. Meanwhile, the landlords 
returned to the rural areas, and wanted to restore pre-war order. 
The peasantry however, realising their new organisational and 
military capabilities, were less willing than ever to accept that order. 
Repression of government forces as well as para-legal landlord 
forces increased, leading to the killing of tenant unionists and the 
disappearance of some key leaders of the PKM peasant union. 
Eventually it led to the so-called Huk rebellion that started in 
1946, reached its peak during 1951, and then faded away until 
around 1956. The Philippine government, supported by the U.S., 
waged an all-out war on what they saw as armed, lawless and/or 
communist peasants. Several national politicians argued that unjust 
agrarian relations and repression rather than communism were the 
cause of the rebellion, but they remained a minority. It was a very 
bloody period, in which both soldiers and so-called 'civilian guards' 
backing up overseers of landlords were allowed or at least 
encouraged to "abuse, arrest and kill in the name of peace and 
order" (ibid.: 211). 
At its peak, the size of the Huk peasant army rose to neady 
fifteen thousand people. It eventually died down because of "battle 
fatigue' and military superiority on the side of the government's 
army. A third reason however, was that the government was finally 
able to improve its image by instilling discipline on its forces, 
starting development projects and promising agrarian reform 
programs (ibid.: 235-239). 
This history of peasant struggle and violence provides an 
instructive historical background against which the irrigation 
management practices explored in this book can be understood. 
Without suggesting hard causal relations, my findings do of course 
have historical roots. It helps to understand why the farmers were 
not so easily turned into obedient water users following the 
instructions of the irrigation bureaucracy. It also gives a 
background to why farmers searching for water organised around 
tough people, capable of using force. Being matapang (brave) is not 
just an element of Philippine macho-culture reproduced by the 
American and local film industry. It is rooted in its recent history, 
as both during and after the war, people had very good reasons to 
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fear for their lives and seek the protection of strong local leaders 
capable of protecting them (Fegan 1982:116-118). 
In one case I found a clear link between the rebellious past and 
the present-day irrigation management of the District. As is further 
described in chapter 4, one of the leaders in the tail-end of the 
District called for the help of the military to guard the gates during 
the particulady dry seasons of 1983-84 and 1984-85. This leader 
came from one of the barrios located near the Candaba swamp (see 
map 1.1 and 1.2). These used to be strongholds of the Huks. In the 
1970s, the rebel tradition was still there, though it had come to 
mean social banditry rather than rebellion. This leader's rebellious 
past had helped him to become close to a Philippine military 
officer. 
He established these contacts in a remarkable instance of social 
banditry that occurred during the unprecedented floods of 1972, 
which was described by Fegan (1982: 118). During that time, the 
'old Huks' of this area raided a convoy of government relief trucks 
that were stranded by a collapsed bridge. This particular leader was 
one of the leaders who organised the raid. Making used of 
motorised canoes and armed men, they unloaded the trucks and 
distributed the relief goods to the inhabitants of the flooded 
villages. The government responded by sending in the military to 
investigate the issue. They were after this particular leader. Instead 
of arresting him though, the colonel in charge felt sympathy for his 
brave move, and they thus became friends. Ten years later, it was 
the same colonel — then a general - who sent out his men to help 
out this particular leader in bringing water to the downstream 
villages of the Candaba swamp. 
Land reform and the green revolution 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the lives of the rice tenants of the UPRIIS 
improved considerably. Firstiy, there was land reform. To pacify 
Central Luzon's tenants, post-war governments legislated, but - due 
to landlord resistance - did not implement land reform. It was 
under president Marcos that land reform had an impact. When 
Marcos declared martial law in 1972, land reform was high on his 
agenda. As he badly needed support from the peasantry for his 
regime, his proclamation of a "new society" and "a revolution from 
above" declared war on the old oligarchy (Litonjua 2000: 384). 
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By Presidential Degree 27, Marcos enforced the implementation 
of land reform in the rice sector. Though this was a counter 
insurgency ploy rather than a truly emancipatory measure 
(Kerkvliet 1979) and die immediate results were meagre nationwide 
(Wurfel 1988:154-76), it did have a marked impact on the agrarian 
structure in the UPRIIS area. Share tenancy was abolished and 
replaced by fixed lease rents. Moreover, payments to the 
landowners went down from the 50 per cent crop shares usually 
paid under share tenancy to 25 per cent of the average normal 
harvests of the three years immediately preceding martial law. Also, 
tenants on land owned by landowners that possessed more than 7 
hectares were given the opportunity to become the owner. They 
were to pay the same 25% of lease rent for 15 annual instalments 
to buy the farm, after which they would become the owner. This 
also brought an end to the direct relation between the landowner 
and the tenant. The tenants were to pay their fixed rents to the 
Land Bank of the Philippines, which in turn compensated the 
former landlords (Fegan 1985:166-169). 
Secondly, the Green Revolution and the related government 
support programs had a significant impact on rice production 
levels and tenants' welfare. Marcos - supported by foreign donors 
and banks - put lots of money into irrigation systems (like the 
UPRIIS system that started in the mid 1970s), extension work, rice 
buying stations and maintaining a rice support price. Moreover, the 
farmers were given cheap institutional credit released and 
recovered on soft political criteria that replaced high-interest 
landowner loans. The productivity increase helped to further 
reduce the burden of the land rent. As the rent remained fixed at a 
percentage of pre-Green revolution harvests, it thus amounted to 
an increasingly smaller part of the harvests attained in later years 
(Fegan 1985:167).3 
Despite this progress, not all families of the UPRIIS areas were 
able to prosper. By the time tenancy reform was implemented, the 
majority of the villagers were landless. Due to high population 
growth the class of landless families has increased only further. The 
former tenants became the new land-owning class in the villages, 
making use of the landless labourers through new types of tenancy 
contracts (Hayami et aL 1990). While selling land titles of tenanted 
land is officially illegal, the richer peasant families were able to de 
facto acquire the land of indebted poorer families. It did however 
not bring a new class of wealthy landlords. As the land is claimed 
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by many heirs, land fragmentation processes stopped even the well-
to-do families from acquiring large tracts of land (Van den 
Muijzenberg 1991: 326; Hayami and Kikuchi 2000). 
People's welfare became increasingly dependent on non- and 
off-farm labour. Money brought in from Manila and especially 
from abroad (the Gulf States and Japan) has become increasingly 
important (Van den Muijzenberg 1997). Due to the risks of crop 
failure, high input prices and low selling prices, rice growing has 
not been a very profitable enterprise. Hence, people tried to invest 
in other ventures, and especially in the education of their children. 
Those who got a better education were able to make a career as 
a bank employee in Manila or even as an engineer in one of the 
Gulf states (Van den Muijzenberg 1991: 331; Banzon-Bautista 
1989). Those originating from poorer families became taxi drivers 
living in the slums of Manila, or became domestic workers living in 
over-crowded apartments in Hong Kong. Many who stayed in the 
village took on year-round non-farm occupations: carpenter, bus or 
truck driver, security guard, factory worker, teacher and so on. 
The poorest villagers are those who have neither land nor year-
round off-farm work, so that they must rely on the seasonal farm 
work available. Unfortunately, rice does not provide them with 
much work anymore. Due to the mechanisation of land 
preparation and threshing, the use of direct wet-seeding instead of 
transplanting and the chemicalisation of other parts of the rice 
cycle - like the use of weed killers instead of manual weeding -, the 
labour demand in rice cultivation has dropped dramatically over 
the last few decades. 
Politically, the post-war changes have been a mixed bag. On the 
one hand, the prosperous gentry landlords no longer control public 
office. A new middle class has emerged in the towns of the UPRIIS 
area that consist of commercial people like rice traders and 
machine-shop owners, construction contractors as well as 
professionals and semi-professionals like teachers and civil 
servants. This has brought forward a new type of political leaders 
who are popular with the peasants rather than with the old gentry, 
and who "have democratic manners, are accessible and have more 
professional staff than ever before" (Fegan 1985: 170). Likewise, 
the integration of the UPRIIS villagers into the wider national and 
international economy have reduced their dependency on local 
power holders. While people could earlier think that "the landlord 
and the mayor controlled their lives, such simple notions had 
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disappeared altogether. A host of 'connections' had to be activated 
for one's economic, educational and political goals to be reached. 
(Van den Muijzenberg 1997:341) 
On the other hand though, Philippine politics is still a kind of 
'elite democracy' (Litonjua 2000: 386), with elite and upper peasant 
political families being entrepreneurs in votes and violence (Fegan 
1994). The politics of Nueya Ecija are certainly no exception. After 
the people's power revolution ousted Marcos in 1986, the pre-
martial law political system based on political patronage made its 
comeback in Nueva Ecija. Family clans of trapos (traditional 
politicians) and even pre-martial law wadords continued to control 
its municipal and provincial politics (Wolters 1991:223). 
The Joson family is a case in point It is the single most 
powerful family dynasty in the province of Nueva Ecija, as it held 
power in the province for nearly fifty years. The old Joson, 'the 
gende Lion of Nueva Ecija', established the Joson dynasty 
(Crisistomo 1989). Coming from a land-owning family, his star rose 
as a USAFFE guerrilla commander during the Second Wodd War. 
Throughout the 1950s, he was mayor of a northern town of Nueva 
Ecija and then elected and re-elected as governor until martial law. 
His power was based on a combination of political patronage, and 
the use of violence with the help of an extensive private army. His 
opponents were several competing political clans, like the Diaz and 
Concepcion-Perez family. Though a kumpare (male sponsor in 
baptism, confirmation or wedding) of the Benigno Aquino family 
(Benigno Aquino was the chief political rival of Marcos, shot dead 
in 1983, while his wife - Cory Aquino - became President in 1986), 
Joson was able to strike a deal with Marcos and remain in power 
throughout the martial law years. 
After the ousting of Marcos, a new type of politician ran for 
office as well, but they largely failed. The old clans like the Josons 
remained in power. In the 1988 elections, the Joson dynasty held 
the positions of governor, congressman and provincial board 
member as well as several vice-mayor and mayoral positions 
(Wolters 1991:222). 
The trapo politics, based on political patronage, vote buying and 
violence, were still prominendy present during the time of the field 
research and have remained so ever since. During 1995, two of the 
most prominent members of the Joson dynasty - the provincial 
governor and a municipal mayor - shot their arch-rival, mayor 
Perez of Cabanatuan City during broad daylight President Ramos 
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had them jailed in Manila. However, the next President, Estrada, 
released them in return for massive vote support. Hence, even in 
2003, the second - and the upcoming third - generation of Josons 
control the provincial capital and the mayorships of several towns 
in the province. 
Another important post-Huk change in the politics of the 
UPRIIS area is that the peasantry became less organised. As the 
tenancy struggle was over and the villages became internally class-
stratified, "the rural people have unlearned the politics of collective 
action" (Wolters 1991: 224). Peasant organisations as well as non-
government organisations were active in the District However, in 
line with Wolters, their network was limited to a few villages {ibid.: 
225). These groups were not strong enough to present themselves 
in electoral- or in my case, irrigation—politics. 
To summarise, this chapter has described the irrigation 
management reform policies of which the implementation is 
examined in the rest of this book. Moreover, this chapter described 
the formal management set-up of the UPRIIS system that is being 
affected and altered due to these reform policies. On the socio-
political side, this chapter gave a concise summary of the history of 
the UPRIIS area. It has pointed to the recent history of violence 
and struggle, and the importance of political patronage in rural life. 
As will be shown in the following chapters, the issues of violence 
and patronage are also crucial to my understanding of irrigation 
management (reforms) in the 4 t h District of the UPRIIS system. 
Notes 
1 Gatekeepers of headgates for water distribution between Zones are 
direcdy under the control of the Operational Engineer. 
2 The water users are furthermore federated at regional and national level. 
The national federation of Irrigators Associations, the NCLA, did try to 
get one of the so-called 'party list* seats reserved for NGO's in Congress. 
Due to late subscription, they failed to make it Given the huge number of 
farmer water users in the country and the nationwide structure of the IA-
organisations, UCFIA leaders expect that the NCIA will be able to attract 
sufficient votes for a 'party list* seat in the next congressional elections. 
3 In reality, tenants often did not or hardly paid rent As non-payment of 
arrears to the Land Bank de facto remained without consequences for their 
security of tenure, many chose to use their money for more pressing 
needs (Van den Muijzenberg 1991: 322). 
3 
The construction of the UPRLTS irrigation system in the 1970s 
must have been exciting to young Filipino civil- and irrigation 
engineers. Technically, it was a thrilling project. They were 
constructing the huge Pantabangan dam, at the time the largest in 
Asia. Moreover, they were constructing the first modem irrigation 
system in the Philippines, based on state of the art American and 
Taiwanese irrigation technologies. Unlike before, water flows in 
this new irrigation system could be well monitored and regulated, 
to allow for a precise watering of rice crops. At field level, it would 
do away with the backward irrigation practices of farmers, who 
would now apply water to their fields based on the instructions and 
co-ordination of well-trained NIA personnel. 
Moreover, it must have been fulfilling to contribute to a project 
that was going to uplift the plight of about fifty thousand poor 
peasant households living in the irrigated areas of the UPRIIS 
system. With the miracle seeds of nearby IRRI and the stock of 
water in the Pantabangan reservoir, farmers would be assured of 
bountiful harvests during both the dry and wet season. It would 
boost the rice-based economy, also because of the canal roads 
connecting farms to markets and the electricity supply coming 
from the dam. 
With hindsight, much of this excitement was correct. Twenty-
five years of water, electricity and roads coming from the UPRIIS 
project have indeed gready contributed to a flourishing rice 
economy. Wealth derived from the rice harvests have allowed 
people to invest in other ventures and thus facilitated the 
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emergence of a middle class in the UPRIIS-based towns and cities. 
On the other hand the success has been partial, and many of the 
original intentions have proven to be illusive. The modem features 
of UPRLIS are hardly put to proper use. Actual control over water 
flows in the system is low, as is the NLA's control over the water 
users. Water scarcity has remained a serious problem and fierce 
struggles over water are the result. 
This chapter looks further into the system's properties and the 
actual water management practices, focussing on the 4 * District of 
UPRIIS. It starts with an introduction to the agro-ecology in the 
area, as well as the historical development of the system. It then 
takes a close look at the design properties and the managerial set-
up of the fourth District It is shown that - if used propedy - the 
designed high levels of control over water and users should prevent 
water scarcity from occurring. Both of these first two sections are 
rather technical and thus perhaps less accessible to readers who do 
not have a background in agriculture or irrigation. 
The subsequent sections discuss the actual management 
practices in the District. They picture the water scarcity problem in 
the District and discuss its reasons. In the final section I explore 
the major strategies used by tail-end farmers and their political 
representatives in the struggle for scarce water. It becomes clear 
that people found very ingenious solutions. For instance, they store 
water in the main lateral during daytime, to be brought downstream 
at night. Moreover, they do not just manipulate the gates but have 
actually re-designed parts of the system. Irrigation water is diverted 
into drains, and put to use in downstream areas. 
The Agro-ecology and History of the 4th District 
Originally, the 4 * District of UPRIIS started out as a run-of-the-
river gravity system. It was named after its source, the Penaranda 
River Irrigation System (in short PenRIS1). The catchment of the 
Penaranda River is found in the nearby Sierra Madre mountains, 
east of the system. The PenRIS extends downstream to the 
boundary of die vast Candaba swamp, which drains into the 
Pampanga River and then Manila Bay (see map 1.1 and 1.2). 
The PenRIS system was constructed between 1925 and 1933 by 
the Philippine government, supported by local hacenderos. Over 
the years, several dams on small rivers and drainage ways were 
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Farmers use irrigation water in both the wet and the dry season. 
The wet season lasts from May to November, and the dry season 
from December to April. During the wet season, average rainfall is 
1720 mm. This is generally sufficient to cultivate a rainfed rice crop 
developed within the system. The service area of the system 
reached about 18,200 hectares in the beginning of the 1970s. 
(Wensley 1989:62). During that time, the average cropped area was 
16,700 hectares in the wet season and 10,800 hectare in the dry 
season. (ECI1975). 
Until today, the intake of the system consists of an Ogee-type 
weir and a diversion structure equipped with sliding gates. The 
canal system consisted of a main canal, laterals and sub-laterals. 
Headgates of larger laterals were at the time already provided with 
sliding gates. Most of the structures however, were simple concrete 
structures provided with wooden stop-logs. Farmers practiced 
field-to-field irrigation. Water was diverted from the canal system 
into fields by means of temporary checks and pipes or cuts in the 
canal banks (Wensley 1989). 
The main source of supply for PenRIS was -and still is- the 
Pefiaranda River. It has a faidy substantial mean annual flow of 17 
m 3 /s, but it runs low during the dry season months (figure 3.1). 
FIGURE 3.1: Average monthly discharges of the Pefiaranda river, 1945-
1970 
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without irrigation. However, farmers do use irrigation water to 
bring forward the start of the wet season crop. This reduces the 
chances of typhoon damage in the later part of the wet season. It 
also allows for an eady start of the following dry season crop, and 
thus avoids the water-scarce months of March, April and May. 
Also, irrigation water is used to overcome temporary dry spells 
during the wet season. During the dry season, rainfall is too sparse 
to cultivate rice without irrigation. Average dry season rainfall is 
147 mm (Wensley 1989: 61 and figure 3.2). 
FIGURE 3.2: Average monthly irrigation requirements in the Central 
Luzon Basin 
Source: USBR1966:129) 
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Farmers in the District almost exclusively grow rice. Until the 
late 1960s, farmers cultivated only one rice crop per year, as the 
photoperiod sensitive varieties of those days could not ripen 
beyond eady January. After 1969, farmers started to use the IRRI 
photoperiod insensitive varieties and turned to double rice 
cropping (Fegan 1979). The start of the wet season crop sets the 
start of the two-season sequence of wet and dry seasons, which is 
determined by the start of the rains in the nearby Sierra Madre. 
This typically occurs between mid-April and eady June. (Wensley 
1989: 66). 
The District's area is well suited for rice. Or, to put it differendy, 
it is hard to grow something else. The soils are ideally suited for 
rice cultivation. In the upstream part of the system with a more 
rolling topography loamy soils predominate. In the flat mid- and 
downstream portions, clay, silty clay and clay loam predominate. 
The main soil types are vertisols of the subgroup Udorthenetic 
Pelluserts. These are deep, poody drained soils that are sticky and 
plastic when wet, and extremely hard when dry. They are slightiy 
acid to neutral in surface soil reaction, medium in organic matter 
content (1-3 percent), high in natural fertility and high in water 
holding capacity (FAO 1972, in: Svendsen 1983: 111). 
These soils allow farmers to minimise percolation rates by 
puddling and harrowing their fields. Average seepage and 
percolation rates are 2 mm/day in the wet and 4 mm/day in the 
dry season. Ln some of the downstream parts of the system 
however, percolation rates can be negative. Due to high ground 
water levels, percolation rates may reach -2 to -3.7 mm/day. In 
these areas, dry season paddies may take up to two weeks to 
become dry and cracked after standing water disappeared from 
their surface (Svendsen 1983:131). 
Rice is also grown because the larger part of the system's area is 
low-lying, flat and poody drained. The great bulk of the service 
area lies between the 10 and 20-meter contour lines. Most of the 
area has slopes of less than 0.25% (Svendsen 1983: 99). The system 
is criss-crossed by numerous creeks. Water-logging and flooding 
are common phenomena in the wet season. This is especially the 
case in the downstream areas at the boundary of the Candaba 
swamp. A large part of these areas cannot be cultivated at all, while 
crop damage to standing crops due to water-logging is a perennial 
problem. Rice is one of the few crops which at least has a chance 
to survive under such conditions. 
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On average, dry season yields surpass yields in the wet season. 
In the period 1987-96, average yields were 3.7 tons/ha in the dry 
season, against 3.0 tons/ha in the wet season (NIA-UPRIIS annual 
reports). Dry season yields are higher because of favourable solar 
radiation. Moreover, the dry season is free from destructive 
typhoons. In an average year, 15 of these tropical storms strike land 
somewhere in the Philippine Islands. In UPRIIS, the months with 
the highest incidence of typhoons are September and October. 
They can inflict heavy damage on standing rice crops, particulady 
when fields are approaching harvest (Svendsen 1983: 61). Finally, 
crop damage due to various pests and diseases is more frequent 
and severe in the wet season. 
The integration into UPRIIS 
The PenRIS system was integrated into the UPRIIS system in the 
late 1970s. It thus became part of the modernisation drive of the 
Marcos administration. As a central part of Marcos's "New Society' 
and the internationally promoted Green Revolution, irrigation 
development was to modernise the rice sector. It all started in 
1964. That year, Marcos established the National Irrigation 
Administration (NIA). It had to ensure rapid expansion of the 
irrigated area in the Philippines especially by developing large, 
agency-managed schemes. The focus of development was the 
Central Luzon Plain (PRC etaL 1983: LT-4). 
The United States had a leading role in this modernisation 
program. It came up with an ambitious masterplan to develop the 
water resources of the Central Luzon Plain. The plan formulation 
was funded by USALD and carried out by the United States Bureau 
of Reclamation, together with the Philippine Bureau of Public 
Works. It was published in 1966. The masterplan concluded that 
the Plain had great potential for rural development, essentially by 
regulating the major rivers of the basin: "The economic and social 
welfare of the Central Luzon Basin is direcdy related to the 
development of its water resources" (USBR1966:4). 
The USBR argued that without dry season irrigation, agriculture 
in the plain could not develop much further. While jungle at the 
turn of the century, almost every hectare of cultivable land was 
already under cultivation during the 1960s. The land frontier had 
been reached. Farmers were growing one rice crop during the wet 
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season. Due to lack of water, lands were idle during the remainder 
of the year. The average farm family at the time was occupied with 
on-farm operations for about five months of the year and two 
months of off-farm work They were unemployed during the 
remaining five months. Agricultural growth was thus to be found 
in the intensification of land use. 
MAP 3.1: Annual runoff of the major rivers in the Central Luzon Plain 
Source. USBR1966: 26 
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Due to the heavy rainfall in the catchment areas during the wet 
season, water storage would provide excellent opportunities for 
irrigation in the dry season. Approximately 90% of the average 
annual runoff occurred during June through December. Only 10% 
of the run-off was taking place from January to May, with a 
minimum of less than two percent during each of the Months of 
February, March and April (map 3.1). Much of this runoff could be 
put to beneficial use for dry season irrigation. All in all, the plan 
would provide year-round water for the irrigation of almost 
300,000 hectares of land. 
The masterplan also estimated that river control could reduce 
flood damage as well as water-logging. During the normal annual 
cycle of flow conditions the rivers in the Central Luzon Plain 
overflowed their banks and flood adjacent lowlands. This caused 
extensive flood damage to property and crops, and frequendy 
endangered the lives of the basin's inhabitants. Though most of the 
problem was caused by rainfall over the relatively flat valley lands 
itself, the runoff occurring from the mountainous areas contributed 
to the problem. River regulation and water storage thus would 
control flood flows into the plain, and it would reduce the problem 
of water-logging. Hence, a significandy smaller area would be 
uncultivable during the wet season. 
Finally, water control in the catchment areas would also help to 
solve the electricity problem of Central Luzon. Most of Central 
Luzon's villages were still without electricity, or received it only 
when there was a temporary surplus of power in the grid. 
Electricity demand was expected to increase dramatically in the 
years to come, and thus required extensive installation of additional 
generating capacity. The hydroelectric power plants proposed by 
the masterplan would almost double the electricity generating 
capacity available to Central Luzon (USBR 1966: 34). 
The plan was well-accepted by the Marcos regime.2 He followed 
the recommendation of the USBR to immediately start the 
construction of the so-called Upper Pampanga River Project 
(UPRP). Construction was authorised in 1969. Funded by the 
Wodd Bank, it included the construction of the Pantabangan Dam 
and reservoir and irrigation facilities for approximately 77,000 
hectares of land (PRC etaL 1983:11-5). 
The project's scope and size was unprecedented in the irrigation 
Struggling with a Modern System 61 
history of the Philippines. The multi-purpose reservoir was going 
to be the largest in the whole of Asia (110 meters above streambed, 
crest length of 920 meters, and a reservoir capacity of 3,000 MCM). 
At the time, six national irrigation systems were operational in the 
Upper Pampanga River Basin. Together, these systems covered less 
than 50,000 hectares in the wet season. The UPRP project was 
going to rehabilitate, modernise and enlarge these systems. The 
reservoir would allow these systems to provide a regulated water 
supply for the whole of the service area in both the wet and dry 
season. The six systems - and a number of smaller communal and 
private schemes - would be organised into three operational 
entities: District 1, 2 and 3. These Districts became operational in 
1975. (PRC: II-3) 
The PenRIS system was not included in original UPRP project. 
It was added to the system later on. The UPRP project would only 
serve the farmer population in the province of Nueva Ecija. 
Marcos however, wanted to bring irrigation to farmers in other 
provinces as well. Just after he declared martial law in 1972, he 
issued Presidential degree 35 to further enlarge the system (NIA 
1977: 50). As a result, the Aurora-Penaranda project started in 
1974, under an additional Wodd Bank loan. This project 
constructed a transbasin diversion from the Aurora river basin to 
the Pantabangan reservoir. It would bring the Pantabangan 
reservoir an extra annual inflow of around 165 MCM of water. 
This extra water was to be allotted for the PenRIS system. 
Supplemental water from storage was to be delivered through 75 
kilometres of river channel and UPRP supply canals to augment 
the flow of the Penaranda River. This was to permit full 
development of the 17,000 hectares under the existing Penaranda 
system, and an 8,260 ha extension. A large part of this system is 
located in Nueva Ecija as well, but especially the extension area was 
going to serve areas in the adjacent provinces of Bulacan and 
Pampanga (PRC: II-6). 
As the PenRIS system was going to be served by the 
Pantabangan reservoir, it would become the fourth District of the 
UPRP system. By that time, it was renamed into its present name: 
the Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation System (UPRIIS). 
The enlarged and improved PenRIS system, the 4 t h District of 
UPRIIS, became operational in 1978. 
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Control over Water and Fanners: the Properties of Water Delivery 
The design and operational manuals of UPRTIS read like the text 
books of my training as an irrigation engineer at Wageningen 
University during the 1980s (see Meijer 1989). UPRTIS was going 
to be the first modem system in the Philippines, based on state-of-
the-art Taiwanese and American irrigation design and management 
principles. Both design and management were geared towards high 
levels of control. The system design allows for a well-regulated 
water flow throughout the system. This would enable high 
irrigation efficiencies, as supplies can meet variation in water 
demands. The management of the system was - and still is -
formally firmly controlled by the NLA. The agency regulates water 
in a planned manner. It prescribes in detail farmers' behaviour with 
regard to cropping patterns and field irrigation practices. 
If managed properiy, the UPRIIS system was supposed to 
dramatically increase yields as well as the cropping intensity (see 
table 3.1). The water supply was expected to be sufficient to irrigate 
the whole of the UPRIIS area during the dry season.3 Shortage 
would only occur once in ten years. This would greatiy enhance the 
farm income of some 44,000 farming families, cultivating about 2.4 
hectares of irrigable land per family (Ng and Lethem 1983:4). 
TABLE 3.1: UPRIIS project targets 
Before project 4 After project 
Irrigable area wet season (ha) 63,000 106,000 
Irrigable area dry season (ha) 7,000 106,000 
Annual paddy production (tons) 150,000 900,000 
Average paddy yield wet season (tons/ha) 2.2 4.8 
Average paddy yield dry season (tons/ha) 2.6 4.2 
Cropping intensity f/o) 110 190« 
Sources: Ng and Lethem 1983; NIA 1977; PRC et al 1983) 
Control over water 
Proper management of the reservoir water would make a well-
regulated inflow into the different Districts possible. River 
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Also the lowest level of the system was designed for a careful 
match of supply and demand. The traditional continuous-flow 
discharges - especially from smaller, deforested catchments - show 
daily variations. Supplemental releases of reservoir water were to 
ensure that water flows in the main system would not fluctuate. 
The reservoir's capacity was designed to supply about two-thirds of 
the total dry season water requirement in UPRITS. About half that 
amount would be needed in me wet season. The remainder was to 
be derived from natural and return flows regulated by diversion 
dams, as well as from rainfall in the service area (Ng and Lethem 
1983: 8). Given the relatively high discharges of the Pefiaranda 
river, dry season support of the reservoir to the 4 * District was 
estimated to be around 50% of the District's total water needs. 
The main system was designed for precise regulation of water 
flows throughout the system, to be able to carefully match demand 
and supply at the turnouts. It was based on USBR design 
principles. Regulation structures and measuring devices were 
installed at all water distribution points. The headgates in the main, 
lateral and sub-lateral canals were provided with sliding gates for 
medium discharges, and radial gates for larger discharges. The 
checks - cross regulators - in the larger canals were also provided 
with sliding gates. All structures were supplied with measuring 
devices, mosdy Parshall flumes or staff gauges (see figure 3.3). 
FIGURE 3.3: Schematic lay-out of a main system, based on UPRIIS design 
principles 
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method of irrigation was to be replaced by the modem rotational 
method practiced in Taiwan. The traditional method was 
considered to be inefficient rotational irrigation could save about 
20-30% of water use. (Cerdan 1975: 8). To allow for rotation, 
farmer fields were grouped into so-called turnout service areas 
(TSAs). Each TSA was to serve around 50 hectares, comprising 
around 20 farmers. Water flow through the turnout would be 
continuous (NLA 1979:3). 
Within the TSA, the water was to be distributed between five 
rotational units of 10 hectares each. The water supply would be 
delivered on a rotational basis for each 10-hectare unit of the 
Turnout Service Area, Following a 5-day interval, each unit would 
receive sufficient water to last for five days. Main farm ditches and 
supplementary farm ditches were constructed for this purpose 
(NLA 1979: 3-5). 
Water supply to the TSAs was to be regulated, depending on 
water demand. Therefore, double-gated - orifice type - turnouts 
were introduced, or single gated turnouts with Parshall Flumes. 
These were installed just upstream of (sub-)lateral checks or road 
crossing structures. Checking was to be done with wooden 
stoplogs in smaller laterals, and sliding gates in the larger ones. 
The turnout service areas were designed for optimal water use. 
The dimensions of the TSA were based on a range of 
considerations, like crop water requirements, cropping patterns, 
effective rainfall, and percolation and seepage losses (Horst 1995: 
3). The capacity of the turnout pipes was based on the peak 
demand for rice cultivation, which occurs during land soaking and 
land preparation. During the first 8-10 days, water delivery would 
be at its maximum capacity and water levels in the sub-lateral 
would be at its highest. Using 18 inch turnout pipes, it would 
deliver the needed 100 mm of water for land soaking (excluding 
submergence) (NLA 1979: 6-8). 
After these nine days, water inflow into the turnout area could 
be decreased to an amount sufficient for farmers to undertake the 
necessary land preparation work (NLA 1979: 3). During the crop 
maintenance stage, water supply inside the lateral would run at 
normal levels. Water requirements for land soaking were estimated 
to be 2.3 1/s/ha, and around 1.2 1/s/ha during the crop 
maintenance period. By carefully adjusting turnout deliveries to 
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crop water demands, it was expected that a field application 
efficiency of 80% could be achieved (NIA 1979: 6-8). 
The management of scarcity 
Even in cases of water scarcity, the system would still allow for a 
high control over water. Water scarcity would not affect the 
operation of the system. It was expected that - given the huge 
reservoir - water scarcity would not be much of a problem anyway. 
However, in the rare cases that it would happen, the solution was -
and still is - to reduce the area to be irrigated.7 This allows for 
normal irrigation to the limited area on which crops will be grown 
(Ng and Lethem 1983:4). 
The 'program area' is the term used to indicate the area to be 
irrigated in times of scarcity. The size of the program area is 
determined on the basis of the reservoir water levels: the lower the 
water level, the smaller the program area. Two months before the 
start of the dry cropping season the program area in the different 
UPRLIS Districts is to be determined, based on the reservoir water 
level at that point in time. Areas to be prioritised are those that are 
close to the water source, and those that are cultivated with high 
value crops. (NIA-UPRIIS annual report 1978: 52). 
Finally, water control was to be ensured by the construction of 
an extensive drainage system. Farm ditches were to end into 
drainage ditches, which would be connected to larger drains and 
natural waterways. The design capacity for these drains was set at 
5-6 l/sec*ha (NIA 1979: 34). 
Agency control 
Formally, the NIA is firmly in control of water management. The 
turnout, as well as the main system, are the exclusive domain of the 
irrigation agency. 
The NIA will operate and maintain all reservoirs, diversion works, 
main canals, laterals and sub-laterals and all appurtenant structures, 
gates and accessories of all irrigation systems constructed by the 
Government (...). No person other than the authorised employees 
of the NIA shall have any right to interfere (...) in any manner 
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except when permitted by the Irrigation Administrator or any of his 
duly authorised representatives (NIA1987: 97). 
The NIA has set up an extensive and hierarchical organisation 
for water management. At the top of the command structure is the 
Operations Manager of UPRIIS. He is in charge of overall 
planning, reservoir management and releases to the Districts. He is 
supported for these tasks by the staff of the Water Control Co-
ordinating Centre (WCCQ. Within each District, the Operational 
Engineer controls water management. He supervises a field staff of 
Zone Engineers, watermasters, gatekeepers and ditchtenders. 
The initial role of farmers was limited to organise the rotational 
distribution of water within the TSAs. Due to the streamlining of 
the NIA's workforce, and the organisation of the water users into 
federations, farmers nowadays also have a role to play 'above the 
oudet'. The formal authority in water management, however, is still 
with the NIA. The farmer federations are to assist the NIA field 
personnel in water management. Their formal influence was 
however limited to consultation and providing support to the NIA 
management, because these organisations were not given any real 
decision making power (for further discussion, see chapter 2). 
The NIA field staff was well-equipped to carry out their 
sophisticated management tasks. Watermasters were provided with 
gauge tables to adjust the gate settings of turnout structures to 
satisfy actual water demands within the TSA's. Likewise, 
gatekeepers and Zone Engineers were to be provided with 
calibrated discharge curves for proper main system management. 
Daily reading of rainfall and river flows were to ensure optimal use 
of water from rainfall and local rivers, in order to save reservoir 
water. Field staff were supposed to be equipped with walkie-talkies 
and motorbikes for quick communication and transport. Field 
offices were constructed to allow for a co-ordinated management 
of the system (PRC etal 1983: pp. Ill 10-16). 
The NIA's fieldworkers were also well trained for the job. 
Watermasters were required to have a BSc in agriculture. Zone 
Engineers and above required an MSc in engineering or agriculture. 
Moreover, field personnel received extensive on-the-job training 
courses. The UPRIIS project staffed a well-equipped training 
centre during the first years of the project. New graduates hired to 
take up the position of watermasters were given a two year on-the-
job training on water management, agronomy, and institutional 
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development. Also the existing NLA staff went through an 
elaborate training program to learn how to deal with the modem 
system (NIA-UPRIIS annual reports 1977-1983). 
Management by prescription 
For a proper use of the system, farmer water users should carefully 
follow the NLA's prescriptions on cropping patterns and field 
irrigation practices. The NLA prescribes which areas may and may 
not be planted, and when this is supposed to happen. Two months 
before every season, the Operational Engineer of the District 
presents the so-called patalastas (communique). This document 
indicates the size of the program area, and stipulates the cropping 
patterns for each TSA and irrigation association of the District. It 
also indicates the so-called 'cut-off dates'. After that date, the NLA 
supposedly cuts off the water. This is done to synchronise the 
cropping patterns of farmers, and thus to optimise water use. Also, 
it allows for maintenance and repair of canals and canal structures. 
The basis of the calculations for the patalastas are the allocated 
water flows from the reservoir, and a number of seasonal variables 
like river water flows, effective rainfall, crop water requirements 
and percolation rates. The idea is to balance supply and demand. 
As supply is given, demand is determined by setting the size of the 
program area. Also, monthly demand should not exceed supply. 
Critical months for these calculations are the beginning of both the 
wet and dry season. To avoid that demand exceeds supply, the 
Operational Engineer will limit the areas that can start land soaking 
activities in the beginning of both seasons. The last months of the 
dry season are also critical, given the low river discharges. The 
patalastas will thus put limitations to the areas still to be irrigated 
during this period (Wensley 1987:153). 
Farmers have little say in the decision-making process leading to 
the patalastas. Before turn over, the TSA farmer organisations were 
to convey their wishes about the cropping calendar to the 
watermaster. He would then pass it on to the Zone Engineer. 
Finally, all requests reached the Operations Manager of UPRIIS. 
He would then determine the boundaries of the program area of 
the next season, as well as the cropping calendars of the Districts. 
Decisions would then trickle down again to the level of the 
farmers. After the implementation of the turn over program in the 
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early 1990s, the NIA was still in charge. In the new situation, 
cropping calendars are supposedly discussed with the NIA 
personnel in so-called pre-season meetings. However, the formal 
role of the federations is limited to consultation. In the end, it is 
still the NIA that prescribes the program area to the farmers, and 
when to start land soaking and subsequent farming activities in the 
different TSAs. 
In conclusion, this section has shown that the technological 
properties and the management principles of the UPRIIS Districts 
are designed for a high degree of control over water allocation and 
distribution. The NIA is supposed to be in control of the system, 
and prescribes detailed rules and regulations for farmer behaviour 
with regard to cropping patterns and field irrigation practices. In 
the following sections I examine how the system is actually used 
and managed. 
Go with the Flow: Actual Management Practices 
During the field research period -though this is still the case -, the 
actual use of the system was very different from what was intended 
by the design and management principles. There was low control 
over both water and water users. Water flows in the District 
proved - and still prove to be - insufficient, erratic and unreliable. 
Consequendy, farmers could not rely on the NIA's planning, but 
rather based their decisions on the actual flows in the system. The 
NIA was not fully in control of the system and could not prescribe 
the behaviour of water users. Often, it was the other way around. 
The NIA followed farmer practices with regard to cropping 
patterns and irrigation practices. The operation of the system was 
the subject of struggle and negotiation between the NIA, rival 
groups of tail-end farmers and local politicians. Main system 
schedules were often disrupted, and actual operation takes place in 
a rather disordedy manner. We will take a look at these actual 
practices, going from the main system to the lateral and field level. 
Limited control over the water supply to the District 
As discussed above, the system was designed for a controlled, 
reliable and sufficient inflow of water into the main system of the 
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UPRIIS District. In reality though, water inflow into the system 
was insufficient, fluctuating and unreliable. The main reason was 
that reservoir water hardly reached the District. The District thus 
still had to rely on river water. Water supplies from the reservoir to 
District 4 were supposedly 15 m 3/s during the dry period from 
December until April (NIA 1981: 12). In reality though, average 
support during this period was less than 1 m 3/s. Support from the 
reservoir was at its highest during March, but even during this 
month average supply only reached 1.5 m 3/s (figure 3.4). The 
maximum supply did not surpass 3.5 m 3/s. Moreover, reservoir 
supplies were erratic. 
FIGURE 3.4: Average river and reservoir supply to the 4 t h District 
(1986-97 period) 
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Source: NIA- UPRIIS 4 * District 1997b 
The limited reservoir supply to the District was partly caused by 
the relatively low water levels in the Pantabangan reservoir. Water 
releases were lower than was expected during the feasibility phase. 
It was expected that the water level would normally reach its 
maximum at the beginning of the dry season crop and thus would 
allow for a full programming of the UPRIIS service area. However, 
reservoir water levels at the beginning of the dry season started to 
drop below maximum in the beginning of the 1980s. This became a 
regular phenomenon in the following years (NIA-UPRIIS annual 
reports 1977-97).8 
Consequendy, the NIA reduced the program area of the 
different Districts, as well as the allotted reservoir supplies. Allotted 
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supplies to the 4* District were cut disproportional. This was done 
because of the relatively good access to river water of the District 
compared to other Districts. Also, the fourth District is the tail-end 
District, and the hardest to reach with reservoir water, because of 
upstream diversions. Hence, actual allotments of reservoir water to 
the fourth District are limited to around 6 m 3/s in 'good' years, and 
reduced to less than 2.5 m 3/s in years of low reservoir water levels 
(Wensley 1989:216; NIA 4 t h District, operational plans 1988-97). 
The limited supply of reservoir water to the 4 t h District was 
furthermore caused by inter-District distribution problems. Only a 
part of the intended allocation of water actually reached the 4 * 
District, if it arrived at all. Moreover, arrival was highly erratic. This 
had three causes. Firsdy, the capacity of the supply canal was 
limited. This canal served as the supply canal for the 4 * District, 
but at the same time was the main lateral for one of the Zones of 
the 3 r f District. The capacity of a main siphon structure was too 
limited to allow full support of water for both District 3 and 4 to 
pass (NIA 1981:12). 
FIGURE 3.5: Dry season program area of the 4* District 
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Sources: NIA-UPRIIS 1993; NIA-UPRHS, 4 * District 2002a 
Secondly, water intended for the 4 * District was diverted into 
District 3. Farmers in the tail-end areas of District 3 diverted the 
water into the headgates of their laterals. Thirdly, water was illegally 
diverted to hundreds of hectares of rice farms on the left bank of 
the supply canal. These farms were located outside the service area 
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of UPRIIS, and thus were not supposed to get water at all. These 
lands were highly elevated, and in some cases were irrigated by fully 
checking the supply canal of District 4. Irrigation of these lands 
thus further hampered the water supply to the 4 * District. 
Consequendy, the District became mainly dependent on the 
supply of the Pefiaranda river. As mentioned above, its supply was 
— and still is - insufficient — and moreover erratic - to satisfy the 
needs of the whole service area. Water became scarce especially 
during the second part of the dry season, in the months of March, 
April and May. To deal with this scarcity, the NLA's District 
management limited the program area. The average dry season 
program area of the District was only 56% of the service area 
during the 1978-97 period. The program area reached an aU-time 
low during the 1996-97 dry season, when it was set at only a third 
of the service area (see figure 3.5). 
Fluctuating water levels in the main system 
An important consequence of the fluctuating supply of water into 
the system, was that controlled main system management became 
highly problematic. When river discharges were high, like in the 
period from July-November, the problem was manageable. As the 
District only needed a part of the river discharge during this period, 
regulating die main intake structure of the system could control 
fluctuations in the river discharge. During the dry season however, 
the Districts needed to divert the full flow of the river - except for 
limited losses passing the Ogee weir - to satisfy its water demands. 
Consequendy, fluctuating river flows led to fluctuating water levels 
in the main system. This made - and still does make - control over 
water distribution a cumbersome affair. It requires frequent 
measurements of discharges and re-setting of gate openings of the 
headgates of laterals, distribution structures and the hundreds of 
turnout structures throughout the system. 
The NIA was - and still is - not doing that. It was only 
measuring daily flows at the main intake, and at the two 
distribution points dividing the water between the 3 Zones. 
Measuring devices in the rest of the system have disappeared, 
broken down or were not calibrated since they were constructed. 
In any case, they were not used. The response of the NIA to a 
fluctuating inflow into the system was largely limited to these 
headgates, and a few headgates of major laterals. Gate settings in 
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the rest of the system were left untouched, or were operated on an 
ad hoc basis. 
Usually, these fluctuations affected downstream (sub-) laterals. 
Farmers or NIA fieldstaff from upstream laterals responded to 
declining water levels by increasing the gate openings to their 
lateral. As a result, fluctuation in the lower parts further increased, 
while water flows were disproportionally reduced. Hence, the 
amplitude of fluctuations increased further down the system 
(Wensley 1989:129; cf. Horst 1998: 64). 
A second consequence of die fluctuating inflow into the system 
was that it limited the possibility to control the cropping patterns in 
the system. Both farmers and the NIA's management were forced 
to go with the flow. The determining factor for the start of the wet 
season crop was not the official patalastas of the NIA, but rather 
the start of the rains in the nearby Sierra Madre mountains. 
Recognising the importance of an eady start of the wet season 
crop, the Operational Engineer would usually divert the river 
discharges into the system as soon as possible. The official starting 
date of the wet season crop was usually set at June 15, but if it 
rained eady, farmers started one month ahead of schedule. In other 
years, rains in the mountains were late, and actual cropping 
patterns were later than planning prescribes. (Wensley 1989:93) 
Head-end farmers in the system began their wet season activities 
as soon as irrigation water becomes available. Tail-end farmers had 
to wait until the water demands of the upstream areas were 
fulfilled. The length of the waiting period was determined by the 
inflow of river water into the system, and by local rainfall. The 
difference between the start of the head and tail of the system 
could be up to one month. 
The majority of upstream farmers practiced direct seeding of the 
wet season crop, to save on labour costs. The majority of the tail-
end farmers however transplanted the rice. Obviously, they also 
liked to save on labour costs. However, they preferred to transplant 
seedlings, as this method allowed them to speed up the start of the 
wet season crop, and thus avoid water scarcity problems for the 
subsequent dry season crop. Through transplantation, and rapid 
land preparation, tail-end farmers were able to almost catch up with 
head-end farmers at the end of the season (Wensley 1989: 97). 
Starting dates varied from year to year and from location to 
location. In some years, local rainfall started eady in the season. 
Tail-end farmers might gamble that these rains would continue, 
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and would start eady with land preparation. In some years they 
succeeded. In other years rains did not push through and they were 
then forced to wait for new rains or canal water to arrive at their 
fields. Farmers adjacent to one of the many creeks and local rivers 
often used pumps to have an eady wet season start Hence, rainfall 
patterns in the catchment areas of these creeks and rivers also 
determined the pacing of the agricultural activities in the system. 
The cropping patterns in the low-lying areas of the District were 
again a different story. The determining factor of the planting dates 
in these areas was determined by the patterns of water-logging. 
This also varied from year to year. In some years, water receded 
quickly so that farmers could start eady. In other years, wet season 
crops were destroyed because of flooding or higher than average 
water levels. In short; cropping patterns within the system differed 
substantially from year to year, and were largely beyond the control 
of the District's management. 
Contested control over headgates 
Controlled main system management was further jeopardised by 
the fact that the operation of gates in the main system was not the 
exclusive domain of the NIA. Gate settings during the dry season 
were highly contested. Rival alliances of tail-end and mid-stream 
farmers, headed by local politicians or farmer leaders were involved 
in day-to-day operation of the major gates. In some parts of the 
system the NIA was in control, but in other parts local politicians 
had de facto taken over control over crucial headgates. Finally, in 
other situations the NIA was still involved in gate management, but 
it was then forced to accommodate its operational practices to the 
interests of powerful actors. Consequendy, main system 
management was the subject of negotiation and struggle. Multiple 
parties frequendy changed gate settings during both daytime and 
night-time. This made planned main system management and an 
ordedy scheduling of water throughout the system neady 
impossible (for further detail, see chapter 4). 
A major consequence of the NIA's failure to control headgates 
in large parts of the system, was that it could not effectively 
implement its policy for the management of scarcity. Tail-end 
farmers largely ignored the NIA's determination of the program 
area. They cultivated a dry season crop despite the fact that their 
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fields were excluded from the program area. Their access to water 
through the (contested) control over the headgates of the system 
allowed them to do so. As a result, the actually cultivated and 
irrigated area was usually much larger than the program area. In the 
dry season of 1996-97, the irrigated area even doubled the program 
area.9 
The water control conditions in the District contributed to the 
NIA's inability to enforce its program area. As explained above, the 
inflow into the system was erratic, as it depended on the water of a 
local river. Consequendy, it made good sense for the District's 
management to play safe and run the canals at full flow if river 
water allowed it. Often, part of this water would end up in the tail-
end canals of the system, and farmers in these areas were thus very 
much tempted to start their land preparation. The system's physical 
properties allowed the NIA's management to divert this water into 
drains, to avoid that the water would reach areas outside the 
program area.10 However, as also the NLA could not tell how much 
water the river would bring in the rest of the season, such a strict 
position would be very difficult to defend. Hence, 'going with the 
flow' was the more logical management strategy. 
Farmers of these 'outside areas' realised the risk of growing a 
second crop. It might be less profitable as they would be forced to 
maintain their crop by pumping from NLA canals, drains or even 
through deep wells. Also, their harvest might be lower due to water 
stress, or in the worst case, they might not even harvest at all. Many 
took this calculated risk. 
These farmers found very creative ways to get access to water. 
Some would start land preparation eadier by making use of pumps, 
to avoid the scarce period from March until May. Many also made 
use of re-use structures, which allowed them to use drainage water 
from the upstream areas. However, as I will show below, they also 
tried to get access to 'first-use' irrigation water from the main 
system. This led to intense struggles over scarce water. Hence, the 
concept of the program area as a allocation tool for the 
management of scarcity was not effective in the District. As a 
result, water was spread thinly over the cultivated areas, and intense 
struggles were the result. 
A second consequence of the NIA's inability to effectively 
control gates, was that main system management scheduling 
became problematic as well. When water was scarce, the NIA's 
District management usually shifted from continuous irrigation in 
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the main system, to a rotational schedule between the different 
laterals. The undedying idea was mat rotation in the main system 
facilitated water distribution. It supposedly speeded up the 
irrigation of the fields along a particular (sub-)lateral, as the water 
levels in these (sub-) laterals could be maintained at full supply 
levels. Also, it allowed the NIA to concentrate its field personnel in 
the targeted irrigated areas. In reality, local politicians and farmer 
leaders frequendy disrupted these schedules. They implemented 
their own, rival schedules or interfered on an ad hoc basis. The 
consequence was that the actual distribution patterns of water in 
the main system were unpredictable.11 
A third consequence was that the NIA hardly controlled the so-
called cut-off dates, i.e. the dates that the NIA stops supplying 
water into the canal system. In between the dry season crop and 
the subsequent wet season crop, the NIA supposedly cut off water 
flows to allow for canal maintenance and repair. Also, it is a 
measure to discipline cropping patterns of the water users. Cut-off 
dates were stipulated in the patalastas. Actually enforcing cut-off 
dates while farmers still have standing crops is a drastic measure, 
and thus requires toughness on the side of the NIA. The problem 
already existed at the very start of the UPRLIS project. At an open 
forum meeting in 1975, a farmer asked a question to the UPRP 
assistant project manager. 
I am a farmer with a farm in division II. According to the schedule 
of water releases, it will end May 17, but most of us are still 
preparing their seedbed now (May 5). My question is, is it possible 
to extend the releases of water? 
The answer of the UPRP manager was a tough one. 
We prepare schedules and we would like the farmers to work with 
us to be able to make use of the system most efficiendy. If they do 
not, our timetable will go awry and we will not be able to make use 
of the more than P700 million worth of irrigation system. I 
remember an instance in Penaranda. Farmers said that some 1,000 
hectares will die because we cut the water. We extended service by 
one month and they asked for another extension. Again, we gave in 
fifteen days. They kept coming back and so what wfll happen to us? 
If we go on extending, the people who believe us will come and say, 
"Your word is no good". You did not follow what you told us. We 
lost because you told us not to plant". We are here for a common 
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purpose that is to bridge the gap between the managed and the 
management To answer the question, I should say we will not 
extend. (Miranda 1975:1) 
I do not know what happened in reality, but I would be surprised if 
the UPRP manager actually enforced the cut off date. In the 4 * 
District, the NIA would usually give in to farmers' demands. Cut-
off dates for canal desilting or repairs were rescheduled to allow 
farmers to harvest their crops. Basically, water ran through the 
main system as long as standing crops required water. 
Fixing headgates 
Control over the main system was further subverted by the sorry 
state of the headgates. It was common practice of farmer leaders 
and local politicians to immobilise the adjustable structures by 
blocking, damaging or destroying these devices. The most innocent 
intervention was to put stones or other materials at the floor of the 
sliding gates. As these could then no longer be fully closed, water 
would pass even during 'closure'. One step further was to bend the 
rods of the lifting devices of the sliding gates of headgates and 
checks. The most destructive intervention was to remove the lifting 
device itself, or to destroy its concrete support structure. These 're-
designs' were common practice. In 1996 for instance, two out of 
three of the headgates and cross regulators of the main lateral of 
Zone 1 were partly or fully immobilised.12 In 1997, the NIA 
repaired six major headgates and checks. A few months later, three 
of them were at least partly damaged again. 
The NIA's District management also took steps to reduce the 
adjustability of the water control structures in the main system. It 
thus departed from the concept of the modem, sophisticated water 
control regime based on adjustable gates. The District engineers 
had their fieldmen cut holes in a number of the cross-regulators 
located in the main laterals of Zone 1 and 2. These holes were 
made in the upper part of the sliding gates. This allowed water to 
pass the check during the dry season, flowing to the downstream 
laterals. They thus tried to find physical solutions for a problem 
that they were unable to solve by managerial means. 
The problem they tried to solve was the full diversion of water 
from the main laterals of the Zones into the upstream or mid-
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stream branch canals. By closing the cross-regulators and fully 
opening the headgates, the larger part of the limited dry season 
flow was often diverted into these laterals, to quickly satisfy the 
water needs of the rice areas served by these canals. Farmer leaders 
or local politicians representing these areas usually did this. This 
created turmoil in the downstream parts of the system. Farmers' 
anxieties would increase, and so would the pressure put on its 
farmer leaders and local politicians to act in order to bring the 
needed water downstream. 
To avoid all this from happening, the engineering solution was 
to reduce the regulatory capacities of these main structures. By 
cutting the holes, the checking capacity of the cross-regulator was 
reduced. In such a way, only a part of the scarce water could be 
diverted into the upstream or mid-stream laterals. 'Automatically', 
at least part of the water would flow downstream. 
The other reason for the engineers to cut the holes, was to avoid 
overtopping during the wet season. Due to poor maintenance, 
parts of the main laterals were heavily silted. Consequendy, a full 
closure of cross regulators would lead to overtopping of the 
upstream canal section. This regulady happened, causing damage to 
canal dikes and roads. By cutting these holes, the overtopping was 
'automatically' avoided. 
Farmer control over the sub-lateral and field level 
Though contested, the NIA still had an important say in headgate 
operations. Its authority to manage was however virtually absent at 
the lower levels of the system. Some of the watermasters still had 
some say over water distribution practices at the sub-lateral and 
turnout level, but farmers and their leaders mosdy controlled it. 
The NIA thus only controlled a fraction of the total number of 
distribution structures in the system. In 1986 for instance, the 
NLA's control in one of the Zones of the District was limited to 17 
headgates out of a total of 231 distribution structures (Wensley 
1987:165). 
The actual use of the system at field and sub-lateral level did 
neither match the design properties of the system, nor the 
managerial prescriptions of the NIA. Firsdy, the principle of 
rotational irrigation in the TSAs never became reality. From the 
very beginning of the UPRTIS system farmers ignored the idea. The 
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NIA introduced the concept through several pilot areas throughout 
the system, but farmers stuck to their 'traditional' practices of 
continuous field-to-field irrigation. Farmers removed the 
supplementary farm ditches and the division structures and in 
many cases the main farm ditch as well.13 
To the farmers, the continuous field-to-field irrigation is a 
convenient practice. It is labour-extensive, as one does not have to 
regulate the water flow. Also, the continuous presence of a water 
layer in the field helps to reduce weed germination and growth.14 
Moreover, it avoids rights-of-way issues over the field canals. The 
consequence was that field application efficiencies were low. 
Especially in the upstream areas, it was often the case that 
continuous water flow from the irrigation system passed the rice 
fields into the (natural) drains. 
Secondly, the rotational service areas themselves were abolished. 
Farmers constructed large numbers of so-called 'illegal turnout 
structures', to get direct access to canal water. It also allowed them 
to circumvent problems of conflict with neighbouring farmers 
(NIA 1985:25). In 1983, only five years after the completion of the 
UPRITS system, it was estimated that the number of *unauthorised, 
farmer installed turnouts' equalled the number of legal ones (PRC 
1983: III-7). During 1997, it was not uncommon to find four 
'illegal turnouts' against each legal one in the tail-end areas (NIA-
UPRIIS, 4 * District 1997). The NIA does not act against these 
inlet pipes. Though officially still considered 'illegal', in practice 
their existence is accepted by the agency. 
This phenomenon of the 'illegal' extra pipes is related to 
farmers' refusal to adopt the rotational method of irrigation. They 
did not want to wait for neighbouring farmers to finish land 
preparation. Instead, they wanted direct access to canal water. Also, 
the capacity of the inlet pipes was considered to be too limited, 
considering that it should be shared over the fifty hectares of a 
TSA. In the tail-end areas, the installation of high numbers of extra 
pipes was a reaction to the intermittent and unreliable water flows 
in the main system. In case water would arrive in the (sub-) laterals, 
the extra pipes allowed the farmers to quickly divert large amounts 
of water (NIA 1985:26). 
Farmers not only installed extra pipes, but also extra 'illegal' 
checking structures. Banana trunks and coconut lumber were used 
to check water at thresher crossings, bridges and/or siphons. In the 
smaller (sub-)laterals, farmers also constructed temporary checks 
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Dry season Wet season 
Land soaking » Transplanting J Land making Transplanting 
('ooo hectares) (days) (days) (days) (days) 
< 2 42 54 30 54 
2 - 4 45 61 24 60 
4 - 6 51 70 28 75 
6 - 1 0 45 81 33 72 
1 0 - 1 8 60 90 45 96 
Source. PRC 1983: HI-16 
The second consequence was that tail-end portions of relatively 
long (sub-) laterals would suffer from water stress. During times of 
scarcity, upstream and mid-stream farmers started to worry about 
future deliveries, and responded by checking whatever water was 
available in the (sub-)lateral. They would close their field bunds and 
build up the water level in their paddies. It thus would take a long 
time before water reached the area of the tail-enders along such a 
lateral. In case it took more than a week or so, water might not 
reach the tail-end areas at all. Upstream farmers might check again, 
themselves. 
These extra turnouts and checks had two major effects on main 
system management throughout the UPRIIS system. Firsdy, it 
staggered cropping calendars along (sub-) laterals. The common 
practice was that upstream farmers along a (sub-)lateral started land 
preparation by checking the water. After they were finished, 
downstream farmers followed. Finally the tail-end portions would 
be reached. Especially when water flows were limited in the (sub-
)lateral, cropping calendars would be much longer than intended by 
the NIA. For long laterals serving large areas, land soaking and 
transplantation activities took as much as three months (see table 
3.2). Consequendy, cropping seasons were prolonged and water 
was thus also required during the months of March, April and May 
when the local rivers were running dry. This hampered 
maintenance and rehabilitation work, as the cut-off period would 
become very short or non-existent (PRC 1983:111-17). 
TABLE 3.2: Average duration of land soaking and transplanting period for 
different sized areas in UPRIIS 
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as their fields - at least in their anxious minds - required to be 
irrigated once more. 
Poor canal maintenance 
The last but certainly not least cause of improper system use and 
the occurrence of water stress in the 4 t h District, was the poor 
maintenance of the canals. Throughout the system, but especially in 
the downstream areas, laterals and sub-laterals were silted. 
Consequendy, the carrying capacity of these canals was reduced. 
This further aggravated the problem for the tail-end areas along 
long canals. 
A tail-end sub-lateral may serve as an example. Measurements 
were carried out in 1986. Due to siltation and poor canal 
maintenance, the cross-sectional area of the canal was reduced by 
cme-third, compared to the design cross section. Also, velocities 
were much lower than designed, due to higher roughness 
coefficients, primarily attributable to growth of grasses. As a result 
of the loss of conveyance capacity of the canal, the effective service 
area declined by no less than two-thirds, from 1,600 hectares to 
500 hectares (Wensley 1989:173). 
This section has shown that actual NIA control over water and 
water users was low. Water flows were insufficient and erratic, 
while the NLA's ruling over cropping patterns and the use of the 
system was either simply disregarded or at least challenged by 
farmers and politicians. Water stress to crops was the result. 
The following section examines the magnitude of water stress in 
the District. The subsequent section explores the most important 
strategies employed by tail-end farmers to avoid such water stress. 
Water Stress in the District 
Water stress was - and still is - a serious and perennial problem in 
the District. On average, 9% of the dry season program area during 
1978-97 experienced severe yield reductions, mainly due to water 
stress (see figure 3.6). This is the equivalent of 1300 hectares.15 
However, the actual acreage of yield reductions due to water 
stress was much higher than the NIA's figures suggest. This had 
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two reasons. Firstly, the NLA only reported yield reductions within 
the boundaries of its program area. It did so to determine the areas 
to be exempted for the billing of service fees. By definition, fields 
that harvested lower than 2 tons/hectare were exempted from 
irrigation fee payments.16 However, the larger part of the problem 
of yield reduction due to water stress occurred in the tail-end areas 
outside of the program area. Secondly, farmers' yields may be 
affected by water stress but may still harvest more than 2 tons/ 
hectare. As dry season yields easily reached 4-5 tons/hectare, the 
exemption level of the NIA was set at a very low level. As the NLA 
did not keep (reliable) records of'mild' yield reductions within their 
program area, and had no yield data on the 'outside areas', I have to 
rely on my own estimates. 
FIGURE 3.6: Low yield areas due to water stress in the 4 t h District as part 
of the dry season program area 
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Source. NIA-UPRHS 1993; NIA-UPRHS, 4 * District 2002a 
I have tried to establish the magnitude of yield reductions due to 
water stress for the 1996-97 dry season crop. The NIA records 
show that 600 hectares of paddy yields within the program area were 
classified as 'exempted' during that season. Based on my interviews 
with the NIA's watermasters however, the total area of affected 
yields due to water stress in the whole of the District ranged 
somewhere between 4 - 6,000 hectares. It must be noted however, 
that water was particulady scarce during that season. There was no 
support at all from the reservoir, due to constxuction activities of a 
collapsed siphon in the feeder canal. Also, river supplies were 
relatively low. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that dry season 
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yield reductions due to water stress occurred on average on at least 
two thousand hectares (with at least a few hundred to a thousand 
hectares that were seriously affected, in the range of 0-2 
tons/hectare). Roughly, this equals over 10% of an average planted 
area of around 18,000 hectares during the dry season 
Wensley (1989) has measured water stress in more detail. He 
conducted a water balance study on three areas in one of the Zones 
of the 4 * District in the dry season of 1986-87 (Zone 1 of my study 
area). Despite the relatively good water supply from river and 
reservoir during that season, crops in the tail-end areas - included 
in the program area - suffered from water stress (see table 3.3). His 
measurements show that the average water supply to a tail-end 
lateral was only 0.33 1/s/ha (against an average planned water 
allowance of 1.3 1/s/ha.). During most of the dry season, water 
supply to the tail-end lateral was lower than crop water demands. 
Average yields were lower than in the head-end and also the 
variation in yield was higher, but the deficient water supply did not 
cause massive crop failure. The reason was that many farmers in 
that tail-end area were able to irrigate their fields from other 
sources, like groundwater and pumping from a nearby river 
(Wensley 1989:212-215)." 
TABLE 3.3: Head-tail yield differences due to water stress in Zone 1 
Average water supply 
(l/s/ba) 
Average yield ( t/ha) 
System-wide 0.8 4.0 
Upstream lateral 1.1 5.0 
Mid-stream lateral 0.7 4.3 
Downstream lateral 0.4 3.5 
Source: Wensley 1989: 213 
Water scarcity was found in the tail-end areas of the District. As 
these areas are located at the end parts of the canal system, the 
chances of water scarcity leading to crop damages or failure were 
relatively high. However, there is more to say about the potential 
loci of water stress. Firstly, tail-ends were found at all levels of the 
irrigation system. One can be a tail-ender on a field canal, a sub-
lateral, a lateral or a main canal. Water stress was mosdy found in 
the downstream laterals of a Zone, but it also occurred on fields 
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located at the end portion of a head-end sub-lateral. Moreover, 
local rivers and drains criss-crossing the irrigation system also 
provided for scarce water. Hence, the locations of potential water 
stress were found throughout the system. 
Secondly, water scarcity was not only determined by locational 
factors, but by several physical and ecological factors as well. Canal 
capacities, canal slopes, canal length, the number and condition of 
checking structures, soil types, percolation rates, local rainfall, re-
use facilities and planting dates all played a role. As some of these 
factors changed over time, the areas that suffered from water 
scarcity were not fixed in time. For instance, the carrying capacity 
of a canal could improve considerably due to desilting. Hence, the 
struggle over water was a dynamic one. The loci of struggle 
changed weekly, monthly and from season to season, due to 
changes in physical and ecological circumstances. 
Thirdly, also mid-stream areas were prone to water stress. The 
reason is, as Mollinga points out, that scarcity is both a cause and 
consequence of organisation (1998: 176). Effective networks of 
tail-end farmers could change the distribution of scarcity 
throughout the system. Upstream areas may experience water 
scarcity, caused by effective collective action of downstream 
colleagues. Over time, the areas suffering from water stress shifted 
as a consequence of changing power relations between rival 
networks. Consequendy, also areas located in mid-stream sections 
of the canal system potentially suffered from water stress. 
All in all, a large area in the District was potentially affected by 
water stress. The most problematic areas were located in the 
downstream parts of the District, but also end-portions of some 
upstream laterals were prone to water stress. Due to the effective 
strategies of tail-end farmers, water stress threatened to effect the 
mid-stream parts of the system as well. We will now take a look at 
some of die most important strategies of toil-end farmers in the 
struggle for scarce water. 
Strategies in the Struggle for Water 
Rival alliances headed by mid-stream and tail-end farmer leaders 
and local politicians struggled to get access to scarce water. The 
characteristics of these alliances are further examined in the 
following chapter. In this section we take a look at three major 
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strategies employed by these alliances in their struggle for water. 
The first strategy was to try to change and guard gate settings in the 
main system during the night. The second strategy made use of 
water storage in the main lateral at ckytime, to be released to 
targeted areas during the night 
The third strategy was the most ingenious one. Tail-end leaders 
- supported by the NIA staff - actually 're-designed' the layout of 
the system. By connecting drains to irrigation canals, they were able 
to optimise the use of their 're-use' dams, and circumvent the 
control of upstream villages over the irrigation canals leading to 
their tail-end areas. 
The nighdy struggle in the main system 
A lot of struggle focussed on the operation of the main system. 
The rival alliances tried to bring water to their areas, by struggling 
over the setting of gates and checks 'above the oudet' (Chambers 
1988). The struggles focused upon the following structures. 
• Headgates and cross-regulators at the main canal and at the 
lateral canals; 
• Bifurcation and tri-furcation structures at smaller (sub-) 
laterals; 
• Illegal' diversions from the main system into drains; 
• Legal and illegal checks in the smaller laterals 
These struggles were often intense and complicated. Firsdy, they 
involved multiple alliances. In the tail-end of Zone 1, it was not 
exceptional to find the leaders of up to six rival tail-end and mid-
stream groups all trying to operate the system in line with their own 
interests. It thus could be busy on the canal system. One could find 
up to twenty people from different alliances gathering at crucial 
headgates, who were all involved in negotiating its settings. 
Secondly, to be effective in bringing water downstream, an 
alliance needed to control multiple points in the canal system. 
Guarding one gate or check in the main system was usually not 
enough. Other groups, either upstream or downstream of the 
structure that one was guarding might then divert water. Therefore, 
alliances brought groups of people, using one or more vehicles. 
They would patrol canals to remove checks in the smaller laterals 
and to change, guard and/or negotiate settings of major headgates. 
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Thirdly, it involved large distances. For instance, the distance 
between the headgate of Zone 1 and the far tail-end of the 
extension area was neady 40 kilometres. Many canal roads were 
poody maintained, which made the patrolling of canals a 
cumbersome affair. Fourthly, the struggle required a prolonged 
effort from the people involved. Water may be scarce for several 
weeks. Irrigation of the fields represented by a certain alliance may 
take several days of continuous effort An example may clarify this 
point. 
I joined the group of the tail-end of the Zone 1 extension area, 
headed by the federation president, at eight in the evening. They 
were rather desperate. Around fifty hectares in their area still badly 
needed water. It had not been irrigated for two weeks now. This 
was the third consecutive night they went out to bring the water 
downstream. The last two nights they failed. Farmers from other 
tail-end areas were more successful in diverting the water. They 
made an agreement with these farmers that this night it would be 
their turn. However, also this night they could not make it 
We started to move upstream from their area. Along the 15 
kilometre stretch between their area and the headgate of the main 
lateral of the extension area, we counted around 20 motorpumps 
pumping from the canals and several farmer-constructed checks. 
They removed some of the checks, but the next morning farmers 
had re-installed them again. They were successful in changing the 
settings of two major headgates in the main lateral, which they 
guarded during most of the night However, the water levels were 
low and they had to seek compromises with groups of farmers 
from other tail-end areas as well. Moreover, farmers who could not 
be persuaded to at least reduce their intake guarded two diversions 
in the main lateral. Tomorrow night they will try again. However, if 
the water discharges into the Zone do not increase, they do not 
believe they can make it in time, (fieldnotes, February 1996) 
Much of the struggle for water in the main system took place at 
night. Tail-end leaders operated at night, because their chances of 
success were bigger than during the day. During daytime, farmers 
from the mid-stream areas were checking the (sub-) laterals to 
irrigate their fields. They usually did not allow these checks to be 
removed by downstream farmers. They argued that the tail-end 
farmers had to wait until the water needs of the mid-stream areas 
were served. Or they argued that the tail-end areas had no right to 
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Intermediate storage in the main canal 
As will be explained in the following chapter, some of the major 
alliances involved in main system management are very powerful. 
This power allowed them to operate the main system during 
daytime. They could overrule or persuade the daytime claims for 
water of mid-stream farmers or leaders of rival alliances. Their 
daytime interventions in the main system made their efforts in 
bringing water to the tail-end areas more effective. Their practice 
was to store water in one of the main laterals during daytime, and 
then to subsequendy release the water during the night. It was 
practiced to serve targeted tail-end areas. When lateral flows were 
limited, this was a common practice especially in Zone 1 of the 
District. 
intermediate storage was an effective practice for three 
reasons.19 Firsdy, it allowed one to increase the water releases to 
the tail-end areas during the night During the day, water would be 
stored in the mid-stream part of the main lateral of the Zone, by 
closing the gates of several major cross-regulators. The inflow of 
water from the main canal would ensure the water level to build up 
behind these structures. In the evening, this water was then 
water anyway, as they were not included in the program area. 
During daytime, the NIA field personnel were also around. They 
might insist on following schedules, and satisfy the needs of the 
program area first. 
During the night however, many of these opponents to tail-end 
interests were sound asleep. The NIA fieldworkers were not 
required to be at work after office hours (except for a few 
gatekeepers)18. Most of the mid-stream farmers were asleep as well. 
They felt confident that their farms would receive sufficient water, 
by guarding their check or the headgates during daytime. At night, 
tail-end farmers moved upstream to remove checks and operate 
headgates. The next morning, mid-stream farmers would find their 
check removed or would notice that the water flow in their (sub-
)lateral had been reduced. If they were still in need of water, they 
would re-install their check. Or they would contact their leaders or 
NIA field personnel, asking them to take action to increase the 
water flow in their (sub-)lateral. 
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released to targeted areas in the tail-end. At that time, the upstream 
farmers along the (sub-)laterals leading to such targeted tail-end 
areas were asleep, as explained above. It was thus easier to remove 
their checks, and to bring most of the water all the way down to a 
targeted area along one of the tail-end (sub-) laterals.20 
Secondly, the relatively big volume of water released facilitated 
the passage of upstream and mid-stream checks and diversions. In 
the evening, the cross-regulators in the main lateral of the Zone 
would be fully opened. Consequendy, a 'wall of water" would flow 
down into the canal system leading to the targeted tail-end area. 
The high discharge ensured that the many diversions along the way 
would not divert all the available water. Hence, water would 
actually arrive in the targeted tail-end area. Also, the high water 
level and high velocity would cause the overflow of the upstream 
and mid-stream checks and might destroy them as well. Especially 
the temporary checks made of bamboo and banana trunks would 
be (partly) flushed away. The result was that less water was 
diverted, and more water arrived at the tail-end. 
Thirdly, this practice made effective use of the lag-time of water 
flow. The travel time for canal water to flow from the from the 
mid-stream part of the main lateral in Zone 1 towards the tail-end 
areas was between 6-12 hours. Depending on the time-distance of 
the targeted tail-end area, the stored water in the main lateral would 
be released during the late afternoon or eady evening. This ensured 
water to arrive in the targeted area eady in the night, and to drop 
off by eady morning. Hence, most of the water would have arrived 
in the tail-end areas, before their upstream colleagues would be 
awake and might take action to check this water. 
Potentially, intermediate storage could be carried out in the full 
stretch of the main lateral. However, this required a co-ordinated 
effort that went beyond the capacities of even the most powerful 
alliance operating in Zone 1. At best, they could manage to control 
water storage over a distance of around 6 kilometres. Roughly 
estimated, this allowed for an active storage of over 20,000 cubic 
meters.21 I f we assume that two thirds of this water actually arrived 
in the targeted area, then one day of storage was sufficient to 
irrigate fifty hectares of tail-end farms with 30 mm of water. It thus 
was a rather effective practice to irrigate water-thirsty crops in 
targeted tail-end areas. 
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Re-engineering space: the diversion of first-use water for re-use 
dams 
Last but not least, the third strategy to get access to scarce 
irrigation water involved the use of re-use checks and local river 
dams. Ever since the construction of the original irrigation system in 
the 1930s, there has been a continuous development of dams and re-
use checks to counter the water scarcity problems in the District's 
area. The NLA, the old hacenderos as well as farmer leaders put up 
checks and dams in creeks and rivers criss-crossing the area, mostly 
located in the mid-stream and downstream parts of the District. This 
allowed them to make use of the limited flow of water in creeks and 
small rivers that came from relatively small catchments on the 
Eastern side of the District These waterways passed the main lateral 
of Zone 1, and continued their way towards the Candaba swamps. 
Also, during the construction of the UPRIIS system, a bigger dam 
was constructed on a faidy large river in the very tail-end of Zone 1. 
This dam would supplement the water supply of lateral 1 to serve the 
water needs of the Zone's very tail-end area (see map 3.2; area C 
indicates the area served by that river diversion dam). 
Moreover, the re-use checks in the system were constructed to 
make use of run-off water from the upstream areas in the District. 
Most of these checks were made of concrete and operated with 
wooden stop-logs. Sometimes also bulldozers were used to raise 
temporary earth dams in the natural drains to save whatever limited 
water was available for irrigation. 
Nowadays, large parts of the downstream areas of the District 
receive water through drainage ways and local rivers, rather than 
through the irrigation canal system (see map 32). According to 
NIA data, the service area of the largest 16 checks and dams in the 
District was over five thousand hectares. During the 1996-97 dry 
season, the NIA included over 2400 hectares of rice areas irrigated 
by means of re-use checks and river dams in the program area. My 
own findings suggest that the total irrigated area through re-use 
checks and river dams might be as large as eight thousand hectares. 
This is one third of the total service area of the District. 
At the start of the UPRIIS project, the NIA did not yet see the 
value of the re-use checks. Some were demolished, as they were 
considered a potential cause of flooding. Given the water supply of 
the reservoir, the modernised irrigation system and improved water 
management, these structures were considered to be redundant 
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£fp - Connection from irrigation canal to creek 
Source. NIA-UPRHS, 4 * District 1983,1995 
As the UPRIIS did not meet its expectations, tail-end farmers 
started to use the drainage checks again. In several cases they were 
able to convince NIA to reconstruct the eadier demolished checks. 
Nowadays, the NIA management of the District has accepted the 
idea of dams in local rivers and the re- use checks to augment the 
water supply of the tail-end areas. Some of the larger re-use checks 
MAP 3.2: The re-use system of the 4 * District and the interconnections 
with the irrigation system 
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were even operated by a NIA-employed gatekeeper. 
Tail-end farmers resorted to re-use water for the simple reason 
that water was to be found in the drains rather than in the irrigation 
canals. Due to upstream checking, the tail-end parts of (sub-
)laterals did not carry much water in the dry season. The drains 
however did carry water. The reason was that farmers along 
upstream laterals made abundant use of irrigation water. The excess 
water ran into the drains.22 This water in the drains allowed the tail-
end farmers to start eady with the wet season crop, and thus with 
the subsequent dry season crop. Also, it gave them access to water 
in the first part of the dry season, when water was still easily 
available for the upstream laterals. 
The re-use of water for irrigation in tail-end areas had its 
limitations. When irrigation water became scarce the chains also ran 
dry. This usually happened in the second half of the dry season crop. 
Upstream and mid-stream farmers responded to water scarcity by 
using water more prudendy. Fearing water scarcity problems in the 
near future, they repaired their field bunds to avoid water leaking 
away. Farmers located in die upper parts of the tail-end areas used 
whatever available water was left in the drains. They closed the checks 
in the drains, and irrigated their fields. If possible they made use of 
gravity, but in case water levels in the drains were too low they would 
use pumps. Hence, water scarcity in the irrigation canals was followed 
by scarcity of re-use water in the drainage system 
Also the supply of the local rivers in the tail-end areas was 
insufficient As the catchments of these rivers are small, and farmers 
upstream along this rivers - located outside of the District's service 
area - also diverted water, these rivers easily ran dry. Hence, farmers 
along these local rivers still needed the support of water from the 
main lateral. 
To solve this problem, tail-end farmers as well as the NIA have 
connected these drainage creeks and local rivers to irrigation canals at 
rdatively upstream points in the irrigation system. Over the years, 
numerous connections have been established (map 3.2). Through 
these connections the 're-use checks' and dams in local rivers were 
supplied with 'first-use' irrigation water from the District's canal 
system. The drains, creeks and rivers started to serve as shortcuts or 
feeder irrigation canals for the tail-end areas. The checks diverted 
both drainage 're-use' water as well as 'first-use' irrigation water. This 
supplemental 'first-use' water was crucially important to satisfy the 
water needs of the rice crops (see table 3.4). 
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TABLE 3.4: Importance of first-use water from the main system during 
dry season for areas served by re-use checks and dams in local rivers 
Area 
(see map 32) 
Program area 
(ba) 
Irrigated area 
(ha) 
Irrigable area without 
support of canal water (ha) 
A 1100 1200 100 
B 500 950 200 
C 400 900 300 
Source: NIA-UPIUIS, 4* District 19952* 
The connections were often ingenious. At crossings of irrigation 
canals with drainage creeks, holes were made in the bottom of 
concrete floors of the irrigation canals. To the farmers deprived of 
water, such a connection was hard to detect and even harder to 
repair.24 In other cases pipes were installed in the bunds of the 
irrigation canal to divert water into the drain, or the irrigation canal 
was simply cut. 
FIGURE 3.7: First-use/re-use connection by means of a manhole 
It was not always necessary to demolish or re-design the physical 
infrastructure to establish a connection. Sometimes it sufficed to 
use the irrigation infrastructure in a different way. For instance, one 
connection - supplying water to area B in map 3.2 - was made at a 
point where a main lateral crossed a river through an inverted 
siphon. The water was diverted into the river by opening the 
manholes of the siphon. These manholes are meant to be used for 
cleaning purposes, but farmers discovered that these can be used 
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for diversion purposes as well. Due to the large water head, a 
'fountain' of water pours out of the irrigation siphon into the river 
and supplements the water flow to several temporary and fixed 
checks in the river and connected drainage creeks (see figure 3.7). 
In other cases, irrigation water was diverted into drains through 
escape structures. Located upstream of inverted siphons and larger 
division points, escape pipes allowed for the diversion of irrigation 
water into drains when supply exceeds the canal capacity. They are 
also constructed to drain the irrigation canal in case the canal or 
clogged-up structures need to be cleaned. Tail-end farmers, 
however, happily made use of these structures to divert water into 
the drains during times of scarcity. 
The largest of such a type of diversion was feeding water to the 
re-use check serving area A (see map 3.2). This 're-use' area of 
around 1200 hectares almost fully depended upon first-use water 
diverted into a large drain. The area's diversion was located in the 
very upstream part of the system, taking water direcdy from the 
District's main canal. The diversion structure was a gated check 
that was constructed as the escape structure of the main canal. By 
opening these gates, main canal water went into the drain, and 
served the water needs of this large tail-end 're-use' area. 
The tail-end farmers would often not have to manipulate this gate 
to get the water. Regulady, water entered the drain as the checking 
gates of the escape structure overflowed due to excessive checking of 
a nearby checking structure. Also a local crushing plant regulady 
diverted irrigation water into the drain to be used as washing water 
for the crushed stones. As the owner happened to be the vice-
governor of Nueva Ecija, the NLA management tolerated this 'illegal' 
practice. However, in case water did become scarce, the farmer 
leaders, NIA fieldworkers or local politicians representing this tail-end 
area would go upstream and open the gates of this escape structure. 
Formally, the NIA considered these connections to be 'illegal', but 
in practice they were tolerated. The NIA also made use of them and 
in several cases the NIA decided to strengthen temporary 
connections initially put up by water users. 
The advantages of re-use/first-use connections 
Accessing both re-use and first-use irrigation water through these 
back-door connections gave important advantages not available to 
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tail-end farmer fields only reached by irrigation canals. In several 
areas, the bypasses even allowed rice to be planted in areas located 
downstream of areas that could not be planted by rice due to a lack of 
water in the irrigation canals. Also, these bypasses sometimes allowed 
for better harvests. The advantages are several. 
Firsdy, a low number of checks were built in these drains and 
rivers that allowed water to flow downstream relatively quickly. The 
drains and local rivers were natural waterways of large dimensions, 
created by heavy rains and floods. Now and then, they were enlarged 
to lessen water-logging or flooding problems in the areas. It was 
therefore difficult for farmers to build temporary checks in these 
waterways. Hence, only a few large concrete checks were constructed 
in these waterways. In contrast, a high number of checks and legal 
and illegal turnout structures were located in the narrower irrigation 
canals, especially at the tail-end. If ever, it thus took a very long time 
before water reached the end of the canal. 
Secondly, the large dimensions in combination with the relatively 
low elevation of drainage creeks and local rivers allowed large 
volumes of water to be diverted from irrigation canals in case water 
was available. The smaller and highly elevated irrigation sub-laterals 
could only divert part of this water. The water inflow was further 
hampered due to backwater effects of the legal and illegal checking 
structures in these canals. This was an important difference when one 
realises that water in the irrigation laterals in the tail-end areas usually 
comes at erratic times and in highly varying volumes. 
Thirdly, the drainage creeks and rivers only served a relatively 
narrow strip (around 200 meters) of rice fields located directiy 
along them. Farmers considered it to be too expensive to pump 
water from the creek to fields further away. Also, drainage creeks 
hardly had branches and distribution points from which water 
could be pumped into the fields, because an extensive drainage 
network was lacking. In contrast, the irrigation sub-lateral and its 
branches served large areas with a high number of farmers. 
Fourthly, these differences in physical characteristics gave an 
important managerial advantage to the drainage and river bypasses. 
Negotiation over water distribution was limited to a small group of 
people. Downstream farmer leaders could limit their negotiations to 
the farmer leaders who were in charge of the few checks in the drains 
and rivers. In contrast, the tail-end farmers located along an irrigation 
sub-lateral or one of its branches needed to talk to a high number of 
upstream farmers, as they were all operating canal structures, like 
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small checks, cuts in the canal bunds, or oudets. It was easier to deal 
with the former than with the latter case. 
To summarise, tail-end farmers developed ingenious strategies in 
the struggle for scarce water. They made use of the design 
characteristics of the modem system, but in ways very different from 
those supposed to be used. Also, they re-designed the system in line 
with their own interests. They operated at night, as they then had 
more 'room for manoeuvre' in the main system. If well-organised, 
tail-end alliances made use of intermediate storage in the main system. 
Finally, re-use structures in combination with first-use connections 
have proven to be a very effective way to bring the water 
downstream. These strategies of the tail-end farmers make the 
struggle for water a dynamic and complicated one. It moreover 
involves large areas, including die mid-stream sections of the system. 
Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the physical properties of and the water 
management practices in the 4 * District of the UPRIIS system. It 
showed that the actual use of the system was very different from 
what was intended during the design phase. It was designed for 
high levels of control over water and the water users. By precise 
regulation of the gates, detailed prescription of farmers practices 
and clear-cut allocation procedures, the NLA hierarchy was going 
to ensure high water use efficiencies and a secure environment for 
crop growth. 
In reality however, the actual control over the water in the 
system and the NIA's control over farmers' practices turned out to 
be low in large parts of the District. This situation was caused by a 
combination of technical as well as socio-political factors. On the 
technical side, poor canal maintenance and the erratic and 
inadequate inflow into the system made controlled main system 
management a cumbersome affair. 
On the socio-political side, the NLA authority to enforce its 
regulations was compromised. Worse, its control over the 
headgates - let alone the lower levels of the system - was often 
contested by farmer leaders and local politicians (for further 
discussion, see the following chapter). Farmers and their leaders 
ignored cut-off dates of the NIA, as well as its program area that 
supposedly determined which areas could and could not be 
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irrigated during the dry season. Moreover, farmers installed large 
numbers of turnouts, checking structures and connections to 
drainage creeks and local rivers that compounded the complexities 
of controlled main system management 
In short, the idea of a highly controlled environment that was 
laid down in the system's design as well as its management 
procedures have proven to be an illusion. The system still 
functioned, was being managed and to some extent, water flows 
were predictable. However, it was much more 'mess/ than 
expected. The behaviour of both farmers and NIA managers was 
guided by an ad hoc 'go-wifh-the-flow' attitude, rather than one of 
planned control. 
These findings coincide with eadier studies of main system 
water management in canal systems (see for instance Chambers 
1988). It also tallies with business management literature on the 
behaviour of managers. As they find themselves in dynamic, 
complex and uncertain environments, rigid behaviour based on 
planning and pre-determined activities will not work. Successful 
managers are good in 'groping along', 'muddling-through' and 
'learning-by-doing'. (Behn 1988). This chapter has shown that the 
environment for the NIA's District managers as well as the farmers 
is also a complex, dynamic and uncertain one. Similady, people and 
crops could only survive by adopting a flexible and pragmatic 
'muddling through' approach. 
My findings on water control also seem to support the thesis of 
Horst (1987,1995,1998) on 'the paradox of operational flexibility'. 
His argument is that systems designed for high levels of water 
control often attain the opposite. The higher the possibilities for 
regulation and adjustment to fine-tune water flows through the 
system, paradoxically, the lower the actual levels of predictability 
and water use efficiency. Indeed, the existence of gated structures 
throughout the system contributed to the system's problems, rather 
than lessened them. In times of scarcity, gate operations 
disproportionally reduced water flows to the tail-ends of the 
system, while also the amplitude of water level fluctuations 
increased further down the system. 
Horst advocated the use of simple and fixed structures to 
increase the predictability of water flows, and to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of scarcity throughout the system. My 
findings support his idea. The NIA itself reduced the operational 
flexibility of the gates, by cutting holes in them. Their motivations 
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were very similar to what Horst advocated: to improve the 
predictability of the water flows, and to ensure that at least part of 
the water in the main system would 'automatically' flow to the tail-
end areas. 
I disagree however with Horst when it comes to the explanation 
for the occurrence of this managerial paradox. He argues that the 
problem arises because irrigation agencies in developing countries 
usually lack sufficient manpower and skills to propedy manage 
these sophisticated systems. The NIA might indeed have been 
understaffed, especially since the mid-eighties when the 
streamlining policies took effect. However, skills were definitely 
not the problem. As was shown in this chapter, both the NIA 
engineers and fieldworkers were highly educated and well trained. 
They knew very well how to make use of this modem, 
sophisticated system. 
The major reason for the improper use of the system was socio-
political in nature. The NIA engineers could not employ their skills 
for high-tech management to proper use, as local power holders 
challenged their authority. Or they were not inclined to do so, as 
central control over their performance was limited, and the merit 
system for promotion was undermined by a system of favouritism 
and political backing (for further discussion, see chapters 4 and 7). 
The last conclusion in relation to the issue of water control is 
about turn over. Given the findings presented in this chapter, it can 
be concluded that the idea of turn over stands out as an awkward 
one. Farmers were already deeply involved in main system 
management, before turn over came to their area. Put ironically, 
the more appropriate label for these turn over policies would be: 
1et's-formalise-what-we-already-lost'. I f put in more constructive 
terms, the policies tried to build up functional management 
organisations that came to terms with reality, and thus gave a larger 
formal role for farmers in the management of the system. At the 
same time however, the IAs and federations would help to 
discipline farmer behaviour and thus would allow the NIA to 're-
take' control, rather than turning it over. 
This chapter has also shown that water stress was a recurrent 
and serious phenomenon in the District. As farmers could pump 
from local rivers and drains, and also often had access to deep 
wells, water scarcity increased costs of production but not 
necessarily crop failure. Nevertheless, yield reductions and total 
crop failure were a recurrent phenomenon that - in particulady dry 
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seasons- involved thousand of hectares. Consequendy, the risk and 
actual occurrence of water stress shaped farmer behaviour as well 
as the NIA's practices in large parts of the tail-end and mid-stream 
areas of the District. I described three major strategies employed in 
the struggles for scarce water. These were the nighdy operations to 
guard and manipulate headgates, the practice of water storage in 
the main system, and the ingenious use of re-use checks and dams 
in local rivers, supplemented by legal and illegal diversions of 
irrigation water. 
My findings on the interconnections between the re-use and 
first-use system allow me to warn against ovedy optimistic or 
simplistic views on the benefits of re-use systems. Re-use has been 
propagated in recent years by institutions like IWMI. It has been 
portrayed as a key solution to water management problems. By 
looking at catchments rather than individual systems, the problem 
of low irrigation efficiencies suddenly disappears, as re-users in the 
lower parts of a catchment pick up losses in the upstream. As water 
may be used several times before it finally reaches the sea, overall 
irrigation efficiencies might easily reach and surpass 100% (Seckler 
1996; Keller and Seckler 1996; cf. Wolters and Bos 1990). 
To a large extent, I agree that re-use systems are very helpful 
indeed. The checks in the drainage creeks - and the dams in local 
rivers supplemented by upstream irrigation water - helped a lot to 
solve water scarcity problems in the District. Also, it has been 
shown that it provided downstream farmers advantages to access 
water, which were not available through the irrigation canal system. 
However, although the re-use structures thus eased the problem 
of main system management, they also further complicated the 
matter. Farmers and NIA workers alike did not simply wait for 
irrigation water to arrive in their drain. They started to manipulate 
the gates and even re-designed the system to make this happen. 
Hence, the re-use systems further increased the rivalry over scarce 
water, and further lessened the possibilities for a co-ordinated and 
agency-controlled main system management. 
This chapter has shown the strong spatial dimension of 
struggles over water and the spatial distribution of scarcity in the 
District. It also showed how social action affected this spatial 
distribution of scarcity. This will be further examined in the 
subsequent chapter. 
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Notes 
1 It is also locally known as the PRIS system. However, PenRIS is used by 
the NIA, as PRIS gets confused with the acronym of the Pampanga River 
Irrigation System, another UPRIIS sub-system located further upstream. 
2 The plan is still die basis for water resources development in Central 
Luzon. For instance, one of the major dams and reservoirs suggested in 
the plan (the Balintingon dam and reservoir) was again on the political 
agenda of congressmen and senators during 1996-97. 
3 Overall irrigation efficiencies were initially set at relatively low levels of 
ambition (36% for the dry and 31% for the wet season). These were 
expected to rise to 70% for the dry season and 58% for the wet season 
(NIA UPRIIS 1978:12). In time, this would allow for an expansion of the 
irrigable area. By 1997 however, the irrigation efficiencies did not go 
above 40%. These low efficiency figures were used by the NIA to 
determine the irrigable (program) area. 
4 These are pre-project data of the UPRP project, thus concerning the 
mid-sixties. By the time the Aurora-Penaranda project started in the mid-
seventies, pre-project yields as well as the cropping intensity were already 
much higher. 
5 To be achieved thirteen years after the full completion of the project in 
1978 (Ng and Lethem: 1983: 4). The expectation that the wet season 
would yield higher than the dry is remarkable. I could however, not find 
an explanation. 
6 The cropping intensity was not expected to reach 200%, due to 
remaining drainage problems in the wet season. 
7 It thus follows a different principle than the protective irrigation 
schemes in the Indian sub-continent In protective schemes, water is to be 
spread as thinly as possible throughout the irrigation system, to maximise 
the irrigated area 0urriens et al. 1996). 
8 The management of the reservoir was not part of my study. From what I 
learned from the NIA engineers, there were two reasons for the low 
reservoir levels. Firsdy, rainfall in the catchment was less than expected 
and more erratic. The catchment of the reservoir is relatively small. A 
'good' typhoon was needed to fill the reservoir, but - given the relatively 
small size of the reservoir's catchment - there was considerable chance 
that typhoon rains would fall outside the catchment Secondly, water 
build-up for the dry season was said to be undermined by wet season 
water releases for electricity generation. 
9 There are no official data available on the actually planted areas. The 
reason is that the NIA management does not gather data outside the 
program areas. Watermasters of these areas are not required to report 
weekly on the farming activities in these areas, nor do they have to submit 
a harvest report Only when these areas happen to have a good harvest 
due to good access to water, the District management may decide to 
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include these areas for billing. In that case a harvest report will be made. 
1 0 Even if the NIA had done so, their authority would probably still have 
been challenged. Farmers along these drains would have grabbed the 
opportunity and would have started growing rice. Over time, they would 
have pressured local politicians and the NIA to build 're-use* dams in the 
drains, and would organise themselves to divert water from the NIA 
canals into these drains. Hence, this NIA measure would simply have 
created a new tail-end alliance contesting the main system management 
operations of the NIA, rather than solving the problem. 
1 1 This was however not the case for the whole of the District As chapter 
4 shows, the NIA had formed an effective alliance with farmers and local 
politicians in Zone 2. In that Zone, rotational schedules were largely 
implemented as planned. 
1 2 Wensley (1989:166) found the same situation in 1987. 
1 3 In several cases, the UPRIIS project failed to construct these facilities. 
This was partly because farmers resisted their construction. 
1 4 This is not to say that farmers do not manage water at all. Field water 
management is for instance taking place in cases of direct seeding and 
during the application of fertiliser and pesticides. In between these 
activities, continuous field-to-field irrigation is the dominant practice. 
Only in case of (expected) scarcity, farmers will repair and close the 
fieldbunds, to conserve as much water as possible on the field. 
1 5 Water scarcity was the most important cause of low yields in the dry 
season. However, rat and pest infestation also played a role. 
1 6 In practice, though officially not accepted by the NLA's management, 
NIA fee collectors would be accommodating to farmers who had 
relatively low harvests. Also, they were lenient to those farmers who had 
spent money for pumping from deep wells, or to bring water from NIA 
canals or local rivers to their fields. The NLA collector might then decide 
to exempt part of the farmers' area, although the actual harvest exceeded 
the 2 tons/hectare. Consequendy, the magnitude of water stress in the 
program area might be smaller than the exemption figures suggest 
1 7 Valera and Wickham (1976) reported more serious yield differences 
between the head and the tail of this Zone due to differential access to 
water. In their study on the 1972-73 dry season - thus before the start of 
the UPRIIS project -, they found yields to decline from 2.5 tons/hectare 
in die head of the Zone, to only 0.4 tons/hectare in the tail. 
1 8 See chapter 5 for the activities of the NIA fieldworkers during the 
night 
1 9 See Horst (1998 111-115) for a general discussion of the advantages of 
intermediate storage. 
2 0 Ln case these upstream farmers were worried about their water supply, 
they might not go to sleep, though. In case they did not get water during 
daytime, they might decide to guard their check during night-time. They 
obviously knew what was going on, but they did not necessarily know 
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where the water would go during the night They thus might decide to 
find out whether this big volume of water will pass their check during the 
night, or whether it was targeted to a tail-end area that was not located 
downstream of their check. 
2 1 A rough estimate is that the average active storage over this six-
kilometre stretch was around 3.75 m 2 (2.5 m wide x 1.5 m depth (average 
depth in between structures, allowing for backwater curves)). 
2 2 From a system wide perspective, it can be argued that the practices of 
upstream farmers were inefficient To them, however, it was not They for 
instance 'over-irrigated1 their paddies to avoid weed growth. Also, they 
preferred to irrigate their paddies in a continuous manner, to minimise the 
input of labour. Moreover, over the years hundreds of paddy fields in the 
upstream areas were converted into fishponds. A continuous flow of fresh 
water in these fishponds was a precondition for high fish yields. 
2 3 The data refer to the dry seasons of 1994-97. The data of the program 
area were obtained from the District office. The other data were estimates 
of watermasters or farmer leaders from the three areas. 
2 4 One would need to replace the concrete floor to repair it Tail-end 
farmers affected by the diversion tried to close such a connection, by 
putting a sandbag into the hole. At night, farmers from the tail-end area 
making use of the diversion would again try to open the hole. A new 
diversion point, operated by farmers, had thus been created. 
Forging Alliances for Main System 
Management 
While I described the practices of main system management in die 
preceding chapter, this chapter explores the politics of these 
practices. It was already shown that water allocation and 
distribution 'above the outlet' is a seriously contested matter in the 
District. To give some initial flavour to the idea of main system 
management politics, this chapter starts with an interview held with 
a former barangay kapitan (elected village leader). His village is 
located in the tail-end of Zone 1 of the District. The interview talks 
about his tactical moves made in irrigation management during the 
dry season of 1984. 
Water was really critical at the time. I mobilised thirty men and 
thirty women from my own as well as the neighbouring barrio. We 
went to the headgate of San Anton and stayed there for nine 
consecutive days. We used the NLA quarters at the gate to sleep, 
cook and eat The women cooked, but sometimes also joined 
guarding the gates. We believed that the presence of the women 
might stop others from attacking us. 
I had made a deal with the NIA District Chief, but he broke 
it In the beginning of the season I gave him PI0,000 as an advance 
payment of service fees, for which the NIA cashier gave me a 
receipt Ln return, the NIA would help us to get water, although we 
were not included in the program area. 
During the season however, the NLA District Chief ordered 
the sliding gates of a major division structure to be welded, to stop 
water flowing to the tail-end areas located outside of the program 
area. 1 then ordered my men to destroy the sliding gates with a mam 
[a sledgehammer, JO]. When the Chief learned about it, he arrived 
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in his land cruiser. I said 'Good morning'. The Chief responded: 
"What's good about this morning, you are destroying NLA's 
property". L ignored what he said and we continued destroying the 
gate. Then the Chief raised his voice and told me stop it I then told 
my man holding the maso: "I will count 1,2,3 and then you hit the 
Chief on his head!" The Chief got frightened and left to his office. L 
followed him, showed him the receipt and shouted at him that from 
that day onwards, L would be engineer as well as technician. L meant 
to say that I would take care of everything, without relying on the 
NIA anymore. 
I then went to the hometown of General Ocampo, who at 
the time was commanding the Civil Relations Services. He 
instructed the mayor of my town - who was a local commander 
over these forces - to provide me with soldiers. The mayor gave me 
12 soldiers who helped me guard the gates for two months. 
1 needed these soldiers for my protection and security. I was 
afraid of both the Juatco and Meneses factions of the municipality 
of Victoria. These two factions were fighting each other, and 
without realising it, 1 had become part of it One day Juatco and his 
men harassed my group at the headgate, and chased them away. 
When I learned about it, I was very angry and went to Juatco's 
house, carrying my M-16 machine gun and .45 pistol. I decided to 
go alone, because in case things would go wrong, I would be the 
only one killed. Fortunately Juatco understood my anger, and we 
started to co-ordinate our efforts at the gates. Lt was only later that I 
learned about the feud between the Juatco and Meneses clan. I 
parted ways with Juatco, but L was afraid that Meneses would still 
consider me to be one of his enemies. That is why 1 looked for the 
protection of these soldiers. (Interview with a former barangay 
kapitan of a tail-end village in Zone 1, January 1997) 
Within the 4 t h District, the bold moves of this kapitan were 
widely considered to be the starting-point of a politicised struggle 
over water that lasted at least until the time of my field research in 
the mid-nineties. However, if only out of fairness to all those 
'civilised' and 'responsible' actors in the District, it should be 
stressed that this is one of the most dramatic accounts of irrigation 
politics I came to know of. To some extent it pictures a kind of 
irrigation politics that was no longer found during the mid-nineties. 
In 1984, the country was still under the military rule of President 
Marcos. Also, the leader interviewed belonged to one of the former 
Huk strongholds, who were known for their rebellious acts of 
Forging Al&ancesfor Main System Management 103 
bravery long after the Huk rebellion came to a halt (see chapter 2). 
Hence, the story above is an extreme one. Nevertheless, it reveals a 
number of points that are valid for the everyday politics of main 
system management in the District in general. 
Firsdy, it shows that farmers do not passively obey the program 
or wait for water to arrive at their oudets. They move 'above the 
oudet" and are active players in the management of the main 
system. Secondly, it shows that the NLA's District managers -
though de jure in charge - were de facto challenged in their control 
over the main system (for these first two points, see also the 
previous chapter). Thirdly, it shows the important role of 
politicians in managing water. Fourthly, people forge alliances - in 
this case with upstream political factions and the military - to get 
access to scarce water. Fifthly, the mechanisms at work in main 
system management (henceforth MSM) are not limited to 
administrative or financial ones. As the story above shows, political 
patronage and the threat of force and violence were also important. 
This chapter further explores these points. The focus is on the 
social relations of power: who had control over MSM and why? It 
analyses the ways in which people organised, built alliances and 
fought each other. The leading questions for this analysis are: who 
were the main actors, what were their strategies, and how were they 
related to each other? To understand these practices and strategies, 
I examine how they are embedded in wider state-society relations. 
Finally, this chapter also examines how the different reform 
policies -notably rum over - changed the everyday politics of 
MSM. 
The main arguments of this chapter is that the MSM in the 
District was the subject of struggle between rival alliances 
composed of politicians, NLA officials and IA leaders. These 
alliances were bound together by interpersonal relations based on 
political patronage, friendship and kinship. 
This is a long chapter. It is structured as follows. The next 
section explains the NLA's weakness to control MSM, as the NIA 
is part of a weak state facing a strong society. As none of the 
involved actors in MSM have the upper hand, people are forced to 
forge alliances and accommodate their interests to those of others. 
Several of such alliances compete for scarce water. The section 
ends with discussing the major characteristics of these rival 
alliances. 
104 Water, Works and Wages 
The following two sections are the empirical heart of this 
chapter. They are detailed accounts of the two major irrigation 
alliances in die MSM of Zone 1 and 2. These two alliances have a 
very different character. Relations in Zone 1 between NIA 
engineers, local politicians and farmer leaders are rather 
antagonistic, while the relations in the Zone 2 alliance are more 
friendly and co-operative. In 'consultancy speak', Zone 1 is a case 
of partnership failure, while Zone 2 is a successful case of 
partnership between the NIA and the LA federations. However, it 
is shown that political patronage and brokerage are at the heart of 
both cases. 
The fourth section draws these empirical findings together. The 
main binding forces of the water alliances are discussed one by one. 
These are the interpersonal relations based on political patronage 
and brokerage as well as friendship and kinship. Bribery is 
discussed as a third — though much less important — binding force. 
Finally, it is discussed how the threat of force shapes the MSM in 
the District. 
In the concluding section I summarise the main findings, and 
stress the usefulness of the concepts of 'alliances' and 
'accommodation' as well as the concept of 'blurred boundaries' 
between state and society for the study of main system 
management in canal systems. 
The Weakness of NIA 
The previous chapter has shown in detail that the NIA could not 
enforce its rulings in the management of the main system. For 
instance, it lacked the capacity to stop water from flowing outside 
the program area. Also, it had to accept the numerous 'illegal' turn 
outs and checking structures built by farmers. As this chapter will 
show, local politicians (barangay kapitans and mayors) as well as 
farmer leaders had a large say in the management of water. In some 
instances, - as in the case above - the NIA fully lost control and 
the politicians or farmer leaders took over. In most cases however, 
the NIA District managers and staff still had some say. They were 
forced - or willingly chose to do so - to adopt NIA policies and 
practices to the interests of local power holders, and/or built an 
alliance with them. 
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This section will explain why such accommodation and alliance 
building was taking place. It will do so by discussing wider state-
society relations in the rural Philippines. First however, I turn to a 
more physical explanation for the NIA's limited power canal water 
is a resource not easily controlled. 
Canal water a resource that is hard to control 
During one of the coffee breaks in the period I was writing this 
section, I read a newspaper article on illegal immigrants trying to 
pass through the tunnel between France and England. The article 
discussed the various tactics of the immigrants to outsmart the 
French immigration authorities. It made me realise once again the 
difficulty of the NIA's task in controlling water. I f two resourceful 
and effective states cannot even control one central point of 
passage (the tunnel entrance), how can one then expect the NLA to 
control numerous passage points spread out over a very large area? 
These immigrants may be desperate and very innovative, but so are 
farmers in tail-end areas. 
The nature of the resource and the characteristics of the 
irrigation technology thus also help account for the NIA's lack of 
control over water management. Social and political scientists 
discussing the weakness or strength of states to control resources 
tend to ignore the importance the physical characteristics of a 
certain resource (e.g. Grindle 1990; Migdal 2001). However, it 
cleady makes a difference whether a state has to control for 
example the distribution of hand-tractors to a target group of 
farmers, or to control the distribution of water. Users are able to 
treat irrigation canal water as a common pool resource: "The basic 
feature of a common pool resource is that exclusion is difficult and 
yield is subtractable" (Ostrom and Gardner 1993: 93). The sheer 
size of a large-scale system simply provides too many opportunities 
to stop water users from interfering in MSM (Mollinga 1998:150). 
The odds are heavily against the NLA management. The 
operations engineer of the District commands around fifty 
fieldworkers who work five days a week, from nine to five. Let us 
assume that he had full control over his field personnel and that he 
desperately wanted to enforce the rules. Even then, he would still 
lack the capacity to control the (wrong) doings of around twenty 
thousand farmers. These farmers can divert water from the main 
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system during both day and night and during work days and 
weekends. They can do so, from hundreds of legal and illegal 
diversion points located along several hundreds kilometres of main 
canals, laterals and sub-laterals, and at intersections of these canals 
with drainage creeks. 
Having said this, the socio-political context is cleady important as 
well. Public agencies in some East Asian countries managing equally 
large schemes attain higher levels of control (Lam 1996; Wade 1982a). 
Even in the protective irrigation schemes of India, the irrigation 
agencies seem to be more in control than the NIA does in the 
management of the District studied (on India, see Wade 1988). The 
socio-political relations between the NIA and local forces thus 
deserve further examination. 
A weak state in a strong society 
The NIA is weak, as it is part of a weak state, the weakest in Asia 
(Cammack et aL 1993). A state is considered to be weak if it has a 
limited capacity "to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, 
extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined 
ways" (Migdal 1988: 4). As the Philippine state enjoys little 
autonomy from "dominant social classes and entrenched 
particularistic groups, it has been captured by competing societal 
interests" (Rivera 1991). The capabilities of the state to manage 
public resources are thus seriously undermined by a 'strong 8 0 0 6 1 / . 
This has historical roots. 
In the course of Philippine history there has been no phase during 
which the central state has expropriated the means of coercion and 
extraction from autonomous and private power holders through 
their subordination or incorporation into paid public servants (Sidel 
1995:41). 
This does not mean that the state is absent in the countryside of 
Central Luzon. On the contrary, there is an extensive multi-tier 
Local Government Units (LGU) system of barangays, 
municipalities, provinces plus elements of the national system 
including congressional Districts and agencies of the national 
government. Elected barangay kapitans and councils, municipal 
mayors and councils, province governors and councils and finally 
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congressmen head these. Especially after the implementation of the 
Local Government Code in 1991, the LGUs have been relatively 
well funded and staffed. 
However, the politicians governing these bodies are elected. 
They thus do not owe their appointment, re-appointment, salary or 
promotion to the central government (Fegan 1994). Moreover, the 
political parties to which these politicians are related do not 
aggregate ideological, principled or even partisan interests; it is 
standard for successful candidates to switch, soon after the 
election, to the party of the winning executive of that unit. Political 
parties consist of loose alliances of politicians that distribute 
political patronage in return for electoral support. Hence the 
central government or the ruling party has Utile means to discipline, 
dismiss or otherwise punish these elected officials. The local 
politicians appoint most of the staff in the local government 
bodies, and the congressmen try to intervene in the appointment, 
promotion and transfer of staff in central government agencies in 
or affecting their congressional District. These state workers thus 
tend to follow local interests rather than the laws, regulations and 
policies of the central state. 
Ironically, much of the power of local power holders is derived 
from their control over the political institutions of the state. Firsdy, 
it gives them access to state funds. In the post-war period, they 
captured the ever-increasing state resources to increase their power 
and wealth, while further weakening the state in the process 
(McCoy 1994). The Philippine state became a predatory state, but 
one that is plundered rather than plunderer. 
The primary direction of rent extraction is not toward a 
bureaucratic elite inside the state but rather toward oligarchic forces 
with a firm independent base outside the state (Hutchcroft 1993: 
167). 
Secondly, the control of elected politicians over the state gave 
them access to its ruling powers. Being modelled after the 
American polity, political positions provide for large discretionary 
powers. In the Philippine context this has led to the emergence of 
so-called "local and provincial "bosses' who exercise considerable 
regulatory powers over the legal and illegal economies in their 
jurisdiction." (Sidel 1995:230). 
The local and provincial power holders are predorninandy 
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organised along family lines. Not only is the Philippine family the 
primary unit of economic organisation and capital accumulation, it 
is also "the most enduring political unit and die one into which, 
failing some wider principle of organisation, all other units dissolve 
(Fegan 1994:51). 
Roughly speaking, there are three levels at which the families in 
control of political power operate. The most powerful and richest 
families in the country operate at the highest level. These are family 
dynasties or 'family-based conglomerates' that combine economic 
might with political power, by getting family members "elected as 
congressmen, and provincial governors, to such an extent that 
political office remains seemingly inherited (Sidel 1994:112). 
In die post-war period, the country's political economy became 
controlled by an 'anarchy of families'. Under martial law, these 
families at first lost much of their power to the central state, which 
soon came to mean the Marcos family, or "the conjugal 
dictatorship". Soon however, the political survival of Marcos 
became to depend on selected elite families. This time became 
known as a period of 'crony capitalism', in which Marcos divided 
"the whole economy into different fiefs managed by relatives and 
cronies who regularly shared their earnings with the dictator" 
(Manapat 1991:58). 
Each crony had his kingdom: Benedicto was the sugar king, 
Cojuanco the coconut king, Floirendo the banana king, Campos the 
drug king, and, according to the buttons on the intercom system at 
Malacafiang Palace, Ferdinand Marcos was simply the King 
(Thompson 1995: 54). 
Though much has changed after martial law and many of the 
cronies have lost their hold over elements of the state, the larger 
picture - a weak state versus strong oligarchic families - still holds 
true today (Kang, 2002). 
In the UPRIIS area, such family dynasties also prevail until the 
present day. Some originate from the old landed gentry, like the 
dynasty of the Lopez family. After the Pacific war, they branched 
out into industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as 
construction (Gutierrez 1994). Different factions of this family 
have been able to hold the seat of their congressional District as 
well as a local municipality for several decades. Their municipality 
as well as the larger part of the congressional District is located 
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within the boundaries of the 4 t h UPRIIS Irrigation District. If the 
local rumours are correct, they feel strong enough to fight for a 
seat in Congress as well as for the position of Nueva Ecija 
governor in the 2004 elections. 
Their decision to actually fight for the governor's position will 
not be taken lighdy. It will require vast financial resources and 
powerful allies, as they will have to unseat the single most powerful 
dynasty in the province of Nueva Ecija: the Joson family. The 
Josons have been in power in the province for neady fifty years. 
While the power of the Lopez family is limited to the southern part 
of Nueva Ecija, the Josons rule in the rest of the province further 
up north (for further detail, see chapter 2). 
At the middle level there are the political families that fight over 
the control for mayorship of a municipality. Though less powerful 
than governors or congressmen, the mayor's large discretionary 
powers, still allow them to act as local bosses in their municipality. 
They control the municipal police and through them they control 
the hueweteng (numbers racket) and other vice. Moreover, mayors 
and mayoral candidates usually come from wealthy families that are 
involved in different economic activities, including construction 
contracting. 
Family dynasties also operate at this level. Within the District 
boundaries, the Meneses family is a good example of such a 
dynasty. As will be shown below, the Meneses family was actively 
involved in the water management of the District The late 
Meneses ruled the town of Victoria for most of the post-war 
period (see map 4.2). His popularity rose when he was only a well-
known toughguy operating as the manager of a local cock-fighting 
arena. During the 1998 elections, two of his sons ran as rival 
candidates. One of them was able to take the seat, but then lost in 
the 2001 elections. So far, their dynasty has lasted for more than 
three decades. During this period, they acquired vast landholdings 
in rice, mango fields and agribusiness activities (poultry), with one 
of the sons active in construction, and again another - who was 
recendy killed - in alleged illegal activities like drug trafficking. 
Finally, at the lowest level, there are the political families fighting 
for the position of barangay kapitan. Those in power control much 
of local decision making, leaving outsiders without much voice. 
Everybody expects the ruling political family in the village (...) to 
take a leading role whenever (...) official or non-government 
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organisations are making decisions that direcdy affect the village 
and its environs; and to prevent, openly or covertly, implementation 
of decisions about which they were not consulted or that they do 
not like. (Fegan 1994:101). 
As the political institutions of the state are firmly controlled by 
local interests, the power of centrally administered bureaucracies is 
compromised as well. The NIA is a case in point Its administrators 
in the central office supposedly control this Weberian type of 
bureaucracy. Selection and promotion is formally based on the 
merit system. Reality however is different The NIA District 
managers are hardly controlled by their superior officers, nor are 
they well protected from interventions of local power holders. The 
merit system is compromised by the padrino or palakasan system (a 
system of recruitment and promotion based on -mosdy political -
backing), that allows local or provincial politicians to meddle in the 
affairs of the NIA District. In particular, the capacity of the 
congressman to intervene in appointments, promotions and 
transfers of NIA personnel makes it very difficult for NIA staff to 
refuse to do their will and then retain their position, (see further 
chapter 7; for a general discussion on the NIA, see the ADB 1990; 
on the Philippine bureaucracy, see Varela 1996). 
The case of the NIA: a triangle of accommodation 
After this general introduction of the weakness of the state versus 
local power holders, I will now turn to a more specific discussion 
of power relations in MSM in the District. 
Two other actors compromise the power of the NIA District 
engineers in the domain of water management the mayoral 
politicians and farmer leaders (figure 4.1). 
Absent in this triangle are the political families operating at the 
highest levels of power. People like governor Joson or 
congressman Lopez now and then called-up the District Chief, 
arguing for the inclusion of a part of a municipality in the NIA's 
program area, or to help such an area with an extra gift of water. 
Obviously, the 'requests' of such powerful people are not easily 
disregarded and the NIA engineers would usually comply. 
However, such requests were only done occasionally. Moreover, 
these interventions were not very effective either. As this chapter 
Ill 
will show, to make a difference in MSM requires intensive 
supervision. Apparendy, the matter was too local for these higher-
level politicians to be of interest. Or, as a NIA engineer 
commented: "They only go where the money is, and there is no 
money in water management". 
FIGURE 4.1 A triangle of accommodation 
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The mayoral politicians, on the other hand, were very active 
players in main system management. As irrigation water is a crucial 
resource for the rural voting population, ability to influence its 
delivery is an important means of political patronage. The 
incumbent mayors and vice-mayors were the most active in 
irrigation management, as their police and legal powers gave them 
the means to do so. Also rival families fighting for political control 
tried to use main system water management as a way of building an 
effective alliance to overthrow the incumbent mayor. 
Farmer leaders were the third type of actor involved in main 
system management. This category refers to a rather wide variety of 
people. They were leaders who represented groups of tail-end- or 
mid-stream farmers trying to get a hold of scarce water. Apart from 
leadership capabilities, they had the interest and/or resources to do 
so. Some were rich farmer-tenants or even landowners, cultivating 
tens of hectares of tail-end rice land. They cleady had the interest 
to fight for water, and also had the resources (capital for food and 
vehicles, followers or armed allies) to make possible a long-lasting 
campaign for capturing water. 
Others were local politicians like barangay kapitans or municipal 
councillors, or vote brokers for mayoral or higher-level politicians. 
This type of leader could be effective as they could mobilise 
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government resources (like for instance the barangay police) 
and/or make use of their connections to other village politicians or 
mayoral politicians in the municipality. As local politicians they 
used their influence in water distribution as a means for getting 
electoral support in their village. As vote brokers they tried to 
deliver support to mayor, vice-mayor or political candidates, in 
return for benefits derived from their patronage. Some of them 
were - or had been - LA leaders. 
Again others could be put forward to lead based on their 
particular skills. Some were put forward as they were known as siga, 
(toughguys), with a proven record of bravery. Others, on the other 
hand, had well-developed diplomatic skills. Their oratorical and 
negotiating qualities were seen as useful in convincing upstream 
leaders, politicians or NLA people to give in to their demands. 
Obviously, some farmer leaders combined several of these 
characteristics. 
Though these mayoral politicians and farmer leaders seriously 
compromise the power of the NLA District engineers, it does not 
mean that the engineers are left without any power at all. They still 
have 'room for manoeuvre'. Firstiy, they derive power from the 
fact that they are the only actors who are legitimately allowed to 
operate the gates and allocate the water. Secondly, they command 
fifty or so fieldworkers and several vehicles, more than any of the 
other local power holders can mobilise in a given point in time. 
Though their de facto control over their field men is compromised 
as well, they are still able to at least command their 'trusted men'. 
However it is difficult and provocative for NLA engineers to 
assemble those fieldworkers as a tactical force, whereas some of the 
other actors do not face such constraints and have the advantages 
of local concentration, surprise and the night. 
Thirdly, these NLA engineers are socially powerful themselves. 
They are embedded in the local society of the District. They 
married into more or less powerful families, are backed up by 
padrinos and kumpares in political as well as administrative circles, 
and have nested themselves in religious organisations or societal 
brotherhoods. If not, these people would not have become what 
they are: ranking engineers of a national bureaucracy. Hence, the 
mayoral candidates and farmer leaders are not simply dealing with 
local engineers, but with well-established people who know how to 
survive in a politicised environment. 
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Fourthly, and most importandy, the mayoral politicians and 
farmer leaders do not represent one group vis-a-vis the NIA 
engineers, but consist of several rival groups competing with each 
other. 
Leaders attempt to mobilise followers and exercise power in 
environments, in which leaders of other groups are doing the same. 
(...) Attempts at domination are invariably met with opposition by 
others also seeking to dominate or by those trying to avoid 
domination (Migdal 1994:21) 
Consequendy, none of the local power holders fully has the 
upper hand. To be effective, any power holder can only achieve his 
goals by forging alliances, and accepting accommodations. This is 
true for the NIA engineers, but it is also true for the mayoral 
politicians or various farmer leaders seeking control over water 
management. Hence, the water management in the District can be 
seen as 
(...) an arena of domination and opposition, where various social 
acton engage one another, vying for supremacy through struggles 
and accommodations, clashes and alliances, (ibid:. 21) 
To end this general introduction on the power relations around 
water management in the District, I will now describe some of the 
major characteristics of these alliances. This will be further 
explored in detail in the case studies of the Zone 1 and 2 alliances. 
Trust-based alliances organised in space 
The alliances around water have three major characteristics. Firsdy, 
the alliances typically criss-cross formal boundaries between the 
state and society, as well as between the bureaucratic and political 
parts of the state. The core of a typical alliance consists of a few 
farmer leaders representing a tail-end area, including both LA 
Presidents and village-level politicians. They have forged an alliance 
with one or more local politicians at village and municipal level. 
These politicians may be upstream within their own municipality, 
but may also be found in a municipality located further upstream. 
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A typical alliance also includes one or more NIA fieldworkers, 
and one or more NIA engineers. Such alliances with NIA staff are 
however rather subde in nature. Precisely because water is a 
contested resource, it makes good sense for NIA staff to avoid 
being recognised as supporters of certain particular interests. Many 
try to stay out of such alliances altogether. Others however^ 
combine the image of the neutral NIA engineer professionally loyal 
only to the NIA organisation with covert support for certain 
friends, villages and/or political groupings. 
Often, the 'slate', 'non-state', and the 'political' and 
'bureaucratic' meet in one person. The boundaries between these 
categories are blurred to the extent that it is hard to delineate one 
from the other. As shown below, a NIA engineer is not only a 
bureaucratic agent. He may at the same time be also a political 
actor, a local villager, a rice farmer and/or an IA representative. 
Actors operating in these alliances thus often have multiple 
loyalties and interests. 
The second main characteristic of the alliances is the importance 
of interpersonal ties between the actors involved. Relations between 
the core-actors are cemented in informal, inter-personal "trust-
based relationships, such as those of kinship, affinity, compadrazgo or 
political ties" (Long 2 0 0 1 : 1 5 4 ) . 
This is a common feature of organisations involved in the use of 
resources in the Philippines. People build dyadic alliances by the 
reciprocated exchange of favours, each striving to maximise his 
own security (Lande 1 9 7 7 ) . In the struggle for resources, people 
make as much use of non-discrete as of discrete social structures. 
People rely upon a great net of dyadic (interpersonal) alliances, 
some of the horizontal, but more of them vertical, leading inward 
and upward from the villages to the national government, from 
Tittie people' to tag people', and from those who have favours to 
ask (...) to those who have the power to grant them. This network 
of alliances often shows little regard for the boundaries that 
separate discrete structures, whether they be interest groups, parties, 
or the various instrumentalities of government In performing its 
various tasks, the Philippine political system proceeds as much 
through particular decisions affecting individuals, and based on the 
principles of favouritism, as through categorical decisions applied 
impersonally and in accordance with the law (Lande 1977:86). 
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TABLE 4.1: Key actors and types of interpersonal relations of the major 
alliances 
AlBance Key actors Types of interpersonal relations 
A 
Mayoral politician 
Village politicians 
Gatekeeper 
Political patronage and brokerage 
Threat of violence 
Bli 
Gatekeeper 
Village kapitan 
Gifts/friendship 
B2 
Gatekeeper 
Large landowners 
Bribes 
C 
Village politicians 
Farmer leaders 
Watermaster 
Engineer 
ISF payments 
Gifts/ friendship 
Bribes 
D 
District Chief 
Tail-end farmer leader/ 
federation president 
Friendship 
Private business partnership 
In summary, this section has shown that the NIA District's 
managers do not have supreme power in water management. They 
have to accommodate their rulings and practices towards the 
interests of especially mayoral political families and farmer leaders. 
However, none of these actors have the permanent upper hand. 
A third characteristic of the alliances in MSM is that they 
possess strong spatial characteristics. Farmer leaders who represent 
the interests of farmers cultivating land in neighbouring villages 
join forces to manipulate upstream checks or distribution gates. 
They will try to ally with upstream politicians, and to fight rival 
alliances that seek water for competing areas. 
Within the District, several of these alliances were active in 
struggling for scarce water in the main system to secure rice crops 
in tail-end and mid-stream areas. Some alliances were rather stable, 
while the composition of others changed from one season to 
another, or even within the same season. The major stable or 
persisting alliances are shown in map 4.1 and table 4.1. Indicated 
are the areas represented by the different alliances, their key actors 
and the main types of interpersonal relations that brought these key 
actors together. 
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MAP 4 .1 : Areas represented by some of the major irrigation alliances 
3000 meter 
Source: cf. NIA-UPRLIS, 4* District 1983 
Hence, they are forced to forge alliances and accommodate their 
interests to those of others. The water management in the District 
thus involves a number of rival alliances struggling to control the 
allocation and distribution of scarce water. These alliances combine 
state and non-state actors and criss-cross bureaucratic and political 
boundaries. Relations between the actors are trust-based and 
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Main System Management in Zone 1: a Case of Political Rivalry 
The management of water in Zone 1 is a highly contested matter. 
During the larger part of the 1980s and 1990s, water has been the 
subject of struggle between two opposing political alliances. Local 
politicians were the dominant players in the actual distribution of 
water throughout the Zone. The formal organisation of the NIA 
and the IAs was operational, but had littie control over water. The 
authority of the NIA engineers was compromised, and sometimes 
totally disregarded. The section first looks into the composition 
and activities of the political alliances. It subsequendy discusses the 
main strategies of the NIA engineers in dealing with these political 
alliances. Given the perilous situation in Zone 1, the engineers tried 
to play safe, be accommodating to the politicians and stay out of 
conflict. Finally, I discuss the role of the IAs and the Zone 
federation of IAs in the MSM of Zone 1. Given the politicised 
character of MSM in this Zone, these farmer institutions did 
remain rather weak. 
The emergence of the Juatco alliance in irrigation 
The dry seasons of 1983-84 and 1984-85 stand out as landmarks in 
the water management of Zone 1. During these years, water 
management became mixed up with electoral political struggles in 
the upstream municipality of Victoria. This has remained so until 
the time of the field research in 1996-97.2 
There are three reasons why this started during these two years. 
Firsdy, these two dry seasons happened to be particulady dry ones. 
During both seasons, farmers experienced severe water scarcity, 
interpersonal in nature. 
The following two sections further explore the characteristics of 
these alliances. The next section discusses in detail the dominant 
alliance active in Zone 1, while the subsequent section looks into 
the dominant alliance that was operational in Zone 2. As will be 
shown, the characteristics of these two alliances are remarkably 
different The Zone 1 alliance is about political rivalry, while the 
Zone 2 alliance is an example of a co-operative constellation of 
actors. 
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and crops withered on thousands of hectares in the tail-end and 
mid-stream parts of the Zone (see figure 3.6). To prevent their 
standing rice crops from dying, desperate farmers turned to their 
leaders to take action. These leaders tried to mobilise powerful 
people within their networks to help them in their search for water. 
As was shown in the opening story of this chapter, one tail-end 
village leader was able to get military support by seeking the 
support of a befriended general. Other farmer leaders turned to the 
political leaders of Victoria municipality to help them out 
Secondly, in the years prior to 1984 and 1985 the Zone had been 
gready enlarged, through the construction of the so-called 
extension area. The extension area enlarged the service area of the 
Zone by 40% to a total of 12,000 hectares.3 This extension area 
was part of the UPRIIS project. As the Penaranda system became 
hooked up to the Pantabangan reservoir, it was expected that the 
extra supply of water from the reservoir would be enough to 
support this expansion of the system. However, as water from 
Pantabangan hardly reached the District, the enlarged system had 
to depend on the fluctuating, insufficient supply of the Penaranda 
river. Though not included in the program area, farmers in the 
extension area planted their paddies just the same. They explored 
both legal and illegal means to bring water to their area. Farmers 
located within the boundaries of the original system likewise tried 
to protect their interests. An intensified struggle for water was the 
result (for further discussion see the previous chapter). 
Thirdly, the eady 1980s saw the return of local (and national) 
politics. From the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 to 1981, no 
genuine elections were held. Especially during the first period of 
Martial Law, Marcos iron-rule had put an end to much of local 
politics. He closed down Congress, and purged any province, town 
and even village elected leaders who tried to remain autonomous. 
From 1981 onwards, when Marcos's empire started to crumble, 
politics livened up again. In 1981 village elections were allowed to 
resume and opposition candidates to run. Village elections were 
followed by municipal and then national elections (Fegan 2000: 
377). Hence, during the mid-eighties - just before the ousting of 
Marcos in 1986 -, politics had really loosened up, and found 
irrigation to be an attractive issue for electoral struggles. 
It was during these two dry seasons of 1984 and 1985 that the 
irrigation alliance of municipal secretary Juatco came into being. He 
was a core member of the 'conflict kindred'4 headed by his uncle, 
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MAP 4.2: The 4 priority villages located in the downstream part of 
"victoria 
Source. c£ NIA-UPRIIS, 4»' District 1983 
who was able to hold the mayorship of Victoria from 1980 to 1986. 
As one of his trusted men and political kingpin, the mayor gave to 
his nephew the politically important and powerful position of 
municipal secretary. 
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Soon, secretary Juatco discovered the political virtues of water 
management. 
The first time I became involved in irrigation was simply because I 
wanted to save my own fields from drought as well as the fields of 
my good friend kapitan Tecson. At the time I knew nothing about 
irrigation. During the dry season of 1983-84 however, more and 
more people started to come to my house and asked me to help 
them to get water to their field or village. That is when I discovered 
the political virtue of irrigation. Once you enable farmers to 
harvest, they will have strong feelings of utang-na-loob [debt-of-
gratitude, JO], and their family will vote for you in the next election. 
(Interview held in March 1997) 
His key concern was to bring water to the rice-fields of the four 
most southern villages of Victoria, mosdy located along the canal 
networks of laterals 1-G and 1-H1, in the mid-stream part of the 
Zone (see map 4.2). The rice fields along especially the tail-end 
parts of these laterals are prone to water stress, as these laterals are 
long and have a limited carrying capacity. Moreover, the 
distribution gates for these villages had become focal points of 
conflict. Whenever given the chance, farmer leaders of downstream 
alliances of the original as well as the extension area of Zone 1 
would try to change the gate settings in order to bring the water to 
their own areas. As these alliances were fighting for the rice fields 
of two downstream municipalities, it was not in Juatco's political 
interest to help them.5 
Finally, water management was problematic as the water flow 
into the main lateral 1 was erratic as well. Upstream alliances along 
lateral 1, alliances from other Zones and even alliances along the 
District's feeder canal in the upstream District, were all struggling 
for water and changed upstream gate settings in their favour 
whenever possible. 
Two other people belonged to the core of Juatco's irrigation 
alliance. One of them was a NIA ditchtender who had become a 
barangay kapitan of one of the four tail-end villages of Victoria. His 
son, who was also a NIA ditchtender, helped this man. The other 
principal ally of Juatco was Mr. Tecson, who at the time was 
gearing up to become barangay kapitan in another of these four 
tail-end villages. Secretary Juatco himself also came from this area. 
He was moreover in a good position to help this area, as he had 
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The irrigation syndicate of kapitan Tecson 
By 1986, the irrigation alliance around secretary Juatco lost much 
of its power, as the Juatcos lost the mayorship, hence the municipal 
secretary position, to their arch-enemy, the Meneses family. In the 
meantime, Mr. Tecson had managed to become the kapitan of his 
village. By being a member of Juatco's irrigation and political 
alliance, he became popular in his village for being able to secure 
water and to bring peace and order to this remote village. Kapitan 
land as well as many family members located around a crucial 
headgate in the upstream part of lateral 1. Taking advantage of his 
potential control over this gate, and the crucial gates further 
downstream, he tried to do well for Victoria's tail-end villages, and 
thus win the support of their voting population. 
Each of these people were seen as siga, capable of ruthless 
action, including killing if necessary. The father of secretary Juatco 
and the kapitan had become known for their bravery as Huk 
guerrillas in defending Victoria against the Japanese occupation 
army. Ever since the war, the kapitan had been the no.l bodyguard 
of the mayor (and thus at the same time a NIA ditchtender). He 
was known for killing several Huk 'bandits' that challenged the rule 
of the mayor (who at the time was only a barangay kapitan) during 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Secretary Juatco was a toughguy as well. Next to irrigation, 
peace and order was his political business. Together with the 
kapitan, they would fight NPA guerrillas in the remote barangays in 
the municipality (NPA is the New People's Army, the communist 
guerrilla group still active today). Also the tail-end villages of 
Victoria, especially those located near the hills around lateral 1, 
were 'NPA-infested' during that time. The son of this kapitan, the 
NIA ditchtender, was also considered to be a tough man. He 
operated as one of the bodyguards of the secretary. 
During these years, this irrigation alliance was patrolling the 
canals of Zone 1, and now and then went to the upstream District 
to open gates and bring the water to their area. Their reputation for 
toughness was useful during their operations. At the peak of the 
alliance's power nobody dared to touch the crucial headgates in the 
main lateral of the Zone, without the consent of Juatco or his 
principal allies. 
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Tecson was able to further increase his power in the community, 
and was re-elected for three consecutive terms. As the law forbade 
him to stay for another term, he successfully launched his son as 
kapitan in the village elections of 2002. So far, he thus managed to 
rule his village for neady two decades. Key to his political (and 
economic) success was his control over main system management 
in the Zone. He developed a secretive but well-established 
irrigation alliance that locally became known as the 'irrigation 
syndicate'. 
Through his syndicate, the kapitan became the single most 
important player in the management of water of most of the mid-
stream and tail-end parts of the Zone. How can a kapitan of a 
remote, little village can become so powerful? This can only be 
understood by recognising the peculiar position of his village in the 
irrigation layout of the canal system as well as the political layout of 
the area. 
The village happens to be a bottleneck in the irrigation system 
of the Zone. Three major headgates are located within the 
boundaries of the village. Together, these gates control the water 
flowing to around 75% of the Zone's service area, and around 50% 
of the planted area during the dry season. Especially the 1-H 
headgate is important This is the distribution point between the 
whole of the extension area (the 1-X canal system) and the original 
tail-end parts of the system, served by 1-H canal system (see map 
4.2). Hence, the settings of these gates are crucially important for 
the distribution of water in the mid-stream and tail-end areas of the 
Zone. 
Moreover, the village of kapitan Tecson happens to be at the 
boundary of two municipalities and even two provinces. This 
border-position gives the kapitan a lot of power over the 
downstream municipalities. The local and provincial politicians and 
farmer leaders of his own municipality and province do not really 
care about the captain's doings in irrigation, as long as his activities 
to favour the downstream municipalities/province do not threaten 
delivery of sufficient water to their upstream bailiwicks. The 
downstream politicians and farmer leaders, on the other hand, do 
care about bis doings, but lack the political means to control the 
kapitan. As he is not a part of their political networks, he is — to a 
large extent - 'out of reach'. 
The kapitan explored and exploited this strategic and peculiar 
position to the fullest extent. Economically, he has been able to 
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earn a significant income from his control over water. He entered 
into deals with farmer leaders of the downstream areas, mosdy 
located outside of his own municipality. These farmer leaders 
usually represented areas that were excluded from the NIA's 
program area. Seeking the support of the NIA did not help them 
very much. The NIA could not stop them from planting their 
fields, but would only help them after serving the interests of the -
politically powerful - upstream areas that were included in the 
program area. These farmer leaders could also not expect much 
support from Victoria's political leaders, as they would also first 
prioritise the needs of their own citizens. Hence, they had little 
option but to enter into a deal with kapitan Tecson. 
Three different types of deals were being made, usually at the 
beginning of the dry season.6 In exchange for the promise of the 
kapitan to do his best to secure water supplies to the area 
represented by a tail-end leader, farmer-leaders offered one or 
more of the following promises in return. 
• Water-for-tbreshing rights. This was the most common deal. The 
kapitan would be allowed to thresh the area being served by 
irrigation water at the end of the season. The kapitan charged the 
regular threshing fee (6 sacks for every 100 sacks of threshed 
paddy). Local thresher owners were obviously not happy with 
this deal. The disadvantage to farmers was that local thresher 
owners would often provide them with credit in cash or kind 
(farm inputs) at the beginning of the season, in return for 
threshing rights. The kapitan would not enter into such a deal.7 
• Water-for-palay. In return for water, farmers served would give one 
or two sacks of palqy (unhulled rice) per hectare, to be collected 
and handed over by their leader, 
• Waterfor-land. La return for the promise to irrigate a certain area, 
the kapitan was given the right to cultivate a few hectares of land 
in that particular area. 
These were not easy deals on the side of the kapitan. It was not 
certain whether the deal made would actually push through. He 
was not certain that he could deliver, as the total water in the 
system depended on the rainfall and river flow and water supply 
flowing towards the District and the Zone was to a large extent 
beyond his control. Even if he could deliver, he was not certain 
that the farmer leaders would actually meet their promise. Local 
leaders frequentiy experienced difficulty in collecting the promised 
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paddy at the end of the season. Farmers in the tail-end areas were 
often poor, and thus had many other financial obligations. Or they 
were unwilling to pay, as they were dissatisfied with the supply of 
water. In other cases, local leaders pocketed part of the palay 
collected from the farmers, as a return for their activities. Hence, 
this 'water market' was full of politics as well. 
Also, the deals were not that Tausiness-like', or at least not in all 
cases. Several of the farmer leaders had befriended the kapitan, 
while some had even become his kumpare. Many argued that the 
kapitan "helped' them to get water, and they naturally should return 
the favour by allowing him to thresh in their area. Still, others felt 
that they had no option but to enter into a deal and considered it 
lagqy (a bribe or payment of extortion). 
In addition to these deals made at the start of the season, and 
payable at its end, these farmer leaders were expected to provide 
during the season food, drinks and cigarettes to the kapitan's 
fieldworkers who were actually managing the water. Finally, these 
leaders also spent thousands of Pesos to buy a goat, a lechon (a 
roasted pig) or a botde of Johnny Walker Whiskey as birthday 
presents for the kapitan's anniversary (this happened to be in the 
beginning of January, which was also the period of negotiating the 
deals for the coming dry season). 
All in all it must have been a profitable venture. Most of the 
income seems to have come from the threshing business. At the 
height of his power in irrigation during the beginning of the 1990s, 
the kapitan operated no less than six threshers, which made him 
one of the largest thresher owners in the area. Given his popularity 
and power in the village, he threshed almost all fields in his own 
barangay. All in all, he told me that his maximum earnings from the 
threshers in a dry season had reached 10,000 cavans (a cavan is a sack 
of 75 liters of palay weighing around 50 kilos in the dry season, and 
54 in the wet season). Assuming that farmers had an average 
harvest of 100 cavans (5 tons) per hectare, it meant that the kapitan 
was able to thresh an area as large as 1700 hectares. 
Local people called it a 'syndicate', because of the secretive 
nature of the above-mentioned deals, and because of the secretive 
(and formally illegal) operation of the kapitan's workers in 
distributing the water to the different tail-end areas. The kapitan 
headed this 'syndicate', but never left his house. During times of 
scarcity farmer leaders frequendy visited him, during both day and 
night. His men did the actual field operations; i.e. changing and 
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guarding gate settings and patrolling canals. The core of the 
kapitan's group consisted of three men. One was locally known as 
the Hari, meaning 'the King'. This nickname referred to his 
toughness, indicating that he would not bow for anybody. Another 
one was a local policeman hired by the barangay. These trusted 
men were also operating the kapitan's threshers at the end of the 
dry (and wet) season. 
Politically, the syndicate was also important for this kapitan. It 
allowed him to build a wide socio-political network of powerful 
friends and allies in the area. His network was bigger than what is 
usual for a leader of a remote, small and resource-poor village. 
Today, I went to the birthday party of kapitan Tecson. It was even a 
greater event than I expected. Hundreds of people were there, and 
certainly not only mere farmers. I saw several village kapitans from 
the downstream areas, as well as a mayoral candidate and two 
incumbent municipal councillors. The place was loaded with drinks 
and roasted pigs. He boasted that these were all presents given to 
him. A brass band from the nearby military camp played during the 
party. It was an attention from his good friend, a ranking military 
officer from the camp. The Zone Engineer was there, as well as 
some of the fieldworkers. Conspicuously absent was the 
Operational Engineer (I learned a few days later that he secretiy 
visited the kapitan the next day) (excerpt of research diary, January 
1997). 
The kapitan became such a crucial figure for the downstream 
municipality of Burgos, that he even started to play a role in its 
electoral politics. During 1997, when mayoral candidates of this 
municipality were gearing up for next year's elections, different 
candidates sought his endorsement. His control over water 
apparendy allowed him to influence the electoral behaviour of 
farmer leaders of these tail-end areas. He even cracked jokes about 
it: "The municipality of Burgos consists of 50 barangays: The 49 
ones officially included in its boundaries, and mine...". 
His network and economic well-being built on his control over 
water made him an unbeatable politician in his village. Villagers voted 
for him for several reasons. Firsdy, he ensured water in his village. 
Secondly, his threshing and irrigation operation provided work for 
many of his villagers. Thirdly, his connections allowed him to act as a 
broker to the outside wodd for many of the needs of his citizens. 
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The take-over of the Meneses alliance 
Together, secretary Juatco and kapitan Tecson formed a strong 
alliance in irrigation. While Juatco could control a crucial upstream 
headgate, kapitan Tecson controlled the major gates located more 
downstream in the Zone. The power of Juatco to operate the 
upstream headgates was however dependent upon his position as 
municipal secretary. He lost this position when the political alliance 
headed by his mayor-uncle had to give way to another mayor in 
1986 (see below). 
Juatco's power was further reduced when his family's rivals, the 
Meneses family, re-gained the mayoral position in the 1988 
elections. As discussed above, mayor Meneses was by far the most 
powerful municipal politician in the recent history of Victoria. 
Mayor Meneses was die typical 'self-made man'. His family did not 
even originate from Victoria, but from the downstream 
municipality of Burgos. He built his political career on his 
popularity as a manager of the local cock-fighting arena. He was 
vice-mayor from 1968-72, and mayor from 1972-80 and the 1988-
98 period. 
Secretary Juatco and the Meneses family were not just political 
rivals: they were archenemies. While being politically close before, the 
Juatco and Meneses family became involved in severe political 
struggle during the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, when the 
Meneses alliance took over the control of the town hall, ex-secretary 
Juatco lost much of his power in irrigation.8 
This also hampered the operations of kapitan Tecson, as he could 
no longer co-ordinate with Juatco in the scheduling of water in the 
head-parts of the Zone. Kapitan Tecson could not turn to Mayor 
Meneses as they were political rivals as well. During barangay 
elections, Mayor Meneses launched and supported several local 
political leaders to unseat the kapitan, but to no avail. The kapitan 
returned the favour by supporting mayoral candidates running against 
Mayor Meneses.9 
Until around 1995, Mayor Meneses did not bother too much 
about the irrigation activities of kapitan Tecson. The mayor would 
occasionally show up in Tecson's village following complaints of 
water scarcity in the tail-end villages of his upstream municipality. 
However, the mayor did not care about the deals of the kapitan with 
farmer leaders outside of his jurisdiction. Hence, the 'syndicate' could 
flourish during this period. 
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Starting 1995, kapitan Tecson's rule in irrigation came to an end 
when one of the four legal sons10 of Mayor Meneses became active in 
water management This son - henceforth Meneses Jr. - took over 
the control of water management in the Zone. Being endorsed by his 
father, Meneses Jr. was too powerful an actor for kapitan Tecson. 
Tecson could no longer control the headgates of the lateral, not even 
those located within his own territory. His men were still operational 
in the field, but their control over water was greatly reduced. 
Consequendy, he could no longer help the tail-end farmer leaders in 
their search for water, and his threshing activities in the downstream 
municipalities came to a standstill. 
The reasons for the Meneses family to get involved in water 
management were similar to those of the Juatco alliance. Their 
primary objective was to gain politically in the four tail-end villages of 
the Victoria municipality. By showing their capacity to safeguard the 
crops of these villagers, they hoped to get the votes of these villagers 
in return. The principal allies of Meneses Jr. in his irrigation 
operations were vote brokers and political candidates from these four 
villages. It was hoped that their public activities in irrigation would 
lead to their election during for instance the 1997 barangay elections, 
and/ or would generate votes for the Meneses family in the 1998 
mayoral elections. 
Moreover, Meneses Jr. had political aspirations himself. While he 
publicly claimed that he was only active in irrigation because he was 
asked to do so by his father, he was at the same time working for his 
personal political career. Mayor Meneses was old and was legally not 
allowed to run again in the 1998 elections. The family was undecided 
about who should take-over his position. The elder brother of 
Meneses Jr. wanted to run, but his father was hesitant because of the 
poor public image of this person. Just before the elections, the family 
broke into two rival factions, that each put forward a mayoral 
candidate. The son involved in water management turned out to be 
one of them.11 
Meneses Jr. was particulady active in irrigation during the 1997 dry 
season. He tried to use the irrigation issue as a vehicle to boost his 
own popularity and to develop his political network. He carefully 
selected his allies in the tail-end villages, and involved them in his 
irrigation campaigns. He put them in charge of guarding crucial gates, 
so that they could claim to be responsible for water deliveries to reach 
their respective villages.12 He also combined his time spent in 
irrigation with political activities. Managing water is a time-consuming 
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activity as it requires long hours of guarding gates and patrolling 
canals. It involves many eating and drinking sessions, which are 
excellent opportunities for political strategizing. Meneses Jr. had 
numerous meetings with his allies during these irrigation activities. He 
had overt discussions while guarding gates, as well as back-door 
meetings to discuss politics. 
Meneses Jr.'s control over water management in the Zone was -
like secretary Juateo before - facilitated by spatial factors. His home 
village and the political bailiwick of the Meneses family were located 
along the main lateral, just upstream of Juatco's area. This gave him 
an easy control over two upstream headgates of lateral 1 (one of his 
brothers was even barangay kapitan in that area), which helped him to 
secure water supplies to the tail-end villages of his municipality. 
The Meneses family also had previous experience in the water 
management of the Zone. The family rice lands (amounting to eighty 
hectares) were located along lateral 1 as well. Most of the land was 
located along the left side of the canal, outside the official service area 
of the District In order to irrigate these lands - which is thus formally 
illegal - a checking structure in the lateral needed to be checked to the 
maximum level, and for a long period of time. This operation 
conflicted with water needs in the rest of the Zone. The family thus 
had previous experiences in co-operation and struggle over the water 
in the lateral. 
The management practices of the political alliances 
The political leaders of the Juatco/Tecson as well as the Meneses 
alliances were direcdy and intensively involved in irrigation 
management. They did not remain powerful outsiders who 
occasionally interfered by pressuring the NIA officials. Nor were 
they just mediating in conflicts between the irrigation agency and 
groups of tail-end farmers. On the contrary: they were actually 
managing the system themselves. When water became scarce, the 
municipal-level politicians led their alliance in operating gates, 
patrolling canals, and scheduling water deliveries to the different 
areas of the Zone. They would be operational as long as it took to 
satisfy their clients' demands, which could be several weeks. 
Their involvement was intense. It was a full-time job, and more 
than that. It could have the intensity of an electoral or even military 
campaign. The irrigation campaign of Meneses Jr. during the 1996-
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97 dry season may serve as an example. That year, it took him 
around 25 days of hard, fufl-tirne, around-the-clock work to satisfy 
water demands in the tail-end areas of his municipality. A year earlier, 
he spent even longer to do the job. His core group consisted of 
himself, a bodyguard and three close allies (all poUtically active in 
the town or the downstream villages of the municipality). During 
their operations, they mobilised several more people to guard the 
main gates and checking structures. Most of the work in the field 
was done at night During the night it was relatively easy to bring 
water downstream, since the farmers in upstream villages were not 
present in the field. Also, one has to be present at night to stop rival 
groups of tail-end farmers from changing gate-settings and 'stealing 
water1. 
During the day he was also busy with irrigation matters. He had to 
make sure that the gate-settings of the previous night would not be 
altered. Or, that the gates would be set to build up a stock of water in 
the main lateral, for distribution during the coming night Also, he 
had to entertain several farmer leaders who daily visited his house in 
the morning, seeking help and information. He was also busy with 
mobilising support for his doings and fighting opposition. Both day 
and night he and his allies had to contact their followers guarding 
gates, discipline farmers in water use, seek advice, solve conflicts and 
counteract moves of rival groups seeking control over the water. 
Hence, their operations required a vast intelligence network, to know 
the events taking place in the field and the moves of their enemies. 
It was also a cosdy operation. Meneses and his core allies were 
expected to provide meals and drinks to their followers involved in 
the irrigation campaign. During the 1996-97 operation, Meneses 
used a pick-up truck and one or two motorbikes. All in all he 
estimated his costs for the one-month operation to be around 
thirty thousand Pesos (~ 900 USD) for food, drinks, gasoline and 
repairs to the vehicles. 
In short, this section has shown so far that municipal and 
barangay politicians were deeply involved in the main system 
management of Zone 1. To these politicians, controlling irrigation 
water was a way of building political alliances as well as gaining 
electoral support. For one village politician, it brought economic 
gains as well. As was shown, these politicians do not simply 
interfere in irrigation management they were actually in charge of 
distributing the water. In other words, they were deeply involved in 
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a matter that is properly 'internal' to the bureaucracy, i.e. the NIA, 
in partnership with the IAs. Below, I explore how the NIA District 
engineers were related to - and dealt with - these political alliances. 
Subsequendy, I will examine the doings of the IA farmer leaders in 
this Zone 1. 
The Strategy of the NIA Engineers in Zone 1: Risk Aversion and 
Delegation 
The water management in Zone 1 was controlled by the political 
leaders discussed above, rather than by the NIA engineers. These 
engineers were involved in the management of the Zone. They 
made allocation plans, scheduled water, and actually had their 
fieldworkers operate the gates, especially during daytime. They also 
made a difference and thus were frequendy visited by tail-end 
farmer leaders to help them out, but the local politicians had the 
upper hand. To these politicians it made sense to co-ordinate with 
the NIA engineers, if only to legitimate their doings. However, it 
was rather the other way around. Given their subordinate position, 
the engineers needed to accommodate their doings to the 
dominant politicians in charge. 
Both secretary Juatco and Meneses Jr. would probably disagree 
with this line of reasoning. They both argued that they were 
involved in water management because the engineers were not 
doing their job propedy. As Meneses Jr. put it, while guarding a 
gate during the night 
Do you think I like being out here, and get my pick-up battered to 
pieces due to these poody maintained canal roads?! I would prefer 
to be sound asleep just like these engineers 
In fairness to these politicians, they had a point. NIA fieldworkers 
also frequendy criticised the NIA engineers for not leaving their 
office, and not supporting them in the field. The Zone Engineer of 
this Zone did not seem to make a serious effort to lead his men 
and get control over the water flows. He lived in a municipality 
outside of the Irrigation District, and did not spend long hours in 
the field, even during times of scarcity. During the 1996-97 dry 
season, I found the Operational Engineer in the field taking charge 
of water management on two occasions only. Bom times, he went 
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to the field to satisfy demands of superior officers in the NIA's 
central office in Manila, following successful visits to the NIA's 
central office by a leader of tail-end farmers. 
However, given the perilous and politicised character of 
water management in the Zone, keeping a low profile was the 
logical thing for these engineers to do. As the opening quote of this 
chapter already indicated, the authority of these engineers was 
easily over-ruled by local politicians, toughguys and or farmer 
leaders. In case of conflict, these engineers were not so certain that 
their superior officers would back them up (see chapter 7 for an 
example). Under these circumstances, playing safe is a survival 
strategy often adopted by bureaucrats leading to apathy or 
formalistic behaviour. 
Bureaucrats face such personal and career insecurity that they adopt 
highly formalistic procedures to protect themselves against possible 
allegations of wrongdoing or even of responsibility for particular 
events or outcomes. (Moore 1992: 67)13. 
During the Juatco-Tecson hegemony the NIA engineers had 
developed more or less friendly relations with the Juatco alliance, 
with the wife of secretary Juatco working in the NIA office. 
Relations with kapitan Tecson were more than just friendly. One of 
the engineers had become a kumpare of the kapitan, and the two 
were also frequendy meeting each other in the local chapter of their 
religious denomination. Favours were flowing both ways. NIA 
equipment as well as NIA water was used to construct and 'irrigate' 
the kapitan's fish-pond, and its product regulariy found its way to 
an outdoor lunch of the engineers. Also, as mentioned above 
already, the kapitan's birthday party was well visited by the 
engineers 
The engineers co-ordinated their actions in main system 
management with the kapitan. Farmer leaders visiting the office as 
well as the NIA gatekeepers were told to co-ordinate with the 
kapitan, and the Zone Engineer frequendy visited him in his 
village. Rumour among tail-end farmers had it that the engineers 
were financially benefiting from the deals made by the syndicate. 
This rumour however, did not seem to match with the rather 
humble and straight character of the engineer involved. However, 
even if he would be open to such 'grease money', the kapitan 
would probably not be inclined to pay for it. He simply did not 
need the support of the engineers that badly. 
The more logical explanation for their co-ordination with the 
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kapitan is that they genuinely felt that it helped them to carry out 
their work. As one fieldworker put it " I f we can't beat them [the 
politicians, JO], let's join them". Obviously, such co-operation is a 
sensitive matter. The NIA's engineers should not openly support 
or join local interest groups, let alone politicians. The Operational 
Engineer legitimised their co-operation with the kapitan as follows. 
There is nothing wrong with his doings. He simple helps us in 
managing the system. Actually he is a great help to us. I regularly 
discuss with him how to prioritise the different areas. Also, the 
Zone Engineer and the gatekeepers in his area co-ordinate with 
him. He helps me in securing the water needs of the program area. 
If possible we also do our best to also help those farmers outside 
the program area. 
By joining forces with the local politician usurping their functions, 
the NLA engineers could at least still claim to be relevant actors in 
irrigation. This is important to the office, if only for financial 
reasons: their income crucially depends on the collection of 
irrigation fees. For kapitan Tecson, the alliance with the engineers 
also made sense. It gave him the opportunity to legitimise his role in 
irrigation management, and to counter the allegations that he was 
running a clandestine operation. Rather than being a syndicate leader 
illegally operating the NIA gates, he could now claim that he was 
actually helping the NIA to serve the needs of the farmers. Once 
again, this is the way the Operational Engineer put it 
I am actually grateful to the kapitan. It is only practical. Often, 
farmers enter his village at night to look for water. He requires 
them to first visit his house. Being the barangay kapitan, that is the 
logical thing to do. It is his responsibility to look after the safety of 
his people. This village is located in a remote area that was an NPA 
area before. He is also protecting my gatekeeper, who is sometimes 
staying there overnight They then co-ordinate the water flows to 
the different areas. 
In the case of Meneses Jr. , there was no alliance with the NIA's 
engineers.14 This is partly because the mayor's son did not feel the 
need for such an alliance. He could do without them. There is 
another reason as well. The NLA engineers were related to rival 
political or irrigation alliances. As explained already, kapitan Tecson 
was an archenemy of the Meneses family. Also, many of die NIA 
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engineers were sympathetic to a rival irrigation alliance active in 
Zone 2 (see further below) Hence, there was animosity between 
Meneses and the engineers. La his case however, he was powerful 
enough to implement his rule, despite the opposition of the NIA's 
engineers. 
Since Meneses Jr. was the mayor's son, - and intervened in 
irrigation with the approval of his father - the NIA engineers had 
little option but to accept his 'interference' in water management 
As said earlier, mayors have considerable regulatory powers in their 
jurisdiction. He can therefore harass the NIA in many ways, 
especially because the District office is located in the centre of 
Victoria. The District Chief put it as follows. 
What can I do about it? You better not mess with the mayor. He is 
a hot-headed man, and has many means to have it his way. One 
time he was angry with me, and he forced me to humbly make it up 
with him. He ordered his police men to stop the NIA trucks 
carrying gravel and sand from passing town. If he likes, he could do 
other odd things like having his policemen fining my field men for 
driving a motorbike without a helmet" 
Given their inferior position vis-a-vis Meneses Jr., the main strategy 
of the NIA's engineers in Zone 1 thus was to accept his power, be 
accommodating, and to stay out of trouble. They had developed 
five kinds of practices that fitted this strategy.16 
Their first practice was to always include the whole of the 
Victoria rice fields in the program area. As this suits the interests of 
the politicians of Victoria, it gives the NLA's field staff room for 
manoeuvre. The Zone Engineer can actually take charge of water 
management during ckytime. It also means that he can order his field 
personnel to co-ordinate with the intervening politicians, as both are 
directed towards serving the same areas. 
Moreover, the engineers set the boundaries of the program area 
rather conservatively. They excluded the areas outside of Victoria that 
had proven to be prone to water stress. The engineers of course 
realised that the actually irrigated area might double the size of the 
program area. However, by doing so they could prioritise the 
upstream areas of Victoria, and at the same time avoid legal claims or 
formal petitions from the larger part of the tail-end areas. The 
engineers could still be accommodating to these tail-end farmer 
leaders and politicians, by giving water whenever its availability 
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allowed them to so. They thus satisfied the powerful demands of the 
upstream politicians, while at the same time avoiding conflict with 
downstream power holders.17 
Secondly, the allocation schedules of the District would start the 
land preparation activities in the upstream areas, while the tail-ends 
were the last to receive water. The IRRI experiment with scheduling 
water in Zone 1 in the 1970s showed that it made sense to do 
otherwise (see chapter 1). It reduced crop failure in the tail-end, 
without affecting the upstream areas. Even during that time, mayor 
Meneses already resisted this type of water scheduling, as it hampered 
the irrigation of his estate. After IRRI stopped the experiment, the 
NIA's management never again tried to pursue this politically 
dangerous 'operation dulo' to irrigate the tail-end areas first It is the 
official - and politically convenient - practice of the NIA that the 
upstream areas of Victoria are to start ahead of downstream areas. 
Thirdly, water flows are only measured at the intake of the system 
and at the headgate of the lateral of Zone 1. The engineers did not 
bother to measure water in the Zone itself. They argued that they 
lacked the resources to maintain these measuring devices, and that 
farmers would destroy them anyway. Whatever the validity of these 
arguments, the convenient result was that it thus remained unknown 
how much water was being delivered to different parts of the system, 
and how much was wasted. In such a way it became impossible for 
field-staff or farmer leaders to present substantiated claims about 
areas not having received their due share of water. 
Fourthly, the engineers avoided taking a firm position when farmer 
leaders visited their office asking for water. Their regular practice was 
to grant all requests. As the District Chief commented: "I dance the 
santpela with them (an old Spanish light opera or dance, JO) I go 
wherever they want to go." The regular practice was to give a 
visiting farmer leader a piece of paper, which was a written order to 
a certain gatekeeper to help this particular farmer leader as much as 
possible. The latter practice led to awkward situations in the field. 
For instance, NIA gatekeepers sometimes received several 
conflicting commands regarding gate settings during one day. 
Fifthly, the engineers tried to delegate their responsibilities to 
the field level. During times of scarcity, the Chief tried to be out of 
office to avoid meeting angry or desperate farmer leaders. Also, they 
tried to stay out of the field, and preferably would not accompany 
farmer leaders that visited the office to their respective field areas. As 
said, they provided them with (conflicting) commands written on 
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small pieces of paper intended for their field-personnel. Ln such a 
way, the management of water in Zone 1 was thus thrown back to 
the NIA's field staff as well as the farmer leaders themselves. 
Ln short, the NIA engineers found themselves in a weak position 
vis-a-vis the political alliances operating in the Zone. In order to 
survive, they took a low-profile role. They tried to develop friendly 
relations with the politicians, be accommodating, and first and 
foremost, tried to stay out of trouble. 
The weakness of the farmer federations in Zone 1 
According to the organisational contracts, the IAs and its 
federations in the Zone were to be non-partisan, a-political 
organisations of farmer water users. Their role was to support the 
NIA in main system management. Given the dominance of the 
political alliances, it is no surprise that this did not become reality. 
The federations were formed and to some extent became 
operational, but they remained weak organisations, largely 
disregarded by both die politicians and the NLA engineers. To 
farmer leaders in the tail-end and mid-stream areas, the IAs and 
federations were seen as one of the possible ways to pursue their 
interests in irrigation. 
The Juateo alliance was organised along political lines, and had 
little to do with the IAs and its federations. This is logical, given the 
fact that these farmer organisations were set up after the heyday of 
the Juateo alliance. However, although kapitan Tecson's network 
continued to exist after the IAs were instituted, he was not forced 
to accommodate with the federation. The federation was too weak 
to be taken seriously by Tecson. One of the original federation 
leaders tried to develop the strength and cohesion of a tail-end 
federation. He wanted it to become an organisation that was in 
charge of water scheduling in the Zone, in co-operation with the 
NIA. After a few years he resigned. He was frustrated with both 
the NIA and his farmer colleagues. 
I am disappointed and angry. All this talk about partnership, and all 
the training on water management It was useless. The monkey 
business in water is still going on. Even the engineers are involved 
in it 
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Similarly, Meneses Jr. did not pay any attention to the IAs or the 
Zone federation. It was not in his interest As shown, he wanted to 
use irrigation to build his political network, not a functional, a-
political organisation. He dealt with political leaders and ignored 
the LA leaders. 
The farmer leaders representing water-scarce areas were 
pragmatic about the irrigation institutions. They tried to discover 
and develop any new ways and means that would give them access 
to those in control of water. To get access to the politicians -
including kapitan Tecson - it was not necessary to be an IA or 
federation representative. However, to get access to the NIA 
engineers or field staff it might help. 
The most successful tail-end villages (or a group of villages located 
along a sub-lateral) were those that followed different strategies at the 
same time. They would put forward a group of leaders that tried to 
establish relations in different alliances relevant for irrigation. Hence, 
one of them would become an IA leader and thus become close to a 
watermaster, the Zone Engineer or the Operational Engineer. At the 
same time, other leaders would try make a deal with kapitan Tecson. 
If needed, a third actor would try to become close to Meneses Jr., to 
see if he could help them out. They thus made use of variety of 
formal, informal, legal and illegal strategies. It was perfecdy possible 
to find a group of village leaders participating in a formal meeting in 
the NIA office during ckytime, while at night the same group might 
join forces with one of the political leaders. 
The IAs and the federations were thus not irrelevant. The IA 
organisation helped and legitimised tail-end villages to develop 
fruitful relations with the NLA fieldworkers and the engineers. The 
Zone federation now and then came together, usually on the 
initiative of the NIA. During times of scarcity, the IA leaders of 
water-scarce areas would visit such a meeting. They would try to 
influence the NIA engineers and technicians to favour their 
respective areas, and try to gather information. They would learn 
about the NIA plans and the plans of their rivals. This might help 
them to (re-) design their tactics to bring water to their own areas. 
At the end of the day though, these meetings did not count for 
much. As Meneses was pulling the strings, the real decisions were 
not made in the federation meeting. 
Today was a funny day. The Zone Engineer called for a Zone 
federation meeting in the field. This was the first time this season. 
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Apparently the lobby of one the tail-end leaders in the NIA's 
central office has been effective. I pitied the Zone Engineer. He did 
not seem to realise what was going on. He discussed the water 
problems in the Zone, and determined a rotation scheme for the 
days to come. He seemed to be satisfied with the results of the 
meeting, and seemed to believe that his plan would actually push 
through. 
What he did not know, was that earlier that morning a meeting had 
been held at the house of Meneses Jr. Some of the leaders present 
had also visited that meeting. Most of the field personnel also knew 
about it, but did not bother to tell the Zone Engineer. It was clear 
to everybody -except perhaps the Zone Engineer - what was going 
to happen in the coming days. Meneses had already instructed his 
men to build up a stock of water in the main lateral during the day. 
Tonight, he would start implementing his schedule. No matter what 
the Zone Engineer might have decided. At best, Jerry, one of the 
influential watermasters, might be able to bridge the gap. He might 
try to show Meneses the advantages of gearing his nighdy schedules 
to the schedule of the Zone Engineer. If not, the Zone Engineers' 
schedule is doomed to fail, (field notes, February 1997)" 
To conclude, rival and politically informed alliances were 
dominating water management in Zone 1. In the triangle of 
accommodation (Migdal 1988) between local politicians, NIA 
engineers and farmer leaders, the local politicians had the upper 
hand. They used their control over water as a source of political 
patronage, and in one case for economic benefit. The NIA 
engineers had little option but to be accommodating to these 
political interests, while the power of local politicians turned the 
IAs and federations into rather weak organisations. This, however, 
was not true for the whole of the District. The alliances in the 
water management of Zone 2 had a very different oudook. 
The Case of Zone 2: an Effective NIA-IA Partnership in Water 
Management 
The dominant alliance in the water management of Zone 2 was 
remarkably different from the rival alliances of Zone 1. It was an 
effective alliance of NIA engineers, NIA field staff and IA leaders. 
Any evaluation study would argue that turn over was a success in 
this Zone. The study would probably enthusiastically conclude that 
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it was a true partnership between the NLA and LA leaders, who 
successfully co-managed the water in this Zone. As we will see 
however, this alliance was as much about politics as the alliances in 
Zone 1. The difFerence is that the politics in Zone 2 were internal 
to the NIA-IA institutions. It will moreover become clear that this 
alliance was based on strong and multiple interpersonal relations of 
political patronage, friendship and real and ritual kinship. 
An effective alliance in water management 
The Zone 2 alliance was very effective in water management. The 
challenge for this alliance was a relatively easy one, as the physical 
conditions were more favourable than in Zone 1. Zone 2 was a 
much smaller Zone (5,200 ha against 10,800 ha for Zone 1), and 
was conveniendy located in the middle of the District Due to its 
relatively low elevation, surplus water from the two other Zones 
supplemented the water supply of this Zone. Nevertheless, good 
water management was still difficult to achieve. The tail-end sub-
lateral network (2-E and its branches) consisted of long canals 
serving a large area (see map 4.3).1 8 It required much effort to 
prevent water stress in this area. The alliance was able to overcome 
these difficulties. Some measures of its success are that only a few 
hundred hectares were usually excluded from the program area in 
Zone 2, against several thousands of hectares in Zone 1. Also crop 
damage due to water stress was much less of a problem in Zone 2, 
than in Zone 1. 
This alliance effectively combated scarcity in Zone 2, by 
controlling the headgates and schedule of water distribution within 
the Zone. If necessary, the alliance would go out at night to fight 
the practices of rival alliances from other Zones. They would 
defend the gate settings of the major gates distributing water 
between the different Zones, and - if given the chance - would 
change these settings to their advantage. Within the Zone, they 
followed a strict scheduling of water among the different sub-
laterals. They saw to it that the different sub-laterals received their 
due share. Gate settings and the rotation schedule were now and 
then violated, but these transgressions were effectively acted upon. 
Within the territories of the IAs, IA Presidents and NIA field men 
worked together in water management in the sub-lateral system. 
They removed upstream checks to ensure that water flows were 
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During times of scarcity, the IA leaders of the tail-end areas, the 
NIA field men and the Zone Engineer met each other almost daily 
at a NIA field office located along the main lateral. They would 
discuss the water distribution problems, and how to solve them. It 
not unnecessarily delayed, and could reach the tail-end areas as 
well. 
MAP 4.3: San Anton village as part of the municipality of La Paz 
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was also the pick-up point for nightly raids, to defend their 
interests vis-a-vis the other Zones. 
Other things were managed smoothly as well. The NIA - often 
with the support from the municipality or the congressman -
ensured well-maintained roads and canals. The remaining 
ditchtenders and the IAs took care of canal cleaning. Moreover, fee 
collection was relatively high (mosdy between 50-90%) as many 
farmers were willing to pay in full.19 
The Zone Engineer of this Zone was the central figure in this 
alliance. He was an industrious manager who commanded his field 
men in the Zone, and ensured they showed up for work. He was in 
charge of the water scheduling practices, and he was actively 
involved in patrolling canals and - if necessary — in the nightiy 
raids. 
A political alliance 
It is not just water, that brought these people together and what 
made the Zone Engineer so eager to make it happen. First and 
foremost, this water alliance was a political alliance. 
The Zone Engineer was the son of the vice-mayor of La Paz. 
The village of San Anton -and its surrounding villages - was the 
bailiwick of his father. This village covered the larger part of the 
tail-end area of Zone 2 (the 2-E irrigation network, see map 4.3). 
The family of the Zone Engineer originated from this village. His 
father had been in public office for almost three decades. Over 
ninety percent of the San Anton voting population voted for this 
man, while he also got a majority vote in the neighbouring villages. 
As San Anton village was good for more than 10% of the total 
voting population of La Paz, it provided the vice-mayor with a 
mass base that might help him to win. He was very popular in the 
area. As irrigation was vital to the economy of these tail-end rice 
villages, his son's doings as a Zone Engineer were strategically 
important to reproduce the political popularity of his father. 
The three IA leaders of San Anton, and some of the NIA field 
men that lived in this village, were part of the political machinery of 
the vice-mayor. During election time, they campaigned for his re-
election. As kindred leaders, they ensured that the votes of their 
kindred and allies went the right way. Moreover, they also 
campaigned for the (re-) election of the son of one of the three IA 
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leaders of San Anton. This son was a municipal councillor (and a 
former NIA engineer and a contractor of NLA works as well), and 
a close ally of the vice-mayor. The IA President's membership of 
this effective alliance that brought the needed water to the village 
helped to boost his son's popularity in the village. Finally, this 
irrigation tropa (troop), was also close to the barangay kapitan of 
San Anton, and helped him to get elected. In return, the barangay 
kapitan was supporting the irrigation alliance. 
Sometimes, I order my barangay tanod [the village police, JO] to 
accompany the NIA collectors, because they are carrying a lot of 
money with them. Now and then they also escort the IA Presidents 
at night, because they might meet armed men of other groups at the 
gates (interview with the barangay kapitan of San Anton, January 
1997). 
An economic and financial alliance 
The Zone Engineer spent a lot of money in water management and 
keeping the alliance together. He usually paid for the daily lunches 
and drinks with the field men and the LA leaders in the NLA's field 
quarter. They used his truck to patrol the gates and to move 
upstream in the nighdy patrols and raids for water. After such a 
nighdy raid, he would sometimes bring the gang to their favourite 
beer house. He would then shoulder most of the costs involved. 
He was not only doing this to facilitate his NIA water management 
duties and to further the political career of his family. His 
effectiveness in water management was also important for his own 
businesses. I f he succeeded in bringing water to the tail-end of 
Zone 2, his business would flourish. 
Firsdy, he owned one of the largest grocery stores in the town 
of La Paz. Many villagers of San Anton favoured his place. As their 
incomes mainly depended on the rice harvest, their expenditures in 
his shop (and their capability to repay their credit) were related to 
the quality of the water supply. 
Secondly, the Zone Engineer had been able - through 
connections of his father - to acquire the exclusive distributing 
rights for certain beer and soft-drinks brands to the oudets in the 
tail-end villages of Zone 2. He thus had a clear stake in supplying 
the rice fields of this tail-end village with sufficient irrigation water. 
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My sales during the dry season depend on the yields of the farmers. 
If they have a good harvest, they will spend much on drinks. 
During March, [this is the harvest month of the dry season crop, 
JO] many villages celebrate their barrio fiestas. If the harvest is 
good, my sales will at least triple. I will earn good money then, 
because of the large volumes involved (interview with the Zone 
Engineer, October 1997). 
The Zone Engineer developed an economic stake in fee collection 
as well. Many farmers chose to pay their irrigation fees in kind, i.e. 
by sacks of palay.20 The NIA provided the collectors of these sacks 
an allowance for carrying and hauling. This could be a lucrative 
activity, provided that one could collect large quantities in 
accessible areas in a relatively short period of time. This Zone 
Engineer was able to meet all these conditions. 
As he was well known to the farmers and as the majority was 
pleased with his performance, it did not take much time and effort 
to persuade these farmers to pay their dues. He could make a 
substantial income from carrying and hauling large quantities of fee 
payments in kind, since he already possessed a truck for his grocery 
and distributing businesses. Finally, he was able to use his 
connections in the District office as well as among politicians to 
keep the canal roads in good condition (see chapter 5). This 
allowed him to use his truck. Also, as the passable roads allowed 
his truck to get close to farmers' fields or houses, his expenses for 
labourers hauling sacks of palay could be limited. 
Being close to this industrious and well-connected Zone 
Engineer helped the tail-end LA leaders to develop their own 
interests as well. For instance, it helped one of the LA leaders to 
establish his name. He had married a woman of San Anton and had 
recendy moved into the village. As a small-time broker of irrigation 
water and services, as well as a vote-broker for the vice-mayor and 
the town councillor, his star rose quickly. Another IA leader, who 
was already involved in palay trading, was able to get an extra-
income from collection-in-kind. Through the patronage of the 
Zone Engineer, he was also given a NIA contract for hauling palay 
to the office. 
Finally, they were all able to acquire an income out of the fee 
collection incentives given to the I As. Collections in the area were 
usually high (on average between 50-90%) as farmers had good 
harvests and were willing to pay, as they felt the difference made by 
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the alliance. Moreover, the Zone Engineer ensured that his 
collectors were doing their utmost best to collect the dues from the 
farmers. Consequendy, the incentives for the IAs were high as 
well.21 Though officially not allowed, the IA Presidents would use 
at least part of that money for their personal benefit The Zone 
Engineer, though aware of these practices, looked the other way 
(see further chapter 6). 
To summarise, the effective irrigation alliance of Zone 2 was not 
just about water. It was an alliance for which water management 
was the key to a sophisticated political and economic project The 
Zone Engineer was the central figure in this alliance. Through his 
patronage, participating in this alliance was a fruitful endeavour for 
the field personnel as well as the IA leaders. 
An inter-personal alliance: friend- and kinship 
This tight and effective alliance did not emerge out of the blue. 
Firsdy, it was grounded in family- and kin relationships. The IA 
leaders and NIA fieldworkers of San Anton as well as the Zone 
Engineer were all related to each other as family members or 
through wider kin relationships. Secondly, the alliance invested a 
lot of time in befriending each other. The alliance started to emerge 
in the end of the 1980s. At that time the IAs were being formed. 
The alliance however got momentum when the Zone Engineer 
took the position from his predecessor in 1994. As described 
above, he spent a lot of money in building and reproducing the 
alliance. By 1997, the IA Presidents, some of the NIA fieldworkers 
and the Zone Engineer had developed into a barkada (a group of 
close friends). 
The barkada started with the three IA Presidents of San Anton. 
Soon, a fourth IA President from a neighbouring upstream village 
— and upstream municipality - joined the group. 
The IA Presidents of San Anton befriended him to neutralise their 
upstream problem with water. They always had problems with the 
main gates of 2-D and 2-C. This IA President was actively involved 
in operating these gates, as the 2-D gate leads to his area. Having 
him as their friend, the co-ordination has improved a lot (interview 
with a ditchtender working in the San Anton area, October 1997) 
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During times of water scarcity and during the collection periods 
of irrigation service fees, the irrigation alliance had intensive 
contact Daily, at least part of the group could be found enjoying 
lunch, coffee or a drinking session at the NIA's field quarters, or in 
the house of one of them. The barkada also garnered during the 
birthdays of the members and of their spouses, and during 
barangay fiestas. It is safe to say that at least a part of the group had 
a social gathering once every week, and that they met almost daily 
during the dry season. 
La several cases, the friendly relations were further cemented in 
kumpare relations. As the majority of the people belonged to the 
same village, they often had already become each others mare or 
pare in earlier confirmation, wedding or baptism occasions. Two 
occasions stand out, as they were direcdy related to the barkada of 
the irrigation alliance. One of the LA Presidents of San Anton 
asked the Zone Engineer as well as the two other LA Presidents of 
the village to be kumpares at his daughter's wedding. Secondly, the 
IA President of the upstream village also entered into a kumpan-buo 
relation with the NIA's watermaster in the area.22 
San Anton: the breeding-ground of the NLA 
The Zone 2 alliance was not confined to the field only. There were 
good relations with the NLA District office as well. The Zone 
Engineer, the NLA field men and the IA leaders had easy access to 
the office, and friendly relations with the engineers. The office was 
sympathetic to the needs of the Zone. The engineers tended to 
support the Zone, when the need for water was critical. The office 
included the tail-end areas of San Anton in the program area, 
although these areas were difficult to irrigate. The Zone, and 
especially the San Anton area, was also favoured when it came to 
the selection of areas for maintenance and improvement works. 
When the works started, the equipment would often first go to this 
Zone. As a result, the condition of the irrigation canals and roads 
were good, much better than the infrastructure in Zone 1 (see 
chapter 6 for more discussion). 
To explain this, the Zone Engineer was undoubtedly the crucial 
factor. He could be classified as a 'champion of change'. He was 
able to develop an effective alliance, both in the field and in the 
office. He managed to enrol the other actors into a complex 
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The success of the Zone 2 partnership between the NIA and the 
IAs then, has emerged from 'thick' socio-political relations between 
political-economic project; that served the needs of the farmer 
water users, the political interests of his family as well as his own 
commercial interests. However, it cannot be all attributed to the 
personal skills and motivations of one man. Relations between the 
NIA and San Anton were well developed long before that Zone 
Engineer came into the picture. A key-factor in the success story 
was the intimate socio-political relations between the NIA 
leadership and the tail-end village of San Anton. 
No less than three of the engineers of the District office 
originated from this rice village. This was about a third of the total 
engineers. Moreover, they occupied ranking positions. One of 
them was the Zone Engineer, the other two headed the operations 
and the maintenance sections. Moreover, two others engineers 
from this village had previously been involved in the management 
of the District, but had left the NIA. Being contractors, they were 
still connected to the District office, as they were now and then 
carrying out projects for the agency. Finally, the village had 
'delivered' other engineers to the NIA when the system was still 
under construction in the 1970s. 
This, of course, is no coincidence. It is a clear case of the 
padrino system of hiring people into the bureaucracy (Varela 1996). 
When the NIA was in need of engineers during the 1970s, the NIA 
fieldworkers from San Anton mobilised a prominent co-villager to 
utilise his close friendship with the District's superintendent of 
those days. They had him recommend their sons to this Chief. 
When the first of these sons were able to enter the NIA, co-
villagers got also attracted, and were subsequendy helped by their 
predecessors to get into the agency. 
When the UPRIIS project started in 1973, the NIA was in need of 
engineers. I was among the first batch of engineers from San Anton 
that graduated during that time and that entered the NIA. In 1978, 
a second crop of engineers from San Anton graduated. Many of 
them had taken up engineering, because seeing us having good jobs 
within the NIA inspired them. Other barangays also had engineers 
graduating, but they went into other agencies or companies, 
following their predecessors as well, (interview with an engineers 
previously employed by the District office, September 1997) 
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its tail-end village of San Anton and the engineers and fieldworkers 
of the NIA. The San Anton engineers were family- or kin related to 
each other, to the NIA fieldworkers and to many of the San Anton 
villagers. The padrino system not only brought several engineers of 
San Anton into the NIA, but also around ten NIA fieldworkers. 
This gave way to smooth NIA-village relations. A NIA fieldworker 
who originated from a neighbouring village put it as follows. 
NIA and San Anton are very close, because so many NIA 
employees and engineers came from that place. I am the only NIA 
worker from my barangay. That makes a big difference. The people 
of San Anton are sympathetic to the NIA's needs. There is a good 
collection because the farmers understand the need to support the 
NIA, as otherwise the engineers might feel ashamed. Also, there is a 
good information drive between the village and the NIA. Whenever 
there is a problem with water or a structure, you can be sure this 
information will quickly reach the District office, (interview with a 
ditchtender, October 1997) 
The San Anton engineers were not crudely or very openly 
prioritising San Anton, but - as one of them commented -, "charity 
of course begins at home". Several District Chiefs, though they did 
not originate from this village, also became sympathetic to its 
needs. 
Twenty years ago, San Anton was really a depressed area. It did not 
have roads, it was hard to reach, it was neglected by the NIA, and it 
did not pay its fees. Then we started to help the village, with the 
support of the District Chief. Also the present Chief continues to 
support them. They like the village, because it is so easy to become 
popular there, (interview with one of the San Anton engineers, 
September 1997) 
The San Anton case is an example of the close interconnectedness 
of family ties, political ties and ties of friendship. A good example 
is the relation between the NIA engineers and fieldworkers and the 
electoral politics of La Paz. The San Anton engineers were 
relatives of La Paz's vice-mayor, the father of the Zone Engineer. 
They supported him him during election time. As one of them said: 
When I was young, I was a kanto-boy [a teenager killing time and 
drinking at a street comer, JO] It was my uncle [the vice-mayor of 
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La Paz, JO], who took me from the streets and sent me to Manila 
to study. Siempre, I am indebted to him. 
The vice-mayor was also supported by the NIA fieldworkers 
from San Anton and the surrounding villages, who were all close to 
him: "whenever one of the 12 NIA employees have their birthday, 
everybody is there, including the vice-mayor." Through these 
engineers, also die District Chief had become a friend and kumpare 
of the vice-mayor as well as the mayor of La Paz. This helped to 
develop smooth relations between the NIA and the La Paz 
municipality. For instance, in case the NIA needed krudo (diesel 
fuel) to run its equipment, it was easy to find their way to 
municipality funds. 
These inter-related political and kin ties also existed at a higher 
political level. It happened to be the case that the Lopez family -
who occupied the congressional seat for a long time already — was 
living within the boundaries of the La Paz municipality. Multiple 
ties of political patronage, and kin and kumpare relations 
connected the NIA engineers, workers and IA leaders to this elite 
political family. 
The family of the Zone Engineer was not in good terms with 
the congressman because of earlier political struggles, but others 
were. Both the former NIA engineers were getting construction 
contracts through his patronage. The NIA Maintenance Engineer 
had him become the sponsor of his child, and had his family and 
other relations support him during the congressional elections. The 
result was that NLA. people as well as villagers from San Anton 
used this congressional family to get access to projects. The grader 
of the congressman was regulady found on the NIA's canals of San 
Anton and neighbouring villages (see chapter 7 for further 
discussion on the relations of this congressman with NIA and its 
projects). 
To conclude, the two case studies in Zone 1 and 2 have shown 
mat water in the main system is being managed by alliances of NIA 
engineers and fieldworkers, farmer leaders and local politicians. In 
the case of Zone 1, local politicians who undermined the authority 
of the NIA engineers, and left the IAs and the federations as weak 
organisations controlled the dominant alliance. In the Zone 2 
alliance, electoral politics was also interwoven with irrigation 
management. In that case however, it did not undermine the NIA's 
authority, but rather reinforced the effective alliance of NIA 
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engineers, fieldworkers and IA leaders. The Zone 2 case also 
showed the importance of friend- and kinship relations in the 
functioning of the alliance in the management of the Zone. 
The alliances that emerged in the two Zones cannot simply be 
understood as diverse outcomes of a uniform set of management 
reform policies. The 'failed' turn over case of Zone 1 is related to 
the success story of Zone 2. Firsdy, the resources managed by the 
District office (water, equipment and money) can only be spent 
once. Hence, better services to Zone 2 go hand in hand with 
poorer services to Zone 1. This affects the willingness of farmers 
to pay their dues, which in turn reinforces the nearness of NIA-
farmer relations in Zone 2 and the somewhat distant relations in 
the other Zone. Secondly, the friendly relations of the NIA 
engineers to the Zone 2 alliance did not remain unnoticed to the 
dominant alliance in Zone 1. This reinforced the tense relations 
between the NIA engineers and the Meneses family. 
The Binding Forces of the Water Alliances 
This chapter has shown that water management in the District is 
a matter of struggle and accommodation between the different 
parties involved. Nobody has the permanent upper hand, and 
alliances are the result. The composition of these alliances can be 
very different, as we have seen in the cases of Zone 1 and 2. 
Nevertheless, these alliances are based on the same set of 
relationships. This section discusses these relationships one by one. 
It starts with a discussion of two major binding forces of these 
alliances. These are 1) the interpersonal relations based on political 
patronage and brokerage and 2) friendship and kinship. The third 
type of relationship discussed is that of bribery. Bribery did not 
play a major role in the main system management of the District. It 
is nevertheless discussed here, because bribery has been singled out 
as a major force in irrigation management in other countries. 
Finally, this section discusses the threat of force as a structuring 
element of main system management in the District. 
Management through political patronage and brokerage 
The analysis of the water alliances has provided ample evidence 
that political patronage (and brokerage) is a key mechanism in 
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water management. The alliances are led by political patrons. In 
Zone 1, the primary motivation of both secretary Juateo and 
Meneses Jr. was to bring water to their constituency, in return for 
votes. Their political clients sought their patronage to selectively 
deliver scarce water, and they eagedy responded to it Juateo was 
already cited about the political virtues of water. Meneses, his arch 
enemy, had the same message. 
My father asked me to make sure that the whole of victoria is able 
to get a good harvest during the dry season. My father depends on 
the poor man's vote'. His platform is a very simple one: to provide 
electricity, security and irrigation water. He asked me to take care of 
the latter promise. (February 1997) 
At the surface, the dominant Zone 2 alliance in water management 
seemed to be perfecdy innocent The Zone Engineer and his 
fteldworkers - in a perfect partnership with LA leaders - were in 
control of the water. One might think that the group is held 
together by the functional hierarchy of the NIA organisation, and 
the formal rules and regulations stipulated in the contracts between 
the NIA and the IAs. In actual fact; this alliance existed to a large 
extent on relations of political patronage and brokerage as well. 
The alliance had a strong political dimension, as it was part of 
the political network of the Zone Engineer's father, a vice-mayor. 
The IA leaders were enrolled in this political alliance as small-time 
vote-brokers (cf. Fegan 1994). They acted as intermediaries 
between the individual irrigators and the Zone Engineer's father. In 
the village, they helped to rnaintain electoral support to the vice-
mayor, in exchange for services, like water and maintenance works. 
Their position as vote and service brokers gave them access to 
different kinds of benefits, provided by the Zone Engineer (e.g. 
hauling contracts and collection benefits for personal use). For 
others, access to this political and irrigation alliance allowed them 
to further the political interests of their own families. 
Patronage is central to Philippine politics. Patronage politics are 
a remedy for the weak political and moral legitimacy of the central 
Philippine State among the electorate. 
The provincial elite compete among themselves for elective posts 
from national to municipal levels, and depend mainly on the poor 
population for the votes. Candidates can credibly present 
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themselves to the electorate as indispensable conduits to state 
patronage, thereby seeking 'legitimacy through patronagi (Wurfel 1988: 
38). 
Essential to a political career, is the capability of a politician to have 
the 'image of a good patron' (Rutten 1994: 3). Or, as van der Top 
puts it 
Local, non-political elite families can bring a politician voting blocks 
that are often as large as an entire barangay. In return, the delivery 
of infrastructure projects and personalised assistance in times of 
need are part of the image of the good patron on the basis of which 
the rural electorate and their leaders measure politicians (Van der 
Top 1998:253). 
In present-day vocabulary, local politicians are constandy seeking 
for what are called pogi points (these are earning points to look 
'politically handsome' in the eyes of the voter). 
We scrutinise what to do and what not, on the basis of three 
criteria: it should bring in money, it should score pogi points, and it 
should deliver real services to the people concerned (interview with 
a municipal secretary, January 2003) 
As two of the three criteria are being met, mingling in water 
management affairs may thus be attractive to a local politician. 
Present day scholars of Philippine politics have correcdy 
criticised the eadier idea that it consists only of exchange type of 
relations between the good patron and the faithful client. 
Politicians are not just 'good patrons', but some are better pictured 
as 'bosses', as their power is derived from massive vote buying and 
violence (Sidel 1995). Indeed, as I will show below, a credible threat 
of violence is an important resource in water management. 
Nevertheless, my analysis shows that patronage and broker 
exchanges remain important ways for local politicians to amass 
parcels of votes. The Meneses family is a case in point. Vote buying 
and violence were part of their strategy to stay in power. Meneses 
Jr. still felt it necessary to win the hearts of the constituency, and 
build up his network of local vote brokers in the different 
barangays. He spent a month in the field, to bring the services the 
farmers so badly needed.23 
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Management through kinship and friendship 
The analysis of the Zone 2 alliance showed that water management 
in the District is organised through trust-based networks (Long 2001: 
154), which criss-cross formal boundaries between the irrigation 
bureaucracy, the farmers and local politicians. As was shown, 
family, kumpadrazgo and friendship ties gave shape to the relations 
within the NIA District's bureaucracy, as well as between the NIA 
and a favoured tail-end village in the Zone. It was also shown that 
those seeking control of the water put a lot of time, money and 
energy into the creation and/or reproduction of instrumental 
friendships. Often, people tried to further strengthen this 
friendship by turning it into a kumpare (br kumare) relationship, i.e. 
a ritual kin relation. 
In the Philippines, the family is of paramount importance, and 
people organise along kin lines. However, as Filipinos count kin on 
both sides equally, any person is simultaneously a member of such 
a large number of descent groups that descent cannot on its own 
be the organising principle of organisational units like the irrigation 
alliances. Hence, people choose within this large kin group whom 
they will ally with and whom they will follow. Fegan (1994) has 
called this conflict kindreds. 
These conflict kindreds, based on cognatic, affinal and ritual 
kinship are thus the primary organisations in the struggle for 
resources (McCoy 1994). A strong senior leader - the matanda -
heads these conflict kindreds. In politics, the matanda are the vote-
brokers of the kindred that they lead. Politicians try to attract such 
leaders of big kindreds to their alliance. 
In the case of main system management, such leaders were 
operational, trying to secure water for their conflict kindred. 
However, the irrigation alliances could only be partly organised 
along kin lines. Obviously, the location of farmers in the canal 
network primarily determines their interests. Although many of the 
farmers along a certain sub-lateral or creek supplied with irrigation 
water would be close kin, others would only be distandy related, or 
not at all. 
Hence, tThough kin relations may partly work to organise 
interest groups of one sub-lateral, they become far less helpful 
when it comes to alliances at Zone level. The reason is that leaders 
representing the different areas or villages in a Zone are not likely 
to belong to the same kin group. Hence, as 'descent' did not 
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suffice, people were befriending each other in irrigation, and tried 
to build up ritual kin ties. 
Kumpare relations are ritual kin relations. They are formed on 
major family occasions such as a baptism, confirmation or the 
wedding of a child. Multiple patrons, the godfathers and 
godmothers, are invited to sponsor these celebrations and in this 
way become ritual kin of the family. Patrons may be selected from 
the same socio-economic strata, or - if that person is willing - from 
somebody of the political or economic elite. 
Kumpare relations signify friendship between equals, and a 
patron-client type of relationship between different social strata. 
The functional nature of kumpadra^go is openly acknowledged.24 It 
builds trust between the parties involved and it gives a sense of 
belonging. Kumpares are supposed to help each other in times of 
need, and should not betray each other (Lande 1977: 87). These are 
useful attributes for building a functional and lasting alliance in 
main system management 
Management by bribery 
Bribery - and extortion - were not important mechanisms in the main 
system management in the District I discuss it here, because this 
contrasts with the findings of researchers in Indian canal systems 
(Wade 1982; Ramamurthy 1995). More recent research in a canal 
system next to the system studied by Wade found far less bribery in 
water management (Mollinga 1998). Nevertheless, Wade's findings on 
institutionalised bribery still seem to play a role in international 
irrigation discourse and thus warrant discussion. 
In Wade's study, the mid-level staff of the operation and 
maintenance department collected bribes (and extortion money) from 
farmers. Parts of the collected bribes were forwarded to satisfy 
demands of their superiors, who again had to pay-off politicians. 
These politicians could demand bribes from these officials, because 
they control the latter through their discretionary power over their 
transfer, which happened once every three years. This led to an 
awkward situation in which higher-level irrigation officials paid large 
amounts of money to politicians to get access to a lucrative 
moneymaking post in operation and maintenance. Bribery thus had 
become a lucrative business for irrigation officials, and it was part of a 
system through which Indian politicians financed their re-election 
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campaigns. Though the larger part of the rent-seeking practices 
focused on construction funds, it also involved water management 
(Wade 1982). 
The bribes taken for water management were not a great burden 
on the side of the farmers. Nevertheless, it provided an extra income 
for these mid-level irrigation engineers amounting to twice their yeady 
salary. Also field-staff were being provided with 'gifts' in terms of a 
few sacks of rice. The ability of these engineers to demand bribes was 
based on their control over the main gates of water distribution. 
Village leaders collected the bribes from their villagers and paid the 
engineers, in return for a guarantee that water would reach their areas 
that were not authorised to be irrigated, or which were not allowed to 
be planted with water demanding crops. Also, bribes were given in 
return for extra water in times of scarcity, especially in the tail-end 
areas. Even upstream villages sometimes paid bribes, responding to 
threats of engineers to close off the water flows to their areas. These 
engineers purposely created uncertainty and scarcity of water 
availability and -delivery, to stimulate farmers' willingness for illicit 
payments (Wade 1982). 
In the case of the Irrigation District in the Philippines, bribes for 
water involving NIA staff did occur. The largest case of bribery I 
heard of involved a gatekeeper of a tail-end gate. By diverting 
irrigation water at upstream diversions into drainage creeks, he was 
able to bring big volumes of water to his tail-end gate. Part of this 
water was used within the program area or at least the service area of 
the District, without large monetary returns. Another part was now 
and then being sold for 'real money" to large land- and fishpond 
owners, whose areas were even located outside the service area of the 
District This practice has been going on from the mid-eighties until 
the beginning of the 1990s. Though I did not find any evidence of the 
involvement of NIA engineers in these deals, they knew about it, and 
did not bother to stop it . 2 5 
However, bribery did not become an institutionalised practice of 
the irrigation engineers. If it happened, the amount involved was 
much lower than in the case of the South Indian system studied by 
Wade, and it usually concerned gifts of consumer items rather then 
money. A typical 'bribe' from a tail-end village to the NIA engineers 
was limited to one or two sacks of palay, a bottle of whiskey, or 
perhaps a roasted pig. The stakeholders involved considered this to 
be a matter of bigqy (a gift), rather than lagay. Moreover, these 
transactions were not made in a business-like fashion. These 'gifts' 
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were usually given during birthday parties of the NLA engineers and 
other drinking sessions. The farmer leaders involved frequendy 
visited these NLA engineers, and had often established friendly 
relations with them Deals over water between NLA engineers and 
tail-end farmers were, unlike in the system studied by Wade, thus 
based on social relationships, rather than financial ones. 
One explanation for the difference between the Indian and the 
Philippine situation, might be the relative strength of the bureaucracy 
vis-a-vis local politicians. Wade states that the Indian engineers were 
not able to control the whole of the system very well, but could 
control some of the gates and distributaries through a concentrated 
effort In such a way, farmers had no option but to offer bribes. In 
the UPRIIS case, the NLA engineers may have had the manpower for 
such concentrated efforts, but they lacked the socio-political power to 
control the gates in order to demand bribes. As was shown, municipal 
politicians use water management as a means of political patronage. 
They would not allow their constituents to be the victim of systematic 
bribery, or extortion as it would go against their 'image of the good 
patron'. Apparendy, irrigation bureaucrats are more powerful vis-a-vis 
local politicians in South India, compared to this case in the 
Philippines. 
As will be shown in chapter 7, the UPRIIS leaders were no saints. 
Rent-seeking was an institutionalised practice in the case of 
construction contracts for infrastructural works. Why then is bribe 
taking hardly occurring in the case of MSM? I have two explanations. 
Firsdy, taking bribes on infrastructural programs is relatively easy 
to organise. It involves a few people only, and deals are of a secretive 
character. Water involves a high number of people, while its results -
areas irrigated - are easily observable. Zone Engineers do not have 
such access to bribes from construction works, and thus might be 
interested to trade bribes for water. As said, politicians will however 
stop them from doing so. Also the superior officers will not allow 
them. It will affect their relationships with farmers and the income of 
the office through irrigation fees. Moreover, it might be reported to 
their superior officers in Manila, and thus may cause their transfer to 
another District or other part of the agency. 
Secondly, taking bribes on infrastructural programs is more 
compelling. As chapter 7 will show, the contract works involve big 
money, big contractors and high-level politicians. A 'realistic' NLA 
official will accept the grease-money offered, accept the deal, and 
look the other way. In the case of water management, the arena is a 
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different one. In the absence of powerful private interests or 
higher-level politicians, the NIA's engineers are not 'forced into 
briber/.2 6 
Management by force 
The last mechanism that structured the alliances in water was (the 
threat of) violence. Violence is an important ingredient of the 
everyday politics in the Philippines at large. To politicians, force -
along with patronage - is the key means for seeking and 
maintaining power, and to many it is a way of life - and death - (see 
for instance Cullinane 1994; Coronel 1995). In popular terms, the 
power of politicians is based on the three 'G's': Goons, Guns and 
Gold. Being tough, or even better being a known killer - or having 
such men in your entourage -, is a crucial asset in political careers 
(Fegan 1994). The politicians in the District make no exception. 
Secretary Juatco, kapitan Tecson, and Meneses Jr. were all known 
as toughguys. They - or their closest family members or allies - had 
a track record of violence, including killing. 
However, violence goes beyond the realm of electoral politics. 
As was described in chapter 1, the recent history of rural Central 
Luzon is a violent one, including anti-Japanese guerrilla wars, 
peasant uprisings and communist insurgency. Also today most of 
the rural households are armed. In the evening, chinking parties in 
the villages might end with people shooting their guns in the air. 
Also, day-to-day conflicts over land, sexual affairs and issues of 
inheritance run the risk of being bloody. 
The fear of violence played a role in water management. In the 
recent history of the Irrigation District; there were only two cases in 
which people died because of a water-related conflict However, 
coercive acts and shows of force took place in every dry season. 
People feared for their lives and consequendy acted carefully. Most 
field personnel of NLA had experienced physical threats when doing 
their duty. This is just one of the many experiences which were 
shared with me by die field personnel: 
Several years ago, I was stopped on the road by a toughguy, who 
was the son of a notorious village leader. He was angry at the way I 
distributed the water. He drew his gun and shot a hole in my 
helmet, which was at the carrier of my motorbike. He told that me 
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that he would put a hole in my head the next time I would enter his 
village again. (Excerpt of interview with a former Zone Engineer, 
March 1997) 
To the local politicians who led their alliances in seeking water in 
Zone 1, the ordinary person's fear of violence was an asset Their 
reputation as toughguys and their possession of arms helped them to 
control the gates. Only the brave and powerful dared to challenge 
their authority. Mere farmers and even NIA field personnel would 
usually think twice before touching the gates. Especially at night they 
would consult the poUtirians involved before doing so, even if the 
gates were left unattended. 
This fear helped the local politicians of Zone 1 to control the 
gatekeepers of NIA as well. The gatekeepers were afraid of being 
molested or worse. One of their survival strategies was to seek the 
protection of the dominant politician involved in water 
management. They would follow his orders in the operation of the 
gate - or would at least pretend to do so - in return for his 
protection. 
The behaviour of farmers was also structured by the threat of 
violence. Farmer leaders of tail-end villages employed several tactics 
of risk-avoidance. When they went out at night to look for water 
upstream, they would often bring one or more armed people with 
them. They would also make sure that none of them was hot-headed' 
in temperament Furthermore, they would usually only enter 
upstream villages at night to remove checks in the sub-laterals and 
close turnouts, after they made a courtesy-call to the local barangay 
kapitan or an upstream farmer-leader. Also, they usually first found 
out during ckytime, whether the water needs of the upstream area 
were more or less satisfied already (Svendsen 1983). 
In my interpretation, the time and energy put into befriending 
people and building alliances was also related to this fear of the threat 
of violence. Bribes or gifts to upstream farmer leaders or local 
politicians were not only given to "buy' water, but also served as a way 
to avoid being shot at during the long hours of the nighdy raids. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the rule of the central state does not 
carry very far in the management of water in the main system of 
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the UPRIIS Irrigation District. Though the NIA, as a central state 
bureaucracy, is formally in control of water management, its actual 
authority is seriously contested and undermined by local power 
holders. Consequently, water in the main system is the subject of 
fierce struggle between rival groups of tail-end and mid-stream 
farmers. 
This is not to say that 'anarchy ruled' on the banks of the 
irrigation canals. There was no disorder in which nobody followed 
rules and individual free-riding farmers - following the Prisoner's 
Dilemma - grabbed whatever they could (Wade 1988: 490). Free 
riding at main system level is hardly possible anyway. To manipulate 
and guard gates, individual action will not suffice. More importandy 
however, those in power checked free-riding behaviour of individual 
farmer water users. Order did exist and it was faidy predictable which 
areas would and which would not get sufficient and timely supply of 
water to irrigate the rice paddies during the dry season. 
Wade (1984), foUowing Seckler (1982) has used the term 'populist 
anarchy' to characterize the situation in South Indian canal irrigation 
systems (on 'anarchy' in irrigation, see also Hart 1978). 'Anarchy' 
refers to weak governmental authority for carrying out its programs. 
"Populist' refers to a situation in which the electorate has come to 
control the use of a valuable political resource (in this case water), and 
which is moved primarily by short term material inducements rather 
than by longer term policy choices (Wade 1984: 298). This comes 
close to the Philippine case described in this chapter. 
Also anthropologists discussing lawless' cases of tribal political 
systems have introduced terms like "ordered anarchy" (Evans-
Pritchard 1960), or similar contradictory expressions like "the 
peace in the feud" or "the frailty in authority" (Gluckman 1963). In 
a situation of "ordered anarchy", every individual has to belong to an 
alliance in order to a) protect himself and his interests from other 
individuals and alliances, and b) to struggle to get what he wants, in 
competition with others who want the same non-divisible thing. This 
also comes close to the situation of water management in the District 
However, die term anarchy is misleading and too strong, as a good 
part of the order was organised around NIA engineers and elected 
state politicians. The more suitable expression for the water 
management in the District would be something like a 'contested, 
accommodated and populist order*. 
Three actors contested the control over water the NIA engineers, 
local politicians and farmer leaders. As none of them had the 
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permanent upper hand, they were forced to build alliances and 
accommodate to the interests of the other actors. The order in main 
system management thus came from the balance of power between a 
number of rival, fairiy long-lived alliances representing different areas 
in the irrigation system. 
To a large extent, the order in main system management was the 
result of the political configuration in the Irrigation District; and its 
dynamics were thus shaped by electoral struggles. Mayoral politicians 
seeking (re-) election tried to secure water for tail-end or mid-stream 
areas in return for electoral support This tied in to village level vote 
brokers - some of them IA leaders - whose brokerage gave them 
access to different kinds of benefits generated by the mayoral 
politicians and/or irrigation engineers heading these alliances. 
Politics was not necessarily a bad thing for water management 
Electoral politics did indeed hamper the emergence of a functional 
NIA-IA alliance in one of the Zones. In another Zone however, the 
same kind of politics helped to produce a very effective partnership 
that would meet all the criteria of conventional evaluation studies to 
be classified as a 'success story' of turn over. 
Next to politics, there were others forces at work that bound 
these irrigation alliances together -or drove them apart 
Reciprocity, friendship and real as well ritual kinship created tight 
alliances based on inter-personal, trust-based relations that brought 
stability in the distribution of water, and - in one case - a 
successful, functional partnership of NIA officials and IA leaders. 
Another alliance was built on the economic benefits of a village-
level politician, who used his strategic location and following to 
deliver water in exchange for exclusive rights to thresh palay from 
those farmers. His control over water was based on a very 
particular way in which the irrigation canals criss-crossed 
ad^xiinistrative boundaries. La general though, bribery or extortion 
were not very important mechanisms in the allocation or actual 
distribution of water. My findings thus differ from those of Wade 
(1982) on bribery in Indian canal systems. 
Finally, it has been shown that (the threat of) violence was an 
organising principle as well. It helped the potentially violent actors 
to get control over gates, and it explains a number of measures 
taken by local actors to avoid water management from becoming 
bloody. 
This chapter has shown the importance of understanding water 
management from a wider state-society perspective. Without such 
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an embedded analysis, I would not have been able to decipher the 
socio-political relationships discussed here. It proves the need for 
approaches that go beyond the reductionist models of neo-
institutionalism. 
Further proof of the need for such a wider perspective can be 
found in an article analysing the success of Taiwanese irrigation 
systems (Lam 1996). The author of this article started out with 
Ostrom's neo-institutional rde-crafting framework, and indeed 
carefully analyses the main institutional arrangements. However, to 
explain why certain rules came about the author could not help but 
to turn to the wider state-society relations of Taiwan. In the end, 
for the greater part die effective management is explained in terms 
of the authoritarian state, the effectiveness of the government to 
enforce fee payments, the subservient behaviour of Taiwanese 
farmers and the embeddedness of the state irrigation agency in the 
local communities and electoral political system.27 
The 'alliance' and 'accommodation' concepts have proven to be 
useful concepts to understand main system management. These 
concepts help to focus on the dynamics of water management, as 
the analytical interest is on how different actors 'wheel and deal' 
with each other. Though formal rules and organisational structures 
may be important, they get transformed, resisted or simply over-
ruled in the processes of struggle and accommodation that emerge 
when people are involved in the management of a precious but 
scarce resource like canal water. 
These concepts may also prove helpful for the implementation 
of policy programs. Lasting reforms are not simply created by 
policy programs designed in the NIA's or Wodd Bank's central 
offices. It requires strategic manoeuvring to construct the proper 
alliances and the proper set of incentives that get powerful local 
actors to accommodate their interests to certain policy goals. For 
instance, this chapter has shown that policies that would simply 
deny the role of local politicians make litde sense. The task is to 
involve them in such a way that they will be beneficial to the larger 
policy goals and programs. In other words, local level policy 
implementers thus need to be able to build strategic alliances and 
seek -and offer - useful accommodations of interests. 
There is nothing wrong with forging alliances and seeking 
accommodation. According to Evans (1995) that is what good 
governance is all about. He has argued that the effective post-war 
developmental states of East Asia were in a position of 'embedded 
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autonomy'. On the one hand, these states were closely related — 
and thus accountable to - the needs and interests of certain societal 
(in this case industrial) forces. On the other hand, these states kept 
a certain level of autonomy, to be able to change the economy and 
social structures over which they presided. Hence, crafting effective 
organisations is about forming strategic alliances with different 
power groups, and a continuous search for a proper mixture of 
accommodations. 
At the conceptual level, future research could further develop 
the concepts of 'alliances' and 'accommodation'. A first step would 
be to develop a typology of different alliances and the various 
forms of accommodation. A second step would be to identify the 
sociotechnical conditions under which certain kinds of alliances 
arise or do not arise. The major differences in the conditions that 
account for the emergence of the alliances in the two Zones of the 
District were the following: a) the size of the two Zones and the 
physical properties of the canal systems that conditioned the 
ease/difficulty in bringing water to the tail-ends, b) the relation of 
the NIA engineers and fieldworkers to local politicians (in Zone 2, 
politicians were closely related to the NIA, in Zone 1 the two 
parties were rivals rather than allies), and c) the variation in familial 
and wider kinship relations between the NIA and the water users 
communities. 
Finally, this chapter has shown the importance of the 
recognition of 'blurred boundaries' between formal structures. 
Engineers are not simply or only "bureaucrats' or 'technocrats' but 
may be deeply embedded in society as members of a kin group, as 
villagers, farmers, entrepreneurs, or politicians all at the same time. 
In other words, abstract categories - and the boundaries between 
these categories - should not be taken at face value. This is also true 
for such labels as 1A leaders' or 'federation presidents'. Further 
inquiry shows that the actual socio-political position of the actors 
involved may be far more complicated than the formal label 
suggests. 
Notes 
1 The Bl and B2 alliances were operational from the mid-eighties until the 
early 1990s. The alliances faded away after a key actor fell ill during the 
eady 1990s. 
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2 This is not to say that 1983 was the start of political involvement in 
water management in the District As was discussed in chapter 1, local 
politicians and farmer leaders were already involved in struggles for water 
during the eariy 1970s. However, it seems that the water management in 
the Zone became more politicised during the 1980s and 1990s. 
3 It soon became clear however, that the tail-end part of the extension 
area was not serviceable. Hence, the extension area to be served by the 
District was reduced to around 3,500 hectares, while the NLA set the total 
service area of the Zone at only 11,000 hectares from the eady 1990s 
onwards. 
4 A conflict kindred is defined as "all those people who choose to 
support, cruciafly with all their household votes in elections, a leader to 
whom they are related — however distantly — as kin, affines and ritual kin, 
and who in return expect that leader to represent them in conflicts with 
members of other led kindreds, outsiders and the state (c£ Fegan 1994: 
46). 
5 Actually, reality is somewhat more complicated. Rice fields located in 
villages bordering the municipality of victoria were often owned or 
cultivated by citizens of Victoria's tail-end villages, or by their close 
relatives. Hence, serving these areas with water was also in the interest of 
people trying to win votes in Victoria, Whenever water was available, 
Juatco would thus try to irrigate the fields in border villages of these 
neighbouring municipalities as well. 
6 Sometimes farmer leaders also went to the kapitan later during the 
season, when water scarcity was already occurring. This, however, was 
risky, as the kapitan already had made pledges to other areas. Chances 
were that the request would be turned down. 
7 He did not do so because he lacked the capital to finance the credit 
needs of such a large clientele. Moreover, as these farmers were living 
outside his village and municipality, it would have been a risky enterprise, 
as he had few means to sanction defaulters. 
8 As he had made many enemies - among them the Meneses family or 
their close allies - he feared for his life, and hardly left his house. 
9 Often they would also find themselves in opposing alliances during 
congressional and provincial elections. The main reason was that Juatco 
and Tecson were 7°son-boys', while mayor Meneses was in the anti-
Joson faction during most of his political career. 
1 0 His father was not only a powerful politician, but a powerful male as 
well. It was said that Mayor Meneses had as many as one hundred 
children, raised by more than ten women. This son is one of the four sons 
from the mayor's legally married wife. 
1 1 This split in the family turned out to have dramatic consequences for 
the Meneses family. It allowed a rival political alliance of another 
candidate to come to power. Though this candidate got most of the votes, 
Meneses Jr. successfully challenged the legality of mis victory and 
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eventually became the new mayor of Victoria. During the 2001 elections 
however, this rival candidate won over the still divided Meneses family. 
n This strategy was only partially successful. Two of the four candidates 
lost during the barangay elections, one of them was a newcomer. Meneses 
Jr. argued that their defeat was caused by not putting enough effort into 
the irrigation management They did not always show up to support him 
during the nightly raids. Another reason — put forward by the defeated 
candidates themselves — was the potential split in the Meneses family, and 
the likely defeat of Meneses in the coming municipal elections. Local 
leaders thus turned to rival political networks. 
1 3 For a similar line of reasoning, see Hood 1998:44-45. 
1 4 There is however, an important alliance between Meneses and some 
fieldworkers of the NLA. This is elaborated in the next chapter. 
^ The mayor's power over the NLA engineers is also based on the fact 
that the engineers all reside in the town of Victoria. If he wants, he can 
thus harass them on a personal level as well (e.g. withholding permits, 
checking on tax payments). 
1 6 These strategies were not only valid for Zone 1. Risk-avoidance was 
important in the other Zones as well, but given the tense situation it was 
particulady relevant for Zone 1. 
1 7 The downside of this arrangement was that the NLA's fee collection 
was affected. The office tried to solve this problem by still collecting fees 
outside of the program area, in case the farmers were well served with 
water. In these cases the office would credit the collection to the back-
account of the farmers. 
1 8 As figure 4.4 shows, 2-E is actually located in the middle of the Zone. 
However, the areas downstream of 2-E are irrigated by means of two re-
use check gates that draw water from the drainage system. These are not 
included in this discussion. 
1 9 Many farmers in the downstream villages of this Zone (and Zone 3) 
however, served by the re-use gates, were members of two farmer 
organisations that proclaimed that irrigation services should be free of 
charge. Consequently, collection was relatively low in these areas (for 
further discussion, see chapter 6). 
2 0 Whether farmers in paid in kind or in cash, depended on different 
factors. Firstly, it depended on the strategy chosen by the NLA collector. 
Some collectors preferred to collect in kind, while others preferred cash 
collection. This preference had a clear effect on the mode of payment 
chosen by the fanners. Secondly, it depended on the rice price and quality. 
During the dry season, the market price of palay was usually higher than 
the government support price followed by the NLA. Farmers then 
preferred to market their palay, and pay the NLA in cash. During the wet 
season, especially when the quality of the rice was not very good due to 
problems with drying, the market price was low, and farmers then 
preferred to pay the NLA in-kind (and sometimes with moist palay). 
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2 1 For instance, the total collectible amount of fees in an IA with an 
average area of 350 hectares during dry season was around 370,000 Pesos. 
If over 90% of that amount was indeed collected, the IA was entitled to 
15% of the collected amount This amounted to 50,000 Pesos for one 
season.. 
2 2 A kumpare-buo means a 'full kumpare' relation. This is established 
between the father and mother of a child being baptised, confirmed or 
married and the persons and their spouses asked to be sponsors. This is 
usually the strongest type of relation. Weaker "kumpare' relations are 
usually those between co-sponsors, or between the siblings of sponsors 
and the siblings of the parents of the newly baptised, confirmed or wed 
child, who are kumpare bawa, i.e. by contagion. Finally, people may even 
call each other 'pare' or 'mare' to indicate an affectionate tie, without 
having actually entered into such a ritual kin relationship. The kumpare 
relationship is stronger than that between the sponsor and the sponsored 
child and Tagalogs liken it in strength and obligations to the tie between 
siblings. 
2 3 Further evidence for the importance of patronage in present-day 
politics is found in a case study of the politics in the most modem part of 
Philippine society: the city of Makati, the business centre of Manila. The 
mayor of that city made it a point to have a daily walk through the slum 
areas of Makati, and listen to slum dwellers'grievances. Though the money 
for his re-election campaign came from the business community, he 
apparently realised that the basis of his power was in maintaining 
personalised patron-client networks (Gloria 1995) 
2 4 Though there are limits to its use. It has to be handled with a sense of 
delicade^a (subdeness, sensitivity), while its use should be reciprocal 
(Paredes 1989: 50, cited in van der Top 1998: 254). 
2 5 Fairly large monetary bribes have reportedly been paid to NLA 
engineers in the past by contract-growers of the capital-intensive 
cultivation of cucumbers, operating in some of the tail-end villages. 
However, as the area grown with cucumber sharply decreased since the 
early 1990s, such bribes were no longer heard off. 
2 6 A comparison can be made with the study of Van den Top (1998) on 
illegal logging in the Sierra Madre in the Philippines. In that case, officials 
are 'forced into bribery'. It has much similarity to Wade's analysis of 
irrigation in India. It involves institutionalised bribery of the DENR 
officials. Lucrative positions have a price. High-level politicians-00*-
loggers, who transfer officials who do not cooperate, control their doings. 
2 7 The conceptual struggle of the author in this article may perhaps be 
attributed to the feet that earlier drafts were commented upon by people 
with very different paradigmatic backgrounds. Comments were provided 
by on the one hand Elinor Ostrom, and on the other hand Peter Evans, 
Mick Moore and Judith Tendler. The latter three are political economists 
who all put a state-society perspective at the core of their analyses. 
5 
Making the Best of it: Frontline Workers 
Implementing Reform 
Comments and Recommendations: 
The NLA move to trim down its Working Force ... and especially 
Ditchtenders weakens the capacity of NLA to maintain needed 
services to the end-users. Majority of Gatekeepers and Ditchtenders 
has an age 55-64, old enough to remove debris and stop logs at 
critical checking structureseven more difficult for them to carry 
cavans of palay as 1SF collection in kind. The canals vacated by the 
retired Ditch tender without MTO were abandoned, deteriorated ... 
due to lack of manpower and inability of LAs to accept 
responsibilities. ... We recommend that NLA must hire young, 
energetic, responsible, capable new Daily Ditchtenders... (NIA-
UPRLLS, 4 * District 1996c) 
This chapter is about the NIA's fieldworkers. It discusses the 
behaviour, the interests and motivations of these lesser people1, 
like ditchtenders, gatekeepers and watermasters. Also, this chapter 
takes a look at the doings of a newer kind of fieldworker, the 
institutional development officer (LDO). In the previous chapter 
on main system management, I have hardly discussed these 
officers. However, this was a practical rather than a substantive 
choice. I think these people matter so much that they deserve a full 
chapter. 
One reason for giving them attention is that I sympathise with 
them, as I pity their fate. In the Philippines, as well as other parts 
of the globe, irrigation agencies are reducing their staff numbers. 
Employees are offered eady retirement packages, or are simply 
laid-otr". In the case of the 4 t h Irrigation District of UPRIIS, 
streamlining reduced their numbers from 180 in 1982, to only 80 
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during 1996-97. Since then, their number further fell to only 40 at 
the beginning of 2003. 
Another reason to discuss fieldworkers is that I think that they 
deserve more credit than is usually given to them. Funnily enough, 
the litde documentation that I know of is rather positive about 
their behaviour. A study conducted on irrigation management in 
the national systems that would later become the UPRIIS system 
emphasised the central position of the ditchtender. 
The ditchtender is the person most farmers go to when they have 
an irrigation problem. He is easily approachable since he lives with 
the farmers. (...) In turn, the ditchtender takes his responsibility of 
providing water within his area quite seriously. (Wickham 1972; 11) 
The opening quote above also indicates that the NIA District 
engineers saw the downsizing of their fieldworkers as a great loss 
for system management. Similar findings were reported on 
Mexican fieldworkers. Van der Zaag (1992) presented a detailed 
account of canaleros in a Mexican system, before it was turned over 
to farmers. He found them to be committed and knowledgeable 
workers, who made the complex irrigation system work, and 
ensured that farmers were satisfied. In another study on Mexico 
after turn over, it was reported that the farmer organisations that 
took control of the system, hired the 'good' laid-off engineers and 
fieldworkers to do the work for them (Kloezen 2002). 
Apparendy, fieldworkers are not all bad, or can do well under 
certain circumstances. My own findings also suggest that these 
fieldworkers can be committed to their jobs, can play important 
roles in making the system work, represent farmer interests within 
the agency and give meaning to the reform policies. This chapter 
thus questions the downsizing trends in irrigation reforms. Has the 
NIA been getting rid of people that it should have kept? 
Finally, the fieldworkers deserve attention because they are not 
just the victims of the streamlining and turn over policies, they also 
have to implement them, and live with the consequences. It is 
interesting to analyse how fieldworkers give shape to turn over 
policies that create the conditions for the streamlining of their 
colleagues or even themselves and that potentially increase their 
own work load. What happens in such a situation? Do they resist it, 
do they make the best of it, or are they even enthusiastic about the 
chances provided by the new management set-up? 
166 Water, Works and Weges 
What made turn over and streamlining policies so popular all 
around the globe? One of the reasons is financial: cutting staff-
levels helped governments to curb public spending and irrigation 
agencies to keep their reduced budgets in the black (cf. Nunberg 
1995; Kikuchi et al 1999; for further discussion on die NIA and 
UPRLTS, see the following chapter). However, there is more to it 
than just a practical, financial reason. There are also ideological 
reasons for removing these state workers. Streamlining and turn 
over became well-accepted policy discourses because they 
contained elements that fit into the agendas of neo-liberal as well as 
more progressive lines of thought Both agendas mistrust - or at 
least disregard - the state worker (cf. Tendler 1997:2). 
Obviously, neo-liberalism does not like state workers. They were 
to be removed, because there were far too many of them in the 
inflated Third Wodd bureaucracies or patrimonial slates. They 
abuse their secure positions by displaying shirking or rent-seeking 
behaviour (for irrigation, see Repetto 1986). Governments 
therefore should leave as much as possible to the private sector, 
either through full privatisation or through contracting out parts of 
their services. Whether it is the supply of electricity, the marketing 
of an agricultural commodity, the ambulance services to hospitals, 
or the counselling of the unemployed to find a job, the argument is 
the same globally: workers who do their job in a private setting do 
things more efficientiy than their colleagues in the public sector 
(McElligott 2001). 
These neo-liberal beliefs have shaped the international policy 
agenda in irrigation. Full privatisation is not so often pushed for, 
because a dam and its canal system constitute a natural monopoly 
so that real competitive markets would have difficulty to develop in 
irrigation management (Moore 1989). Instead, the focus is on the 
downsizing of irrigation agencies by contracting out the work to 
irrigation associations of farmers. These associations might be 
public, but at least they are non-state. The argument is that they do 
a better job, as farmers at least have a private interest in getting the 
job done effectively and cost-efficiendy (Vermillion 1991; Small 
and Carruthers 1991). 
More surprisingly perhaps, also more progressive lines of 
thought do not give state workers much of a future. In the 'putting 
people first' (Cemea 1985) line of thinking, the trust is in 
community self-management in which people manage their own 
affairs. Farmer associations rather than state workers have to take 
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care of irrigation management (Jopillo and de los Reyes 7988).1 In 
'farmer empowerment' lines of thinking, state workers also tend to 
drop from the equation. To make the irrigation agencies more 
accountable or responsive to farmer needs, farmer organisation and 
user participation is required. In these discussions, state workers 
are not given much attention. The problem is usually 
conceptualised primarily as a question of power between engineers 
and farmers, which are argued to have different class background, 
interests and/or life-wodds (Ramamurthy 1995;Diemer 1990). 
Apparendy, the state workers are considered rather irrelevant for 
the question of control. They simply have to give way to make 
room for farmers who will make state agencies more accountable. 
The undedying assumption is that farmers are more inclined or 
better equipped than fieldworkers to make engineers behave 
responsibly. The other possibility is that the fieldworkers are 
considered part of the problem of the non-accountable irrigation 
agency. Following a Weberian view, they constitute the lowest level 
of the bureaucratic pyramid, and as such embody state power and 
represent state interests. In any case, the progressive agenda wants 
them out of the way as well, be it by default or on purpose. 
Let me now return to the analysis presented in this chapter. 
Conceptually, the starting point is that state workers are no rule-
bound automatons. They are people of flesh and blood who 
possess agency, interests and ideas, and thus do matter in policy 
implementation (day and Schaffer 1984). These state workers 
transform policy "as they give social meanings to it that were not 
set out in the original policy statements" (Long 1989:3). 
My analysis also uses Lipsky's (1980) theoretical work on so-
called 'street-level-bureaucrats1. To Lipsky, street-level-bureaucrats 
are people like policemen, judges and welfare workers. They have 
to work on the outer boundaries of the state, in the sense that they 
have to implement state policies in direct contact with the state's 
clients (McEUigott 2001: 20). NIA field workers fit this definition. 
However, I prefer to use the term ftondine worker rather than 
street-level-bureaucrat, as the former term stresses the fact that the 
frontliners are workers rather than white-collar officials. Moreover, 
unlike judges, the NIA's fieldmen do not sit in offices waiting for 
their clients to come to them to be processed. 
Lipsky's work is interesting for two reasons. Firsdy, he puts 
emphasis on the working conditions of the frondine workers. He 
convincingly argues that the peculiar character of their work 
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structures policy transformation. They are squeezed between the 
demands of their superiors and those of their clients. This 
"boundary-spanning role' is full of tensions. 
It typically involves overwhelming client demands, chronically 
inadequate resources, complex and changing work rules, high but 
conflicting public expectations, and often physically dangerous 
work. (Lipsky 1980) 
Hence, they are inclined to transform state policies in such a way 
that they can cope with these tensions and make their life bearable. 
Secondly, Lipsky takes as a starting-point that frondine workers are 
professionals who - at least at the start of their career - are 
ambitious people committed to serve the state to the best of their 
abilities. Given the present-day dominance of rather cynical 
assumptions about people's rent-seeking behaviour, this, to me, 
seems a refreshing starting-point for research. 
This chapter continues as follows. The next section introduces 
the frondine workers by discussing their responsibilities and 
exploring their motivation: what drove them in their work. The 
following two sections look at their tactics in main system 
management, as well as in the ways in which they give shape to the 
turn over program. I use detailed case studies of a few fieldworkers. 
I gave names to the most important actors. In the perilous working 
environment of Zone 1, the practices and strategies of watermaster 
Argee as well those of Jo, a ditchtender and acting-gatekeeper, are 
examined. In the friendlier environment of Zone 2, the focus is on 
watermaster Alan. Finally, attention is given to the limited room for 
manoeuvre of Martin, the only institutional development officer 
working in the District. The chapter ends with conclusions, 
especially on the policy implications of my findings. 
The Concerns of the Frontline Workers 
This section looks at the motivations of the frondine workers. Are 
they indeed the indifferent bureaucrats that neo-liberalism argues 
them to be? Locally, workers shirking their responsibilities are 
called '15-30s'. This means that they only report to office on pay-
days, the 15 th and 30* of each month. According to engineers as 
well as fieldstaff, many of the workers fitted that image at the start 
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of the UPRIIS system. However, during 1996-97 only a few of the 
gready reduced workforce portrayed such behaviour. On the 
contrary: the majority was pretty much committed to their work. 
Before going into this in further detail, I will first explain the tasks, 
numbers and training of these frondine workers. 
The responsibilities of the frondine workers 
By 1996-97 - thus respectively 15 and 8 years after the start of the 
streamlining policies and the IOSP turn over program - the group 
of fieldworkers in the District consisted of 22 watermasters and 58 
gatekeepers and ditchtenders.2 
The watermasters operated under the command of a Zone 
Engineer (see figure 2.2). Each watermaster had his own area of 
responsibility, the so-called division. Due to the streamlining and 
turn over policies, the size of the divisions has been growing and 
growing. At the start of UPRIIS, it was limited to around 500 
hectares. By 1996-97, its size had more or less doubled (for further 
detail, see the following chapter). 
The responsibilities of the watermaster have grown over time as 
well. At the start of UPRIIS, they were held responsible only for 
water management. A separate maintenance section supervised 
maintenance, and special collectors from the office carried out fee 
collection. By 1996 however, they had become 'area masters' rather 
than watermasters. They were de facto in charge of most NIA 
concerns in their division.3 They were held responsible for water 
management, canal maintenance, fee collection as well as 
'institutional development'. 
The last responsibility meant that they were expected to keep 
the IAs 'alive'. Moreover, they had to check on the performance of 
these IAs in carrying out the fee collection and/or canal 
maintenance tasks contracted out to these organisations through 
the turn over program. The IAs were located within the boundaries 
of a watermasters' division. As an IA covered around 300-500 
hectares, each watermaster had to take care of two to three IAs. 
The ditchtenders and gatekeepers worked as assistants to the 
Zone Engineers as well as the watermasters. They were doing the 
actual fieldwork, like operating gates, removing or installing checks 
and cleaning canals. They also assisted in fee collection. Formally, 
the gatekeepers are under the command of the Zone Engineer or 
170 Water, Works and Wages 
even the Operational Engineer. Given the limited numbers of 
fieldworkers left, they were however assisting the watermasters as 
well. Gatekeepers were often expected to clean a stretch of canal, 
and to assist a watermaster in water management and fee 
collection. In short, watermasters thus operated as 'area managers', 
who were expected to make things work in their division, through 
the help of one or two fieldworkers (either ditchtenders or 
gatekeepers) and about two IAs. 
In terms of training, the watermasters consisted of three 
different groups. The first group consisted of the older 
watermasters, who were hired by the agency before the start of 
UPRIIS. Usually they did not have a college degree. Though a 
formal requirement for the position, the agency made an exception 
for this group. By 1996, they were limited in number, as many were 
already retired. The second group was well educated and trained. 
They were hired at the start of UPRIIS. They had a degree in 
agronomy, passed their civil service examination and received an 
intensive, one year on-the-job training in water management, 
maintenance, administration and organising/social skills. 
The third group consisted of former ditchtenders, gatekeepers, 
or office personnel like collectors. As the agency was constantiy 
reducing its staff numbers, it opted to fill vacant watermaster 
positions by re-assigning or promoting existing staff. To allow this 
to happen, the agency let go of the educational requirements for 
the group of fieldworkers, who usually had only passed high 
school. Due to financial constraints and a government ban on 
filling vacant positions, they were working in an acting-position. 
While waiting for promotion, they were still ranked and paid 
according to their original position. 
Concerns of the frondine workers 
The majority of the frontliners was service oriented. Despite their 
difficult working conditions, they still tried to make a difference. 
Their motivation was partly based on a concern for the well-being 
of their own neighbourhood. Many of them were bom and raised 
and still lived in one of the villages served by the Irrigation District. 
Fieldworkers usually preferred to work in their own 
neighbourhood, as they wanted to help out their kamag-anak, Le. 
their family and kin. As a watermaster commented: 
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My primary concern is to bring water and other NIA services to my 
own village and those nearby. My own fields are there, and those of 
my father. I have also many relatives in these villages. I have 
worked hard to serve them. 
Working in their own neighbourhood was also considered to be 
practical and safe. They did not have to travel to go to work and 
could save on gasoline expenses. Gasoline allowances were seven 
liters/week, which did not count for much. Also, it allowed them 
to combine their NIA work with household matters and home-
based activities like backyard pig keeping. Moreover, their frondine 
work was not a nine to five job. They had to go out when the need 
arose, which was often at night It was thus convenient to live close 
to their area of work. Finally, in this way they were able to operate 
in the relatively secure environment of their own neighbourhood. 
As will be discussed further below, many had lost much of their 
initial motivation to serve their co-villagers. However, as they 
worked within their own neighbourhood, they could not easily 
escape the social pressure put on them to do their work. The 
District management, who preferred to assign the fieldworkers to 
their own areas, utilised this fart. Their local knowledge of the 
farmers and their leaders was seen as an advantage to the office. It 
facilitated fee collection, and helped to build up good relations 
between the NIA and the village leadership. However, as a District 
Chief commented, it also motivated the fieldworkers to do their 
jobs. 
For me, it is hard to supervise and control them, as they work in far 
away and sometimes remote places. However, they cannot easily 
withstand the pressure from their neighbours. If people need water, 
they go their house. They cannot hide, and are thus forced to 
respond to the needs of the farmers. (Interview with a UPRIIS 
District Chief, April 1996) 
According to Lipsky (1980), frondiners turn sour towards their 
clients during the course of their career. As he puts it. "Generations 
of thoughtful and potentially self-sacrificing people are disarmed in 
their social purpose by the dynamics inherent in frondine 
workplaces." As they cannot serve them in the way they want to, 
they increasingly see their clients as cases, and come to dislike those 
172 Water, Works and Wages 
that are more difficult to handle, or more defiant in their 
behaviour. In the end, according to Lipsky, these frontliners give 
preferential treatment to those they like, which are usually the less 
problematic and richer clients. 
Such cynicism and preferential treatment was not prevalent 
among the NIA frondine workers. Stereotyping their clients in 
categories like 'good' or Taad' payers, Tiard-headed or 'co-operative' 
was common practice. Some were indeed disappointed in the 
willingness and/or capacity of the farmers to organise themselves 
and help out the NIA in managing the system. However, it did not 
go as far as alienation from part of the NLA's clients.4 Though they 
were dissatisfied with the services they could provide to the NIA's 
clientele, they did not turn away from them. 
My explanation is that unlike Lipsky's welfare workers, 
policemen and lawyers, the NIA's frontliners belonged to the same 
social group they were trying to serve. Being rice farmers 
themselves, or at least being part of these rice-farming 
communities, they could easily identify with the anxieties and 
requests of their clients. 
A second reason why they were motivated to serve the NIA's 
clients, was based on financial self-interest. As their income 
depended on fee collection from the farmers, they realised they had 
to make a difference, to make these farmers willing to pay. To the 
fieldworkers, the NIA wages were crucially important. Some 
fieldworkers, mosdy watermasters, had other sources of income 
like farming. However, they would also have a hard time making 
ends meet, without their government salary. Moreover, they highly 
valued the security of the NIA's income, as well as the social 
security provisions for health and pension. 
As the District office was to be financially autonomous for its 
operational budget, low fee collection had a direct effect on the 
payment of salaries and benefits. This was a real problem to the 
fieldworkers. Being government employees, they would eventually 
receive their salaries. However, insufficient income of the District 
from fee collection frequendy delayed salary payment by two to six 
weeks. Due to these delays, many fieldworkers were forced to take 
salary loans against hefty interest rates. The payments of the office 
for health insurance and pensions were delayed for more than a 
year. Though this posed no immediate threat to their well-being, 
they were still concerned that it might threaten their security in case 
of illness or retirement. Hence, there was a widely felt sense of 
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urgency among the fieldworkers to serve the NIA's clientele in 
such a way that sufficient fees could be collected to secure a timely 
payment of salaries and benefits. 
Though important, the concern of these fieldworkers with the 
affairs of die office was not only based on their need to earn a 
living. Fieldworkers often told me that they worked harder at the 
start of the UPRIIS system, when the connection between fee 
collection and salary payments was not yet established. Hence, 
there was more to it. Their concern with the office was also based 
on their identification as NIA workers and a sense of belonging to 
the agency. 
This NIA identity was partly based on pride. Especially at the 
start of UPRIIS, fieldworkers took pride in the fact that they could 
bring the much-needed water and construction works to their 
vfllages. At the time, the NIA was considered a fine agency to work 
for. It was considered to be an efficient corporation, which played 
an important role in the modernisation of the Filipino countryside. 
Operating under the direct control of President Marcos, it built the 
biggest dam in Asia. At the time, its salaries were relatively high, 
even if compared to the private sector. Much of this pride was 
gone by 1997, as the NIA was no longer what it used to be. 
However, especially some of the ditchtenders and gatekeepers still 
derived their status in the village from the fact that they enabled 
farmers to harvest their dry season crop. 
To most fieldworkers, die NIA did not just provide a job. It had 
become an important part of their life. To many, it was their only 
work experience. They joined the NIA at the start of UPRIIS, or 
even before that time. Hence they were already working in the 
District for twenty years or more. Often, colleague front line 
workers had become part of their barkada. Consequendy, their 
work at NIA became an important part of what Bourdieu called 
their habitus, defined as "history turned into nature' (Bourdieu 1977: 
78). 
In line with Lipsky's theory on street-level-bureaucrats, I believe 
that the frondine character of their job reinforced their 
identification with the NIA. The character of the work 
strengthened group feelings. Being a FLW within the NIA is not a 
boring job. On the contrary. They all experienced a lot of thrilling, 
stressful and even fearful moments in the 'course of duty'. While 
guarding gates or collecting fees, they are often criticised, scolded 
at, and at times threatened. To make their work bearable, they 
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often go out together. Hence, some of their most anxious 
experiences were shared experiences. Many friendships emerged 
out of these experiences. 
When ditchtenders or gatekeepers left the house of a 
watermaster late at night to guard a gate or patrol a canal in times 
of scarcity, it was like observing a session of a police movie: te 
careful out there'. Among themselves, they frequendy gathered to 
discuss tactics in water distribution, as well as fee collection. In 
short, their frontline working conditions strengthened their identity 
as NIA workers, as well as their identification with their co-
workers. 
Low morale 
Nevertheless, work morale had gone down rather dramatically over 
die years, following the downfall of the NIA from the eady 1980s 
(for further detail, see the following chapter). The general feeling 
was that NIA had lost much of its attraction, as salaries had 
become relatively low and often delayed. The glorious days of the 
start of the UPRIIS system were long gone. They felt that the 
system was deteriorating due to insufficient maintenance and the 
lack of sufficient funds for repair works. Also the large reduction in 
field personnel was considered to be a major cause for the poor 
performance of the system. As a result, they found it increasingly 
difficult to carry out their work. As one watermaster commented: 
You might trunk I am the laziest watermaster of the District 
Indeed, I hardly go to the field, but what should I go out for? Even 
if I worked day and night, like I did before, it still would not make a 
difference. These farmers would still be without water and their 
canals would stul be silted. 
The working morale of the frontiiners in Zone 2 was better, 
mainly because of the doings of the Zone Engineer. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, this industrious and ambitious 
engineer was still able to motivate his workers. Given his access to 
office resources and the co-operative relations between the villages 
and his NIA office, they were able to make a difference in the area. 
Moreover, the work itself was more enjoyable. The engineer did 
put a lot of time and personal money in to bringing the 
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fieldworkers and the IA leaders together, during working hours as 
well as during their informal gatherings after office hours. 
The morale of the fieldworkers was also affected by their age. 
The work had lost much of its attraction after twenty years or 
more. Qeaning canals is obviously a tedious, and at older age, a 
very heavy job. Some had been able to be promoted to gatekeeper 
or watermaster. However, due to government policy and financial 
problems within the NIA, these vacant posts were not allowed to 
be filled up. Hence, many carried out the job in a so-called 'acting-
position1, and thus still received the salary of their original position. 
The watermasters had no chance to climb the hierarchical ladder at 
all, as they lacked a degree in agricultural or civil engineering. 
Worse, many felt that their jobs had lost importance and power. 
While they used to be in command of several ditchtenders, 
streamlining left them with one or two workers only. 
To summarise this section, the frondine workers were pretty 
much committed to do their work well. They were motivated by 
the drive to serve their own neighbourhood, the need to earn an 
income from fee collection, and a more genuine concern with NIA 
matters. Morale has gone down over the years, following the 
perceived decay of the NIA organisation as well as the physical 
system, and the lack of promotional possibilities. The next sections 
will explore how these motivations shaped the way they dealt with 
main system management as well the turn over program. It will be 
shown that - despite low morale and the difficult working 
conditions - the majority still tried to make the best of it. 
Frontline Workers and Water Management 
The work environment was a crucial factor in how the frondine 
workers engaged in water management. In the NIA friendly 
environment of Zone 2, the frondiners joined the dominant 
alliance built around the Zone Engineer. Their work in water 
management was rather straightforward as it did not require careful 
manoeuvring. Under his leadership, and in partnership with the IA 
leaders, they took care of controlling the main gates of the Zone. 
As we will see in the next section, there was some rivalry between 
the frondiners and the IA leaders. Generally speaking however, 
they could carry out their jobs without many difficulties. 
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In contrast, the more perilous environment of Zone 1 required a 
more careful approach. As several alliances were competing for 
scarce water, and as the NIA management did not provide much 
back up to its fieldworkers, one could easily run into trouble. This 
section takes a closer look at three different types of strategies 
employed by the fieldworkers, to be able to operate and survive in 
this difficult working environment. These strategies are labelled as 
the evasive, the careful and the bold strategy. 
The evasive strategy 
Evasive behaviour was mainly found among some of the 
gatekeepers in charge of the crucial headgates in Zone 1. As much 
as possible they tried to avoid making a difference. It was their way 
of coping with the physically dangerous character of their work 
that - as Lipsky (1980) argues - is one of the typical characteristics 
of frontiine work. Undoubtedly, their work was fearful and 
dangerous, as was discussed in the previous chapter. These gates 
were located in remote places, and frequendy visited and guarded 
at night by groups of desperate farmer leaders and local politicians. 
More often than not, some of these group members were armed, 
and/or were known to be 'toughguys'. This was to ensure the 
safety of the group and to show others that they meant business. 
During times of scarcity, these gatekeepers were assigned to stay 
in their field quarters, which were built next to the gate. Their 
commanding officers instructed them to guard the gate settings, 
both during day and night. Hence, if such a gatekeeper would stick 
to his instructions, he would openly challenge groups that visited 
the gate to change its settings. Such behaviour might infuriate them 
and might be the cause of physical threats. Gatekeepers were 
frequendy threatened in their work. A gatekeeper who followed a 
Isold strategy' was threatened with gunshots while guarding the 
gate (see further below). Another gatekeeper was indeed killed in 
the late 1970s. This killing seemed to be related to his role in village 
politics. However, his colleagues believed that his tragic death was 
at least pardy job related. 
One of the main tactics to evade trouble was to be absent during 
those periods that the tensions over water were getting high. As the 
visiting groups usually brought their own operating equipment (a 
handle or turning wheel, or a chain block in case the Ufting devices 
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were damaged), they did not require the assistance of the 
gatekeeper. However, there were limits to how often this tactic 
could be employed. As many people would visit the crucial 
headgates during times of scarcity, complaints about the absence of 
a gatekeeper would almost certainly reach the commanding 
officers, i.e. the Zone Engineer or Operational Engineer. 
Another tactic was to be present; but to give in to demands 
made with regard to gate settings. To avoid trouble with their 
superior officers, gatekeepers would not inform them of all gate 
operations. Like the gatekeeper of a headgate commented: 
During the night, the gate settings are usually changed. When I 
wake up in the morning, I will re-set the gates, in line with the 
instructions of the Operational Engineer. I will then do the daily 
reading. In this way, it will not show in the readings and he will not 
be bothered. 
The third tactic to evade trouble was to seek the protection of 
one of the involved politicians in the struggle for water. The 
advantage to the gatekeeper is that people will not easily harm him, 
as they know that the politician is protecting him. They were 
however careful not to support the politician too openly, as they 
would then lose their 'neutral position' as a NIA worker, and might 
enrage members of one of the competing alliances. 
The careful strategy 
The majority of the frondiners opted for what I call the 'careful 
strategy'. Either because of their own motivations, or because they 
felt pressured by their co-villagers, they still wanted to make a 
difference. They felt that they could or should not run away from 
their responsibilities. However, they tried to carry out their work in 
a careful way, so as to avoid unnecessary conflict. Or, in the words 
of Lipsky (1980), "they used their discretion to relieve tensions 
arising from their boundary-spanning role, i.e. the mediation of 
state-client relationships." As an example, I will take a closer look 
at the tactics employed by Argee, a watermaster operating in the 
tail-end area of Zone 1. 
For twenty years, Argee had been operating as a watermaster for 
the 1-H canal network (see map 4.2). For several years he took care 
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of water management in his own division, as well as the division of 
his wife, who was also a NIA watermaster (in return, she took care 
of most of the administrative duties).5 All in all, he was thus in 
charge of an area as large as 2000 hectares. 
His area was located at the boundary of the program area. 
Usually, a part was included while the remaining part would be 
excluded from the program area. Consequendy, crop damage or 
total crop failure was a recurrent phenomenon in his area. 
Moreover, the crucial headgates distributing the water between the 
different tail-end areas of Zone 1 were located within or near his 
area of supervision. Hence, he had to operate amidst several 
alliances competing for scarce water. 
He had always been very active in water management Working 
day and night, together with some trusted colleagues, he was one of 
the key-players in the area. His primary motivation was to secure 
water to the fields of his own village, which was located in the 
upstream division. However, he also cared about the villages of his 
tail-end division. He pitied the farmers in these areas, as water 
logging frequendy damaged their wet season crop or did not allow 
them to plant at all. Hence, he liked to help them to secure water 
for their dry season crop. 
In recent years, however, he was no longer at the forefront of 
water management. Given the deterioration of the system and the 
loss of his field men, he found it increasingly difficult to take care 
of his responsibilities. As a result, he had chosen a more careful 
strategy. Nevertheless, he was still a player to be reckoned with. His 
carefulness was based on the following key-elements. 
Firsdy, he operated behind the scenes as much as possible. He 
hardly left his house, but rather let a few trusted men (one from the 
NIA, the other one a farmer) go out to gather information or guard 
the gates. Also, as much as possible he let the different alliances 
from his areas of supervision struggle for the water. He still made a 
difference to them by giving them advice and information. They 
frequendy visited his house to discuss tactics. It was only in those 
cases that the atmosphere was growing tense and he feared for the 
well-being of his field men that he might decide to go out himself. 
By doing so, he tried to preserve the image of a 'neutral' NIA 
employee, rather than being seen as a representative of one of the 
involved interest groups. 
Secondly, he ensured that he was well informed about the water 
flows in the upstream parts of the system, the water needs of the 
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different areas, as well as the moves of the various rival alliances 
operating in the tail-end. He got his information through regular 
visits to the office, through colleague frondiners and his trusted 
field men, and through befriended IA- and village leaders visiting 
his house as they were seeking his advice. Given his long-time 
experience, he understood the dynamics of this complex game over 
water well. It allowed him to be effective in his moves. He knew 
when and how to intervene, and when to lie low. This allowed him 
to avoid unnecessary conflict due to interventions, which would 
turn out to be futile anyway. 
Thirdly, he was keen on developing and maintaining friendly 
relations with all key players in the field of water management For 
instance, he remarked about one of his biggest rivals, the village 
captain who was heading the so-called syndicate: 
We fight about the gate settings, but we treat each other with 
respect I make it a point that our fights do not become personal. I 
do for instance attend his birthday parties and give him a present 
Another way of staying on speaking terms with the different 
people involved, was that he tried to be accommodating with 
regard to the water needs of other areas. Water flows were 
negotiated and shared, even though it hampered the flows to his 
own area. For example, during the 1996-97 season, he allowed a 
barangay captain from a downstream village to frequendy divert 
water from one of his sub-laterals. He could have stopped this 
diversion all together, but did not do so, as it might have 
jeopardised his relation with this particular village leader. 
Fourthly, he was careful in making promises about water 
deliveries. As he realised very well that he lacked control over the 
system, he avoided making promises that he might not be able to 
keep. During one instance, for example, he attended a meeting in 
which the Zone Engineer had set up a concrete schedule for water 
distribution in the Zone. He however decided not to convey this 
schedule to the different farmer leaders in his area, because it might 
harm his reputation. 
So many things can happen that we cannot foresee or control. If I 
am going to tell about this schedule, these people will have 
expectations. If we cannot keep our promises, they will blame me, 
and I will make a fool of myself. 
180 Water, Works and Wages 
Fifthly, he played by the NIA rules. He followed the NIA's 
procedures in order to retain his legitimate and neutral position. It 
meant that he would not openly claim water for areas, which were 
excluded from the program area. In such a case, he would lie low. 
He would then limit his actions to advising farmer leaders from 
these excluded areas on how to make efforts in securing water 
successfully. However, he did try to play the rules as well, to avoid 
being cornered altogether. As Lipsky (1980) argues, the "sheer 
volume of contradictory work rules enables street-level-bureaucrats 
to exploit 'Zones of relative indifference' to the management, while 
respecting defacto core rules." 
This was indeed part of Argee's manoeuvring. For instance, in 
the dry season of 1996-97, the office was planning to keep his areas 
out of the program area. He however was able to convince the 
office to include at least small parts of his areas in the program 
area. Given these areas, he could legitimately claim that water had 
to be flowing to his areas. He was well aware that the actually 
planted areas were much larger, and also made use of these waters. 
However, he could always claim that this was the unintended 
consequence of a legitimate effort to serve the program areas. 
Another example of bending the rules was found in his 
reporting to the office. One particular IA in his downstream 
division was widely known for their efforts to please the NIA 
office by collecting fees. Based on this sympathy, the area of this 
IA was usually included in the program area. Argee helped to 
maintain this image by playing die rules. He was supposed to 
report all of the planted areas as the basis for the billing of 
irrigation fees. This rule was however not very clear. At other 
instances, the office preferred them to submit only those areas for 
billing, which would have a fair chance of a good harvest In this 
way, the office avoided that large areas would have to be classified 
as exempted from billing later on. They wanted to avoid this as it 
would be interpreted by the NIA's central office as a sign of poor 
management. Also, the engineers wanted to maintain a small 
program area, as it otherwise might face claims for water from local 
farmer leaders that it might not be able to honour. 
Argee clevedy played with these contradictory work rules. He 
only reported a part of the actually planted area as planted or 
programmed, but he also stimulated efforts by the IA to collect 
fees from all of the harvested areas. The collected fees from 
farmers that were not reported as being planted, were charged to 
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their back-accounts. Consequently, fee collection efficiency rates 
seemed surprisingly high, and the image of the 'good IA' was 
reproduced. 
Finally, he was careful not to get squeezed between the field and 
the interests of the office. In general, the watermasters well 
understood the subtieties of the socio-political dimensions of the 
struggles over water, and the positioning of the office in these 
struggles. They understood the fact that the engineers were playing 
a game of survival as well. Hence, the office might not back them 
up in case of conflict, if it would not suit their interests. To avoid 
being squeezed, the watermasters frequendy had informal 
discussions with each other as well as with befriended engineers or 
politicians. In such a way they remained up to date, and could 
adjust their tactics if needed. 
A female watermaster who was rather new to the job learned 
about the relevance of this careful strategy the hard way. Previously 
she had been working at the office as a collector. Due to the 
retirement of a watermaster, she was asked to take his position for 
a division adjacent to those of Argee. As she liked to work in the 
field, she took the job and ambitiously tried to make the best of it. 
However, as she lacked the necessary political skills, she badly 
misjudged the wider politics of her work. Her division covered part 
of the villages that were the primary targets of Meneses Jr., the 
mayor's son (see previous chapter). She had a hard time collecting 
fees from these farmers, as they argued that it was this politician 
who brought them the water, and not the NIA. As she felt that the 
office should address this issue, she decided to write a letter to the 
Operational Engineer. In that letter, she explained the situation, 
and requested the office to take action. Another reason for writing 
the letter was to argue that she could not help the low collection in 
her area. 
Her move turned against her. The office let her down. The 
Operational Engineer used her letter in his subtie struggle with this 
politician regarding his interventions into the water management of 
the District. Through one of his trusted men, the Operational 
Engineer had the letter shown to the mayor's son. The mayor's son 
was enraged and called her to his house, where he scolded her. 
Obviously, she felt bad about the situation and lost much of her 
appetite for the job. She was relieved from her position, as both the 
office and the watermaster herself felt that she could no longer 
carry out her job effectively in that area. 
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The bold strategy 
The third strategy described here is the bold strategy, chosen by a 
few of the fiddworkers. Though a small minority, they were an 
important minority. These were toughguys, who were willing to live 
rather dangerously. By standing firm in guarding gates and 
patrolling canals, they were crucial actors in water management 
who did make a difference. Being brave is not just a highly valued 
trait in the macho culture of Central Luzon. It can be turned into a 
resource as well. There is a job market for these people, as 
politicians and other power holders like to make use of their 
services. Hence, people can make a career out of it (Fegan 1994). 
This was true for Jo, a tough gatekeeper in Zone 1. His toughness 
made a difference to the water management of the Zone, and at the 
same time allowed him to develop his own politico-economic 
project 
Jo was neady fifty years old, and had served the NIA for over 
twenty years. He was an uneducated and relatively poor man who 
owned a small house in one of the tail-end villages along lateral 1-
H. For many years, he had served as a ditchtender under Argee. Jo 
worked hard, not only in cleaning his canal, but also supporting 
Argee and his wife in securing water for their areas and collecting 
fees. To secure water for Argee's divisions, a trifurcation gate in the 
1-H canal network was crucial. Hence, Jo took also care of 
guarding this gate. 
During the first half of the 1990s guarding this gate was a 
dangerous practice. The syndicate group around kapitan Tecson 
controlled this gate, to allow them to serve their clientele along the 
1-H canal system. Jo was however known for his bravery, and still 
went to the gate at night, when the kapitan's men where not 
around. It resulted in serious animosity between Jo and the 
syndicate's field men. In three instances during three consecutive 
dry seasons, shots were fired in the air to scare him away, while he 
tried to approach or operate the gate. In another instance - when 
Jo was not around - a bullet was actually fired in the direction of a 
farmer group guarding the gate. A bullet hole was still to be seen in 
the concrete structure of the gate. Argee was pleased with this 
hard-working fieldworker, who dared to go this crucial gate. On 
the other hand, he was worried that Jo might be harmed. 
Jo, however, could not easily be stopped from carrying out his 
bold strategy. Part of his motivation was based on pride to be a 
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NIA worker. He was proud that he could make a difference to the 
many farmers who where depending upon his services. He 
genuinely felt that it should be the NIA in control of the gates, and 
not outsiders like the syndicate. He considered it to be his duty to 
stay firm and not to give in to their threats. He felt that it was their 
job to serve the farmers, among others because otherwise the NIA 
had no right to demand irrigation fees. 
There was however also a political angle to his doings. He had 
been a long-time local vote broker for various politicians at village, 
mayoral and congressional level, and had already served as a 
barangay councillor. As his village was located downstream of this 
crucial trifurcation gate, serving these farmers with water would 
increase his status and popularity in the village. Moreover, during 
the second half of the 1980s he found himself in a serious conflict 
with the kapitan of his village, the toughguy who during that time 
belonged to the irrigation and political alliance of kapitan Tecson 
and municipal secrelary Juatco (see previous chapter). 
This conflict started when Jo decided to no longer support the 
congressional candidate that was supported by this kapitan, but 
instead to support a rival candidate. The conflict rapidly deepened. 
The kapitan's group uprooted his watermelon field, tried to frame 
him for a local theft he did not commit, and Jo even received a 
note saying that his days were numbered. Hence, the rivalry over 
water was complemented by a rivalry in village politics. 
When the mayor's son started to challenge the syndicate's 
project during the mid 1990s, he quickly discovered Jo's value. At 
that time, Jo had become acting-gatekeeper of the trifurcation gate. 
To the mayor's son, Jo's boldness was a resource he could well use 
to take over control from the syndicate. Moreover, Jo was willing 
to work day and night. Also, Jo lived in one of the villages where 
he was trying to gain electoral support. Hence, the son of the 
mayor tried to gain his sympathy. Jo liked the interventions of this 
politician, as it helped him to beat the syndicate's control over his 
gate. 
They joined forces in the 1995-96 dry season. When the son of 
the mayor learned that shots were fired at Jo while guarding the 
gate, he took his chance. He provided Jo with an M-16 automatic 
rifle. It was only after the dry season ended that Jo had to give it 
back. Jo considered his relation with the politician as a 'tactical 
alliance', but others then started to see him as a bata (a 'pawn' and 
trusted follower of another person) of this politician. 
184 Water, Works and Wages 
In the subsequent dry season, Jo was again supporting this 
politician in securing water for Jo's village as well as the 
surrounding villages. By patronizing him, the mayor's son was able 
to further strengthen their relationship. Firsdy, the mayor's son 
gave him a chance to act as the broker for the sale of some his 
land. Jo had been trying to develop this side-line activity for years. 
As a NIA worker, he had daily contacts with farmers in a wide area. 
He figured that he thus had firsthand and eady knowledge of 
farmers who were willing to sell their land. Until that time, he had 
not been able to make much money out of it Though this deal 
eventually did not work out as well, it would have earned Jo a 
substantive income if it would have pushed through. 
Secondly, this politician helped him out when Jo got involved in 
a shooting incident. One day in 1997, Jo was physically threatened 
by a group of rivals from his own village. To defend himself, Jo 
shot one of them. He was imprisoned, but the politician intervened 
and ensured that he was quickly released. Thirdly, this politician 
supported Jo's wife in the political campaign as barangay councillor 
in local elections. Fourthly, the politician backed him to secure one 
the available vacancies for the position of gatekeeper that became 
available in 1997. 
In summary, this section has described three major strategies 
applied by the NIA's fieldworkers to cope with their work. Despite 
the fact they had to work in a difficult work environment, the 
majority still tried to make a difference. Being frondiners, they used 
their discretion to cope with the uncertainties and pressures 
inherent in their daily work. I will now explore another important 
field of work for these frondine workers: the shaping of their 
relations with farmers. 
Shaping Joint Management 
The frondine workers, notably the watermasters, have played a 
central role in organising farmers. At the start of UPRIIS, they 
were supposed to organise farmers to stimulate the use of Green 
Revolution technologies and the application of rotational forms of 
irrigation. Later on, several attempts were made to organise farmers 
for the sake of fee collection. During the 1980s, when the 
participatory approach gained importance within the NIA, the 
fieldworkers became involved in organising Irrigation Associations. 
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The NIA also gave them a central role in the organising of 
farmers for turn over, under the IOSP program (see chapter 2). 
Though assisted by the Institutional Development Officers, the 
watermasters were in charge of actually organising the IAs. Also, 
they were responsible for selecting the Farmer Irrigator Organisers 
(FIOs) in their areas. These FIOs would help them in organising 
the farmers. Also, after the IOSP organising process was 
completed in 1991, sustaining the farmer associations was put in 
the hands of the watermasters. Moreover, several watermasters 
from the District acted as trainers of IA leaders in courses on water 
management, leadership and financial management 
Generally speaking, the frondiners adopted the IOSP program 
and tried to make the best of it. Initially, the program was resisted 
by ditchtenders as they feared for their jobs. Later on this 
resistance vanished as they realised that the pace of turn over was 
slow, and that the phasing out of their positions remained based on 
voluntary retirement. Many frondiners were sceptical about the 
idea of turn over. They could see the negative effect of the 
reduction of the NIA field personnel, and could only hope that the 
IAs would be able to make up for it. As they could not stop the 
streamlining process, they did see the need for organising the 
farmers to take over the responsibilities no longer taken care of by 
the NIA. Moreover, the initial IOSP program looked promising. 
They particulady liked the fact that the IOSP would not only 
take care of organising the farmers, but also would ensure that the 
facilities would be rehabilitated. The promise was that the IAs 
would only enter into a contract after their canals would be de-
silted and the gates would be repaired. These repairs were very 
much welcomed by the frondiners, as NIA funds had dried up 
since the eady 1980s (for further detail, see the following chapter). 
In the words of a watermaster 
All in all, I felt that the IOSP project was a program that I could sell 
to the farmers. We were not just going to tell them that they should 
pay their fees, while we were taking out our fieldworkers. We could 
however also tell them that they would get paid for their activities, 
and that we would ensure a proper functioning system before turn 
over. 
Much of the initial enthusiasm vanished during the course of the 
IOSP program. The organising part went ahead quickly, as the 
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many Institutional Development Officers working under the 
Institutional Development Department of UPRLIS pushed this. 
However, the funds for repairs and rehabilitation were delayed, and 
eventually did not come through at all. It was envisioned that larger 
funds for repair works would become available in the second phase 
of the IOSP program, which ran from 1992-95. However, it turned 
out that only a limited number of national systems would get access 
to these funds. 
The management of the UPRLIS system failed to persuade the 
national office to select it as one of the "happy few*. As a result; 
turn over was taking place without the repair works. Moreover, the 
incentives to be paid to the IAs for the cleaning of the canals and 
the collection of the fees were also problematic. Firsdy, IA leaders 
considered the payments for canal cleaning to be too low to cover 
the costs of cleaning and the payments were usually delayed by at 
least three months. Secondly, the actual payments of the incentives 
for fee collection of the NLA to the IAs were usually delayed by a 
year or more. Hence, the frondiners felt bad about their broken 
promises to the farmers. Also, they experienced that the IA leaders 
were hard to motivate, and could not make up for the loss of the 
fieldworkers. 
One time, I told Bautista [the NIA administrator from 1992-95, JO] 
during a seminar that the streamlining program had gone wrong. At 
the start of UPRIIS there were many 15-30's employed by the 
agency, but it has gone too far. The fieldworkers provided the 
services to the farmers, not those higher-ups in the offices. When 
you remove the fieldworkers, you remove the services, and farmers 
will stop paying their fees. This is what has been happening for over 
ten years now. We have now reached the point that the NIA has 
lost all of its credibility towards the farmers (interview with a 
watermaster.July 1996) 
Again, a distinction should be made between the two Zones. 
Much of the disappointment among the frondiners was to be 
found in Zone 1. Given the preferential treatment of Zone 2, its 
historical ties with the NIA office, and the socio-political project of 
the Zone Engineer, the turn over program gained momentum in 
that area. I will further explore the dynamics of their efforts in 
giving shape to the turn over program, by discussing a case in each 
of the two Zones. The organising efforts of Argee in Zone 1 will 
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be discussed first. In his case, the policy process and die outcomes 
showed a remarkable diversity. To account for this diversity, I will 
discuss the dynamics with regard to two different IAs located in his 
area. Subsequendy, I take a look at the policy shaping activities of a 
watermaster in Zone 2. This section ends with a discussion of the 
policy shaping efforts of the Institutional Development Officer 
who remained operational in the District after the organising 
process was finished. 
Zone 1: Argee replacing his fieldmen 
As Argee was operating as a watermaster for two divisions, he was 
involved in the organising of no less than five different IAs. I 
explore his relations with one IA in each of the two drvisions. The 
first IA was located in the more upstream division. The IA covered 
three villages, one of them being his own home village. I will 
therefore refer to this IA as the tiome village IA'. The other IA is 
located in the more downstream division, along a river. This will be 
referred to as the 'riverside IA' 
During the IOSP-project, Argee played a crucial role in the 
organising process of the home village IA. He carefully picked out 
two Farmer Irrigator Organisers who were going to organise the 
IA, as well as the farmers who were asked to become the IA 
leaders (the Board of Directors). Obviously he knew all the people 
in these villages. The people he selected needed to have proven 
leadership capability, and had to be good in befriending people and 
pakikisama. He was careful not to select people with factional 
inclinations, as he felt that factional politics should stay out of the 
irrigation organisation. He tried to stay far away from such 
factional politics, as: "If I would give water only to one of the 
factions in the village, it would be disastrous. I quickly would have 
made a lot of enemies, and they won't pay their fees any more." 
He did not follow the bottom-up organising process, as 
prescribed by the IOSP program. He felt that it did not make sense 
to try to involve all farmers. It would be a time-consuming activity, 
and farmers would show little interest anyway. Rather, he focussed 
on the selection of the IA leaders, and called several meetings in 
the village, as well as in his own house. There, he explained the 
purpose and details of the organising program, and tried to 
motivate them to join the IA. 
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He soon discovered that it was hard to motivate the IA leaders 
to get involved in irrigation management "They are only willing to 
meet during times of crisis. Otherwise, it is very hard to bring them 
together. If I call for a meeting, I have to go to their houses and 
collect them there. Otherwise they will not show up." 
Their role in irrigation matters was minimal. Despite having a 
fee collection contract with the NLA, they would do little more 
than advocating for fee payments during informal discussions with 
neighbouring farmers. The farmers did usually not recognise the IA 
leaders as such, nor did the majority of the farmers know about the 
IA. The IA had entered into a canal cleaning contract for a sub-
sub-lateral only. Argee could not persuade them to enter into a 
canal cleaning contract for the larger and more important sub-
lateral running through the IA. They felt it to be too cumbersome 
to clean this canal monthly, and felt that the NIA payment was too 
limited to do the job. Argee could understand their feelings. 
They do not get paid to be an IA leader. They are all busy with 
managing their own affairs, and making a living. I understand that 
they do not want to do the cleaning of the canal. It is more cosdy 
than the contract provides for. Moreover, it is heavily silted, as the 
office did not desilt it for many years. 
He was unhappy with the situation. He felt that the time would 
come when his own village would suffer from water stress, due to 
the continuing siltation of the canal, and the lack of co-ordination 
among the farmers. To make the best of it, he did two things. 
Firstiy, he concentrated his efforts in shaping joint management on 
two local farmers only. He built a working relationship with them, 
in which they assisted him in irrigation matters, like guarding gates, 
organising the cleaning of canals and assisting in fee collection. To 
put it differentiy, as he could not succeed in building an LA, the 
best he could was to at least try to make up for the loss of his field 
men. 
The first farmer he focussed on was an IA leader who turned 
out to be the only one who was willing to spend his time and effort 
on irrigation matters. The other one was a neighbouring young 
farmer, who had become personally attached to Argee. In return 
for Argee's advice and different kinds of help, he was willing to 
assist Argee in water management 
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Argee did his best to build a working relationship with the IA 
leader. He called a few times for an IA meeting to re-organise the 
IA, and to get the IA leader elected as IA President However, 
insufficient people showed up to attain a quorum. He then made it 
happen, by individually visiting the IA leaders and make them sign 
the necessary papers. Also, he tried to help the newly elected IA 
President wherever he could. 
The main motivation of this IA President to join the IA was to 
try to persuade the NIA to improve the local NIA road that 
connected his house to the barangay road. This canal road was in 
bad shape and badly needed to be rehabilitated. Argee did bis best 
to get the project approved by the NIA. When this only worked 
out partially, he helped the IA President to hire trucks with the 
money of the IA, acquired from the ISF collection contract 
Argee was also lenient with regard to his checking of the quality 
of the canal cleaned under the MTO contract. In this way, the IA 
president received sufficient funds to at least do some cleaning of 
the smaller sub-lateral. Moreover, Argee granted the IA President 
the contract for hauling fees paid in kind to the office, which 
earned the IA president an extra income. Finally, Argee allowed the 
IA President to use the IA collection incentive funds to be put as 
stocks in a local rural bank. As the IA President was one of the 
bank's board members, this strengthened his position in the bank. 
Due to this working relation, they became friends. Later on, they 
also started a joint venture together, in which both invested money 
to start cultivating a field in the nearby mountains. 
After several years of working for the IA, the IA President was 
fed up with the job. He was unhappy with the fact that the other 
leaders were not putting any effort in the IA, and felt that the NIA 
had let him down: "I am instrumental to the NIA. I am cheaper 
than the field personnel they hired before." He wanted to resign, 
but felt that he could not let down Argee and his wife: "they have 
asked me to stay as President until they retire". 
The second thing Argee did to make a difference for his area, 
was to stimulate and support the collective action of farmers 
whenever he could. Though the IA leaders were not willing to 
accept the canal cleaning contract, farmers did occasionally feel the 
urge to clean the canal. This usually happened at the start of the 
wet and dry season. As tail-end farmers were eager to start their 
land preparation eariy, they realised the need to clean the canal to 
enlarge its capacity, as this would speed up the water use of the 
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upstream farmers. During such occasions, Argee stepped in to 
assist them. During the first years, he spent money from his own 
pocket to buy foods and cirinks for the group of farmers cleaning 
the canal. In latter years, when the IA received incentives from fee 
collection, he would reimburse the expenses with the IA fund. 
In the case of the riverside IA, Argee was more content with the 
way in which he was able to shape the joint management scheme. 
He was pleased with the fact that the leadership in that area took 
good care of irrigation matters, while his own involvement was 
limited to some well appreciated support The different outcome 
seemed to be caused by two reasons. Firsdy, as this IA did not 
cover his own village, he did not feel that responsible. 
Consequendy, he could more easily leave problems unattended, to 
be picked up by the IA leaders. In the home village IA, the local 
leaders considered Argee to be primarily responsible. 
Secondly, the situation with regard to water control was more 
problematic in this IA. Water-logging often damaged their wet 
season crop, or prevented them from planting all together. Hence, 
these farmers were very eager to have a good harvest in the dry 
season. As they were located in the very downstream part of Zone 
1, they could only do so by being very well organised. Moreover, 
due to the regular flooding of the roads in the riverside IA, the 
need for repair works was relatively high. Again, they had much to 
gain to be well-organised, in order to have good access to the NIA. 
Their eagerness facilitated Argee's efforts to organise this IA. 
As he was relatively new to the area, he used the organising 
process to get to know the leaders in the area. Assisted by the 
Farmer Irrigator Organiser, he selected the IA leaders. He also built 
up relations with some of the barangay leaders, as they were active 
in irrigation matters already. His main message to them was that -
to be able to survive - they should get their act together, because 
the NIA was taking out their field men because of financial 
difficulties. 
Given their eagerness, the organising process facilitated the 
emergence of an effective organisation of a number of IA leaders, 
together with a few village politicians. They took care of their own 
concerns, without relying on Argee. They were widely known for 
their effective struggles for water, as well as for their effective ways 
in courting the office. 
With regard to fee collection, this IA was probably the only IA 
of the District that actually did what the fee collection contract 
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required them to do. They earned their incentives by taking care of 
campaigning and collection tasks. The IA President was key to the 
collection activities. The person who took the position as IA 
President was an old but relatively rich lady, who wished to secure 
the water needs of her own fields, and to serve the well-being of 
her co-villagers. She realised that courting the NLA office with 
good collection rates was crucial to win their sympathy. She thus 
put effort in persuading farmers to pay, and in collecting their dues. 
Also Argee played an important role in her activities in fee 
collection. As fee collection involves large amounts of money, the 
issue at stake was trust. Colleagues did not dare to delegate the 
collection and billing to the IA leaders, as they were afraid their 
billing book would get lost, or collections would be pocketed. In 
the end, the NLA fieldworkers would be held accountable. 
However, Argee was able to develop a relation of trust with the 
person involved. Moreover, he granted her the hauling contract; 
which many of his colleagues preferred to keep to themselves. 
Argee hardly visited the area, which allowed him to take care of 
other matters. Still, the leaders of the IA and the village highly 
appreciated him. Their appreciation was based on the following 
reasons. Firsdy, as he lived and operated in the more upstream 
area, his support and advice was crucial to their access of water 
through the diversion from the main lateral. Secondly, he was 
instrumental to push for their needs in the NLA, as he was involved 
in the NIA office. Thirdly, he had come up with some rather 
ingenious suggestions to improve their access to water. Through 
his ideas and effort, several re-use structures (and first-use 
connections, see chapter 3) were built that had a great impact on 
their access to irrigation water. 
To summarise the case of Argee in Zone 3: As his ability to act 
was climinished by the loss of his field men, he tried to shape the 
IAs to make up for these losses. In one of the LAs his efforts 
largely failed, as the turn over program had too little to offer to be 
interesting to the farmer leaders. In the other IA, he was able to 
shape the working relation in a way that fitted mutual interests. 
Zone 2: Alan's struggle with an IA president 
Alan worked as a watermaster in a tail-end division of Zone 2, 
covering - among other villages - the village of San Anton (see the 
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previous chapter). His working environment was a very different 
one. Argee was given a lot of room for manoeuvre by the 
engineers. As they wanted to stay away from the perilous tail-end 
of Zone 1, they preferred to leave it to the ftondiners. In the case 
of Alan, his options were far more limited. Given the close ties and 
socio-political connections between the engineers and his working 
area, he had little option but to comply with the grand scheme set 
up by the Zone Engineer. 
Alan, however, had kttle reason to oppose his Zone Engineer's 
project. On the contrary, he found it advantageous to be part of it. 
Alan's strategy had always been to stay close to the engineers of the 
office. He was considered one of the 'yessies' by the more union-
oriented group around Argee, who were much more critical of the 
doings of the engineers. In the past, Alan had held a temporary 
position as a fee collector. His aim was to get a permanent position 
as a watermaster. He preferred to work in the field, as this was 
where the action was. Also, he realised that the office would phase 
out the collector position. To achieve his aim, Alan did two things. 
Firsdy, he tried to show his capabilities to the engineers, by 
working very hard and ensuring that he was the top collector of the 
District. Secondly, he tried to befriend the engineers, and become 
their kumpare. His tactics were successful, and he indeed was able 
to become a watermaster holding a permanent position. 
Alan helped the Zone Engineer's effort to set-up the alliance of 
the NIA and IA leaders in the Zone. Though he lived in another 
municipality, he was always found in the informal gatherings of the 
alliance. He enjoyed die work, and worked hard in water 
distribution and fee collection. He had developed a clear interest in 
fee collection. Ensuring a high collection rate was his way to 
distinguish himself among his colleagues. It also had become an 
important side-line. He earned a substantive extra-income from the 
hauling of fees-paid-in-kind from the farmers to the office. 
Rumours had it that he made money out of collection, like fiddling 
with the weighing scales, or replacing high-quaUty rice paid by 
farmers with low quality rice, before submitting it to the office. 
His efforts to maximise fee collection and maximise his income 
earned out of the fee collection, shaped the way in which he dealt 
with rum over and the IAs. T?ay your obligations' was his main 
message to the farmers, and he was known to be very persistent in 
making them pay. The IA Presidents of his area appreciated his 
efforts in fee collection. It provided them with high collection 
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efficiencies, and consequendy with a high income from the 
incentives. The LA Presidents used this money at their own 
discretion. Some used it for irrigation-related expenses like canal 
cleaning, others used it for private purposes. 
Though Alan was enthusiastic about the alliance built up by the 
Zone Engineer, he felt that the LA Presidents challenged his 
authority as a watermaster. Tensions built up during 1997. On 
several occasions, they neglected his ruling with regard to gate 
settings. However, the real conflict emerged over fee collection. 
During the previous years, it had become a practice that the LA 
presidents would give a share of the incentives from fee collection 
to Alan. The argument was that he conducted all the efforts to 
collect the fees, while the rewards for his labour went to the 
Presidents. His share was around 10-25% of the incentives. In 
1997, Alan wanted it be formalised, and be set at 25% of the 
collection incentive. One of the LA Presidents refused to do so. He 
felt that it was his money, and that Alan had no right to demand 
such a share. It should be his prerogative to give such a share, in 
case he felt Alan deserved it. 
The conflict over the incentives developed into a more general 
power struggle between the LA President and the FLW. Alan tried 
to get the LA President replaced. He however miscalculated his 
chances. The joint management scheme shaped by the Zone 
Engineer had already changed the power relations between the 
frondiners and the IA leaders. It was no longer simply the NIA 
who controlled the turn over and organising program, in which the 
frondiners could change IA leaders at their will. Moreover, the IA 
leader had been acting as a local vote broker for the father of the 
Zone Engineer as well as the local kapitan. The kapitan backed the 
IA President. The Zone Engineer then decided that the IA 
President should stay, and that Alan had no right to demand such 
monetary claims. To solve the problem, Alan was transferred to 
another division. Apparendy, the Zone Engineer did not want to 
jeopardise his political project by removing one of his allies in the 
village. 
The case studies of Argee and Alan show that the individual 
interests and motivations, personal ties as well as the working 
environment are crucial factors in the shaping of joint 
management It also shows that the room for manoeuvre of these 
frondiners to shape the joint management program can differ. In 
the case of Zone 1, the office gives much room to the frondiners 
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to make their own project In the Zone 2 case however, the 
frontliners had little option but to comply to the project of the 
Zone Engineer. Hence, whether frontiiners can be local heroes or 
not, whether they are squeezed or not, are empirical and contextual 
questions. In other words, their discretion is not simply die a result 
of having a position at the interface between the NIA and the 
water users. Given the nature of their work, they exercise some 
autonomous discretionary powers. However, "the scope and nature 
of these powers are objects of struggle." (McElligott 2001:24). 
To end this section on frondine workers and the shaping of the 
turn over program, I explore the room for manoeuvre of another 
type of FLW: the Institutional Development Officer (LDO). It will 
be shown that he lacked the backing to turn the turn over program 
into a more radical project. 
The room for manoeuvre of the Institutional Development Officer 
Martin was hired by the NIA as one of the five Institutional 
Development Officers at the start of the IOSP program. After the 
organisational process was finished in 1991, he was the only 
Institutional Development Officer that remained in the District. 
He was not radical in his aims. He did not believe in full turn over, 
and he put a lot of time and effort to make farmers believe in the 
need for paying their fees. Still, his project was far-reaching. Being 
inspired by some of the former Institutional Development Officers 
and superior officers, he was striving for more transparent, 
formalised and democratic decision-making in the District He 
wanted the IAs to be democratic institutions, in which the leaders 
were accountable to its members. More importandy, he wanted the 
engineers to become accountable to the IAs. He was after 
transparent criteria for decisions on the program area, as well as the 
areas to be prioritised for maintenance and improvement works. 
Given the context he was working in, this was an ambitious 
project. 
His room for manoeuvre to carry out his project was limited, as 
he lacked the necessary back-up. Firsdy, he lacked the manpower. 
He was only given one assistant, who had been considered to be 
too weak by the NIA management to perform well as a 
watermaster. Martin's task load was overwhelming. He had to look 
after the contract and organisational renewal of the 78 IAs and the 
Frontüne Workers Implementing Reform 195 
federations, he was organising the training given to the IA leaders, 
and he organised the meetings between NIA management and the 
IAs. He was thus busy with practical matters, and lacked time to 
work on his démocratisation project at a strategic level. 
Secondly, he lacked the back-up from the NIA leadership. 
Within the District, the engineers supported the institutional 
development program for as long as it served the interests of the 
office, i.e. fee collection and farmer participation in irrigation 
management. They did not support his démocratisation project 
For instance, the District Chief did not really care about the tact 
that the IA presidents were pocketing the money from the fee 
collections. The Chief felt that this was OK and should be seen as 
a kind of remuneration for the fact that they were helping the NIA 
Also, the engineers did not support Martin in his effort to make the 
signatures of the IA Presidents an obligatory procedure in the 
quality control of contracted works. Moreover, they gave little 
importance to the dialogues between the IA leaders and the office, 
set up by the Institutional Development Officer in the NIA-IA 
meetings or during training sessions. Frequendy they were invited 
but simply did not show up. 
Also, he did not get much back-up from the UPRTIS leadership. 
The former head of the Institutional Development Department at 
UPRIIS had been opposing the more far-reaching organising 
efforts of the Bagadion group from the very start. 
I did not like their doings and philosophy. They were never able to 
enter UPRIIS. When I came back from the United States where I 
did my Ph.D., I found out that they had fielded two of their 
Institutional Development Officers. I had them kicked out again. 
Finally, the Operations Manager of UPRIIS was also very 
careful not to let the IAs and its federations go out of his control. 
He had been involved in one of the pilot projects of the 
participatory approach, in which he had seen what could go wrong. 
In that pilot project, located outside of UPRIIS, the doings of the 
Institutional Development Officer resulted in a serious conflict 
between the farmers, the NIA and a contractor over the quality and 
finance of physical works in the area. As he told me: 
I have been careful with the IAs and the federations, only going 
very slowly in involving them in NLA matters. Lu the beginning L 
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was afraid that they might rum against NIA but later I learned that 
they are very co-operative, and helpful, (interview held in October 
1996) 
Given his precarious position, Martin had litde option but to 
downscale his expectations and to operate carefully. He managed 
to gain some support from the relatively small group of 
fieldworkers who were critical about the way the District was being 
managed. They provided a platform where he could at least air his 
frustrations, and discuss his tactics. They also supported him as 
trainers to the IA leadership. Other than that, he was forced to 
accept his marginal position. As he formulated it himself: "Who am 
I against these engineers?" 
Conclusions 
The findings presented in this chapter give reason to question the 
mistrust towards state workers that informed the Philippine 
irrigation reform policies of the 1980s and 1990s. These policies 
tried to control their assumed rent-seeking and shirking behaviour 
by either rolling back the state (e.g. streamlining and turn over), or 
by fixing this behaviour through client control (e.g. farmer 
federations and fee-for-performance schemes). My findings 
however, show something else. 
Both rent-seeking and shirking behaviour existed, but this was 
not the most important mode of conduct. There was a lot of 
commitment and genuine concern among the NIA fieldworkers 
about the plight of farmers in getting water and the shaping of turn 
over policies as well as the proper management of the system. 
"Making the best of it', rather than rent-seeking informed their 
doings. 
My findings thus coincide with Van der Zaag's analysis of the 
role of frondine workers in a large-scale Mexican irrigation system 
(see also Vos 2002). However, there is no reason to assume that 
frondiners are heroes everywhere and always. It is perfectiy 
imaginable that - given different circumstances - fieldworkers 
indeed stand in the way of efficient and equitable irrigation 
management, for instance because they are hired on the basis of 
favouritism and political patronage. Hence, their practices require 
explanation and need to be contextualised. 
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In this case, their commitment arose from a balanced mixture of 
loyalties and interests. Many combined a particularistic concern for 
their rice growing kin and home villages, with a concern for the 
wider interests of the NIA-District The latter concern was based 
on peer group solidarity and identification as NIA workers, as well 
as the felt need to serve farmers in order to earn their own wages 
from irrigation fees. 
The turn over and streamlining policies greatiy reduced the 
number of field workers in the District, and likewise reduced their 
capacity to make a difference. As shown in the case of Zone 2, LA 
Presidents effectively challenged the power of NIA fieldworkers in 
controlling local matters. In Zone 1, watermasters felt it to be 
increasingly difficult to take charge, as they were left without their 
labourers, i.e. the ditchtenders. As the IAs and the federations did 
not become strong organisations and did in most cases not live up 
to their tasks and responsibilities, the NIA fieldworkers found it 
increasingly difficult to make a difference. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has also shown that some of the 
remaining fieldworkers were important actors in the District. They 
played crucial roles in main system management and fee collection, 
as well as in the shaping and outcomes of the turn over policies. 
They were not Weberian rule-bound automatons carrying out 
whatever they were told by their superiors, but instead were people 
with agency mat had room for manoeuvre. 
In line with Iipsky (1980) I believe that much of their room for 
manoeuvre was derived from their 'boundary-spanning role' as 
frondiners, in which they mediate state-client relationships, and in 
which they can exploit 'Zones of relative indifference to the 
management'. This is, I think, especially true for frondiners in 
large-scale canal systems. They - somewhat like policemen on 
patrol - operate in the field far away from their superior officers, 
often outside of office hours. Moreover, they deal with locally 
specific situations that are difficult to comprehend and thus to 
control by their bosses. 
This observation is important for policy-making. Firsdy, it 
points to the need to provide fieldworkers with discretionary 
powers when implementing policies. In this respect, the NIA turn 
over program can serve as an example. The watermasters were 
given pivotal roles in shaping the IAs, in training their leaders, and 
in monitoring the LA performance in the implementation of the 
contracted tasks. Nevertheless, I think that their role should be 
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further enlarged (see the recommendations in the concluding 
chapter). 
Secondly, it points to the fact that frondine positions like those 
of watermasters or gatekeepers are positions that will be required in 
the management of large-scale canal systems, whatever the wider 
governance set-up. Even if systems are fully controlled by private 
or farmer-elected bodies, proper system management will have a 
need for such functions. Moreover, to make them perform well, 
my findings suggest that such people will require this 'double-bind' 
described above. They need to be both responsive to local needs, 
but on the other hand need authority and a degree of autonomy 
from particularistic interests, to be effective in main system 
management and fee collection. 
This need for fieldworkers questions the wisdom of the NIA's 
streamlining policies. Undoubtedly, the UPRLTS staffing levels in 
the original set-up were an example of an inflated bureaucracy. 
This may have served the clientelistic interests of local politicians as 
well as the authoritarian interests of President Marcos (see the 
following chapter), but it over-staffed the UPRLTS system, and thus 
made it very cosdy. Hence, streamlining was needed and useful. 
However, it seems that the need of the NIA to save money has 
pushed present-day staffing levels below what may be considered 
healthy. By eady 2003, the NIA District employed only 39 
fieldworkers that had to make things work in a system of over 
20,000 hectares and 10,000 water users. Their number was too low 
to operate as a group, and to reproduce the described sense of NIA 
identity needed to face the particularistic claims of local power 
holders, kin and co-villagers. 
A comparison with staffing levels in other countries is revealing. 
According to Robert Wade (1988), 'the bureaucratic relative supply' 
is a major factor that explains the successful management of 
Taiwanese and South Korean systems, and the disordedy situation 
in Indian systems. The relative bureaucratic supply of irrigation 
staff per 100 irrigated hectares was of the order of 0.3-0.5 in Indian 
canals, and around 2.5 in South Korean canals (Wade 1988: 493). 
In the UPRIIS District, the range in 2003 is only between 0.2-0.3, 
thus neady half of the Indian figures, and only around 10% of the 
staffing levels in the well-managed South Korean systems.6 
The situation is likely to worsen in the years to come, as the 
remaining experienced fieldworkers are going to retire. By 2003, all 
fieldworkers had passed the age of forty and many are already older 
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than fifty. There is thus a rather urgent need for the NIA to finally 
develop and implement a workable management scheme. This 
should be either based on far-reaching turn over schemes, thus 
withdrawing to for instance the main canal only (which would 
mean that the farmer organisations will have to hire fieldworkers). 
Or it should decide to re-strengthen its own workforce, especially 
at the level of watermasters (for further discussion, see 
recommendations in the concluding chapter). 
Analytically, the findings in this chapter further stress the need 
for an embedded estate-in-society' approach in irrigation 
management studies. The findings go against reified perceptions of 
an irrigation agency that is sharply bounded from the farmer 
communities it is supposed to serve. Although it claimed not to do 
so, Long's 'encounters at the interface' model has, I believe, 
reinforced such a dichotomous view. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
this model was used in Wageningen in studies on rural 
development (e.g. de Vries 1992) as well as irrigation (e.g. Ubels 
1989 and van der Zaag 1992). It puts forwards die idea of two 
different life-wodds - the state vis-a-vis the peasantry -, that meet 
each other in the field, as a result of government interventions. For 
instance, in the analysis of a land reform program in Costa Rica, de 
Vries (1992) talks about the intervention-strategies of the 
government vis-a-vis intervention-coping strategies of the 
peasantry. 
The frondine workers in the District were indeed operating at 
the interface between the NIA and the farmer water users. To put 
it more apdy, they were the embodiment of that interface. They 
belonged to the NIA domain and the farmer/village domain both 
at the same time. To a certain extent, they thus acted as the 
intermediaries between the NIA and farmers. This position at the 
interface provided them with room for manoeuvre, and - being 
brokers in between the two domains - allowed them to be effective 
in their work. Put in these terms, it can be argued that the turn over 
program strengthened the direct access of farmer leaders to the 
NIA domain, and thus undermined the 'middle men' position of 
the NIA frondiners. 
However, the metaphor of two different life-wodds — the NIA 
and the peasantry that encounter each other in the field - is a far 
too strong one. The idea of two different life-wodds may fit the 
Costa Rican case, but did certainly not fit the realities in the 4 * 
District, in which both the NIA (earlier Public Works) and farmers 
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were already working together since the 1930s. There was just one 
life-wodd. The NIA 'wodd' of engineers and fieldworkers and the 
Vodd' of water users and farmer leaders was 'molded' over time, 
to the extent that it was hard to separate one from the other. 
Many of the NIA fieldworkers did not just work in the system; it 
was also their place of living. They did not leave their private life 
behind mem, and sometimes did not even go to work, as their 
home served as their 'office'. The water users were not just their 
clients but could well also be co-villagers, business partners, 
friends, faction allies or enemies, if not their kin. Obviously, this 
local embeddedness shaped their oudook on and behaviour in their 
daily work in irrigation. Moreover, it was shown in this chapter as 
well as the previous one that NIA engineers and field workers had 
developed multiple, inter-personal ties with both farmer leaders 
and local politicians. 
Hence, it makes litde sense to picture irrigation management in 
the District as interface encounters between a NIA domain and a 
farmer domain and less so to discuss it in terms of separate life-
wodds. Rather, irrigation management was made up of a number 
of rival alliances criss-crossing the boundaries between the 'NIA' 
and 'society' and the 'political' and the 'administrative'. In this 
complex life-wodd, NIA frondiners tried to make the best of it, by 
forging alliances with co-workers, co-villagers, local politicians and 
IA leaders. 
This is not just an academic insight, but it also has practical 
value. State institutions like the NIA are not big bounded entities, 
but are made up of different levels and different groups or factions 
within them, that may be in subordination, co-operation, 
competition or conflict with each other (Quades van Ufford 1988; 
for a general discussion see Mintzberg 1983). Even within the 
relatively small NIA organisation of the District, different groups 
existed with different ideas and interests and different relations to 
farmer leaders and local politicians. 
It means that also the prospects for constructive change should 
not only be seen in the perspective of the irrigation agency vis-a-vis 
the water users. The NIA is not one group of bogeymen, and 
neither are the farmer water users the good guys. This chapter 
showed that there were a fair number of committed fieldworkers 
within the District's organisation. For reform to be effective, such 
people should be mobilised and supported in their efforts to build 
workable alliances and be protected in their struggle against people 
Frontline Workers Implementing Reform 201 
who are less committed to change things for the better, whether 
these are co-workers, superior officers, farmer leaders or local 
politicians. 
Notes 
1 In extremes, it fits the "Red before Expert' idea of Mao's Cultural 
Revolution, according to which peasants rather than technical experts 
should run rural affairs and factories (Moore 1992). 
2 Arguably, Zone Engineers can also be considered fieldworkers or 
frontliners. However their doings were already discussed in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, their class position is rather different from those of 
the watermasters, let alone from that of the gatekeepers and ditchtenders. 
Being engineers, they usually belong to richer and more powerful families. 
3 Formally their tasks and responsibilities were not very clear. Their job 
descriptions were not up to date. Due to continuous restructuring 
programs initiated by the NIA as well as by the national government, both 
the names and content of their position has been changed several times. 
In 1996-97, the official term for a watermaster was a 'water resources 
facilities technician', in short WRFT. 
4 If anything, they carried resentments against those that did not recognise 
their authority, or refused to cooperate with their procedures. These were 
found throughout the different social strata. Some richer farmers were not 
liked because they refused to pay their fees when they did have the 
capability to do so. These farmers knew that they would get away with it 
Frontliners targeted this group as the primary group for receiving demand 
letters from the office (see next chapter). In the same manner, frontliners 
talked negatively about poorer, but hard-headed farmers who were not 
inclined to entertain requests with regard to the operation of their checks. 
5 The fieldwork was a men's world. All gatekeepers and ditchtenders were 
males, but a few of the watermasters were female college graduates. They 
entered the NIA as a watermaster, or were transferred to the field coming 
from an earlier administrative position. Water management was 
considered to be a male job, requiring physical strength and toughness. 
Nevertheless, Zone 2 had a macba who also joined nightly raids. However, 
female watermasters were appreciated given their proven capabilities in 
collecting fees by house-to-house visits of farmer water users. This may 
be attributed to the fact that in Tagalog rural life, women rather than men 
are in charge of financial matters (Dlo 1988). At the office level, all but 
one of the engineers in UPRIIS were also males. On the other hand, 
women outnumbered men in the administrative sections, and had taken 
up management positions. 
6 For mis calculation, I used an average irrigated area in the District of 
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12,000 hectares in the dry season and 20,000 hectares in the wet season. 
This gives a relative bureaucratic density of 0.32 in the dry season and 0.2 
in the wet season. 
6 
For three times already, I made it into the UPRIIS millionaires club. 
It is a yeady celebration. The UPRIIS operations manager hands 
out the plaques of appreciation to those who were able to collect 
more than one million Pesos and gives us small rewards. I was 
given a mobile phone (interview with a watermaster, January 2003). 
To people not familiar with the NIA situation, it may seem to be 
odd that an irrigation agency is organising competitions like this 
'Millionaire's dub' to stimulate watermasters to collect more fees 
from the farmer water users. For the NIA people it is not odd at 
all. Becoming viable became one of their major pre-occupations. 
Outsiders might think of a viable irrigation system as a sustainable 
one, which allows for good water management and proper 
maintenance. To the NIA. however, viability has a clear and 
restricted meaning: viability is all about money. To them, a viable 
Irrigation District is a District that is able to keep its budget in the 
black. 
As was explained in chapter 2, this concern for money started in 
the beginning of the 1980s. During that period, the NIA became a 
so-called financially autonomous agency'. It means that it lost its 
access to government subsidies for O&M expenditures, and was 
thus forced to rely on user fees to finance these costs (Small 1989; 
Small et aL /989). The NIA decentralised this financial 
responsibility to the system level. Hence, UPRIIS became a so-
called 'responsibility centre', in which each District had to look 
after its own O&M budget Since that time, the NIA - and the 
District in particular - took a series of measures to reduce its 
expenditures and increase its income. 
Being one of the few irrigation agencies that acquired this 
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financially autonomous position, the NIA became an example for 
the rest of the world (Svendsen 1993). By the end of the 1980s it 
became a widespread belief that irrigation agencies around the 
wodd should no longer be centrally financed, and follow the NIA 
example. The rhetoric of financial autonomy is that it liberates the 
irrigation sector from the fluctuating and often limited subsidies of 
debt-ridden Third Wodd governments. Moreover, it forces them to 
become 'downwardly accountable' to the water users. As farmers 
start to provide the O&M funds of the agency, their position 
changes from mere recipients or beneficiaries to that of a client of 
a service. Following the popular reasoning that 'one should not bite 
the hand that feeds you', financially autonomous agencies 
supposedly have a keen interest in taking the needs and wishes of 
the farmers seriously (Small and Carruthers 1991)-1 
Financial autonomy and the financially induced accountability 
(henceforth financial accountability) were assumed to have very 
positive effects on the quality of management of large-scale 
systems. Firsdy, the often construction-oriented irrigation agencies 
would start to take O&M more seriously, as they would wish to 
increase the farmers' capacity and willingness to pay fees. Secondly, 
as fees are usually levied on an area basis, the agencies would 
develop a strong, vested interest in expanding the area receiving 
adequate irrigation services, and increasing farm incomes 
(Svendsen 1993). 
Thirdly, 'the will to manage' would emerge among irrigation 
managers. Instead of being upwardly accountable to government 
for the use of budgets, they would now be held accountable for 
producing the right outputs by farmers who want to get their 
money's worth. (Vermillion 1991). Finally, it would create an 
incentive for cost-effective management as well. The agency's 
interest is to reduce costs to keep its budget in the black, while the 
farmers like to keep the fees as low as possible. Hence, this mutual 
interest was argued to stimulate a greater efficiency in resource use. 
This would also stimulate the participation of farmers in 
management, in order to make use of their local knowledge and/or 
their cheap or flexible labour inputs (Small and Carruthers 1991). 
Despite its status as an international example, the actual rather 
than postulated effects of the NLA's financial autonomy on the 
management of the systems have hardly been studied. Positive 
effects have been claimed on system performance as well as farmer 
participation (Svendsen et al. 1990; NIACONSULT 1993). 
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However, these studies were statistical in nature and used fairiy 
aggregate data sets. Moreover, other studies presented a more 
critical analysis of the effects of these changes (Wodd Bank 1996; 
Kikuchi et aL 1998; Oorthuizen and Sloot 1993; Oorthuizen and 
Kloezen 1995). 
This chapter tries to clarify the effects of the NIA's financially 
autonomous position. In the first section, I present a historical 
account of the NIA's relation to government and its access to 
funds. In the following section I discus in detail the measures taken 
by the District to keep its budget in the black . In the third section 
I examine how the financial needs of the District shaped its 
managerial practices and its relations to farmers. This examination 
is used to discuss the major assumptions of what I call the 
'financial autonomy advocates'. 
This chapter shows that the NIA's financial autonomy had 
major impacts on the management of the system and the relations 
between toe NIA and water users. However, these effects do not 
fit the theoretical assumptions of the financial autonomy 
framework. The relation between the farmers and the District 
cannot be reduced to a conttactoal-financial one. Neither did I find 
very positive effects on the quantity and quality of services of the 
agency. On the contrary: the District's financial autonomy led to 
deterioration rather than an improvement of its O&M services, 
while it aggravated rather than reduced the head-tail problem. 
The NIA's Boom and Bust Cycle 
From its creation in 1963 the NIA was organised as a public 
corporation, or what is called in the Philippines, a 'Government 
Owned and ControUed Corporation'. Having corporate status, it 
was de jure expected to operate relatively independendy from central 
government, and to raise its own income. However, its de facto 
relation to government and its access to governmental funds have 
changed dramatically over time. 
The NIA went through two distinct periods. In the first period, 
which lasted until 1980, the NIA was a primary recipient of 
government funds. Its budget as well at its organisation boomed 
during this period. After 1980, the NIA largely lost its access to 
government funds. Consequendy, it went through a period of steep 
decline. During this period, it was forced to raise its own income, 
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FIGURE 6.1: The NIA's capital expenditures in irrigation 
(in billions of Pesos, 1985 constant prices) 
Source: David and Inocencio 2000: figure 2 
To ensure rapid irrigation development, Marcos strengthened 
the NIA through two revisions of its original mandate. In the 
original mandate of 1963, the NIA was empowered to construct 
so-called 'national systems'. Also, it was expected to recover from 
and cut its expenditures. I will now take a closer look at these two 
epochs. 
The period of growth: 1964-19792 
From its establishment, the NIA was seen as a major vehicle for 
the government to modernise the Philippine rice sector. At its 
creation in 1963 by Philippine Congress, the NLA's mandate was: " 
to make the next 10 to 20 years 'the irrigation Age of the Republic 
of the Philippines'." (Svendsen a aL 1990: 17). However, it was 
only after the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in 
1972 that the NLA budget really took off (see figure 6.1). For the 
Marcos regime, investing in irrigation was top-priority. It was the 
single largest item of public expenditures between 1977 and 1984 
when it accounted for close to half of agricultural public spending 
and 20% of total infrastructure budget. (David and Inocencio 2000: 
14). 
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the users the fees necessary to finance its operational costs and to 
reimburse, within a period not less than 25 years, the costs of 
construction. At the time, the NLA was provided with a limited 
stock of working capital for construction purposes (up to 300 MP). 
By presidential degree in 1974, Marcos issued the first revision, 
which gready increased the capacities of the NIA. The main 
changes for the agency were the following. 
• It was no longer expected to repay the working capital 
infused into the NIA by central government; 
• It brought communal irrigation systems under its 
mandate; 
• Its capitalisation was raised to 2 billion Pesos; 
• It would receive annual governmental appropriation 
funds for operation and maintenance, administration as 
well as for feasibility studies, surveys and planning for 
new projects; 
• It allowed the NIA to incur foreign debt up to a limit of 
500 million US dollars for new projects; 
• Apart from fees, it was also allowed to add administration 
charges, equipment rentals, interest earnings and all other 
forms of income to its operating capital; 
• The Aclrninistrator of the NIA was made a direct 
presidential appointee. 
Obviously, these terms were favourable to the NIA. It allowed 
the NIA to receive its operating budget and planning funds from 
the treasury. Moreover, it allowed the NIA to recover O&M and 
construction costs from irrigators, while it was relieved from the 
requirement to repay the government for their contribution to 
these expenditures (Svendsen et at. 1990:20). 
The second revision, issued in 1980, further strengthened the 
NIA's access to money. Its authorised capital stock was raised to 10 
billion Pesos. More importandy though, it authorised NIA to 
impose a 5% management fee on the total costs of the projects 
undertaken by the NIA. This income could be added to its 
operational capital. As the NIA was carrying out projects worth 
billions of Pesos during the first half of the 1980s, this 
management fee soon became an important source of income.3 
It was not only President Marcos who liked to put money in 
irrigation. The same was true for the international lending 
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institutions, notably the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. Their loans for irrigation development in the Philippines 
peaked at the end of the 1970s. In 1978, loan agreements for 
irrigation reached a record sum of250 Million US dollars.4 
Needless to say, the NLA flourished under these favourable 
circumstances. In the period 1964-79, the agency was able to more 
than double the area of agency-managed national systems. Its 
number of employees rose from less than 3,000 in 1965 to a peak 
of 43,000 in 1977 (Kikuchi et aL 1999: table 1; Wodd Bank 1991: 
table A.17). The NLA also became a rich agency. By 1981, its 
corporate fund amounted to no less than P 1.2 billion (Svendsen et 
aL 1990:76). 
The idea of financial autonomy, which was de jure imposed on 
the NIA when it was set up as a public corporation in 1963, did not 
become reality during this booming period. The NIA was not 
expected to return the capital expenditures to central government 
It was also not expected to raise its own O&M budget As if it was 
a line agency, the NIA received its operational budget from the 
central government and remitted its fee collections to the national 
treasury. The level of its operational budget was based on the 
NLA's compulations of its needs, and not on the level of 
remittances collected by the NIA in the field. 
In short, the 1964-1980 period was a period of rapid growth of 
the irrigation sector in the Philippines, and concomitant growth of 
the NIA. The NIA received large sums of funds for capital 
investments as well its operational costs. The NIA was defacto not a 
financially autonomous agency. 
The period of decline: 1980-1997 
Starting in 1980, the NIA's party-time was over. It experienced a 
dramatic decline in its budget for capital investments in the 
beginning of the 1980s. This only levelled off by the mid-1990s at a 
level almost equal to the start of the martial law period (see figure 
6.1). The NIA went through harsh times with regard to its O&M 
budget as well. As capital expenditures dropped, the NIA's income 
from the management fees nose-dived. More importandy, the 
government stopped funding the NIA's O&M budget Though the 
NIA still received occasional subsidies for its operations, die 
government became stricter with regard to cost recovery. 
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This new approach of the government vis-a-vis the NIA was 
clearly economically motivated. The Philippine economy went 
through a deep crisis in the 1980s, which was fuelled by the 
political upheaval before and after the downfall of President 
Marcos in 1986. This crisis put serious strains on the government 
treasury. It was thus forced to drastically reduce its expenditures, 
including its irrigation investments. At the very depth of this crisis 
in 1985, the government did not release any funds to the NIA 
Also, the government's search for savings and income led it to 
start to hold the NIA accountable for its financial obligations 
related to its status as a public corporation. In the first half of the 
1980s, it forced the NIA to take formal responsibility for re-paying 
foreign loans for irrigation investments. In 1987, the NIA did 
indeed start re-paying one of these loans. When the economy 
recovered, the NIA was no longer required to do so. However, it 
was a clear signal from the government to the NIA that 
"emphasised the importance of financial management and 
corporate viability." (Svendsen etaL 1990: 74). 
Economics also made the government stop its operational 
subsidies to the NIA. In 1976, it was formally agreed that these 
subsidies would be phased-out in five years. At the time, the NIA 
might not have expected the government to actually push it 
through. Nevertheless, given the dramatic financial crisis of the 
government, the subsidies were indeed stopped in 1981. 
The new treatment of the NIA as a corporate body was also 
politically motivated. Government Owned and Controlled 
Corporations (GOCCs) had become publicly known for their 
mismanagement and widespread corruption. After the downfall of 
President Marcos in 1986 the bad press around GOCCs worsened. 
Many of them were seen as part of Marcos's network of cronyism, 
and thus became subject of intense debate and severe political 
struggles.5 Pressured by the IMF and the Wodd Bankl, the Marcos 
regime, and the subsequent Aquino and Ramos administrations, 
took several measures to rationalise the corporate sector. 
By the end of the 1980s, many of these GOCCs were abolished, 
merged, divested to the private sector or incorporated into line 
agencies. As the NIA is involved in constructing and managing 
public utilities it could retain its corporate status. However, it could 
not escape the increasingly strict policies and close monitoring of 
the central government of its efforts to become financially viable 
and to increase cost recovery (Svendsen etaL 1990: 56). 
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Finally, the NIA's decline has been the result of smaller loans 
from international lending institutions, especially the Wodd Bank. 
They reduced their funding to irrigation and moreover shifted their 
priorities from irrigation development to rehabilitation, O&M and 
institutional development (Kikuchi et oL 1999). By the end of the 
1990s, fifty percent of the foreign loans for agriculture and natural 
resources were still intended for irrigation (David and Inocencio 
2000: 21 and table 12a). However, the magnitude of loans had 
decreased considerably, compared to the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s.6 
All in all, these changes created serious financial problems for 
the NIA By the end of the 1980s, the NIA was no longer a 
wealthy organisation. To cope with the loss of government funds, 
it started to use its accumulated corporate fund in 1985 to finance 
on-going projects. Within a few years, it reached the bottom of its 
fund. Faced with a shrunken budget for irrigation investments, the 
loss of its corporate fund and the need to finance its own 
operational expenses, the NIA was forced to take drastic measures 
to cut costs and increase its income. 
FIGURE 6.2: NIA staffing levels for O&M, projects and total 
(1972-2000, in three year averages) 
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 2000 
Sources: Wodd Bank 1991: A17; NIA 1993: 2.14; David and Inocencio 2000:19) 
As the larger part of its expenses concerned personnel, its major 
measure to cut costs was to radically reduce its staffing levels (see 
figure 6.2)7 Downsizing was particulady dramatic for the project 
staff. As the funds for new projects diminished, the NIA no longer 
needed the larger part of its project personnel. The project staffing 
level fell from over 20,000 in the period 1976-78, to a little over 
3,000 people in 1991-93. However, also the O&M staff was 
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FIGURE 6.3: Viability index (ratio of income and expenses) of the O&M 
budget of the 4 * District, 1983-1997" 
L.3-| v m 1 
Sources: NIA-UPRHS 1993; NIA-UPRIIS, 4 * District 2002a 
The Struggle for Financial Viability in the District 
Since 1983, when it was required to become financially 
autonomous, the 4 t h District of NIA has been struggling to become 
financially viable.9 Despite the efforts, most of the years financial 
viability was not attained (see figure 6.3). During those years, the 
reduced considerably. Between 1977 and 1992, the staff number 
was reduced by 25%, while the service area for national systems 
expanded by 30%. Salary levels were also targeted for savings. For 
instance, the salaries and benefits of engineers fell by one-third in 
real terms, between 1976 and 1995 (Kikuchi etaL 1999: figure 1). 
In short, this section has shown that a period of prolonged and 
steep decline in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s followed 
the NIA's boom in the 1970s. After 1980, the NIA was held 
accountable by government for its performance in line with its 
corporate status. As far as capital investments were concerned, the 
NIA was - in most of the years - not required to repay these 
funds. For its O&M budget however, financial viability became a 
serious policy requirement of the national government We have 
seen that the NIA took drastic measures to cut costs. In the next 
section, we look at the measures taken by the NIA central office or 
the UPRIIS management to reduce costs and increase income. 
These will be explored at the level of the 4 * District. 
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operational expenses thus exceeded the income of the District 
office. The quest for money shaped the NIA District's relations to 
the farmers. This section discusses the measures taken by the 
District to attain financial viability. I first discuss the measures 
taken to cut costs, followed by the efforts to increase the fee 
income of the District. 
Cost cutting measures 
As personnel costs varied between 75 and 90% of the total 
operational expenditures, staff reduction has been the most 
important measure of the District to cut costs. The District lost 
50% of its total NLA staff as well as field staff between 1982 and 
1997. After 1997, the decline continued and at an even faster pace. 
By the end of 2002, the District office counted only 70 staff 
members compared to 275 in 1982, of which 39 - from 180 in 
1982 - were fieldworkers (see figure 6.4). 
FIGURE 6.4: Streamlining of total District staff and fieldworkers 
I Total District staff 
• Fieldworkers 
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Sources: NIA-UPRHS 1993; NIA-UPRIIS, 4* District 2002a 
To allow for the reductions of the field staff, the NLA. 
streamlined its management set-up several times. The density of 
fieldworkers — on paper - was reduced from 13 per 1000 hectares 
in 1977 to only 4.5 in 1997 (see table 6.1). This was made possible 
by the abolishment of the position of the supervising watermaster, 
and by doubling the area of responsibility of a watermaster. 
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TABLE 6.1: Work standards for UPRIIS from 1977 until 1997, and 
proposed from 1998 onwards 
(staff numbers based on these work standards are put between brackets) 
1977 1982 1997 Proposed 
1998-
Zone Engneers 8,000 ha 8,000 ha 8,000 ha 12,000 ha 
(3) (3) (3) (2) 
Supervising 2,500 ha 2,500 ha X X 
Watermasters (10) (10) 
Watermasters 500 ha 750 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 
(50) (33) (24) (24+24) 
Gatekeepers Headgates Headgates Headgates Headgates 
(17) (17)io (17) (17) 
Ditchtenders 1.5 km 3.5 km 4.2 km X 
(240)» (120) 60) 
Total number of 
13 
fieldworkers/1,000 ba 
7.5 4.5 3 
Source. NIA-UPRHS, 4th District 1996d; NIA-UPRHS 1997. 
The major cost-cutting measure however, was the phasing out 
of the ditchtender position. By 1982, their assigned stretch of canal 
had been (more than) doubled. This thus allowed the District to 
reduce their number by half. The second measure was to phase out 
the remaining ditchtenders by contracting out their work to the 
irrigation associations organised under the IOSP program. Also the 
latter measure saved money, as the IA was expected to carry out 
the work at less than 20% of the costs of employing a 
ditchtender.12 Moreover, in case the IA was not willing to take over 
the maintenance work of vacant canal sections, lack of staff made 
the District management decide to leave the sections unattended. 
In 1996, this was the case for one third of the 91 ditchtender 
sections in the District (NIA-UPRIIS 1996a). 
The proposed 1998 organisational set-up for UPRIIS - which 
was still not approved by the NIA central office in January 2003 -
office - introduces a new position, the so-called "Water Resources 
Facilities Operator Foremen'. They are to assist watermasters in 
operation, maintenance as well as fee collection. However, the 
formal organisational set-up - either the existing or the proposed 
one - determines the maximum number of positions, but not the 
actual number. In reality, since the end of the 1980s the District 
employed far less people than the organisational set-up called for. 
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As either the government or the NIA's central office put a ban on 
hiring new people, a rapidly increasing number of positions 
remained vacant. For instance, the plantiUa (the NIA approved 
work standard) of the District in 2001 requires 228 staff-members, 
while the actual staff number was only 78. 
The staff reductions could be carried out without forced lay-
offs. Firsdy, staff numbers fell by attrition because of ageing people 
who retired or fell ill. Secondly, people were stimulated to leave the 
agency by means of an eariy retirement scheme. This scheme 
provided an attractive bonus for those willing to leave the agency 
after twenty years of service. Thirdly, as the District did not hire 
any new people, it could re-assign ditchtenders to other positions 
which had become vacant due to retirement. Watermasters started 
to act as Zone Engineers and gatekeepers as watermasters, which 
allowed ditchtenders to function as 'acting-gatekeepers'. Finally, 
reduction was made possible by ending the contracts of daily 
workers. 
FIGURE 6.5: Expenses of the UPRIIS 4 * District in current and at 
constant prices, 1983-1997 
25 n 
0 H — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i 
O&M expenses in current prices 
" * " O&M expenses in constant prices 
Sources: NIA-UPRHS 1993; NIA-UPRHS, 4 * District 2002a 
The District also saved money on maintenance, repair and the 
replacement of equipment and structures. The District - as well as 
UPRLTS - hardly allocated any funds for these items. In the 
beginning, project funds were used for these items. As project 
funds dried up, maintenance was 'deferred', while many of the 
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irrigation structures as well as equipment (cars but also heavy 
equipment like bulldozers, trucks and cranes) became inoperable 
and were not replaced. Finally, cutting the gasoline allowances to 
the fieldstaff made limited savings on the operational expenses of 
the District, for instance. 
These cost-cutting measures have been successful in financial 
terms (see figure 6.5). Though the yeariy budget still increased, real 
expenditures showed a slighdy declining trend. The declining salary 
levels (in real terms) discussed in the earlier section have 
contributed to this trend. Likewise, the increase of the District's 
expenditures during 1995-97 has also been the result of salary 
increases during these years. 
Income-raising strategies: the struggle for irrigation fees 
In the case of fee collection, it is more appropriate to talk about 
'strategies', rather than about 'measures taken by management'. The 
NIA management largely controlled the cost-cutting measures. In 
die case of fee collection, the management's control was far more 
limited. It required the consent of both the fieldworkers (to collect) 
and the farmers (to pay). 
To increase its income, the District needed to increase its fee 
collection, as the other sources of income were minimal. From 
1983-87, irrigation service fees (ISF) were the only source of 
income. Starting in 1988, the District was able to gain income from 
management fees charged to projects and equipment rental. 
However, on average this amounted to only 7% of its total income. 
During the beginning of the 1980s, the scope for increasing the 
fee income of the District was enormous. Firstly, the District lost a 
lot of potential income because it could not send out bills to the 
whole of its service area. Bills were sent to farmer water users that 
were included in the program area.13 In case the water supply was 
better than expected, the NIA might enlarge its program area 
during the season. Usually however, the NIA management would 
not do so, but rather would charge the collections of farmers in the 
areas outside of the program area to their so-called 'back-account' 
(outstanding debts). 
Farmers that benefited from the water were charged with a fee 
of 2.5 cavans of palay during the wet season, and 3.5 cavans during 
the dry season. Or they could pay the money-equivalent in cash.14 
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The actual billing was however only possible if the farmer did 
indeed benefit from the NIA's services. In practice this was 
interpreted to mean that they harvested at least 40 sacks (2 tons) 
per hectare. Hence, farmers who harvested less than this amount 
due to drought, disease, a typhoon or any other reason, were 
exempted from fee payment. As the benefited area was on average 
only 60% of the service area, the District had a lot to gain from 
enlarging this area. 
Secondly, the District had a lot to gain from actually collecting 
the dues of farmers. The farmers of the benefited areas paid on 
average only around 50% of their dues. Some did not pay at all, but 
the majority paid in part. If farmers paid in kind, they would often 
give only one or two sacks of palay to the District's collector, 
instead of the full amount The NLA charged the remaining debt to 
the back-account of farmers. Given the low fee payments, the total 
back-account of farmers to the District - that started accounting 
the debts from 1975 onwards - had ballooned to more than 300 
million Pesos in 1992 (NIA-UPRIIS, 4 t h District 1993) and has 
increased ever since. This amount equalled 25 times the operational 
expenses of the District in that year. 
To increase its income, the District stepped up its collection 
efforts. In the eady years of UPRIIS, fee collection was carried out 
only by a handful of collectors. Soon, also the watermasters 
became responsible for collection, while also the ditchtenders and 
gatekeepers were authorised as deputy collectors. To these 
fieldworkers, fee collection became their main time-consuming 
task. A Wodd Bank study (1996) estimated the time devoted to fee 
collection by the staff of National Irrigation Systems to be between 
10-40%. This seems to be true for the District as well. For a period 
of around two months during each harvest season, the fieldworkers 
spent most of their time on fee collection. 
Fee collection was a time-consuming activity for several reasons. 
Firsdy, farmers were billed individually. For an average watermaster 
division, this thus involved over 500 transactions. Secondly, most 
farmers had to be persuaded to pay the fees. Only a minority of the 
farmers would drop by at the house of a watermaster or other 
collector to pay their dues. To make the majority pay, it had 
become regular practice that the NIA's fieldworkers would visit 
farmers at their house and even spend some time to convince them 
to pay.15 They would do so, just after the farmer harvested his field. 
In case farmers would pay in kind, the collectors could usually take 
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the sacks of palay with them, right away. In case of cash-payment 
however, they were frequently told to come back another time, as 
the farmer claimed to be lacking cash at that moment. 
Thirdly, collection-in-kind was time-consuming. It involved the 
hauling of the bulky sacks of palay to the NIA office, and its 
subsequent drying, storing and selling. Fourthly, the NIA still made 
use of a non-computerised administrative system. This brought a 
lot of paperwork to the fieldworkers, and necessitated the full-time 
employment of several so-called "billing-clerks'. 
The District management closely monitored the collection 
process. As has been explained in the previous chapter, the timely 
payments of the wages and benefits of the District personnel 
depended on it. Hence, the management could not afford to be 
sloppy on the collection efforts of the fieldworkers. Collection 
targets had been set for each watermaster's division, and collection 
reports were updated weekly. During harvest period, collection 
performance was the central topic of the biweekly meetings of the 
District management and the fieldworkers. In these meetings, 
watermasters were held accountable for the collection results in 
their divisions. In short, fee collection became a very important 
concern to the District management as well as the fieldstaff, which 
equalled the importance of water management and 
maintenance/repair works. 
Next to giving more attention and manpower to collection, the 
NIA also tried to increase the farmers' willingness to pay their 
dues. Three strategies were followed. Firsdy, a lot of effort was put 
into legitimising fee payments in the eyes of the farmers. The 
institutional development program was a primary vehicle to do so. 
In the training sessions, but also in the IA-meetings in the villages, 
and the conferences in the District office, the NIA fieldworkers as 
well as the engineers stressed over and over again the importance 
of fee payments. A popular message of the NIA staff to the 
farmers was that 'fees were the life and blood of the agency'. It was 
argued that the NIA and the farmers were trapped in a vicious 
cycle: a low NIA budget led to poor services, causing low yields 
and dissatisfied farmers, which in turn caused low fee payment and 
thus a low NIA budget. 
The key to the solution, according to the NIA, was in the hands 
of the farmers. To achieve a break-through, they had to change 
their attitude. Instead of responding to poor services with low fee 
payments, they should take the first step. The 'virtuous cycle' 
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would only emerge if the farmers would improve their fee 
payments (1). Then, the District's budget would rise (2), the 
services would improve (3) and farmers would be satisfied (4) (see 
figure 6.6). 
FIGURE 6.6: The virtuous - also called ambitious - cycle of fee payments 
and services 
ISF Canal (NLA) 
^-—Farmers 
Among the farmer population in the District, few questioned 
the legitimacy of fee payments as such. As the farmers had been 
getting used to 'dole-out' programs of especially the Marcos 
administration (e.g. the Masagana-99 credit program, see Evangelista 
1978), non-payment or partial payment was not considered as a 
crime. A popular saying among farmers was that "nobody was ever 
jailed for the non-payment of irrigation service fees". Nevertheless, 
the majority considered it their obligation to pay the fees. Even if 
the services were not so good, many would still pay, though only 
partially. Probably, the institutional development program - which 
started in the end of the 1980s - strengthened this view. However, 
'the obligation to pay' has been in the minds of the farmers for a 
longer period of time. Fee payments were already a requirement 
even before the start of UPRIIS in the mid-seventies. According to 
some of the fieldworkers who worked in the District during the 
1960s, also the hacienda owners were paying irrigation fees. 
However, the legitimacy of fee payments was questioned by two 
farmer organisations in the District, called 'AMA' and 
'Sandujuan'.16 Both organisations argued that the irrigation services 
should be free of fees. Farmer members of these organisations 
were found throughout the District, but they had significant 
influence in the villages located in the downstream parts of Zone 2 
and 3. In these villages, the resistance to fee payments was high. 
The NLA tried to deal with this resistance, by using the 
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organisational and Iraining instruments of the institutional 
development program. 
The NIA strategy in the downstream part of Zone 2 may serve 
as an example. As the stronghold of these peasant organisations 
happened to be adjacent to the village of San Anton - the village 
with the well-developed ties with the NIA - the farmer leaders were 
well known to the NIA. The NIA carefully picked out the leaders 
that they felt would be amenable to the NLA's organising program. 
As a District engineer recalls it 
We found the brother of one of the local peasant leaders willing to 
become the IA President He was also a member of the AMA. We 
helped him to become what he is now, a respected leader himself. 
Through our support, he is now the District's president of the IAs, 
and he even made it as the President of the UCFIA [die UPRIIS 
based confederation of IAs, JO]. He helped us a great deal in 
convincing these AMA members to participate with the NIA and to 
pay their fees, (interview held in October 1996) 
The second strategy to make farmers pay was based on 
coercion. The NIA used a 'carrot and stick' strategy to increase 
collection of back-accounts of farmers. The 'carrot-part' was that 
farmers could avail of the so-called 'Amnesty Program'. This 
program, which started in 1988, offered the farmers a substantial 
discount for their outstanding back-accounts.17 However, few 
farmers setded their back-account, as participation was voluntary. 
To urge them to pay, the NIA developed a 'stick' as well. Starting 
in 1995, farmers who were not accepting the attractive deal offered, 
could be sent demand letters and eventually be sued in court. 
The District management was however not very eager to pursue 
this coercive strategy. It did send out the demand letters, but their 
number was limited. It had sent out a total of two hundred letters 
only by 1997, while the vast majority of the farmholders in the 
District had unsettled arrears to the District. Moreover, it was 
hesitant to actually sue in court those farmers who had received a 
demand letter but had refused to setde the matter amicably. The 
formal argument of the NIA management was that it lacked the 
financial and administrative capacity to process a larger number of 
cases. Though true, it could have taken steps to solve these 
managerial problems. Rather, its lack of capacity was an excuse for 
not taking a tough stand vis-a-vis its delinquent clients. 
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The more important reason was that the NIA staff did not to 
want jeopardise their relations with the farmers. Their 
considerations strongly limited the target-group for the demand 
letters. Firsdy, fieldworkers and management alike felt it to be 
inhuman to come down hard on small farmers, who had difficulty 
in making ends meet Sending out demand letters was the 
responsibility of the administrative officer of the District He was 
keen on avoiding trouble for poorer farmers, who he thought were 
around two-thirds of the District's clientele. 
I will not sue these farmers. I understand the difficulties of their 
lives. If the watermaster does not know the farmers well, I will first 
visit these farmers before I send out a demand letter. If they are 
poor, I will not pursue a case against them. (Interview held in July 
1996) 
Secondly, to play safe, the District office mosdy limited the issue 
of demand letters to farmers in the upstream areas, where it felt 
certain that services were well provided. The fieldworkers in these 
areas selected those farmers who were known to be capable of 
paying, but who -in their view- took the NLA's rightful claim for 
fees for granted. These were the 'stubborn' or 'arrogant' farmers 
who refused to pay fees altogether. The third and last filter was a 
socio-political one. Obviously, there were powerful people among 
this group of richer and 'arrogant' farmers selected by the 
fieldworkers. Also, part of this group was connected to one of the 
District engineers through political, kinship or friendship relations. 
Hence, part of this group was not considered suitable for receiving 
a demand letter. Th District managers would do their best to settle 
the issue amicably rather than pushing for a court case.18 
In 1997, the District's management started to adopt another 
coercive strategy, which they considered to be attractive as it was 
less confrontational in nature than suing farmers in court. This was 
the so-called 'Annotation Program', developed by the NIA in 
another region of the country. The threat was that non-payment of 
the back-accounts would result in the annotation of the 
outstanding debt on the land tide of the landowner. On the NIA's 
request, the Provincial Register of Deeds would carry this out This 
was considered to be an effective strategy as landowners could no 
longer sell or mortgage land carrying such annotation. In case the 
land was tenanted, and these tenants were liable for fee payments 
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to the NIA, it was expected that the landowners would put 
pressure on these tEnants to pay their dues to avoid such 
annotation. 
Finally, coercion - or better, social pressure - was practiced by 
the District Chief and the other engineers in their day-to-day 
dealings with IA leaders or barangay captains. They used a 'fee-for-
services' strategy. In return for promises to these leaders for works 
or water, the leaders were expected to deliver fees from the farmers 
they represented. 
The third strategy of the NIA to increase the farmers' 
willingness to pay was based on 'getting the incentives right'. The 
IAs were given the opportunity to enter into a fee collection 
contract with the NIA. In the District, all but two IAs entered into 
such a contract in the beginning of the 1980s. The contract 
stipulated that the IA should help the NIA in collecting the fees. 
The NIA's interest was that the involvement of (cheap) IA labour 
would save on collection costs. Also, it was expected that the 
involvement of farmer leaders in collection would help the NIA in 
legitimising fee payment among the farmer clientele. Moreover, the 
contract would allow the farmer community to build up their own 
fund. Hence, the idea was that the contract would develop an 
interest among the farmers to pay fees. The contractual deal was 
that the IA would receive a percentage of the collected fees, in 
return for its help in collection. Moreover, the better the collection, 
the higher the percentage (see table 2.1). 
This 'incentive strategy' worked out differendy than intended. 
Except for one or two cases (one of these cases was discussed in 
the previous chapter), the involvement of the IA leadership was 
minimal. One of the main reasons was that the NIA collectors 
remained accountable for the collected fees and the receipts. In 
case money, sacks of palay or receipts were lost, they would have to 
face administrative or even legal measures by the Commission on 
Audit This was a real threat as such cases had indeed emerged in 
UPRIIS. Retiring fieldworkers were not cleared for their pension 
payments, or had to face a deduction from their pension equal to 
the outstancling 'debt'. Hence, the collectors were careful not to 
run into trouble by involving IA leaders. 
Another major reason was that the incentive structure 'did not 
become righf, in the way intended by the contract. The IA leaders 
were not inclined to do this labour-intensive and cumbersome job, 
which would not make them very popular either. They also quickly 
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realised that the fieldworkers would not stop collecting without 
their support, as the NIA District badly needed the money. Hence, 
without doing anything substantial themselves, they would still be 
entitled to the incentives. 
Formally, such behaviour on the side of the IA would allow the 
NIA to break the contract. However, the District's engineers did 
not do so. The collection incentives were given another meaning. 
Rather than being seen as a payment to the IA fund for collection 
work done, it came to be seen as the personal allowance of the IA 
President, in return for his or her support to the NIA He or she 
could use the money to shoulder his costs incurred in irrigation-
related matters (like travel expenses, or costs related to canal 
cleaning), and was even allowed to use the money for personal 
expenses. The ISF collection contract thus may have helped the 
NIA to maintain good relations with the IA President, but was not 
a very effective tool to increase collection efficiencies. 
The impact of the District's efforts and strategies to increase fee 
income are shown in figure 6.7. The figure shows that the 
collection efficiencies increased during the 1990s. Also the fee 
income in real terms increased — due to several increases in the fee 
charges per hectare - but the collection in constant prices has 
declined slighdy over the years. Given all the energy put into 
collection, it might be argued that it had little impact. However, 
given the negative impact of the cost-cutting measures on the 
NLA's services, it may be the case that mamtaining fee collection 
efficiencies at levels almost equal to the eady 1980s is an 
achievement in itself. 
So far, I have shown that the NIA gready increased its efforts to 
increase fee collection in the District, and implemented various 
strategies to increase the willingness of farmers to pay their fees. 
The focus on fee collection has affected the institutional relations 
in the District, for a part in ways different than planned. I will 
therefore end this section on the District's income raising strategies 
by discussing some of these - unintended - dynamics. 
Fee-induced institutional dynamics 
As was already shown in the previous chapter, fee collection 
shaped the relations between the watermasters and the IA 
Presidents. As the case studies showed, it gave rise to harmonious 
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FIGURE 6.7: Total fee collection and collection efficiency 
(UPRIIS, 4 * District, 1983-1997)"' 
18 -r T 80 
ITotal fee collection in current prices 
•••Total Fee collection in constant 1988 prices 
Collection efficiencies 
Sources: NIA-UPRHS 1993; NIA-UPRHS, 4 * District 2002a 
The collection incentives were supposed to trigger the 
emergence of strong farmer irrigation associations that were 
remunerated by the NIA in return for the efforts of their leaders in 
campaign and collection work. As shown, it gave rise to a rather 
relations between the watermasters and the IA Presidents, as well 
as more conflictive ones. The issue at stake was the distribution of 
the workload as well as the remuneration for this work. As 
discussed eadier in this chapter, fee collection involves a lot of hard 
work, while on the other hand, it also gives access to money, 
derived from the hauling contracts and the fee collection incentives 
given to the IAs. 
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different institutional arrangement As the IA leaders neither 
campaigned nor collected, the fieldworkers were still doing the job 
and thus claimed part of the collection incentives. This was mostiy 
setded amicably between the two actors, but in one of the 
discussed cases it gave rise to a serious conflict. 
In the first District of UPRLTS, the distribution of the incentives 
between the IA leaders and the fieldworkers had reached a further 
stage of institutionalisation. Due to the good access to water of the 
larger part of that District and the relatively large size of the IAs, 
collection incentives were relatively high, and were attained almost 
every season. In that District, the IA-incentives were regulady 
shared between the fieldworkers, the Zone Engineer and even 
some of the administrative staff. These shares varied between 1-
10% of the incentives. 
Fees and fee collection activities also triggered the institutional 
relations between the fieldworkers and the management of the 4 * 
District. Firsdy, it turned into a source of patronage for the District 
managers. It was within their power to distribute the fee hauling 
contracts among the fieldworkers. These contracts were considered 
lucrative, especially if these concerned well-accessible areas or areas 
where farmers were paying willingly. Usually, hauling contracts 
were given to the watermaster of a certain area, but this was not 
necessarily the case. Hence, 'being close' to the Chief or the Zone 
Engineer helped in getting these contracts. 
The Chief also derived patronage from the distribution of so-
called 'palay loans' to his staff. As salaries and benefits often came 
late, the Chief showed his good will to the rank and file by using 
part of the rice collection as advancement for their salaries. The 
willingness of the Chief to provide these loans, and his strictness in 
the time-schedule for its repayment, opened new ways for 
dispensing favouritism. 
Secondly, the benefits of fee money became the subject of a 
class-like struggle between the UPRIIS and District leadership and 
the fieldworkers during 1996. The issue at stake concerned the 
losses incurred in the collection of fee payments in kind. In the 
1980s, the UPRIIS operational manager had decided that collectors 
would be allowed a loss of 2 kilos of rice for each sack of palay 
collected. This allowance recognised the claim of these collectors 
that the collected sacks of palay lost weight between the time of 
collection and wtighing in the field, and the weighing in the office. 
The collectors had a point in demanding for such an allowance. As 
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farmers often gave wet palay, and as collectors would often keep 
the sacks of palay stored at their houses overnight before bringing 
it to the office, loss of weight did indeed occur.20 
In 1996, the Commission on Audit (the COA) claimed that it 
had not agreed to this allowance for losses, and considered it illegal. 
This enraged the fieldworkers in the District Not only would 
collection in kind lose part of its financial attraction, it also put 
them into financial trouble. The COA considered the allowances as 
outstanding debts, to be repaid by the fieldworkers. As a last 
measure, the COA would withhold the payments of their pensions 
in case of retirement, or would deduct from it the 'outstanding 
debt'. For some fieldworkers who mainly collected in kind, these 
debts amounted to several times their monthly salary. 
The District and UPRIIS employees association picked up the 
issue. They felt that the UPRIIS management took the issue too 
lighdy and did not propedy defend the interests of the rank and 
file. By 1997, it had developed into a sharp conflict. As a sign of 
protest, the associated fieldworkers decided to stop collecting-in-
kind during the 1997 wet season. At the end of the field research, 
by the end of 1997, the issue had reached the level of the NIA's 
administrator, but was still unresolved. 
To conclude, the District has implemented substantive measures 
and strategies to attain financial viability. Money-saving and 
moneymaking efforts became central to the NIA's doings. These 
efforts have re-shaped relations between the NIA and the water 
users. This will be further explored in the following section. 
Financial Accountability: a Critique 
This section discusses the relation between financial autonomy and 
accountability: did the District's need for financial viability 
empower the farmers vis-a-vis the agency? The data will be 
presented in a critical dialogue with the main assumptions of the 
advocates of financial autonomy. 
First assumption: the only way is up 
According to the advocates, irrigation agencies confronted with 
financial autonomy have only one option: to improve the quality of 
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their services. According to Svendsen (1993) these agencies can be 
expected to increase the amount of effort put into O&M, as they 
wish to increase the farmers' capacity and willingness to pay fees. 
Vermillion (1991) argues that financial autonomy stimulates 
agencies to adopt a more flexible and responsive approach towards 
irrigation management. 
Small and Carruthers (1991) add that such an agency will be 
inclined to reduce costs to keep its budget in the black, while 
farmers would like to keep fees as low as possible. However, they 
do not see the cost reduction as problematic, as they claim it will 
lead to cost-effective management. The mutual interest of the 
agency and the farmers to limit expenditures will stimulate a greater 
efficiency in resource use and an economically rational division of 
tasks. The usually high maintenance standards of engineers will be 
counteracted by farmers' wishes for more appropriate maintenance 
practices. Given their low labour costs, farmers will be inclined to 
take care of canal cleaning, while engineers will limit their 
involvement to overall water control and repairs. The challenge is 
to try to find, for any given irrigation system at any particular point 
in time, the types and timing of tasks that are best suited for both 
parties. Financial autonomy stimulates such a balancing of pro's 
and cons. (Small and Carruthers 1991) 
My findings question these assumptions. Improving services and 
farmers' satisfaction was not the only logical option open for the 
District to deal with its status of financial autonomy. As I have 
shown, its response was to decrease rather than increase the 
amount of effort put into O&M. Its main strategy to put its budget 
in the black was by drastically aitting its expenditures, rather than 
by improving its services to farmers. Its efforts to increase fee 
income were also not based on a strategy to improve its services. 
Rather, as I have shown, it increased its collection efforts, and 
implemented various strategies to make farmers pay. 
Did the NIA's cost-cutting result in more cost-effective 
management? In other words, did it save money without negatively 
affecting the quality of its services? My findings suggest otherwise. 
It is probably true that part of the cost cutting was indeed trimming 
the fat It is for instance hard to imagine that the District indeed 
needed the neady 300 staff members employed in the beginning of 
the 1980s. However, my findings suggest that the cost cutting was 
out of proportion, and has led to the deterioration of the District's 
services. 
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The major findings are: 
The benefited area - defined as the areas that were 
programmed by the NLA, served with sufficient water and able 
to harvest more than 2 tons/hectare - during the dry season 
has declined over the years (see figure 6.8). The decline in the 
dry season program area (see figure 3.5) as well as the increase 
in the exempted areas over the years (see figure 3.6) point in 
the same direction.21 
Canal sections in especially the downstream parts of the system 
were heavily silted and not regulady cleaned, causing a 
reduction of the cross-sectional areas and reduced flow 
velocities (Wensley 1989:173) 
The heavy equipment of UPRLTS deteriorated over the years 
and was not replaced. In 1997, only a few of these machines 
were still operating; 
Due to staff reductions, and the unwillingness of IAs to take 
over, one third of the canal sections in the District were left 
unattended in 1996.22 
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In short, my findings contradict the assumption that agencies 
confronted with a change towards financial autonomy will become 
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more accountable towards users and thus wfll be inclined to 
improve their services. The NIA responded differendy. It 
responded by cutting costs to the extent that its capacity to take 
care of O&M in the District reduced. Hence, going up (improving 
services) is not the only way: the alternative way is to go down. 
A second major assumption of the financial autonomy advocates is 
that the accountability relation between the agency and the water 
users is based on money payments only, or at least that fee 
payments are the most powerful mechanism in place. Fee payments 
are supposed to operate as a 'quasi-market incentive' (Rosegrant 
and Binswanger 1993). Following this market metaphor, the 
irrigation arena becomes a market where the salesmen (the 
managers) do their utmost best to satisfy their buyers (the water 
users). The difference between an irrigation system and a real 
market is that dissatisfied water users cannot do their shopping 
somewhere else, but the ability of the water users to withhold fee 
payments provides a strong leverage to condition the behaviour of 
service-providers as well. In short, money talks in the relation 
between an irrigation agency and the water users. 
The most concrete contribution to this theory has been put 
forward by Small and Carruthers (1991). They argued that centrally 
financed irrigation agencies are upwardly accountable to central 
government, as the latter provide their funds. Hence, they do not 
take farmers' wishes or complaints very seriously. Likewise, 
financially autonomous irrigation agencies are accountable 
downward to the water users, as their budgets then depend on the 
fees from the farmers (see figure 6.9). 
FIGURE 6.9: The assumed relationship between finance and accountability 
Second assumption: (only) money talks 
Fees Services 
Direction of 
accountability 
Water users 
Source. Small and Carruthers 1991 
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This theoretical model may be attractive for its neatness and 
simplicity, but it is too simple. Fees shape accountability of the 
NIA's District towards the water users. However, as I have shown 
in the previous chapters, so do relations of kinship and friendship 
as well as economic and political relations. Moreover, 
accountability is shaped by the physical layout of the system. 
Villages located in the downstream part of the system may be 
willing to pay the full 100% of the fees required by die NIA, but its 
far-away position may still jeopardise the emergence of 
accountability, as the NIA lacks the control over the water to 
deliver it 
Among the multiple relations determining accountability, the 
financial relation did not seem to be the most important one. If it 
would be so, there would have been an explicit and publicly known 
strategy of the NIA's District in relation to fee payments. The 
District would have used the collection records of the different 
areas to determine its program area, and the allocation of its works 
budget One would have seen the District making deals to win over 
poor-paying IAs or villages: i.e. we will give you these services, 
provided you ensure us a certain collection efficiency. 
However, such explicit fee-based strategies were not observed. 
The engineers would use such eservices-for-fees' arguments on an 
ad hoc basis only. Allocations of the program area as well as the 
works were shaped by physical and socio-political relations, rather 
than by financial ones. Money talked, but its voice did not carry 
very far. High or low fee payments were the effect of good or poor 
accountability relations between the NIA and villages, rather than 
their cause. 
To validate these arguments, I will discuss the bases of 
accountability relations between the NIA's District and three IAs. 
Table 62 shows the fee collection efficiencies attained in the areas 
covered by these IAs, as well as the quality of the NIA services 
provided to these areas. As the table shows, two out of the three 
IAs do not fit the theory. The IA-2 paid well, but did not get good 
services. IA-3 did get good services, despite the fact that its 
payments were low. Only IA-1 seems to fit the theory of financial 
accountability, as it suggests that its high payments be rewarded 
with a high level of services. However, also this case can only be 
understood when looking at die wider socio-political relations 
between the NIA District and the farmer water users of the area. 
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TABLE 6.2: Relation between fee payments and services for three IAs 
Fee collection efficiency Services received 
(1991-1998 average) 
IA-1 High (76%) Good 
IA-2 High (82%) Poor 
IA-3 Low (37%) Good 
Source. NIA-UPRÏÏS, 4* District 2002b 
The IA-1 is located in the village of San Anton, in the mid-
stream of Zone 2. The NLA was very accountable to this LA and 
provided good services in terms of water and canal and road 
maintenance. However, the high level of fee payments did not 
cause this accountability. Both the accountability and the fee 
payments were the product of intimate socio-political relations 
between this village and the NLA, which had developed since the 
end of the 1970s. This has already been explained in detail in 
chapter 4. To summarise, a disproportionate number of the 
District engineers and fieldstaff originated from this village. Hence, 
friendship and kinship relations between the village and ihe NLA 
were numerous. Moreover, the village was the bailiwick of the 
Zone Engineer's political family. Finally, the Zone Engineer has 
developed a clear economic interest in the well-being of this tail-
end village. 
FIGURE 6.10: Multiple accountability relations between the NLA 
and an LA 
IA-1 
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In this NIA-friendly environment, high fee payments and high 
service levels went together. For multiple reasons, the NIA was 
inclined to take care of the needs of this village (see figure 6.10). In 
return, farmers were satisfied and willing to pay.23 Moreover, given 
the high number of familial relations in the village, most villagers 
knew about the precarious financial situation of the District, and 
the needs of the NIA staff to collect fees to pay for their salaries. 
For the NIA engineers, the high fee collection efficiencies 
attained from this IA became an argument for providing good 
services, if only to legitimate its favoured treatment The financial 
relation may have become a contributing factor to the 
accountability of the NIA towards this IA. However, it did not 
cause the emergence of friendly, accountable relations between the 
two parties. 
The IA-2 did also pay well, but did not get good services in 
return. This peculiar combination can only be understood by 
looking at the wider socio-political relations between the NIA and 
this particular IA. This IA is one of Argee's, located in the mid-
stream part of Zone 1 (see chapter 5). It was located in the 
downstream municipality of Zaragosa in Bulacan province. As 
explained in chapter 4, it lacked the political clout of the upstream 
municipal politicians of Victoria, and the provincial politicians of 
Nueva Ecija, in which most of the UPRIIS as well as the District 
area was located. Consequendy, it was frequendy not included in 
the program area, as the engineers were inclined to give in to 
pressures of politicians from the upstream municipality and/or 
province. For the same reason, the IA had a hard time in getting 
the support of the District to maintain or repair its structures and 
roads. 
The high level of fee payments was a result of its precarious 
situation. In contrast to IA-1, farmers did not pay because of 
satisfaction with services rendered. In this case, payments were 
rather made out of need. Realising the precarious situation vis-a-vis 
the NIA office, they were inclined to pay in order not to further 
impair their situation. Also, they paid because they realised the 
importance of the support of the fieldworkers in securing water to 
their area. During the eady 1990s, the water users in the IA-2 paid 
two types of fees. Some would pay to the NIA and others to the 
syndicate, and some farmers even paid to both parties. Being in real 
need of water, the farmers were inclined to use payments to please 
those able to supply the water. 
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Finally, IA-3 combined good services with low fee payments. 
Again, this combination needs to be understood by looking at the 
wider socio-political context. The villages of this IA-3, located in 
the mid-stream of Zone 1, were the key-targets of rival political 
alliances struggling in the municipal politics of Victoria (for further 
detail, see chapter 4). 
The water users in this LA were able to get water through the 
direct interventions of these local politicians, while the pressure of 
these politicians on the NLA engineers gave them access to 
maintenance and repair works. Payments to the NLA were low, as 
the farmers argued that it was the politician and not the irrigation 
agency who provided the services. Put differendy, unlike the 
farmers of the second LA, these farmers felt confident enough to 
ignore the NLA demand for service fees. Being backed by powerful 
politicians, they did not feel the need to please the NLA office (see 
figure 6.11). 
FIGURE 6.11: Political accountability of the NIA towards an IA 
In short, the second assumption of the financial accountability 
theory seems to be flawed as well. The need to collect fees certainly 
shaped relations between NIA and water users, but it was only one 
and not even the major factor. Hence, money talked in the 
distribution of NIA services, but so did politics, economic interests 
and kinship and friendship relations. 
0 
The NLA's Quest for Money 233 
Assumption three: Financial autonomy improves equity 
Svendsen (et aL 1990, 1993) have put forward the thesis that 
financially autonomous agencies are inclined to increase their 
services to downstream areas in order to increase fee collection. 
Hence, these agencies try to improve equitable water distribution in 
agency-managed systems. Svendsen's study is based on secondary, 
long-term data of five sample systems in the Philippines including 
UPRIIS). His empirical findings supported his thesis. The NIA 
redistributed water from the better-watered areas to fringe areas 
which otherwise would not have received irrigation water. The 
redistribution was argued to be a direct response to the changes in 
NIA's priorities following its loss of operational subsidies around 
1981. Though the findings were not conclusive, such findings were 
exacdy the type that would be expected to follow from an 
emphasis on increased farmer satisfaction and co-operation and 
increased revenues. Because the fee schedule is tied to benefited 
area, the only ways NIA can increase its revenue from that source 
are to expand benefited area and to increase collection efficiencies 
(Svendsen etaL 7990:191). 
Hypothetically, Svendsen's thesis is possible, but in practice it is 
not a very likely scenario. The NIA became financially autonomous 
because it lost its access to government subsidies due to fiscal 
austerity programs. Hence, the NIA - as well as the District -
landed in serious financial trouble. In such a financially difficult 
situation, it is not very likely that the NIA - or any other agency 
operating under such conditions - would find the means to either 
increase its revenue by expanding the benefited area, or to improve 
service to its existing clientele, and thus to raise collection 
efficiencies. Svendsen even seems to argue that the NIA could 
follow both ways at the same time: to expand benefited area and to 
increase collection efficiencies. This, to me, is even more unlikely 
to happen. As I showed above, the NIA's main response was to cut 
costs and to contract its services, rather than to improve them. 
Another weakness in Svendsen's thesis is that he assumes that 
financially autonomous agencies need to improve services and 
farmer satisfaction to increase their income. However, the NIA's 
doings show that income generation can also be achieved in 
another manner. As was discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, 
the NIA responded to its loss of operational subsidies by 
engineering and implementing a whole set of measures to increase 
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its collection capacity and to make fanners pay. Hence, instead of 
choosing an indirect approach to increasing its income - providing 
better services and thus hoping for more farmer payments - the 
NIA followed a more direct collection approach to generate 
income. 
My findings also contradict those of Svendsen with regard to the 
effect of financial autonomy on equity. My findings indicate that 
inequity between the head-end and the tail-end areas has increased 
over the years. This, I believe, has at least been partly caused by the 
measures and policies implemented following the District's change 
to a financial autonomous organisation. The District focussed its 
services on the upstream areas, at the expense of the tail-end areas. 
The empirical evidence for this argument is based on two 
phenomena. Firsdy, the effect of the shrinking dry season program 
area (see figure 3.5) and benefited area (see figure 6.8) was fully at 
the expense of the tail-end areas. The District has consistendy 
favoured the upstream and mid-stream areas. It thus stopped its 
water provision during the dry season to an increasingly large tail-
end area. The reductions in the program area were mostiy carried 
out in the tail-ends of the larger Zone 1 and 3, while the program 
area for the smaller Zone 2 remained largely the same. 
Secondly, the reduction in field personnel caused by the 
streamlining policies of the District was mainly felt in the tail-end 
areas as well. Positions becoming vacant in the upstream areas due 
to retirement of fieldworkers were fiUed-up by re-assigning 
fieldworkers from the downstream areas. As a result, by 1996 the 
density of fieldworkers in the upstream areas was more than double 
of that of the downstream areas (see table 6.3). 
TABLE 6.3: Head-tail distribution of field personnel and 
abandoned/assigned canal sections 
Field personnel 
(per V00 ha, in 1996) 
Abandoned canal 
sections 
(assigned % in brackets) 
(in % of total km of 
larger canals, in 1996) 
Zone 2 
Zone 1 
5.4 
1.7 
5.0 
2.4 
15 (85) 
60 (40) 
0 (100) 
42 (58) 
Source: NIA-UPRIIS, 4 * District 1996d 
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Also, due to streamlining canal sections were abandoned. It 
meant that the District no longer assigned a ditchtender to a certain 
canal, while the LA in place refused to take up canal cleaning under 
a Maintenance Turn over (MTO) Contract. Often they refused to 
do so because the IA leaders felt that the canal condition was too 
bad to handle and/or because the remuneration for canal clearing 
provided by the NIA was considered to be too low. Canals were 
abandoned mainly in the tail-end areas. In the tail-end of Zone 1, 
no less than 60% of the total canal length was left unattended in 
1996 (see table 6.3). 
Hence, the NIA's response in the District to the needs of 
financial autonomy has been to concentrate its services and 
collection efforts in the upstream areas. Increased inequity between 
the upstream and downstream has been the result From the 
viewpoint of the NIA managers of the District, this was the logical 
thing to do. Faced with a shrinking workforce and a deteriorating 
system, they could no longer serve the total service area. Over the 
years, this problem only became worse. To deal with it, they took 
the easy way out. For both physical and socio-political reasons, the 
easy way out was to focus the services and fee collection efforts on 
the upstream areas. 
Given physical circumstances, the areas that are easy to irrigate 
are located in the head-end areas of Zone 1 (and 3), as well as the 
larger part of Zone 2. Moreover, the head-end areas are 
conveniendy close to the District office. Canal cleaning is also 
easier in the upstream areas, as river silt tends to concentrate in the 
smaller canals in the tail-end, where flow velocities are lower 
(Wensley 1989:170) 
In addition, it makes sense to focus on maintaining the 
conditions of the larger head-end canals, as these serve as feeder 
canals to the tail-end areas. It can even be argued that maintaining 
sub-sub-laterals in the head-end is beneficial to the tail-end areas. 
These canal conditions are crucial. The longer it takes to irrigate the 
rice fields along the head-end sub-laterals, the longer tail-end areas 
need to wait for the water to arrive in their areas, (remark of the 
Operational Engineer, February 1997). 
However, the physical conditions alone cannot fully explain the 
choices of the District management If only physics would count, 
other choices could have been made. For instance, they could have 
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abandoned the tail-end areas of all laterals and sub-laterals, 
including the tail-ends of the upstream laterals. By doing so, they 
would have been able to improve water deliveries to the upstream 
parts of the downstream laterals. Or, they could have chosen to 
abandon one of the three Zones all together, and focus their 
efforts on two Zones only. Hence, their choices were also 
informed by socio-political circumstances. 
Socio-politically, the management choices had the following 
logic. The management concentrated the NIA's services on the 
areas which were not only easy to irrigate, but also 'easy to get away 
with'. To put it differendy, they would have a very hard time if they 
had chosen otherwise. The concentration of the NIA's services 
followed provincial as well as municipal boundaries. Services were 
concentrated on the two politically most powerful municipaUties, 
located upstream in the District The municipalities located outside 
of the provincial boundaries were at a loss. The only exception was 
a municipality located in the very downstream of Zone 3. This 
municipality was located within the provincial boundaries of Nueva 
Ecija and as such politically well represented. However, due to its 
very tail-end location, and due to the interventions of farmers and 
politicians manipulating gates, this municipaUty remained largely 
out of the scope of the District's managerial efforts. 
Svendsen has argued that a financially autonomous agency like 
the NLA has good financial reasons to increase equity: it allows for 
an increase of fee-paying farmers. However, my findings show 
otherwise. The District concentrated collection in the upstream 
areas. Zone 1 may serve as an example. The four most upstream 
watermaster divisions in this Zone (out of a total of eleven 
divisions) only covered one third of the Zone's area, but on 
average provided neady 80% of the dry season fee collection in 
that Zone during the 1990-97 period. In other words, the tail-end 
and even mid-stream parts of the Zone hardly contributed to the 
District's income. 
In addition, fee collection in these upstream areas had not yet 
reached the maximum. Collection efficiencies in the upstream area 
of Zone 1 during the 1990-97 period were a little over 50% and 
thus equalled the efficiencies in the rest of the District. Hence, the 
District had still much to gain from improving its collection efforts 
in these upstream areas, before it would be forced to expand the 
benefited area. In short, the District had also no compelling 
financial reason to serve the tail-end areas. 
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To conclude this section, the major assumptions of the financial 
autonomy advocates are flawed. Firsdy, the assumed positive 
effects of financial autonomy on the quantity and quality of 
services of the agency towards the water users seem to be based on 
wishful thinking. My case study does not fit into these assumptions. 
The District's financial autonomy led to the deterioration rather 
than an improvement of its O&M services, while it aggravated 
rather than reduced the head-tail problem. The financial autonomy 
advocates apparendy assume that irrigation agencies collect a 100% 
collection efficiency in irrigated areas. If this would be the case, 
than agencies indeed have no option but to expand irrigated areas 
in order to increase their fee income. However, this is not the case. 
They apparendy ovedooked the fact that agencies can also increase 
income by filling the collection gap in the upstream and mid-stream 
irrigated areas. Likewise, the advocates ovedooked the fact that 
financially autonomous agencies can also put their budget in the 
blue by cutting costs, rather than by increasing their income 
through the improvement of services to farmers. 
Secondly, it has been shown that the accountability relations 
between the NIA's District and the water users cannot be reduced 
to a contractaal-financial one. Fee payments were embedded in 
wider socio-political relations. 
Conclusions 
A first conclusion of this chapter is that money matters in irrigation 
management. This may seem to be somewhat obvious, but I do not 
think it is. Much of the policy discourse as well as research on 
irrigation management focuses on water and maintenance and on 
managerial reforms like turn over. There is less emphasis on 
financial matters, though the discussions on user fees, financial 
autonomy and water markets did put money on the agenda. 
This chapter has shown that the management of money was 
crucial to the affairs of the District. The financial reforms and 
savings had a profound impact on the way the system was being 
managed as well as on the relations between the NLA and the water 
users. The impact of these financial reforms was far greater than 
that of turn over. As more irrigation agencies have been - and still 
are - going through austerity programs, cuts in staffing levels and 
financial reforms (cf. Kikuchi et al 1999), money cleady matters 
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and thus deserve due attention in policy discourse as well as 
research. 
Secondly, the chapter sheds light on the analysis of 
accountability relations. It points to the need to look at 
accountability from a historical perspective as well as from a 
perspective that goes beyond the boundaries of an irrigation 
system. The first sections of this chapter showed that the NIA 
went through a steep 'boom and bust cycle' that fundamentally 
shaped and re-shaped relations between the NIA District staff and 
the water users. The NIA as well as UPRLTS were key instruments 
for President Marcos - after he declared martial law - to built mass 
support, to stem rural unrest and to attain rice self-sufficiency. 
During the 1980s, political turmoil, fiscal crisis and the decline 
of donor support caused the NIA to fall down as fast as it had 
risen during the 1970s. Likewise, the farmer water users of UPRLTS 
were no longer treated favourably by the Philippine government. 
For reasons that still require further study, government spending 
on irrigation during the 1980s and 1990s was low relative to that of 
other types of government expenditures in the peasant sector. 
Hence, the accountability of the NIA as well as the Philippine 
government in general towards the UPRLTS water users needs to be 
examined against the background of the wider relations of the 
Philippine political economy. 
Thirdly, this chapter has shown that the theory of financial 
accountability is flawed. According to the theory, financial 
autonomy induces downward accountability of an irrigation agency 
to its clients and therefore stimulates cost-effective management as 
well as an enlargement of the irrigated area. However, my findings 
prove otherwise. Instead of an improvement of services the 
District contracted its services as an effect of the cost cutting and 
streamlining policies. This mosdy affected the tail-end areas. 
The shortcomings of financial accountability theory can be 
traced back to its undedying premises. It shares the premises of the 
nowadays dominant theoretical approach in political science, i.e. 
new institutionalism, also called rational choice theory. The main 
problem with this type of theories is the very narrow 
conceptualisation of human agency, which is reduced to individuals 
rationally seeking material self-interest. The preferences of actors, 
their driving forces, are thus treated as given, and do not require 
explanation (Mollinga 2001: 739-743). 
This approach has become dominant in the wodd of policy 
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making of international development organisations because of die 
neat models it produces for explaining complex phenomenon (cf. 
Moore 1990). Its heavily edited version of reality is helpful for its 
clarity and for the efficiency with which it simplifies what otherwise 
threatens to overwhelm us (Espeland 1998). Also the international 
policy wodd of the irrigation sector has a strong preference for 
large scale standardised policy initiatives. 
[It has] (...) a strong predilection for what Ostrom has called 
"design principles" for building viable institutions: universally valid 
sets of factors, conditions or principles that can be applied to 
engineer a particular institutional transformation. The paradigm 
suggests the possibility of applying instrumental rationality to 
institutional problems, and proposes a relatively limited set of 
design criteria for the purpose. (Mollinga 2001:743) 
This attraction is true for the financial accountability theory as 
well. It allows the policy-wodd to design these universally true 
policy prescriptions. Douglas Merrey, a researcher at the 
International Water Management Institute, indeed used the model 
to explain the wodd-wide performance and accountability of 
irrigation agencies. By using two dimensions only 
(presence/absence of financial autonomy and single vs. multiple 
systems) it allowed him to explain 'good' or Trad', and to come up 
with some compelling design principles as prescriptions for crafting 
institutional change (Merrey 1996). 
The strength of these neat models is of course at the same time 
their weakness. They produce "propositions that are partly true in 
relation to each of a diverse range of specific situations, rather than 
generating in-depth understanding of specific situations." (Moore 
1990: 16). To put it more strongly, this financial accountability 
model may be a bit true, but is untrue for the larger part The need 
for fees indeed somehow tunes the preferences of irrigation 
managers to farmers' wishes. So far for the true bit. The untrue 
part, as I have shown, is that it leads to various 'good' things like 
increased O&M efforts, improved services and an increased effort 
to serve the tail-end part of the system. 
One of the main theoretical flaws of the financial accountability 
model is that it uses undifferentiated categorisations of 'the farmer' 
and 'the agency', which relate to each other only on the basis of 
maximising self-interest for respectively services and fees. Reality 
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however, is more complex. Instead of a bunch of individual 
farmers and NIA actors, I found alliances of groups of people and 
villages, which had developed multiple socio-political relations. 
Moreover, these relations were structured by the physical layout of 
the system. Hence, both history and ecology structured NIA-
farmer relations. Fee payments as well as services provided were 
embedded in these wider relations. 
The impact of financial autonomy on this complex reality was 
that it increased the inequitable distribution of resources in the 
District. The tail-ends of the system, represented by politically less 
powerful villages, lost out. As cost cutting confronted the NIA 
District with scarcer resources, it had to make a choice: to 
distribute the scarcity evenly over the system, or to focus on a 
smaller group. It chose the latter option. The farmer villages that 
were -for a combination of physical and socio-political reasons — 
'closer' to the NLA's District, were satisfied and paid their fees. The 
more 'distant' villages slowly disappeared out of sight 
The fact that the NIA - and the District in particular - cut costs 
and contracted its services in response to its loss of operational 
subsidies is neither unique nor strange. Accorcling to Rondinelli 
(1982), it is a case of perfectiy understandable bureaucratic 
behaviour. He argues that managers in bureaucracies tend to focus 
on measures that are within their direct realm of control. Third 
Wodd bureaucrats often operate in highly uncertain and volatile 
environments. Hence, they tend to hold on to the more certain and 
controllable parts of their working environment. In the NIA case, 
cost cutting was the safe way out The NIA managers could largely 
control expenditures, like staffing numbers and operational 
expenses. Trying to increase fee income through improved services 
is a much more uncertain, and thus more unlikely strategy. 
This is not only true for the behaviour of Third Wodd public 
managers, but for those in the richer countries as well. A Wodd 
Bank study on public reform in OECD countries concluded that 
the first and main response to fiscal constraints in these countries 
during the 1980s was: "cutback management, consisting of 
measures to curb public spending and civil service staffing" 
(Nunberg 1995:11). 
The study, which was carried out to draw lessons for public 
reform in developing countries, also shows that the OECD 
countries quickly discovered the limits of cutback management, 
especially as it did not give scope for efficiency improvements 
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(ibid.: 11). Similady, World Bank-supported downsizing programs 
in developing countries were criticised for being "one-shot 
employment cuts, rather than longer-term sustainable rightsizing 
and performance improvements" (Nunberg 1996: 6). Judith 
Tendler (1997: 170) makes a similar point She argues that 
downsizing programs that were implemented without 
complementary measures had negative effects on the performance 
capacity of public agencies. 
Of course, die NIA's downsizing and cost cutting was 
implemented with complementary measures, the major one being 
the turn over programs. The contracts to the farmer water users 
were to assure that the O&M performance remained at the same 
level. However, as I have shown, the IAs did not live up to this 
expectation. This has become painfully clear with regard to canal 
cleaning. As the NIA District sent away its ditchtenders and the 
IAs refused to take over the task, one third of the canal sections 
remained unattended in the system in 1996. 
The relevant policy question obviously is: how to remedy the 
situation in the UPRLTS system and how to avoid this from 
happening in other countries where governments may also wish to 
stop subsidising O&M expenditures and make their agencies 
dependent on user fees? What kind of complementary measures 
are needed to avoid that such agencies follow the path of cutback 
management to the extent that their savings become harmful to the 
irrigation economies they are supposed to keep alive? 
I have the following suggestions. Firsdy, the NIA Irrigation 
Districts need to be given more autonomy to run their own affairs. 
As things stand now, the NIA 'responsibility centres' have to 
'surrender' all income to the NIA's central office that is not 
required to cover its O&M expenditures. If they would be allowed 
to keep such income, this would allow them to re-strengthen their 
maintenance capacity, for instance by buying new equipment 
Likewise, the Districts should be allowed to hire or contract extra 
people without being stopped to do so by central government 
Obviously, they can only do so if they can afford it. Such measures 
will honour well-managed systems, while poorly led systems will be 
more exposed. A starting fund should be made available by the 
NIA for each District, so that the perennial problem of delayed 
salaries and delayed payments of IAs is solved. 
Secondly, the narrow definition of financial viability needs to be 
replaced with a more encompassing one that ensures an 
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economically viable and sustainable system. At least, this should 
include significant funds that allow for sufficient canal and road 
maintenance in the systems. This would also require that the 
depreciation of the heavy equipment is included in the accounting 
system of an economically viable system. 
Thirdly, the performance criteria of the system as well as the 
NIA managers should be more oriented towards the productivity 
in the system, and especially the size of the benefited area. This will 
help the reorientation of the NIA District engineers towards 
optimising the economic benefits of scarce resources like water and 
well-maintained canals, rather than a narrow focus on fee income, 
cost reduction and the wages of the NIA staff. 
Fourthly, the NIA central office should strengthen its 
monitoring and control role. It should become much more strict 
and tough on the evaluation of the performance of the Districts 
and other systems, and replace the NIA system managers when 
results are not satisfactory. Given the political mechanisms of 
promotions and transfer, such a change is not easy to establish (see 
the following chapter). Nevertheless, it is a necessary one (for 
further discussion see the concluding chapter). 
Notes 
1 Such a 'pay-for-performance' scheme is one of the key neo-liberal 
measures propagated by bilateral and multi-lateral donor institutions and 
Western governments in the Third Wodd that are "directed at limiting the 
"damage" the public sector can do in developing countries." (Tendler, 
1997:1). In the Philippines, these pay-for-performance schemes were part 
of the conditionalities set by the IMF and Wodd Bank in the Structural 
Adjustment loans of the 1980s (Ofreneo 1987). In OECD countries, pay-
for-performance schemes are part of sophisticated and encompassing 
public sector reforms that belong to the school of "New Public 
Management' (NPM). For a discussion on NPM, see for instance Hood 
(1991) and on NPM in a Third Wodd context, see Minogue et al. (1998) or 
Manning (2001) 
2 This sub-section (and to a lesser extent the following sub-section as 
weD), leans heavily on data provided by the study of Svendsen, Adriano 
and Martin, published in 1990. Though I disagree with their conclusions 
on the effects of financial autonomy on the NLA's management of its 
systems, they provide a rich account of the historical relations between 
government and the NLA. 
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3 For the period 1982-86, the management fee provided for almost 20% 
of the NLA's total operational income. (Svendsen etaL 1990: table 41). 
4 The reasons for Marcos and international donors to finance irrigation 
development fall outside the scope of this thesis. For explanations from a 
neo-classical perspective (mosdy pointing to rice prices and rates of return 
on irrigation investments), see for instance Azarcon (1990) and Levine 
and Barker et aL (1988). For irrigation investments as the key answer to 
the Qub of Rome induced scare during the 1960s of impending food 
grain shortages in Asia, see Colombo et aL, (1978), writing for the 
Trilateral Commission. As far as 1 know, so far there are no contributions 
from a more political or political-economic perspective that directiy 
discuss irrigation investments. For more general discussions on the 
agricultural policies of Marcos, see Kerkvliet (1979), Wurfel (1983) and 
Putzel (1992). They point to the need for Marcos to stem rural unrest in 
especially the Central Luzon rice plain, and gain popular legitimisation 
through ensuring cheap rice production. Others have examined how 
Marcos built his network of cronies through the channelling of public 
money through government corporations used for private pockets (see for 
instance Manapat 1991). For a left-wing conspiracy theory arguing that 
the green revolution and irrigation was all an US-orchestrated anti-
Communist plot to extend capitalist agriculture and impoverish the 
peasantry, see Feder (1983). 
s During the martial law period, the number of GOCCs ballooned from 
around a hundred in 1972 up to over 300 in 1984 (Briones 1986). 
6 This thesis does not dig deeper into the politico-economic rationale for 
the shrinking irrigation investments in the 1980s and 1990s. Neo-classical 
contributions point to the low price-regime of international food markets 
in the 1980s, which caused both donors as well as government to reduce 
their expenditures in irrigation (see for instance Azarcon 1990). Kikuchi et 
aL (1999) argue that it was related to the inability of the NLA - as was the 
case for other Asian irrigation agencies - to attain high rates of return in 
maintaining and rehabilitating existing irrigation schemes. Explanation of 
political economists point to the adoption of neo-liberal policies by the 
Philippine government in the 1980s that cut public spending in general, 
and the agricultural food sector in particular (Ofreneo 1987). 
Intriguing but rather puzzling data have been put forward by David and 
Inocencio (2000). They show that agricultural spending in general fell in 
the 1980s, as was the case for irrigation investments. However, irrigation 
was relatively hard-hit, and did not recover at all in subsequent years, 
unlike other agrarian related expenditures in the food sector. Irrigation did 
poorly, as compared to agrarian reform, natural resource management, 
and credit and input supplies. This thus suggests that the government did 
not shift away so much from the peasant sector, but rather that irrigation 
lost its attraction for subsequent government administrations as compared 
to other agricultural investments (David and Inocencio J000:14). 
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7 Cutting staff levels was also enforced by the national government It 
promulgated the Attrition Law that prohibited the filling of vacant 
positions in government office unless approved by the Civil Service 
Commission. The law was Kfted in 1997 (FGkuchi et al. 1999: 6). 
8 This viability index does not yet include a yearly 25% income deduction 
of the District's income that is used to cover the O&M expenses of the 
office of the Operations Manager of UPRIIS as well as the Dam and 
Reservoir Division. Hence, the actual financial viability of the District is 
more problematic than suggested by the presented figures. 
9 The viability index is the ratio of the District's income and O&M 
expenses. The income is derived from fee collection, equipment rental 
and management fees (most of the equipment rental and the management 
fees are earned in NIA-funded construction and rehabilitation works in 
UPRIIS and thus are not real 'income'). The O&M expenses cover both 
personnel services as well as so-called 'Maintenance and Other Operating 
Expenses' (MOEE). The personnel services account for over 80% of the 
total O&M expenses, while the MOEE budget also mosdy covers 
operational expenses. Hence, the maintenance budget is minimal, and 
expenditures for maintenance and repairs are covered by the yearly works 
budgets that are allocated to UPRIIS. The latter budgets are subsidies, and 
thus do not have to be recovered through user fees. 
1 0 From 1982 onwards, the gatekeepers had to do canal cleaning as well. 
The average length of canal stretch assigned to them in 1982 and 1997 
was respectively 1.5 and 2.2 kilometres. 
1 1 The real number of staff hired under this item was much lower, around 
110 people only. I lack the available data to explain this. My assumption is 
that the available ditchtenders may have been expected to clean larger 
stretches of canals. Moreover, probably also staff hired under another 
(cheaper) post (for instance labourer") may have been required to clean 
canals. 
1 2 In 1997, the monthly salaries and benefits of a ditchtender amounted to 
P8659 (NIA-UPRIIS 1997), while an IA only received a monthly 
remuneration of P1400/3.5 km. The IA costs thus comprised only 16% 
of the cost of a ditchtender. 
1 3 In case the water user was tilling land owned by a landowner, bills were 
given to one of the two parties, depending on their contractual agreement 
1 4 By fixing the fee amount in kind instead of in cash, the NLA's fee 
income was more or less safeguarded against deflation. The cash-
equivalent of the value of the sacks of palay was calculated against the 
government support price for palay. This support price was regularly 
adjusted (raised) to (inter-) national rice prices. (Svendsen et al. 1990) As 
the hauling, drying, storing and selling of palay was a cumbersome and 
cosdy matter, the NLA preferred farmers to pay in cash. To stimulate 
cash-payments, farmers doing so - on time - received a 10% discount 
1 3 Formally, multiple visits were needed. A fieldworker was expected to 
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hand-over a notice to the farmer before harvest, which indicated his/her 
dues. In case of payment-in-kind, the collector could formally not give the 
official receipt of payment to the farmers straight away. He should first 
have the sacks weighed at the NIA's office. Hence, the collector was thus 
expected to re-visit these farmers to give them their receipts after 
weighing. In practice though, they often did not distribute the notice of 
payment at all and/or would only give the official receipt of payment to 
the farmer during the next round of collections. 
1 6 AMA was the legal front of MASAKA during the martial law period, an 
organisation that was affiliated with the old communist party, the PKP. 
Until the end of the 1980s, MASAKA was well-organised in especially the 
downstream municipalities of Zone 3. They were known for organising 
farm strikes by the katulong (•helpers*, tenant-labourers) and mass-actions 
during harvest time, in which the harvest would be 'stolen' from 
landowners or tenants who were considered to be exploitative. Sandujuan 
(meaning 'one blood1) was an issue-based peasant organisation in Central 
Luzon that rose during the 1980s and weakened in the beginning of the 
1990s. It was a so-called 'soc-dem' organisation, meaning that it was not 
related to the Communist Party. It focused on the issue of (lack of) 
government support to maintain the price of palay through the buying 
stations of the NFA, the National Food Authority. It was able to mobilise 
thousands of farmers in rallies, forming "human blockades' in Central 
Luzon as well as Manila (personal communication with Mr. Esquejo, 
director of 'Empowerment', a peasant organisation based in Cabanatuan 
City, Nueva Ecija). For a historical discussion of peasant organisations in 
the area, see Fegan (1982). 
1 7 Under the normal accounting procedures, the back-accounts of farmers 
were re-valued every time the government support price for palay - the 
basis of calculating fees - changed. As this government support price 
more or less followed the inflation rate, the debts of farmers increased 
rapidly over time. Moreover, an annual interest penalty of 1% was charged 
to the back-account Under the Amnesty program, both these re-
valuations as and the penalties were skipped. This discount formula 
reduced the debt by as much as two thirds of the original amount 
1 8 Another reason was that the engineers realised that these well-
connected people could not be scared so easily. It was considered to be 
difficult to actually win a court case against well-endowed farmers. Their 
political connections and their financial capacity to hire a lawyer would 
allow them to at least drag such a case for several years. Also, as the 
administration of the back-accounts left much to be desired, a good 
lawyer would have little difficulty in proving at least part of the NIA's 
claims to be flawed. 
1 9 The total ISF collection is the sum of the collection of farmer fees for a 
current season (current account) as well as back-accounts. The collection 
efficiency is the ratio of the total collected amount of fees and the ISF 
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collectibles. The collectibles ate based on the benefited area of a wet and 
the dry season, multiplied by the going ISF rates for these two seasons. 
2 0 Moreover, the NIA did recognise these shrinkage losses in the fees 
charged to farmers paying in kind. It made these farmers pay an extra 
12% who thus were charged with 56 kilos of palay for each sack instead 
of 50 kilos. This was charged to make up for shrinkage losses as well as 
for the costs incurred for hauling, drying and selling of the palay. 
2 1 Change of rainfall patterns or changes in the inflow of water were not 
part of my study. Hence, it might be that the declining trend was at least 
partly caused by agro-ecological factors. The data on the monthly flow of 
water in the river as well as the inflow of reservoir water into the system 
from 1983-1997 do not show a significant decline. However, more 
detailed data analysis - based on weekly averages and including rainfall -
would be required to get a more accurate picture. Moreover, the program 
and benefited area has risen again during the 1999-2002 period, which was 
partly caused —according to the NIA engineers - due to more favourable 
agro-ecological circumstances. Nevertheless, it still seems plausible - and 
that was also the general feeling of the NIA staff - that the declining 
trend was at least partly caused by the shrinking capacity of the NIA in 
delivering O&M services. 
2 2 Other studies support these findings. For instance, the World Bank 
pointed to low levels of O&M funding as a major cause of poor system 
performance in the Philippines (1996: annex 2, p.4). Others argued that 
the cuts in staffing and salary levels had a negative effect on the NLA's 
services (Kikuchi et al. 1999). Finally, Kikuchi's case study of a system in 
Southern Luzon — located in an area which he has been closely observing 
over the last three decades (see Hayami and Kikuchi 2000) - also points to 
the same direction. The title of his contribution is revealing: "State and 
community in the deterioration of a National Irrigation System" (Kikuchi 
e/^1998). 
2 3 The statements on the farmers' reasons for payment in this section are 
derived from qualitative interviews. The number of farmers and farmer 
leaders interviewed on the subject of fee payments and relations to the 
NLA in the three LAs were respectively 20, 35 and 15 for the first, second 
and third LA. This constitutes between 5-10% of the total number of 
farmers. 
7 
My position was very, very difficult It is a money agency. 
Everybody is after the money, there are syndicated activities, up to 
the level of assist^t-administrator. I had so many responsibilities. I 
had to solve problems leftover from my predecessors, like bids that 
were stopped. People can easily trick you, like making you sign for 
certain anomalies and then report it to the COA [Commission on 
Audit, JO] or the Ombudsman. Hence, you always feel the hot 
breath of these two institutions on your neck. Then there were the 
politicians who were pushing for certain projects, and who kept on 
calling me up. I was even threatened physically, by people claiming 
to be connected with the A.B.B. [a Marxist urban guerrilla group 
operating in Metro Manila, JO]. They did this to test me, to see how 
I would respond, and how far they could go. 
The quotation comes from the Wghest-ranking official of the 
NLA, the administrator. I interviewed him in October 1997, a few 
months after he was released from the position. I pitied him. He 
lasted only a year in the position. As the rumour goes, he was put 
in the position by President Ramos based on the recommendation 
of a powerful Senator, who happened to be close to the 
administrator's wife. Previously he was a manager of an 
Agricultural University, located in an UPRIIS-based town. 
President Ramos replaced him because, as a congressman 
euphemistically phrased it "he was a weak manager". To put it 
more apdy, I would say that they 'fried' him in Manila. He 
apparendy lacked the skills and network to survive in this arena of 
politics, dirty tricks and money.1 
As the outcry of the NLA administrator cleady suggests, the 
domain of physical works is full of politics. I distinguish between 
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and discuss three kinds of politics in this chapter the politics of 
contracting^ the politics of the allocation of works and the politics 
of quality control. 
This chapter first takes a look at the politics of contracting of 
works. Robert Wade's work on this issue in an Indian canal 
irrigation system has shown that it can be an important field of 
inquiry (Wade 1982). He found that the contracting of works was 
embedded in an institutionalised set of corrupt practices. It allowed 
the higher-level irrigation engineers to raise vast amounts of illicit 
revenue, up to thirty times their salary. As a result, Wade argued, 
these engineers were preoccupied with rent-seeking2 rather than 
with proper management of the system. 
Wade moreover showed that these rent-seeking practices were 
crucially important for the positions of the higher-level engineers as 
well. State-level politicians demanded a part of the rents generated 
by these engineers. They could do so through their control over the 
transfer of these engineers. Engineers were transferred at fixed 
intervals to another post. Each desirable post had a high price, to 
be paid to the politician in charge. Engineers who were not willing 
to pay-off these politicians would find themselves transferred to a 
remote area and/or to an area where the possibilities for rent-
seeking were limited. Hence, in this Indian case, the politics of 
works and work were interconnected. 
My findings show similarities to those of Wade. Contracting in 
UPRIIS also involved institutionalised forms of rent-seeking. High-
level politicians were involved, as they sought control over physical 
works for financial as well political reasons. As we will see, their 
power was based on their influence over the promotions and 
transfer of the UPRIIS leadership. Hence, also this case shows 
interconnections between the politics of works and work (jobs). 
The second kind of politics of works discussed in this chapter 
concerns the allocation of works. The works budget of the 4 * 
UPRIIS is limited, and so is the maintenance equipment. These are 
insufficient to keep all irrigation facilities in good condition. Hence, 
people struggle over the prioritization of the stretches of canals, 
canal roads and/or irrigation structures to be maintained or 
repaired. As we wfll see, the District Chief controls the allocation 
of works. His decisions are influenced by a number of factors. As 
in the case of water distribution, these decisions are embedded in 
the wider socio-political relations between the NIA office and 
farmers. 
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Finally, this chapter analyses the politics of the quality of works. 
In a rent-seeking environment, sub-standard quality of work may 
be the rule rather than the exception: "EEs and AEs (the Indian 
irrigation engineers) make poor quality controllers, because they 
benefit from sub-standard work" (Wade 1982: 316). I examine who 
is involved in quality control, and how well they are doing their job. 
In UPRIIS, the IAs are given a formal say in quality control. The 
IA president is supposed to sign for work done in his area. This 
section looks at the relevance of this formal change in quality 
control. 
Much of the chapter is devoted to the politics of contracting. It 
starts with an examination of the rent-seeking practices of the NIA 
engineers in the contracting of these works. It is then followed by a 
discussion of the involvement of congressmen in this arena, and 
the interconnections with the politics of promotion and transfer. 
Subsequendy, the politics of allocation and quality control are 
discussed, including the roles played by the IAs that were organised 
as part of the turn over program. The conclusions takes a detailed 
look at of the effects of the politics of works and work on the 
District's performance, and discusses some of the possibilities to 
change these politics for the better. 
Rent-Seeking 
The NIA engineers at District, UPRIIS and even national level 
make money out of the works contracts to contractors. They can 
do so because of their discretionary powers over the allocation of 
contracts, over quality control and releases of payments for works 
done. They capture for themselves a portion of the value of what 
they allocate. To be able to understand the specific ways in which 
rent-seeking takes place, I will first explain the formal set-up of 
these discretionary powers. 
Formal procedures in the allocation of works 
Funds for works in the UPRIIS system come from the national 
treasury. Every year, the NIA is allotted a works budget by 
Congress, and approved by the President, through the so-called 
'general appropriations act'. The NIA's works budget is also based 
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Central Office level 
Administrator 
Assistant Administrator 
System Management Department 
UPRIIS level Operations Manager UPRIIS 
1 Engineering and Operations 
Department (EOD) 
District level J District 1,2,3,4 
Source-. Personal communication NIA COA auditor, August 1997 
The SMD supposedly scmtinises each submitted POW and 
decides whether it will be funded. In reality, the procedures 
followed are more pragmatic. Usually, the SMD will tell UPRLTS 
beforehand the amount of funds available in the next year, as well 
as the types of works to be done. The Districts will submit the 
POWs in line with these instructions. Usually these POWs are 
indeed approved. Often however, fund releases are delayed due to 
financial problems in the central government. An approved POW 
may thus be funded up to three years after it was submitted. 
on special funds, like Wodd Bank loans or special acts approved by 
Congress to speed up irrigation development. 
To get access to these funds for works, each Irrigation District 
of UPRIIS prepares a so-called Program of Works (POWs). These 
POWs are detailed estimates of works needed in the District in the 
year to come, and the funds required for getting these works done. 
The Districts submit these POWs for approval to the Engineering 
and Operation Department (EOD) of UPRLTS. After the POW is 
approved by the head of the EOD and finally the Operations 
Manager of UPRIIS, it is sent to the System Management 
Department of the NLA's central office (see figure 7.1). 
FIGURE 7.1: Hierarchical control in the approval of POWs 
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Works can be carried out by UPRLTS itself. These are called 
force account works. In that case the NLA uses its own staff and 
equipment. The advantage of force account works for UPRIIS is 
that it allows the agency to charge a 5-10% management fee to 
these projects. This income is added to its operational budget 
Also, renting out equipment to these projects generates income. 
However, force account works are limited, as the UPRIIS 
equipment is in poor running condition. 
Private contractors thus carry out most works. When a POW is 
approved by the SMD, the NLA will start a bidding process. The 
bidding is announced publicly. A pre-bidding session is held in 
which interested contractors are informed of the details of the 
works to be done. As this is supposed to be an informative meeting 
only, the presence of the Commission on Audit (the COA, a 
controlling body of the central government) is not required. Due to 
the high amounts of money involved in the works budget of the 
NLA, the COA has placed a permanent auditor at the UPRIIS level, 
as well as in all of the four Districts. 
After the pre-bidding session the actual bidding will take place. 
Interested contractors supposedly submit their sealed bids to the 
NLA. The lowest bidder wfll get the project, provided requirements 
are met For instance, only licensed contractors are allowed to join 
the bidding. Also, contractors belong to certain classes, which set a 
maximum to the type and magnitude of the works that they may 
undertake. Lower class contractors can carry out only relatively 
small works, while the highest class contractors are large and often 
internationally operating contracting firms with a proven capability 
to carry out multi-million projects. 
The Committee on Bids and Awards of the NLA is in charge of 
the bidding process, and awards the projects to the winning bidder. 
Such a committee is found at the UPRIIS level, as well as within 
each District. At the time of the research a District committee 
handled small projects up to P250.000, while bigger projects were 
dealt with at the UPRIIS level. Table 7.1 shows the composition of 
both committees. 
Most projects involve more than P250,000, and are thus handled 
by the UPRIIS committee. However, the District is still involved. 
After the bidding, the contractor will implement the work. The 
District in which the project is carried out does monitoring of 
progress and the preparation of vouchers for payment to a 
contractor. The actual payment is done at UPRIIS level. Also, 
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formal evaluation of the work is conducted by the UPRLIS office, 
through an evaluation committee headed by the EOD Chief. 
TABLE 7.1: Composition of Bids and Award Committees at UPRIIS and 
District level during 1996-97 
UPRIIS committee District committees 
Chairman Chief EOD Operational Engineer 
Members District Chiefs Maintenance Engineer 
Administrative Officer Administrative Officer 
Chief EDD Staff member 
Approved by Operations Manager District Chief 
Witness COA auditor COA auditor 
Source: personal communication NIA-COA auditor, August 1997 
Making money: connivance between the NLA and contractors 
The above-described formal procedures differed sharply from the 
actual practices. During 1996-97, rent-seeking by the contractors 
and the NLA engineers was an institutionalised practice. It started 
during the bidding process. These were usually negotiated bids 
instead of so-called 'sealed bids'. Instead of competing against each 
other the contractors distributed the contracts among them, and 
ensured they would get the highest budget possible. An auditor of 
the Commission on Audit explains how it worked. 
If there are 4 packages of projects, the five contractors present 
during the pre-bid will divide these packages. The fifth contractor 
will get a percentage from the other four. Usually this is around 3% 
of the total budget They can do so, because they are all local 
contractors. They are organised in the Nueva Ecija association of 
contractors. This association operates like a syndicate. Contractors 
outside of Nueva Ecija are not invited. Even if they would be 
invited, they would not show up, knowing it is not for them.3 
The deals were made in the pre-bidding session, where the COA 
representative was not present, "the secret part is done in the pre-
bidding session. The contractors will then just make a showcase in 
the subsequent bidding session, to make it appear as if it is not a 
forceful bidding. Sometimes they even invite local media." (Remark 
of a COA auditor) 
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The higher-level NIA engineers were involved in these rent-
seeking practices. The going rate was that they took 10-15% of the 
budget of all projects of winning contractors. This was called an 
S.O.P., a Standard Operating Procedure. It was hardly considered 
illegal. As one of the involved contractors told me: "Actually it is 
illegal, it is a payment under the table. But it is such a common 
practice, that we consider it to be legal".4 
According to a District Chief, there is a history to the SOP 
slices. During the first years of the UPRIIS system such high rents 
were not common. 
During those days, central office would scrutinise the submitted 
Program of Works more carefully. Overpricing was then not so 
easy. UPRIIS then also deducted around 10% S.O.P. But that was 
legal. It was going to the operational budget, as savings on the 
projects. For instance, if a project was P100.000, bids of only 
P90.000 would be awarded. The rest were savings for UPRIIS. 
However, nowadays it is pocketed. 
The chairman of the Committee of Bids and Awards was said to 
be coUecting these SOPs (also called 'give-aways' or Trick-backs'). 
As most projects were too large for the Districts to handle, the 
deals were made at the UPRIIS office. The chairman was 
responsible for sharing it with the other committee members. Also 
the Operations Manager received his share, as he finally approved 
the contract to a certain contractor. 
During implementation, the contractor usually also gives 'grease 
money' to the NIA staff of the District in which the project is 
implemented. Also drinks are supplied. For instance, I observed 
that a local contractor provided two boxes of Johnny Walker 
bottles to one of the District offices of UPRIIS, to celebrate that 
he was able to get a contract. In this way, the contractor tried to 
avoid problems like the deadline to be kept, checking on the quality 
of the work, or the speediness of vouchers to be signed. Usually, 
this grease money was given to the District Chief. He might share it 
(the local term is 'chop-chop") with the Maintenance Engineer, the 
administrative officer, and sometimes the Operational Engineer. 
Finally, the COA auditor was given his share. 
I get only a little bit Usually it is 0.5% out of the SOP given to the 
NIA. I do not demand anything; it is just given to me. I could have 
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been rich by now, if I wanted to. However, I have not been given 
anything recently. The contractors know that I am going to be 
reshuffled soon, so they now take me for granted, (interview with a 
UPRIIS-based COA auditor) 
In return for the SOPs, the contractors were allowed to spend 
only part of their approved works budget There was not much 
scope for overpricing, as most of the works to be done had to 
follow standard unit costs. Each meter of road re-gravelling, or 
each length of canal to be de-silted had a standard price. Hence, 
most of the savings were found in savings on construction costs. 
These works were conducted in sub-standard manners (see further 
below). 
According to a COA auditor, contractors only used around 50% 
of the budget to cover the actual construction costs. A 
Maintenance Engineer, however, qualified this statement He made 
it clear that there were many factors involved, mostiy related to the 
risk of being caught 
/. Small versus bigprojects 
Usually, not much money was made on snail contracts. As the 
potential profits were low anyway, the risk was considered too 
high: "these small projects might become a giant problem, when 
somebody makes it into an issue." Hence, big money was usually 
made in the bigger projects, amounting to several millions of pesos. 
2. Concreting works versus de-silting or resurfacing works 
Not much money could be made in concreting works, like road 
pavements or the rehabilitation of check gates. It was difficult to 
cheat on these works. However, it was not uncommon to spend 
only 30% of the works budget on re-gravelling of canal roads or 
de-silting of canals. As a contractor-politician commented on the 
doings of one of his colleagues, who got a P6 Million contract for 
de-silting lateral canals: 
He may have spent less than a Million. He did not do much more 
than to remove the water lilies. As he finished the work just before 
the rainy season, he can easily get away with an investigation. He 
can always claim that silt from the river and canal banks has again 
clogged-up the canals. 
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3. Political motivations versus economic need 
Politicians, who wanted a good job to be done to please the voting 
population, backed some projects. Hence, main roads connecting 
villages to towns usually are done relatively well. On the other 
hand, remote and/or end-sections of canal roads are usually done 
very poody. The latter have hardly any political significance. 
The control over contracts was centralised in die mid-nineties. 
Before that period, bids were regulady done at the District level. 
Works were contracted into smaller packages. An Operational 
Engineer explained its advantage: "I prefer to work with smaller 
packages. I f the contracts are larger, only high-class contractors can 
attend the bidding. These are often politicians, or at least rich and 
well connected people. It is very hard to deal with them." Though 
officially not allowed, the Districts often organised the bidding for 
larger contracts. 
It was centralised to the UPRIIS level because this allowed an 
assistant administrator of the NLA central office in Manila to claim 
a rent from the contracts as well. Nation-wide, he demanded 1% of 
the gross works budget be given to the different regions of the 
NLA UPRIIS was forced to comply with that demand as well. 
Budget releases to UPRIIS of approved POWs were very slow last 
year. The reason was that we did not yet give the 1%. The 
Operations Manager then made the agreement with the assistant-
administrator. Since that time, bids were done in the UPRIIS office. 
The 1% is brought to the assistant adrninistrator in Manila by one 
of the engineers of the UPRIIS office and a cashier, (comments of a 
District Chief) 
TABLE 7.2: Example of rents taken from contracted works 
Function Percentage to be received 
Operations Manager (UPRIIS) 1,25% 
Chief EOD (UPRIIS) 0,75% 
Cashier (UPRIIS) 0,40% 
Regional Manager 0,75% 
Assistant Administrator 0,75% 
I indeed found proof of this allegation. Another District Chief 
was angry about the way in which the bidding process of a package 
of contracts, worth P40 Million, was handled. He took a small 
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piece of paper from his wallet, on which the 'chop-chop' 
arrangement for these works was written, and showed it to me. He 
got it from one of the awarded contractors (see table 7.2). 
Rent-seeking in the implementation of works by force-account 
was also said to be a common practice. Money was made on the 
gasoline and oil bills of the heavy equipment. The amounts 
involved were however limited. The poor running condition of the 
NIA equipment did not allow large works to be carried out 
through force account. Rent-seeking involved some of the 
engineers, and was shared with the field staff (operators and 
maintenance crew). 
The rents taken from the works budget was more than just a 
'side-line' activity. The UPRIIS works budget for 1992-97 was on 
average around P100M yeady (UPRIIS annual reports 1992-97). 
Assuming that 10% of this budget was taken as rents, it means that 
P10 M was distributed yeady. Again assuming that this amount was 
equally distributed over ten people, it means that each top-level 
manager in UPRIIS received IMP yeady. This was around 6-8 
times their yeady salary during 1996-97. 
It must be noted however, that there seemed to be large 
differences between the rent-seeking orientation of the engineers 
involved. Two of the four District Chiefs admitted to take rents, 
but they were not pre-occupied with it On the other hand, seeking 
rents seemed to be the main concern of some of the leading 
engineers in the UPRIIS office: "These guys are busy with their 
'side-lines'. They do not spend much time on their actual work" 
(comment of a former assistant administrator of the NIA). One of 
these engineers was argued to have become very rich in a short 
time-span: "When he came to UPRIIS ten years ago, he was not 
rich at all. Nowadays he owns fancy apartments in Manila, a cattle 
ranch, a night-club, and a lending institution." (comment of a 
contractor regulady taking contracts from UPRIIS). 
In short, rent-seeking was an institutionalised practice in the 
contracting of works. Making money through works seemed to be 
a rewarding strategy for at least a part of the NIA management in 
the Districts and the UPRIIS office. However, it was not only 
money that preoccupied the irrigation managers with the works 
domain. As will be shown below, their survival also critically 
depended on their doings in the works arena. 
The politics of Works and Work 
Congressional Insertions 
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The contracting arena was not as straightforward as it perhaps 
seems to be so far. The reason is that big-time politicians, especially 
congressmen, played a dcariinant role in this arena as well. This 
made life for the engineers far more complicated. Their positions 
within the NIA hierarchy were at slake. If they played the games in 
the works arena well, they might be promoted. If not, they might 
be transferred out of the area. 
Congressmen in the Philippines seek control over programs of 
implementing agencies in their congressional District, in search of 
money and votes. They need high amounts of money to finance 
their re-election campaign. The required investment in my research 
area for a congressman to get re-elected in the 1995 elections was 
around P20 Million. Among other purposes, this money is used for 
buying blocks of votes from powerful political families. For 
instance, it was a public secret that the mayor of an important 
municipality in my research area received as much as 6MP to put 
his political weight behind the re-election of a particular 
congressman in the 1995 elections. Funds are also needed to satisfy 
a continuous flow of daily requests from local citizens for financial 
support (Parreno 1998). 
Congressmen also seek control over government projects to win 
the popularity of the voting population in a more direct way. 
Formally, they are elected to legislate at the national level. The 
District system is designed to ensure that all areas of the 
Philippines are represented in the legislative process. In practice 
though, congressmen are judged by the voting population for their 
capacity in bringing government funds and projects to their 
congressional District. Bringing "home' projects puts them in the 
good graces of their constituents and earns them a place in the 
ballots come election time (Estella 1997). Gaining control over the 
NIA funds, or at least influencing the prioritization of projects to 
be carried out, is one way of doing that. 
The possibilities for congressmen to gain control over the funds 
of implementing agencies like the NIA are derived from their 
discretionary power. Firsdy, Congress is vested with the formal 
power to approve the proposed budgets for the executive branches 
of government for the year to come. The budget proposal comes 
from the President. It lists the proposed appropriations of the 
various agencies, along with the programs and projects these 
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agencies are supposed to undertake. Congress takes a close look at 
these appropriations and organises a number of hearings. The 
heads of government agencies are summoned to these hearings and 
made to explain and justify their proposed budget (Estella 1997: 
106) 
The Committee on Appropriations is the largest committee of 
the Lower House. Congressmen struggle to be on die committee 
(and its subcommittees). As the committee members hold the 
power of the purse, they can strike a deal with the heads of these 
agencies. In exchange for approval (or not making trouble), 
congressmen demand certain projects to be implemented in their 
respective area. 
Secondly, congressmen also may use their formal power to call 
for an inquiry. Though this power is given to them in 'aid of 
legislation', in practice they can demand an investigation into 
practically anything. Usually, these investigations take again the 
form of hearings. High-level officials of agencies may be called to 
Congress, to answer questions with regard to suspected 
malpractices. Often, these involve allegations of corruption. As 
heads of agencies prefer not to be questioned in such hearings, it 
again gives congressmen room for manoeuvre (Estella 1997). 
Finally, congressmen are also vested with the power to scrutinise 
and approve the nominations made by the President for positions 
in government. The powerful Congressional Commission on 
Appointments does this. High-ranking officials of government 
agencies thus seek support for their candidacy with congressmen 
on this committee, or people who are close to them. This control 
over appointments gives congressmen an opportunity to get a hold 
over government projects of agencies, whose leadership is seeking 
endorsement for a promotion. Appointments in the Philippines are 
politicised. Political influence over appointments, transfers and 
promotions go deep down into the bureaucracy (Corpuz 1986; 
Varela 1996, see also figure 7.2). 
I will show the importance of congressmen in the works arena 
by means of a case study in the 4 * District of UPRIIS. This case 
study also shows that the politics of works and work (transfer or 
promotion) are closely interrelated. 
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A case study of works 
The story of this case study starts in October 1996. At that time the 
NIA was organising a bidding process for drainage de-silting works 
to be carried out in the 4 * District, with a total budget of 13 
Million Pesos. The bidding would take place at UPRIIS level. In 
the pre-bidding session it was discussed which contractors would 
get the contracts, and for what price. The contracts would be given 
to contractors from the Nueva Ecija association of contractors. 
Many of them were residing in the area of the 4 * Irrigation 
District. Some of these contractors had clear political backing. One 
contractor was a son of the vice-governor, while another was a son 
FIGURE 7.2: Depth of political appointees in the Philippine civil 
service compared to other East Asian countries, 1984-88 
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of mayor Meneses, a brother of "Meneses Jr.', who was so active in 
irrigation water management (for further detail, see chapter 4). 
Most of these contractors were affiliated with political rivals of 
congressman Lopez of a congressional District of Nueva Ecija. 
Only one package was given to a contractor who was close to this 
congressman. 
Just before the actual bidding would take place, congressman 
Lopez called for a meeting with the NIA engineers. He summoned 
the Operations Manager and the Chiefs of the Irrigation Districts 3 
and 4 to his house. Sizeable parts of both the Irrigation Districts 
were located within the boundaries of his congressional District 
He wanted to discuss with them the Programs of Works to be 
submitted to the Central Office for the corning year. A few days 
later, he learned about the bidding. He was infuriated that he was 
not informed about it, and decided to intervene. 
Congressman Lopez made an unusually bold move. He called 
the NIA managers and told them to stop the bidding process and 
to organise a re-bidding. I f the NIA would not comply with that 
wish, he threatened to call for an investigation into the bidding 
process, and to closely monitor the implementation of the awarded 
works. Given the sensitivity of the matter, the UPRIIS engineers 
brought the matter to the attention of the highest NIA official, the 
NIA administrator in the central office. 
Only a few days later, a delegation of the UPRIIS management 
met the administrator in Manila. The UPRIIS delegation consisted 
of the Operations manager, the Chief of the Engineering and 
Operations Division, the Chiefs of District 3 and 4, and the 
Maintenance Engineer of District 4. At that time they still thought 
they could settle the matter, by striking a deal with the 
congressman. He had demanded funds for the construction of a re-
use dam in one of the towns of his District (located in District 3 of 
the UPRIIS system). The NIA administrator decided to make 6MP 
available for this re-use dam, to be carried out by the construction 
firm of a close relative. This project was indeed accepted by him, 
and construction started in the following months. However, the 
congressman still persisted in his demand that the bidding for the 
clrainage projects should be re-opened. 
The administrator decided to indeed stop the bidding process. 
In the following months all bids for District 3 and 4 were 
postponed. Several meetings took place between the UPRIIS 
management, the administrator and the congressman, to settle the 
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issue. The administrator felt mat he had to comply with the 
congressman, because of his power in Congress over the budget 
allocations to the NIA. 
He is particulariy powerful. He does not sit in the Committee on 
Appropriations, but the hearings are open for all congressmen. He 
is very talkative in these hearings and can make my life very 
difficult. It is their way of trying to ensure that certain projects are 
put into the budget Moreover, he has a point The bidding was a 
wrecked one. He says that two of the UPRIIS engineers are 
involved in contracting themselves, and would carry out a few of 
the projects, through a front I believe these allegations to be true. 
The congressman himself was indeed aware of these powers. 
I have an important say over the NIA budget I do not have voting 
power in the appropriations committee, but I can still ask questions 
in the deliberations. We can delay the budget approval, by asking 
questions on the floor. As there is usually no quorum, asking 
difficult questions can delay the approval. However, I am not like 
that; I would rather settle the issue in private. 
A year after the incident took place, the congressman recalled 
that he did not intervene because of the manipulated bidding, but 
rather because he felt that the drainage de-silting projects were not 
very useful. He believed that the NIA should put its money into re-
use dams and road concreting projects. 
I do not care about these fishy things. I understand the need for 
money of these contractors, but I at least want projects that are 
sensible. De-silting such drains is useless. They only remove the 
water lilies, or only clean the upstream parts. Re-use dams are much 
more useful. I am happy that the new administrator can see the 
need for these dams. 
Others, however, pointed to his political interests. They argued 
that he wanted to get a hold of these projects because he was 
gearing up for the 1998 elections. A contractor close to the 
congressman argued that he wanted to control these projects to 
boost his popularity. He put a lot of effort into bringing works to 
specific areas of his District, where most of the votes had gone to 
his opponent in the 1995 elections. A NIA engineer stated: 
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He Likes road concreting projects rather than drainage projects, 
because roads are useful for all of the voters. Some of the check 
gates that he wants to be constructed have no real re-use purpose. 
Their main purpose is road-crossings. 
It was also argued that he wanted control over the projects to 
patronise contractors. A contractor gave the example of the 
rehabilitation of a provincial road, which was carried out by the 
Department of Public Works and Highways, under his control. 
We are all given one kilometre. In this way he tries to please as 
many contractors as possible. He favours contractors who 
supported him during the last election. He gives more projects to 
two colleagues of mine, because he tries to bring them to his side. 
Last election they joined forces with a rival candidate. 
His political agenda also made him involve the IA leaders. At 
the end of October 1996, he invited the IA Presidents, barangay 
kapitans, and his political representatives in the villages of the 4 t h 
Irrigation District to his house. In that meeting, he explained his 
motivations of intervening in the bidding process. He claimed that 
he only wanted to protect the interests of the farmers, by carefully 
scmtinising the NIA's doings. He called upon these leaders to 
come up with requests for works to be done. He promised to do 
his best to follow up on these requests within the District and in 
Manila. 
The meeting was well attended, and brought new dynamics to 
the ways in which works were allocated. Some of these leaders 
were unhappy about it, and felt that he should not interfere with 
NIA matters. Some others were more pragmatic, and tried to 
secure projects in their area, through the support of this 
congressional representative. 
Politically, the act of the congressman was a courageous one. 
Obviously, his move to halt the bidding process infuriated the 
contractors of the Nueva Ecija contractors association. They had 
several meetings among themselves and with the NIA engineers. 
They threatened to sue the congressman in court. However, this 
threat was not taken very seriously. As he was well informed about 
the illicit deals being made, nobody would wish to have matters 
discussed in court. The bigger threat was a political one. They 
threatened to join forces and campaign against him during the 
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corning 1998 elections. He was however able to overcome these 
threats through a careful give and take strategy. Some of these 
contractors remained political rivals, while others were pacified 
through his patronage over works contracts. 
In the end, the interventions of congressman Lopez turned out 
to be beneficial on his part The larger part of the budget for the 
drainage works was re-allocated for re-use checks. It was re-
tendered in June 1997. Also another project was re-allocated due to 
his intervention. This project, worth several millions of Pesos, was 
initially intended for re-gravelling of canal roads. It was changed 
into road concreting works. The political gain to the congressman 
is that he could claim that it was because of his doings, that these 
projects were implemented in the District. 
By mid-1997, NLA engineers felt that he had gained full control 
over the NLA works budgets and programs in Irrigation Districts 3 
and 4. The NLA administrator, the UPRIIS Operation Manager, 
and the Chiefs of both Districts all frequendy visited him in his 
house, or in Manila. Before the POWs were submitted for approval 
in the Central Office, he would first take a look at them. 
A new type of alliance had been created, which in a way was also 
beneficial to UPRIIS. The NLA engineers would come up with the 
POW proposals, while he would follow up on these proposals in 
Manila. As he had a clear leverage over the NLA administrator and 
was close to some powerful politicians in Manila, he was argued to 
be rather successful in his doings. Not all NLA engineers were 
however happy with the new situation. One of the engineers 
cynically remarked: "We have to submit all POWs to the 
honourable representative of Congress. This is quite humiliating." 
According to some of the involved NLA engineers, his control 
over the projects in 1997 did also benefit him in an economic way. 
As one of them commented: 
He is frequendy using the license of other contractors as a front 
These contractors are paid off with around 3% of the value of the 
contracted works. In some cases these contractors are actually 
implementing these projects, but he is financing it and gets the 
profits. In other cases, the projects are implemented through the 
contracting firm of his relative. 
The congressman did not only focus upon the NLA. It was said 
that he also had gained control over the projects in his District of 
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the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as 
the Department of Education and Community Services (DECS). I 
did not study the importance of these controls in terms of the 1998 
election, but he was able to win these elections. In the 2001 
elections, because of the constitutional limit of two consecutive 
terms he had a close relative run, who was also able to win* 
Rumours in eady 2003 had it that this relative will run again as 
congressman in 2004, while he might try to unseat the Joson family 
by running for governor of Nueva Ecija in the 2004 elections (for 
further details, see chapter 2). 
A case study of work 
This case study of works cannot be understood without including 
the politics around high-level managerial positions within UPRLTS. 
What was at stake? In the beginning of 1996 it became clear that 
the position of Operations Manager (OM) would become available. 
The sitting OM would be promoted to Regional Director. As one 
of the District Chiefs would have a good chance of getting the 
position, it also meant that a position of District Chief would 
become available, and subsequendy the position of Operational 
Engineer or Maintenance Engineer, and so on. The above 
described struggle over the works became closely related to the 
struggle over the position of the OM and the lower positions of 
District Chief and Operational Engineer. 
Formally, the NIA administrator has the power to appoint 
people for the positions of Operations Manager and District 
Chief.3 A committee on appointments of the NIA's central office 
reviews the credentials of qualified and interested candidates. The 
review is mainly based on a performance assessment. Each year, 
such a performance assessment is carried out. A District Chief is 
assessed on the basis of criteria like the water use efficiency in the 
District, irrigated and benefited area, fee collection and the number 
of IAs organised. Each year, the results of this performance 
assessment are published. The Chiefs are ranked on the basis of 
these assessments.6 
In reality, politics comes in. For the OM position six candidates 
were considered as serious contenders. These were the Chiefs of 
District 1, 3 and 4, the Chief of the EOD department in UPRLTS, 
and two 'outsiders'. One of the outsiders was a manager of another 
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irrigation system, while the other one had a position at Central 
Office. All of these candidates were mobilising padrinos. Perhaps 
the best way to explain this point is to quote one of the contenders 
for the position, one of the District Chiefs. It shows that the 
candidates were actively mobilising their networks, seeking backing 
from different sources. They approached politicians, like mayors, 
governors, congressmen and Senators, but also Wgh-ranking NIA 
officials. I have left out the names for reasons of privacy. 
I don't like seeking support from politicians, but puta, engineer A [a 
rival candidate, JO] started doing so, so now I am forced to do it 
also. I have approached the vice-governor of province W to 
approach senator B. He is close to B. I also asked some of my 
friends to approach Mr. C (a powerful staff-member, close to the 
President). They helped him during the years of martial law. Mr. C 
already backs up engineer A, but I do not worry too much about it 
Because in this case it is senator B who counts, because he was the 
one who got the administrator the position in the first place. Also 
the mayor of town X and Y (both located within the boundaries of 
the UPRIIS irrigation system) offered to help me. One even 
dropped by at the central office, to talk to Mr. D [a ranking NIA 
official, JO]. I don't think that engineer E [another rival candidate, 
JO] will stand a good chance. He is not on speaking terms with the 
mayor of town Z, and this mayor is close to the administrator. 
(Interview held in July 1996). 
The District Chiefs also mobilised the leaders of the IA 
federations. As the hometown of the administrator was located in 
Nueva Ecija, they would visit him at his house during the 
weekends. Each of the three District Chiefs had a delegation of 
these leaders visit the administrator to promote their candidacy. 
The reason for IA federation leaders to do so was that they 
expected preferential treatment for the District, in case their 
candidate would be elected. As the Chief of the 4 * District told me: 
"1 promised them that if I would be the OM, I would ensure that 
water from Pantabangan would actually arrive in the District". 
In July 1996, the Chief of the 4 * District thought that his 
chances of getting the position were pretty high. He believed that 
the administrator would select one of the UPRIIS engineers rather 
than an outsider. This belief was based on the idea that the 
administrator could not withstand the pressure of politicians from 
his home-province backing these Chiefs. The administrator also 
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resided in Nueva Ecija. Among the UPRIIS candidates, he thought 
he had the best chances. His most serious contender was another 
District Chief, because of strong backing from the sitting OM, a 
number of mayors and especially a congressman of Nueva Ecija.7 
This congressman was widely considered powerful, as he was the 
provincial party leader of the ruling party at the time. However, 
through one of his informants the Chief had learned that the 
administrator did not want to support this particular Chief. The 
reason being that he considered this Chief part of the UPRLTS 
'syndicate'. This 'syndicate' referred to the engineers involved in 
the alleged rent-seeking activities around the works budget and 
other 'sidelines'. 
By the end of 1996 however, his chances of getting the OM 
position had become slim. The reason was that he had entered into 
a conflict with the congressman over the works issue. When the 
conflict over the works contracting started in October 1996 the 
congressman had still not made up his mind whom to support for 
the OM position. It was clear though that he would support one of 
the two Chiefs from District 3 or 4. The reason is that he already 
had developed close contacts with these two candidates, as these 
two Irrigation Districts were located within the boundaries of his 
congressional District. By the end of 1996, he had made up his 
mind. He would support the Chief of District 3. The District 4 
Chief had fallen in disgrace. 
His choice was based on their different attitude towards 
congressman Lopez. The Chief of the 4* District refused to bow 
to his demands. The Chief felt that the congressman had no right 
to intervene in NIA matters. He wanted to keep the arena of works 
'manageable', and free from the influence of powerful politicians. 
Moreover, he was a good friend with one of the contractors 
belonging to the contractors association. 
Also on a personal level this Chief and the congressman did not 
match. The congressman has an elite background. The Chief did 
not, and also did not try to mingle too much in elite circles. His 
barkada consisted of people without much power. All in all, his 
position infuriated the congressman: "I keep on inviting him to my 
house, but he does not show up. Moreover, if he does, he tells me 
not to interfere and refuses to listen to me." 
The re-bidding for the works in the 4 t h District was organised in 
April 1997. The Chief made it a point that the bidding would be 
organised in his office. He ensured that it was an open bidding, 
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because, as he put it "to avoid that only the bata of the 
congressman will get the projects." 
The Chief of District 3 took his chances. This man's oudook 
was a different one. He was widely considered to be a cow-hqy, 
which is the local term for somebody who is 'easy-going' and 'good 
in befriending different kinds of people'. Also, he mingled in the 
elite circles of Nueva Ecija. He frequendy visited the congressman 
and ensured that the congressman got what he wanted. 
In June 1997 the administrator decided on the matter. Though 
the performance of the District 3 Chief was assessed to be lower 
than that of the District 4 Chief, he still won the position. He was 
promoted as Operations Manager (officer in charge, pending 
formal approval). The District 4 Chief was transferred to another 
Irrigation District, outside of the congressional District of the 
congressman. As the actaiinistrator put it "The District 4 Chief 
lacks P.R." However, he admitted that the congressman also 
pressured him. The backing of the congressman as well as the 
eadier mentioned congressional party leader in the province, gave 
the administrator little option but to comply. 
The transfer of the District Chief was followed by a struggle 
over the vacant positions within the District It gave die 
congressman further control over the works in the District As he 
now was close to the newly appointed OM, it was clear that his 
endorsement would be crucial for these positions. The Operational 
Engineer wanted to be promoted as District Chief. He ensured that 
he did not fall in disgrace with the congressman. He frequendy 
visited the congressman in his house to discuss the POWs and the 
on-going projects. He was indeed awarded the position. 
A struggle followed for the now vacant position of Operational 
Engineer. The most senior candidate was the Maintenance 
Engineer. However, the position was given to one of the Zone 
Engineers. The reason was that the Maintenance Engineer, though 
being a godchild of the congressman, had taken sides with the 
transferred District Chief. He had become a close friend to this 
Chief, and felt bad about the way his friend had been treated. He 
refused to visit the congressman, being afraid that "I cannot 
control myself. The Zone Engineer who got the position was 
close to the recendy promoted Operational Engineer. Moreover, he 
was realistic enough to seek the endorsement of the congressman. 
After he got the position, he also frequendy visited the 
congressman to discuss the works in the District. 
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In short, this detailed account of an 'instructive event* has 
shown that the works domain is a complex arena, because of 
strong political involvement, especially of congressmen. As these 
politicians seek control over works by trying to control the higher-
level positions in the NIA hierarchy, the jobs of these engineers are 
at stake. Hence, the manoeuvring of these engineers in the works 
domain is crucial for their possibilities for accumulation of wealth 
as well as for their career. 
Congressmen as Local Service Providers 
The involvement of the congressman in the works program of 
District 4 was unprecedented. There was nothing new about a 
politician seeking control over works for financial reasons or to 
control contractors. However, these politicians were hitherto not 
involved in the decision making over the types of projects to be 
carried out, or their locations. Mayors did often show an interest, 
but the NIA District discussing the details of a POW with a 
congressional representative was a new phenomenon. However, 
there is logic to it. It was the result of a national trend in which 
congressmen got an increasingly important role in provision of 
local services. 
Champions of pork 
One important characteristic of Philippine politics is the on-going 
power struggle between local interest groups and the powers of 
central government (Doronila 1992). The Philippine polity being 
modelled after the American one, the President represents the 
central power. Vested with enormous powers, including the control 
over the executive branches of the government, the President rules 
the country and implements national policies. On the other hand, 
there is Congress. Though elected as national legislators, the 
members of the Lower House represent local interests. Elite 
political families usually operate extensive economic enterprises in 
their different localities (Gutierrez 1994). They risk large 
investments in the contest each three years to capture a 
congressional seat. They do so to control local affairs, to get access 
to government funds, and to defend their business interests in the 
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national arena (McCoy 1994). 
This power struggle is manifested in the allocation of the so-
called 'pork barrel funds'. These are government funds distributed 
among the congressmen to be spent at their discretion.8 Lacking a 
culture of party loyalty, allocating pork is an important way for the 
President to seek support from these legislators to pass his 
legislative program, approve his appointments, approve his budget, 
or implement policies. The congressmen are inclined to strike a 
deal, given the importance of these pork barrel funds, and switch 
to the party of the president after their election. As explained 
above, voters judge congressmen basically on their ability to bring 
home government funds and projects. It are the 'champions of 
pork' who are usually re-elected. 
As outlined above, congressmen need large funds to finance 
their re-election campaign. One of the experienced Senators in the 
Philippines estimated for instance that die administration would 
need P5-10 billion to finance its campaign for national and local 
candidates (Rocamora 1998: 22). Pork is an ideal instrument for 
providing these funds. In 1998, the budget secretary under 
President Ramos estimated that the legislators pocketed as much as 
45 percent of the pork barrel funds. He said that the kickbacks to 
congressmen from public works projects were on average around 
30 % of total project costs (Parreno 1998: 35). 
The pork barrel funds have become bigger and bigger in recent 
years. Under martial law, which started in 1972 and lasted until 
1986, Marcos ended the pork barrel allocations, just as he had in 
1972 abolished Congress altogether though he instituted a 
controlled National Assembly in 1980. Overt porkbarrel funding 
was re-established in the Eight Congress in 1990, which assumed 
office after Marcos's fall in 1986. Each legislator was given an 
annual allotment of P12.5M. This became known as the 
Countrywide Development Fund. They could use it at their own 
discretion for projects on infrastructure, schools or whatever else 
they considered necessary. Each congressman had their own 
congressional District Office (CDO) established. These CDO's 
were actually controlling the use of these funds. 
From 1992 onwards, the legislators really got a feel for pork 
barrel funds. Under the Ninth and Tenth Congress (from 1992-
1995 and 1995-1998 respectively) the annual pork barrel to each 
representative was increased to at least P50M. Part of the pork was 
to be distributed in a different way. It could no longer be spent 
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under the discretion of the CDO office of the legislators. They 
would be given a budget, but these were to be 'inserted' into the 
budgets of the line agencies. Hence, these congressional Insertions 
allowed congressmen to direct how, where and when these 
particular appropriations would be disbursed for projects to 
agencies like die NIA (cf. Parreno 1998: 36-37). Money-wise, pork 
was still growing. It reached 65MP annually under the Eleventh 
Congress, from 1998-2001. 
The high amount of pork, and the condition to channel this 
money through government agencies, had an important effect on 
the relation between the legislators and the NIA. As one of the 
District Chiefs commented: 
In the past, congressmen would visit the administrator, seeking 
favours. Nowadays it is the other way around. Our money-thirsty 
agency forces us to make courtesy calls to these congressmen, 
begging for money. This is happening to us, although we are a 
government corporation. It is even worse for line agencies, which 
fully depend on government funds. 
Because of the congressional insertions and the many projects 
funded through the pork barrel, congressmen increased their role 
in local service provision. In the 4 t h District of UPRLTS, there were 
indeed many signboards indicating that the congressman enabled 
this or that project By 1998, the congressman had one grader 
continuously running through his District, to maintain canal as well 
as village roads. Given these funds and the possibility of insertions, 
it became perfecdy legitimate for the congressman to sit together 
with NIA staff to discuss a POW to be submitted. The 
congressman may want to support of one of the proposed projects, 
while the NIA might seek funding. 
Finally, the fuzziness over the different sources of funds allowed 
the congressman to claim projects which were actually not his. 
He tells the farmers that he has organised the funds for the check 
gates and concreting of canal roads, but it is actually not true. The 
Program of Works were already approved and the funds allocated 
before he even heard about these projects. 
Looked at from the positive side, the pork barrel opened up a 
new avenue for local leaders to look for projects. One of the IA 
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leaders for instance was enthusiastic about the meeting held in the 
house of the congressman. 
I went back two days later, and submitted my request to one of his 
staff members. I have asked the NIA for a long time to maintain 
the canal road. It is simply not passable. I have good hopes that he 
will grant my request 
In conclusion, the role of congressmen in the provision of 
works in the countryside has increased in the post-Marcos years. 
The reason is that congressmen received increasing amounts of 
funds to be used at their discretion. As they were required to insert 
part of these pork barrel funds into the work programs of agencies 
like the NIA, an opportunity was created to increase their influence 
over the allocation of works by these agencies. We will now take a 
closer look at the allocation of works in the 4* Irrigation District 
The Allocation of Works 
As we have seen above, the congressional representative started to 
play a role in the allocation of works in the 4 * Irrigation District in 
1996. However, this section discusses the 'normal' ways in which 
works were allocated in the District before this practice started. 
The 'who-decides' question is easy to answer. It was the District 
Chief, together with the Maintenance Engineer, who allocated the 
works in the 4 * District. Formally, the Operations Engineer has a 
large role to play. Based on requests from his operational staff 
(water masters and Zone Engineers), he should prioritise. 
However, the District Chief overruled the Operational Engineer 
and kept to himself the power to make decisions. As the engineer 
in charge of preparing POWs commented: 
Yeah, it should be him [(meaning the operations engineer, JO], but 
everybody knows that if you want something to be done, you go 
direcdy to the Chief. That is why you always see barangay captains 
and IA leaders waiting in front of his office. 
Also the IA or federation leaders did not have much to say 
about allocation. Formally, they had not much to say anyway. Their 
formal influence was limited to consultation. They could provide 
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feedback to the NIA about needs and priorities, but decision-
making was still the prerogative of the NIA. The institutional 
development officer of the District organised three conferences per 
year for each Zone, in which all IA Presidents were invited. Works 
were a standard item on these meetings. 
In those meetings, the Maintenance Engineer would inform the 
IA leaders about the decisions made with regard to the allocation 
of works, and the schedule of implementation. These meetings 
were thus not used for a serious, open discussion on priorities for 
allocation. It was however a venue in which the IA leaders could air 
their concerns and criticisms with regard to the allocations already 
made by the office. In those instances where the IA leaders had a 
common concern, these meetings had an effect on decision-
making. This was usually the case when there was an urgent need 
for repair of a structure or canal dike affecting the majority of the 
leaders present. 
However, the IA leaders had too litde formal power and insight 
to actually hold the Maintenance Engineer accountable for the 
decisions of the office. The Maintenance Engineer could disregard 
their wishes, and get away with it. For instance, in one of these 
conferences he simply chose not to show up, to the frustration of 
the institutional development officer. 
He is absent because he knows these farmers are critical of the 
office. Some of them have had requests for a long time, but these 
were not granted. Others are critical of the quality of the work 
done, but what can I do about it I can report it to the Chief and 
than he may be scolded, but next time he might do it again. 
Having established that the District Chief and the Maintenance 
Engineer decided on the prioritisation of areas for works, the next 
question would be: what were their criteria? This is a far more 
difficult question to answer. They did not have a clear policy. In the 
case of water distribution, the office had a formal, publicly 
announced policy with regard to the program area, the cropping 
calendar and the order of water allocation in case of scarcity. As I 
showed in chapters 3 and 4, it did not work out that way in 
practice, but at least a policy existed. In the case of maintenance, 
however, one could only guess. 
Since much is left to the discretion of the District Chief and 
Maintenance Engineer, their prioritisation is partly based on 
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personal favouritism. People seeking works to be carried out in 
their area realise this, and thus try to be one of the favoured ones. 
I get projects for my area, by often going to the office, and insisting 
on my needs. If needed, I wfll ask them more then 10 times to help 
me out Also, I made sure that I became close to the engineer who 
is preparing the Program of Works. The office does not really care 
where the works are being done. If they would, they would go out, 
and look for the areas that really needed it They allocate just based 
on the kind of people requesting for certain works. (Interview with 
a watermaster who was rather successful in getting projects to his 
area). 
Also, some of the IA leaders had developed creative strategies to 
lure the District Chief and the Maintenance Engineer to prioritise 
their area. For instance, one of the IAs regulady invited the District 
Chief to their area. A seventy-year-old lady, who knew how to 
court the Chief, led this IA. 
I invite him to my house and I make quite a celebration out of it I 
organise a lavish lunch, and prepare his favourite foods. In return, 
he will have a hard time not entertaining my requests. I then follow 
it up in the office. 
Part of the Chiefs prioritisation is based on mamtaining good 
relations with politicians. He is frequendy visited by a barangay 
captain for a request, or gets a phone call from a town (vice-) 
mayor. He makes it a point to accommodate these requests as 
much as possible, out of a kind of 'tit-for-tat' strategy. 
This is the Philippines. It is better to keep friendly good relations 
with them. With the big politicians, I simply have to comply. 
Several pieces of my equipment are worn out, because of its use by 
them. Or they "borrow' it, and then it is returned only years later. I 
also help out the barangay leaders as much as possible. A good 
relation with the barangay captains helps us in collecting fees, or to 
operate safely in their areas. 
Sheer pragmatism is another basis for prioritisation. According 
to some NLA fieldworkers, the office prefers to maintain those 
areas that are relatively easy to maintain. Hence, the same canals 
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and roads are chosen for maintenance every year. In the case of 
resurfacing canal roads, for instance: 
Only a little bit of gravel is needed in case the road is re-gravelled 
regulariy. This allows you to pass inspection easily. However, for 
roads that have not been maintained well, even a foot of gravel 
would not be enough. The gravel sinks in the mud, and you cannot 
see it anymore. 
Fee collection also plays a role in the Chiefs allocation practices. 
At least that is what he wants LA- and village leaders to believe. 
Whenever he is requested for support for maintenance or 
rehabilitation, he makes it a point to ask for higher fee collection in 
return. The involved engineers often say that well-paying areas are 
in return the best served areas in terms of works. However, as was 
explained in the case of water, a record of high fee payments is the 
result of good relations with the office, rather than an explanatory 
factor in itself. 
FIGURE 7.3: Comparison of canal road qualities between Zone 2 and 3 
BPoor 
M Moderate 
• Good 
A comparison between the quality of maintenance in Zone 1 
and Zone 2 illustrates this point. It was widely believed by farmers 
and LA leaders that Zone 2 got preferential treatment by the office, 
in terms of works. The LA leaders as well as some of the involved 
engineers argued that this was only right, given the high collection 
payments of Zone 2. To verify the quality of maintenance, I made a 
comparison of the condition of the canal roads in both Zones. For 
each level (lateral, sub-lateral and sub-sub-lateral) I took a random 
sample of five stretches of 200 meters, which I visually inspected 
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by motorbike. The results are shown in figure 7.3. It shows that the 
canal roads in Zone 2 are indeed better maintained.9 
I do not believe however, that higher fee payments in Zone 2 
explain this difference. As was the case for water distribution (see 
chapter 4), particulady close socio-political relations between the 
NIA office and Zone 2 offer a more probable explanation. Also 
the political and economic interests of the engineer of Zone 2 again 
play an important role (see chapter 4). He put a lot of effort into 
following up on the maintenance needs of the Zone in the office. 
Also, he ensured that the well-organised and active IA leaders in 
this Zone would do the same. 
A rather sad case study of the maintenance problem of a Zone 1 
IA might further prove this point This IA is located in the mid-
stream part of Zone 1, just outside the boundaries of the Province 
of Nueva Ecija. Hence, it did not get any political back up from the 
powerful mayor of the town in which also the NIA District office 
was located. Consequendy, this IA was 'on its own'. The President 
of this IA put a lot of effort into water management, fee collection, 
and getting works to the area. His personal interest was, apart from 
water, mainly to get a canal road along a sub-sub-lateral in his area 
fixed. 
This canal road was hardly passable, but vital to many people. 
Over the years, a si&o (part of a village) had emerged along this 
canal road. It was vital to this sitio, as it was the only road that 
connected their houses to the larger barangay road. Due to the 
poor condition of this road, they had to pay high fees to the 
labourers hauling harvested rice to their house or to the market. 
Also, school fees were higher, as tri-cycle drivers demanded higher 
payments for traversing this road. 
As the house of the IA President was located along this road, he 
badly wanted it to be fixed. Actually, it was his main reason to 
become IA President. The request to maintain this road was 
already put forward by the watermaster since the beginning of the 
1990s. When the IA President took his position in 1994, he did not 
at first dare to approach the Chief: "I felt I had no reason to 
approach him. I didn't do anything for the NIA yet". After three 
cropping seasons, he felt the time had come. He had done his very 
best, and fee collection in his IA reached a high 70-80% of the 
collectible. Unfortunately, his requests to the Chief resulted in 
vague promises only. 
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Then, the good news came: the NIA would take care of the 
road. It would be done through the force-account. As the NIA 
lacked funds, the LA was requested to shoulder the costs of 
gasoline and the food of the driver. Unfortunately, only a part of 
the canal was repaired. The road was in such a bad shape that the 
dump trucks could not pass it. After almost a decade, and despite 
good ISF payments, the canal road was sail in a bad shape. At the 
end of 1997, the morale of the IA President had become very low. 
He was about to resign. 
In short, the Chief normally controls the allocation of works in 
the District The role of the IAs are limited. The Chiefs decisions 
are based on a number of considerations. One of them is that 
works are an important instrument for the Chief to establish 
friendly relations with political leaders in the area. Moreover, the 
areas with the strongest socio-political clout towards the office are 
prioritised. I will now turn to die third type of politics of works to 
be discussed in this chapter, i.e. the politics of quality control. 
Quality Control 
The quality of the works carried out was affected by the rent-
seeking practices discussed earlier. Sub-standard work was the rule 
rather than the exception, though there were big differences in the 
degree to which the works fail to meet standards. As was explained 
above, highly visible and/or politically motivated works were done 
relatively well. Works carried out primarily for maximising rents 
(usually in remote parts of the system) were done poody. 
Consequendy, the beneficiaries of these works were full of 
negative sentiments on the quality of these works. On the one hand 
the NIA field personnel, the barangay kapitans and/or the IA 
Presidents were satisfied with the fact their area was prioritised for 
works to be executed. On the other hand, they believed that 
something 'fishy' was going on, resulting in poor construction or 
maintenance. 
During the time of my fieldwork, works were carried out on de-
silting, road re-gravelling and rehabilitation of check-gates. Most of 
the complaints were about road resurfacing. IA Presidents and 
barangay kapitans complained that the gravel put was too thinly 
spread. The quality of the other works was not necessarily better, 
but road re-gravelling is easily monitored. People count the number 
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of dump trucks loaded with gravel that are delivered to the area. 
Moreover, the consequences of poor road re-gravelling is direcdy 
felt, unlike for instance canal de-silting works. 
The primary actor for quality control was - and still is - the 
NIA. The District Office supposedly checked the progress of the 
works done, before they sign a voucher for payment to the 
contractor. Moreover, die quality of implemented works was 
supposedly checked by a delegation of the EOD department of 
UPRLTS, before full payments were released. In reality though, the 
quality was not strictiy controlled, nor followed by harsh sanctions 
in case of poor performance. Rent-seeking and connivance 
between the engineers and contractors stop these controls from 
being tight 
The role of the IAs in quality control was limited, and was 
moreover still under negotiation. The institutional development 
department of UPRIIS wanted the IAs to be given a formal role in 
quality control. The signature of the IA President for a job well 
done was to become mandatory. Without it, contractors would not 
be paid. However, it was not formalised. The signature of the IA 
president was not a legal requirement of the Commission on Audit 
The Institutional Development Department of UPRIIS also 
wanted the IAs to be provided with a copy of the POWs, as well as 
with a copy of the contract with the contractor. In that way, they 
would at least be informed about what was supposed to happen. 
Some of the NIA engineers were in favour of formally involving 
the IAs in quality control. One of the arguments was that this 
measure would lessen complaints, as they would better understand 
the limitations of the works to be done. The engineer in charge of 
preparing POWs gave the following example. 
We got complaints of two IA Presidents about the re-gravelling 
works. I can understand these complaints, but they are not valid. 
Before, the standard used for re-gravelling was 2 to 3 inches. The 
recent contracts stipulate that it only should be one inch. Moreover, 
we have allowed the contractors to deliver fewer trucks to areas far 
away from the H-way. Instead of 18 trucks/km, only 15 truckloads 
are required. Otherwise they will lose money. Farmers do not know 
about these details, that is why they complain. 
Both the Maintenance Engineer and the District Chief however, 
felt that the IA's role in quality control should remain limited. They 
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did not like the idea of making the signature of the IA President 
mandatory. The District Chief argued that he cannot command an 
IA President to do the checking, as he has no hierarchical control 
over them: "they are farmers, they are not always present. I cannot 
expect them to check on the delivery of trucks for a whole day. I 
can however tell my water masters to do so." The Maintenance 
Engineer had a similar line of reasoning, though he was bolder 
about it. 
I have experimented with these countersignatures, but I am not so 
happy about it The contractors complain about it, as they feel they 
have a contract with the NIA, which is legally true. Why do we 
need this in the first place? What is wrong with my men checking 
the works done? Can we not trust the water masters and the Zone 
Engineer? 
In practice, the IAs did not have a large say in quality control. A 
few particulady outspoken IA Presidents or barangay captains were 
able to seize the opportunity of signing for deliveries to raise their 
voice. In general however, the IA leaders were still taken for 
granted. Given the fact that the works arena is about rent-seeking 
and involves high-level struggles between politicians, contractors 
and the NIA leadership, it is hard to imagine the IA leaders really 
making a difference. 
Conclusions 
This section mainly concludes on the politics of contracting and 
the related politics of promotion and transfer. It tries to carefully 
outiine the extent to which the domain of works and work have 
become politicised and the subject of rent-seeking. It is compared 
with the findings of Wade (1982) on an Indian system. I do so, 
because the detail of his analysis allows for such comparison. Also, 
his article is well known within the international irrigation 
'community'. 
This concluding section starts by pointing out the various ways 
in which the politics of the works domain negatively affect the 
irrigation management of the 4 t h District of the UPRIIS system. It 
continues by showing why the situation in UPRIIS is far less Trad' 
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than the Indian case analysed by Wade, and I then sketch a few 
possibilities for positive change. 
My analysis of the works domain in UPRIIS shows similarities 
to that of Wade. Like in his case, rent-seeking is an institutionalised 
phenomenon in the contracting of works in UPRIIS. It allows the 
higher-level engineers to raise illicit incomes from these rents that 
may be several times higher than their salaries. In line with Wade, I 
found that higher-level politicians (especially congressmen) play 
important roles. They seek control over works for financial reasons 
(rents) as well as political reasons (source of patronage, and 
controlling contractors). Finally, as is the case in Wade's study on 
India, I found that these politicians can control works through 
their power over the appointments (promotion and transfer) of 
high-level NIA engineers. The politics of works and work are 
interconnected. 
It is however important to draw the conclusions in a careful 
way. Wade's study - and later on the rent-seeking analysis of 
Repetto (1986) - have contributed to the mistrust in international 
policy discourse towards irrigation officials and irrigation agencies 
in general (cf. Tendler 1997). Too easily to my liking, Third Wodd 
irrigation agencies are branded as nothing but corrupt. A small 
anecdote may stress this point One day, I was in UPRIIS amongst 
a number of NIA fieldworkers and engineers who were busy with 
bringing scarce water to tail-end areas. Some of them had been 
working several nights in a row, using their own vehicles due to the 
lack of NIA funds. I then had a phone call from a foreign irrigation 
expert, living in Manila. On the phone he casually commented: 
"yeah, UPRIIS is all about SOP". 
This anecdote shows that such cynical lines of reasoning are 
incorrect. UPRIIS irrigation management is not 'all about' using 
public office for private gains. There are a lot of NIA workers and 
engineers in UPRIIS - earning less in a year than international 
irrigation experts make in a couple of weeks - who are struggling 
to make the best of it. The analysis is of course important for 
policy making. If the situation would indeed be 'all about" rent-
seeking, the situation would be totally hopeless (and if believed to 
be true, it makes you wonder why international agencies like the 
ADB and the WB keep on funding the NIA). My analysis is that 
the situation is pretty serious, but not beyond hope. 
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The negative corisequences of the politics of work(s) on irrigation 
management 
The first negative consequence is that maintenance and repair 
works suffer. Money channelled to private or political pockets 
cannot be put to productive use in the form of diesel-oil, concrete 
or steel. Moreover, the engineers make poor quality controllers 
because they benefit from sub-standard work. This, in turn 
negatively affects the productivity of the scheme, and — as silted 
canals mosdy hamper tail-end areas - also the equitable distribution 
of water. It is likely that it also affects the amount of fee collection. 
One of the arguments used by farmers to pay only a part of their 
dues, is that they are only partly satisfied with the NIA's services. 
As only a part of the required gravel is put on the roads, and only a 
part of the silt is removed from the canals, this argument is a 
legitimate one, and thus not easily countered by the NIA collectors. 
Secondly, the politics of works and work take up time, energy 
and money from the involved actors that cannot be put to 
productive use in the management of the system. This is what 
political economists call the TJirecdy Unproductive, Profit-seeking' 
(DUP) activities (Bhagwati 1982). They are unproductive because: 
"these activities do not produce goods or services and - as they 
actually use resources - they result in a contraction of the 
availability set open to the economy." (ibid.: 989). I did not quantify 
the resources put to use, but I believe them to be significant. 
What do these DUP activities - or DUPE activities as Bhagwati 
ironically calls them - involve? Frequendy one could find a NIA 
office window closed with curtains because of a secretive meeting 
with a visitor - mosdy a contractor. Engineers were active 
members in brotherhoods that were considered conducive for 
networking. People were regulady throwing parties to entertain 
superior officers, discuss tactics and court high-level politicians. 
They had to attend the parties of others, giving expensive presents 
in case the celebrant was potentially important to them. 
Finally, there is the unproductive energy put in reproducing a 
system that on the one hand ensures that people are accountable 
for the rent-seeking deals being made, while on the other hand it 
should ensure that secrets do remain secrets. This requires complex 
accounting procedures as well as complex and time-consuming 
tactics of courting and threatening allies and enemies.10 
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A third important negative consequence of rent- and position 
seeking is that it partly undermines die upward accountability of 
NIA engineers towards superior officers. To put it more precisely, 
the upward accountability criteria partly depart from those needed 
for a good operation of the irrigation system. Performance is 
measured in terms of somebody's capabilities to acquire rents, to 
befriend politicians and to keep one's mouth shut, next to — or 
instead of - areas irrigated, fees collected or the number of IAs 
being organised. As the District and UPRIIS engineers are tied to 
political backers and higher-ups that seek rents rather than 
irrigation performance, it thus undermines a proper orientation of 
the engineers involved and the merit system to function. 
In addition, this also weakens the possibilities of farmer leaders 
and NIA workers to make the engineers accountable for their 
doings. Being allied to high-level politicians or higher-ups in the 
NIA hierarchy, such engineers will for instance not easily be 
threatened by complaints of fieldworkers or farmer leaders about 
their poor performance evaluation reaching the NLA's central 
office. 
A fourth, and perhaps the most important negative consequence 
is that these rent- and position-seeking activities undermined the 
commitment of the NLA work force. Though not always aware of 
- or interested in - the details of these activities, they most certainly 
were aware of the general mechanisms at work. They felt being left 
alone in the field, as their leaders were busy with the DUP 
activities. They wondered why they should suffer the hardships of 
their work, as their superiors were involved in 'fishy things' and 
getting richer in the mean time. 
Also, it increased the opportunities for shirking behaviour, as 
their superiors were not all and not always 'on top of them', trying 
to manage the system in the best way possible. Finally, it hampered 
the moral claim that these leaders could put on the rank and tile to 
work harder, as the morality of their own activities was being 
questioned. In short, the DUP activities stood in the way of 
effective leadership and the reproduction of high levels of work 
morale and 'esprit de corps' among the NIA work force. To a 
lesser extent, the same is true for the extent to which IA leaders 
were inspired to carry out their largely voluntary work. 
A fifth and final consequence is that it hampered the emergence 
of transparency in the allocation of works throughout the District, 
and the involvement of the IAs in the control of the quality. I f it 
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would be transparent, NLA workers and farmer leaders would feel 
entitled to certain allotted works and would thus be strict on its 
quality. The examined mode of conduct avoided such strictness. As 
work allocations were a favour of the District Chief rather than an 
established right, one might jeopardise future allotments by 
pushing too hard for good quality works. As shown in the chapter 
transparency and quality were embedded in wider socio-political 
relations between the NLA and the different irrigated areas. Hence, 
the extent to which one expected and could demand good quality 
differed between the different municipalities and villages of the 
District. 
All in all, these five points show that the negative consequences 
of the politics of work(s) on the quality of irrigation management 
are indeed pretty serious. These are of course also not easily solved. 
Nevertheless, the situation is not hopeless and certainly not as bad 
as the situation described by Wade (1982). 
A comparison to Wade's findings and starting-points for change 
The institutionalised patterns of rent-seeking described by Wade 
are more serious than those operational in the case of UPRLTS. 
Firsdy, illicit rent-taking was standardised in Wade's case. 
Engineers were entided to an automatic 1, 2 or even 5% slice of 
budgets, while this was not the regular practice in UPRIIS. 
Secondly, another difference is the extent to which rent-taking 
involves the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Wade shows mat rent-
seeking interconnects the higher and lower levels of the Indian 
irrigation bureaucracy. The Indian 'supervisors' - who are at a level 
equal to that of a UPRLTS Zone Engineer or watermaster - are 
active 'partners in crime'. In the UPRLTS case, rent-seeking 
involved a relatively small group of people, the lowest level being 
the Maintenance Engineers in the Districts. 
Although not easy to do as the people involved are the people in 
power, the small size of the group involved makes it a situation that 
is amenable to disciplinary measures from the NIA's central office 
(see the epilogue for an example). In the Indian case discussed by 
Wade, the level of institutionalisation would make such measures 
far more difficult to enforce, and if implemented, would probably 
not change very much. 
The politics of Works and Work 283 
Moreover, it was shown that there were differences in attitude 
among the people involved in rent-taking as well. While some 
indeed seemed to be pre-occupied with money making, other 
engineers found other things in their professional life to be more 
important. I have given several examples of ranking engineers who 
did care about the quality of the NIA's services. The Chief of the 
4 * District chose to fight the political intrusion. If he had gone 
along it would have brought him an extra share of the works 
budget He was not promoted and even transferred, but still he was 
willing to fight. There were different factions within the UPRTIS 
leadership. One of the important dimensions of these factions was 
the extent to which rent-seeking and political backing should be 
allowed to guide their behaviour. 
In addition, the willingness to seek rents and connive with high-
level politicians is not sufficient to make a career as a UPRIIS 
manager. One should be a qualified and a capable manager as well 
(cf. Varela 1996). This is partly because the merit system of 
promotions may be seriously undermined, but has not lost all of its 
importance. Ranking high on the performance-rating list did matter 
in the struggle for die position of Operations Manager. Moreover, 
the jobs of District Chiefs or an Operations Manager are 
demanding jobs. People who lack well-developed management 
capabilities would have a hard time to survive in the position (and 
would thus also not be very good rent-seeking allies of colleagues 
or politicians). It even seems to be plausible to assume that rent-
seeking environments demand better skilled managers, as it makes 
management (e.g. the management of accounting) a far more 
complicated activity. 
A third important difference is the extent to which rent-seeking 
was at work in the different aspects of irrigation management In 
Wade's case, rent-seeking interconnected the domains of physical 
works, water management and fee collection. He found that 
payments of bribes and extortion of water users strongly structured 
water management Moreover, this money contributed to the illicit 
funds taken from physical works, and were both used to finance 
the pay off of high-level politicians demanding such money in 
return for transfer or promotion to lucrative rent-seeking position 
(though it must be said that this was not really confirmed by 
subsequent research, see for instance Mollinga 1998). 
In the UPRIIS case, rent-seeking was largely limited to the 
works domain. Rather innocent, petty types of corruption were 
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present in fee collection as well as water management However, 
these were neither related to the rent-taking in the contracting out 
of works to contractors, nor to the mechanisms of transfer and 
promotion. In other words, there were two kinds of 'wodds' in 
irrigation management On the one hand, there was the 'covert', 
back room and 'business-like' wodd of powerful men and 
politicians struggling for works contracts and engineering positions. 
On the other hand, there was the 'open', and if you like more 
sympathetic wodd of farmers, NIA workers and local politicians 
struggling for water, fees and salaries. 
Above, I discussed how the particularities of this closed wodd 
negatively affected the other domains of irrigation management. 
However, the argument does of course go two ways. The District 
and UPRIIS managers had more on their minds than just managing 
the works domain. If they want to survive in office, they need to 
address water management problems. I f they do not, they have to 
face the anger of farmers (or their political representatives) in need 
of water. Similady, they need to ensure that the office collects 
sufficient irrigation fees to satisfy the salary demands of their 
personnel. Hence, there are pressing issues to attend to, in addition 
to looking for rents in the works domain. 
These pressures also limit the extent to which rents can be 
raised. As discussed, sub-standard works are accepted only up to a 
certain level. Going beyond this level enrages farmers, and might 
lead to exposure and charges and/or low levels of fee payment. 
This in turn would create turmoil among the rank and file. Hence, 
as the NIA workers as well as the farmer leaders do not benefit 
from the rent-seeking practices but do experience the negative 
consequences, they put a check on the extent to which rent-seeking 
can jeopardise field operations. 
What are the possible ways for improvement of the situation? 
One way would be that enlightened leadership at the NIA central 
office investigates existing practices, pinpoints the main culprits 
and takes disciplinary action. The epilogue shows that something 
along these lines indeed happened in UPRIIS in recent years. 
Employees unions might be another force for positive change. 
Union struggle was responsible for the ousting of a number of 
particulady corrupt managers in the NIA central office during the 
term of President Aquino (Gaffud 1994). Also at the District level, 
the NIA-AES (employees union) did put a check on the 
possibilities for favouritism in promoting workers by the engineers. 
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However, they neither looked into the issue of contracting, nor did 
they show sufficient unity to strongly push for a performance-
oriented candidate during the election of the Operations Manager. 
A third identifiable force pushing for change might be die 
federations of farmers demanding better services. However, this 
will not happen easily. I think it would require changes within the 
NIA to allow such change to happen, or the intervention of a third 
actor (for instance an NGO or PO organising farmer leaders). As 
things stand now, farmer leaders were tied to the particularistic 
interests of their villages, rather than to the interests of the 
performance in the District at large. 
Let me end this chapter with a rather depressing conclusion: the 
wider Philippine socio-political context has been moving in a 
direction that makes positive change in UPRIIS increasingly 
difficult. As explored in this chapter, people do not search for 
rents, contracts and engineering positions simply because they like 
to get rich: it ties into the very heart of the Philippine political 
system. These rents fund the re-election campaigns of 
congressmen, and their control over contracts give them the 
necessary tools for patronage over contractors and farmer leaders 
in return for vote support. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the costs of election campaigns 
increased sharply, mainly due to massive vote buying. Hence, it 
increased the need for high-level politicians for control over money 
dispersing agencies like the NIA, in order to earn back their 
election costs and to finance a new campaign. In addition, 
congressmen have been able to squeeze ever-increasing pork barrel 
funds from the national budget, and use it as means of political 
patronage in their Districts. As this went along with a decline in the 
budget of agencies like the NIA, this has increased the hold of 
these politicians over public works projects in their areas. 
As a result, the allocation of NIA works in the irrigated areas 
became further politicised as farmer- and LA leaders started to visit 
the local congressman rather than the NIA engineers to get their 
road or canal fixed. Moreover, it increased the hold of these high-
level politicians over the promotion and transfer of the NIA 
engineers. An increase in NLA budget and a decrease in pork-barrel 
funds would be the start of a process that could turn things around. 
However, as this requires legislation of people that are directiy 
benefiting from the present modes of conduct, it is difficult to see 
who will press for such change, and in what forum. 
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Notes 
1 A retired general replaced the adrninistrator. This general was close to 
the President himself, and his rule promised to be a very different one. He 
was certainly not taken for granted. Only a few months after he took 
office, he already decided to reshuffle as much as a third of the NLA 
leadership in the country. Using retired colonels as 'consultants' in the 
evaluation of programs and projects of UPRIIS, he quickly made it clear 
that he was to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, his appointment 
coincided with the end of my fieldwork. Hence, 1 was not able to see the 
dynamics created by this 'tough' ruler. See the epilogue for some general 
insights into the large impact of his doings. 
2 Rent-seeking is defined here as the search for illegitimate 'rents' on the 
part of actors like politicians, public officials and contractors. L prefer the 
concept of rent-seeking above a concept like 'corruption'. Corruption has 
a negative connotation to it, while rent-seeking is a more analytical and 
neutral term. More importandy, 'rent-seeking' is a verb, and points to 
practices and strategies. Corruption, as a passive noun, seems to be simply 
there. People are corrupt or whole cultures are branded to be 'corrupt*. 
Rent-seeking, on the other hand, suggests that it is reproduced by people's 
doings and thus fits more into an actor-oriented approach. 
The term 'rent" is derived from economics and refers to the "difference 
between the actual return obtained from bringing a resource into 
productive use and the minimum return at which the owner would bring 
the resource into use of that resource were in larger supply (Moore 1989: 
1744). Lt concerns circumstances in which market supplies are deliberately 
held to be limited by human action Eke in this case the existence of 
negotiated instead of open bidding procedures for the distribution of 
UPR1LS work contracts among contractors (see further below). 
3 This chapter presents a high number of quotations of UPRLLS actors 
interviewed during the 1996-97 fieldwork period. For reasons of 
readability, the exact months of the interviews will not be mentioned. 
4 NLA, Eke every bureaucracy, has a number of legal standard operating 
procedures that staff is required to carry out in defined situations. Hence, 
calling an illegal activity a SOP refers in a cynical way to what officials 
actually do, in relation to what they are supposed to do according to 
bureaucratic rules and regulations. Taking SOPs is a common term 
outside the NLA as well. For instance, it is a pubEc secret that mayors are 
being paid a 10% SOP for projects funded through local government 
funds. The mayor is to share this 10% with barangay captains. For other 
examples on SOPs see the different cases studies in Coronel (1998). 
5 Lower positions come under the jurisdiction of the regional manager, 
though the adrninistrator may still intervene. The adrninistrator and 
assistant-administrator of the NLA are to be appointed by the executive 
secretary and the President, but to be approved by Congress. 
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6 The same procedure is applied to all positions, from the Operations 
Engineer down to the level of the ditchtender. The names of top ranking 
NIA employees are published in the UPRIIS yearly reports. 
7 Readers who are familiar with Nueva Ecija might wonder why governor 
Joson was not one of the key backers. Important positions in the province 
usually need the blessing of the Joson family. The position of Operations 
Manager - given the access to the large works budget - was undoubtedly 
one of the most important administrative positions in the province to be 
controlled by the governor. However, these were unusual times. President 
Ramos had his political rival governor Tommy Joson put behind bars in 
Manila, for the cold-blooded killing of mayor Peres of Cabanatuan Qty in 
April 1995. Although one of the brothers of Tommy had become the 
governor, this had weakened the political power of the Joson family. As 
President Ramos would have to endorse the OM position, having the 
Josons as your backers during those days was considered a liability rather 
than an asset 
8 The derogatory term 'pork barrel' is generally used to indicate that these 
funds are like magnets of greed. The term is derived from: "a practice 
during the pre-Civil War days in the United States when, in periodic fits of 
generosity, masters would give their black slaves salted pork in barrels. 
(...) Being hungry, oftentimes slaves would rush upon the pork barrel, in 
which each would strive to grab as much as possible for himself (...). 
Members of Congress, in their rush to get their local appropriation 
items... behaved so much like Negro slaves rushing to the pork barrel." 
(Parreno 1998:34). 
9 Using data of the NIA District office on the Works conducted in both 
Zones over a number of years could have made a more reliable 
comparison. However, works was a sensitive issue. I therefore did not 
push too much to get these data. Moreover, it turned out that these data 
were not well filed by the NIA The Programs of Works were filed, but 
these do not always stipulate the locations of the works to be executed 
(only the length of canals and unit costs). I therefore decided to make a 
visual inspection of the canal roads. 
1 0 For a beautiful example of the complexity of book keeping under such 
circumstances, see the final report of the Dutch Parliamentary inquiry 
committee into the highly institutionalised rent-seeking practices of Dutch 
contracting firms during the 1990s (Dutch Parliament 2002) 
8 
"Do you want the real McCoy?" Regularly, this was the rhetorical 
question of one of the engineers of the 4 t h District of the Upper 
Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation System (UPRLIS) in Central 
Luzon, the Philippines. He meant that things were not so easily 
explained. We would sit down, take a cup of coffee, and he would 
then start to unravel the nuances of a certain issue. Another key 
informant would now and then make me clarity how (well) I 
already understood a certain issue. He might then say something 
like: "well done, you now understand 60% of it. You better talk to 
Mr. X and Y, so you might reach 80%". 
With the help of such informants, this book shows the real 
McCoy of irrigation management in a large-scale canal system, 
managed by the National Irrigation Administration (NLA). It may 
not reach a 100% level of understanding, but 18 months of 
intensive fieldwork allowed me to understand a good part of it. It 
unravels the real problems of real people and takes a close look at 
how people organise themselves, how they manage an irrigation 
system and deal with reform, and why they choose to do so. 
Moreover, it examines how these practices are embedded in wider 
state-society relations. 
This concluding chapter starts with drawing together the 
conceptual insights and empirical findings of this book. The first 
section does do so by discussing the need for an integrated 
perspective on irrigation management. It is followed by a more 
straightforward discussion of the central research question of this 
book: how did managerial reforms like rum over, downsizing and 
financial autonomy affect the everyday politics of irrigation 
management in the District studied. I then discuss why my findings 
deviate substantially from the progressive global image of 
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Philippine irrigation management reforms. The chapter ends with a 
number of recommendations on how to improve the management 
of Philippine large-scale canal systems. 
An Integrated Perspective on Irrigation Management 
This book shows the need for an inclusive or integrated 
perspective on irrigation management It goes beyond conventional 
analyses that make use of simpler and more exclusive models. 
Three types of integration are shown. Firsdy, irrigation 
management is about other resources than water alone. Fee 
collection and the allocation and contracting of physical works also 
shaped the dynamics of the District Secondly, the book shows the 
need to analyse irrigation management as embedded in state-society 
relationships. Thirdly, irrigation management should be understood 
as a combined sociotechnical phenomenon. More specifically, this 
book shows how the interconnections of the physical layout of the 
irrigation system with political-actainistratrve boundaries shaped 
District dynamics of water distribution. Before going into further 
detail, I will first discuss the overall perspective on irrigation 
management in this book: the focus on 'everyday polities'. 
Irrigation management as everyday politics 
This book shows the relevance of understanding irrigation 
management (reform) from a perspective of 'everyday polities'. The 
stakes in the District were high. Water, physical works and 
irrigation fees were valuable, scarce and contested resources, 
involving NIA actors, farmer leaders, local politicians and other 
influentials. These resources were the subject of power struggles, 
even involving the threat of force. Frameworks that conceptualise 
management processes in more neutral, 'powedess' terms (e.g. 
decision-making, see Nijman 1993) cannot cope with those harsher 
aspects of reality. 
Despite the usefulness of this everyday politics perspective, 
there still is a need for a richer vocabulary. The risk is that this 
perspective over-emphasises the struggles and clashes, and the 
tactical or dirty power games. That image does not do justice to the 
fact that many of the interactions in irrigation management were 
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co-operative in nature, based on mutual respect and a constructive 
if not altruistic attitude. 
The point is that both conflictive and co-operative forms of 
interaction were present in the management of the District. There 
was a fascinating mixture of conflict and co-operation, of violence 
and friendship. Apparendy, irrigation management divides as well 
as unites people. These different forms of interactions are 
interrelated. For instance, fieldworkers and fanner leaders operated 
diplomatically and carefully, and spent time and energy to create or 
maintain friendly relations. They did so also because they realised 
that conflicts over scarce water might otherwise develop into overt 
struggle or even violent clashes. 
Integration no. 1: the management of water, works and wages 
Irrigation management is often equated with water management 
Water thus ties an irrigation agency - as water provider - and 
farmers - as water users - together. Consequendy, studies 
exploring such dynamics usually focus on water distribution in the 
field. This book shows the need to broaden this perspective. The 
dynamics of irrigation management — and the relations between the 
key actors - were given shape in several, interrelated domains of 
interaction. Each of these management domains involved the 
struggle and co-operation over vital resources. This book explores 
three such domains: the domain of water management, the domain 
of physical works and the domain of fee collection. To prove that 
there is a need to look at other domains than water alone, I discuss 
the ways in which relationships between the NLA and farmers were 
shaped in the domains of physical works and fee collection. 
The management of physical works involved two major issues: 
the allocation of physical works throughout the District and the 
contracting of works to contractors. The dynamics around both 
these issues formed NLA-farmer relationships. Let me start with 
the allocation of works. 
For the NLA managers, the allocation of works was an 
important way of satisfying demands of targeted farmer groups. 
Unlike the distribution of water, they did to a large extent control 
which canals and roads would and would not be maintained in a 
given year. Hence, the allocation of works was both a cause and a 
reflection of close - and distant - relations between the NLA 
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management and the different farmer communities. Farmer leaders 
and local politicians did not just lobby for water, but for getting the 
canals or roads in their areas fixed as well. To the District Chief, 
works allocation was a means of patronage. By prioritising a certain 
area for maintenance - or by sending his equipment to construct 
for instance a fish pond of a local farmer leader or politician — he 
could develop friendly relations with local leaders and/or increase 
the willingness of farmers to pay their dues (for further detail, see 
chapters 4 and 6). 
To farmers, works were important to satisfy their demands as 
water users. Canal siltation seriously hampered water flows in 
especially the tail-end areas of the District (see chapter 3). Hence, 
whether farmers would or would not experience water stress, 
crucially depended upon the NIA's prioritisation of the canal 
stretches to be de-silted. In some areas, canals were propedy 
maintained while other areas were neglected. This affected the 
distribution of scarcity throughout the District. 
However, the interests of farmers in the allocation of NIA 
works were not limited to water. Next to water users they were 
road users as well. In especially the remote parts of villages, NIA 
canal roads were often the only roads available. For the people 
living in these areas, proper road maintenance may be more 
important than the maintenance of local canals. It greatiy 
determined the costs of hauling farm products like palay or fish to 
local markets. More importandy, it determined the daily 
commuting costs - and hassle - of children going to school. In 
some areas, roads were well maintained. In others, roads were 
hardly passable. Hence, whether the NIA was doing good or bad in 
the eyes of the farmers was significandy related to its performance 
with regard to canal and road maintenance. 
The issue of contracting - and the related issue of quality 
control - shaped relations between the NIA and the farmers in an 
indirect way. The domain of contracting and quality control was a 
back-room world involving big money and big-time politicians-a0»-
contractors. The stakes in this domain were high. It determined 
people's possibilities for lucrative contracts as well as high levels of 
illicit rents. In addition, also the career possibilities of the NIA 
engineers were at stake. Whether an engineer would stay in his 
post, would be transferred or promoted was to a large degree 
determined in the struggles of this domain of rent- and position-
seeking (for further detail, see chapter 7). 
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Fanner leaders as well as the NLA fieldworkers had little to do 
with this domain, and many were unaware of its dynamics. Still, it 
affected their relations with the NIA engineers. The more tangible 
effect was that the NIA leadership would at times pay little 
attention to the needs of these farmer leaders and the NIA 
workers, as they were experiencing great anxieties in their back-
room affairs. To acquire rents and/or to survive in the position 
required skilful manoeuvring and networking, and thus took much 
of their time and energy. 
It also limited the possibilities of farmers and NIA workers to 
hold the NIA leaders accountable for their doings, as rewarding or 
sanctioning these leaders was at least partly beyond their reach. It 
bounded the extent to which the fieldworkers would trust or could 
rely on their superior officers. They felt left alone in the field, as 
their bosses were involved in other matters. Finally, it disturbed 
efforts to make the quality control of works implemented in the 
District subject to a transparent decision-making process involving 
the farmer leaders of the IAs, the Irrigation Associations and their 
federations, (for further detail, see chapter 7). 
Also the domain of fee collection shaped NIA-farmer relations. 
Since the eady 1980s, the NIA personnel had to earn their own 
wages through the collection of irrigation service fees (ISF) from 
the farmers. This gready affected their oudook and practices. 
Collecting sufficient amounts of money to finance the wages and 
other operational expenses became a major concern. During staff 
meetings in the NIA office, collection was the key issue. During a 
period of two months at the end of both cropping seasons, so-
called watermasters, gatekeepers and ditchtenders were operational 
as full-time fee collectors. A good farmer was no longer one who 
co-operated with NIA rules regarding water management and 
helped cleaning canals, but also — and perhaps foremost — a well-
paying farmer. 
The NIA District applied and adopted different strategies to 
collect more fees from farmers and to cut costs. This financial 
concern shaped its efforts towards the organisation of farmers into 
the IAs and federations as well as the turn over of different 
management tasks towards these farmer organisations. The quest 
for money molded the relations between the NIA engineers, 
workers and LA leaders. The remuneration for canal cleaning and 
the sharing of fee collection incentives became important issues in 
the relations between these three actors (see chapters 5 and 6). 
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In short, in order to be able to understand the everyday politics 
of irrigation management in the UPRIIS District, this book shows 
that it was necessary to look into other issues than water 
management. In this case, it turned out that the real McCoy of 
irrigation management had to be understood by looking into three 
interrelated management domains: those dealing with water, works 
and wages (fees). 
The methodological consequence of this insight is that analysis 
needs to unravel the complexities of the overall management unit 
of an irrigation system, i.e. in this case the NIA District office. 
Following the actors (Long 1989) in this case means that key actors 
active in the field were also ftequendy found at the NIA office. In 
the office, they were lobbying for water or equipment to be 
brought to their area or reporting on their weekly fee collections. 
Other actors were seldom found in the field, but still created much 
of the field dynamics. They included and excluded canals and roads 
in the Program of Works submitted for approval to the NIA's 
central office. Or they plotted a tactical move in a downtown lunch 
meeting to outsmart rivals in the struggle for contracting works and 
engineering positions. 
Hence, studying how water user organisations of farmers at 
village or lateral level deal with management reforms remains an 
important research issue. However, the dynamics of such 
organisations are only well understood when their counterparts — 
the state irrigation management bodies - are fully brought into the 
analysis. 
Integration no. 2: state-society embeddedness 
Policy models in irrigation usually picture irrigation management in 
terms of the agency and the user, related to each other through 
formal rules and/or fee-for-performance contracts (e.g.Vermillion 
1991; Small and Carruthers 1991). Such models are derived from 
conventional management models that view management 
essentially as an administrative matter and define socio-political or 
cultural relations as context (Jurriens and de Jong 1989; Small and 
Svendsen 1992). Such models have practical value. They may 
picture the ideal-type goal of certain policy interventions. For 
instance, in the case of the studied District, I believe that future 
reform should be geared towards attaining a situation that is less 
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political and more administrative (see die recommendations further 
below). 
However, the danger of such models is that people start to 
believe that they actually picture reality. Or, that such a reality is 
easily attained by for instance implementing a program to organise 
farmers and train them in irrigation management issues. I f this is 
indeed believed to be true, evaluation studies will find out that the 
impact of reform was only a partial success, or that many of the 
committees became empty shells existing only on paper. As such 
evaluation studies adopt a particular mode of policy analysis, they 
cannot tell why and how reform did or did not succeed in bringing 
the planned changes. 
This book shows that such bi-polar agency - IA/user models 
are inadequate to come to grips with reality. They are reductionist 
to the point that they obscure rather than illuminate what irrigation 
management (reform) is all about The analysis in this book breaks 
out of the two-party agency-user dyad in several ways. Firstiy, it 
dissolves each of the two parties. It shows that there are conflicts 
of policy and interest within the NLA and between levels in NLA. 
Similady, on the user side, there are upstream-downstream and 
other spatially induced conflicts. 
Secondly, it is shown that the IAs are only one of the forms in 
which people organise themselves. The IAs were pre-and post-
dated by groupings formed around the logic of the layout of the 
canals and the rise of local political leaders taking advantage of 
their position in the system. Thirdly, it was shown that there was a 
wider context mvolving local and national politicians, armed men 
and contractors. All of them had their own interests to push 
through alliances with each other and with NLA officials and water 
users, and some of them have successfully penetrated the NLA 
bureaucracy. 
To come to terms with reality, it is thus required to integrate the 
socio-political 'context' into the analysis of irrigation management. 
The 'context' does not stop at the borders of a system, but 
fundamentally shapes irrigation management practices. To explore 
this embeddedness in the District studied, I make use in the book 
of the 'state-in-society' approach developed by Joel Migdal (2001). 
This approach has proven to be fruitful. Firstiy, it helped me to 
see the important - if not pivotal - role of a third actor (next to the 
water user and the irrigation agency) in irrigation management: the 
politician. Elected officials at the village and municipal level turned 
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out to be crucial actors in the allocation and distribution of water in 
the main system. Moreover, higher level politicians were deeply 
involved in the contracting of works for the District, as well as the 
promotion and transfer of the NLA engineers. 
Secondly, it allowed me to see that the irrigation bureaucracy is 
part of society. The NIA staff cannot be understood as a kind of 
Weberian state agents 'above' or 'outside' of the society they are 
supposed to serve. They are very much part of it. Perhaps 
somewhat self-evident, this was true for the NLA fieldworkers. The 
majority were locals, who were raised and lived in the villages 
where they work. The boundaries between their public and private 
life were 'blurred' to the extent that it is hard to separate one from 
the other. Their home often served as their field office. The water 
users were not just their clients but could well also be co-villagers, 
business partners, friends, faction allies or enemies, if not their kin. 
Obviously, this local embeddedness shaped their oudook on and 
behaviour in their daily work in irrigation. These people did not 
just operate at the interface of state and society; they were the 
embodiment of that interface. 
Also the NIA engineers in charge of District management were 
locals', enmeshed in the political economy of the areas they were 
supposed to serve. To see them as merely 'engineers', 'technocrats' 
or 'career bureaucrats' is to miss the point. They were locals, as the 
majority were bom or married into a family of one of the 
municipalities covered by the irrigation system. Over the years, 
these engineers developed an extensive network of friendly 
relations in their areas of work, often cemented in real and ritual 
kin relations. Many of the engineers belonged to the local elite, as 
they were part of more or less powerful families. Some of the 
engineers had developed business interests in the area, while others 
were involved in electoral struggles. Hence, to the engineers the 
irrigated areas were not just a place of work. It was a place of living 
and leisure, as well as a place to make a living, both politically and 
economically. 
Thirdly, the state-in-society perspective made it possible to 
explain local relations in terms of wider state-society structures. 
The Philippine State has been labelled as the weakest state in Asia 
that faces a strong society (Cammack et al. 1993; cf. Kerkvliet 
1998). Most of the public officials in the countryside are elected 
rather than appointed, which makes public resource management a 
highly politicised matter (Fegan 1994). Moreover, local and national 
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political families have captured much of the state's resources and 
powers. Consequendy, the NIA managers are in a weak position 
vis-a-vis local power holders. 
These specific Philippine state-society characteristics had great 
impact on the ways in which people organised themselves in 
irrigation management. The management of water in the District is 
a case in point. It was a matter of struggle and accommodation 
between NIA engineers, local politicians and farmer leaders 
representing the interests of the different areas in the District. As 
none of these actors had the permanent upper hand, alliances were 
the result. A number of such rival, spatially organised alliances 
competed for scarce water. The composition and the power of 
these alliances changed over time, mainly following changes in the 
political arena of electoral struggles. 
The binding forces of these alliances and the rules of the water 
management game were partly shaped by formal NIA rules and 
regulations and the financial-contractual relations between the NIA 
and the I As. However, other binding forces were as important. To 
a large extent these alliances were bound together by interpersonal 
relations between NIA officials, local politicians and farmer leaders, 
on the basis of political patronage and brokerage, friendship and 
kinship. Finally, the threat of force, employed by politicians and 
toughguys structured the ways in water was being managed, (for 
further detail, see chapter 4). 
This embedded state-in-society perspective is not just needed 
for academic purposes, but has practical value as well. It allowed 
me to see that the mainstream problem analysis that is behind 
management reform policies like turn over and financial autonomy 
does not fit the Philippine setting. A core assumption of 
mainstream analysis is that many of the problems in the 
management of canal systems are caused by a lack of 'downward 
accountability' of the irrigation agency towards the farmers (Small 
and Carruthers 1991). It is argued that the actors in these agencies 
are busy with pleasing central government or with filling their own 
pockets. They lack a concern for the well-being of their clients, and 
thus do not provide good services. Management turn over and the 
creation of user-fee dependent agencies are supposed to rectify this 
situation. 
This might well be true for other countries, or perhaps other 
parts of the Philippines. However, my reading of the accountability 
relations in the District do not match these mainstream ideas. The 
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NIA staff (both workers and engineers) was deeply embedded in 
the local society and was accountable towards farmers in multiple 
ways. As shown, this embeddedness gave some of the engineers 
the capacity to make the NIA turn over policies a success (see 
further chapter 4). On the other hand, this embeddedness did 
seriously constrain the NIA's capacity to enforce its policies and 
regulations. The NIA's weakness vis-a-vis local power holders 
forced it to accommodate its policies to the interests and ideas of 
the latter group. Moreover, their superior officers in the NIA 
central office in case of local conflict did not back up these local 
engineers, nor did these officers enforce local engineers to comply 
with NIA rules and regulations. 
These findings thus question the idea that non-accountable 
irrigation agencies are to be labelled as the main or sole culprit of 
problems in canal irrigation. I f I were to select a winner in a 'non-
accountability' contest, there would be good reasons to choose the 
farmers in the District rather than die NIA. Water management in 
the main system again serves as an example. Long before 'turn 
over' was introduced in the area, farmers and their political 
representatives were actively 'messing up' the management of the 
main system. They disregarded the NIA rules and regulations, 
guarded or destroyed main gates, diverted water to non-
programmed areas, and even managed to re-design the layout of 
the system. 
The least one can conclude is that the management of the 
District is the joint product of a state-in-society, and not that of the 
state alone. The managerial problems in the District are produced 
in a complex socio-political arena, in which the NIA engineers and 
workers are main actors, but together with farmer leaders and 
politicians. 
Finally, this wider state-in-society perspective is helpful to 
compare cases of irrigation management in different socio-political 
settings. For instance, the highly different socio-political contexts 
of irrigation management in the case of Taiwan and the Philippines 
may shed light on the different findings on these two (South) East 
Asian countries. Taiwan's efficient organisation of canal systems 
has been well documented. 
Central to this efficiency in Taiwan is a state-society set-up that 
is based on a tri-party relation between the water users, farmer-
controlled but highly bureaucratic para-statal managing 
organisations (called IAs) and central government. In this set-up, 
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accountability of these IAs towards the farmers is ensured through 
the responsiveness of central government to the grievances and 
needs of the water users. The powerful Taiwanese central 
government thus ensures the service orientation of the managing 
bureaucracy towards the users. At the same time, it does empower 
these IAs to take charge of local managerial affairs (Moore 1989; 
Lam 1996). 
In short, this differences in the wider state-society relations 
explain why a country like Taiwan has efficiendy managed canal 
systems, and why inefficiency and a contested order is found on 
the canal banks of the Philippines. 
Integration no. 3: irrigation management as a spatial, sociotechnical 
phenomenon 
Irrigation management should be understood from an 
interdisciplinary sociotechnical perspective (Vincent 2001). It is not 
just about people, institutions and power, because the kind of 
irrigation technologies used, and the specific designs of systems 
also shape it. This is a relevant point for social scientists as well as 
engineers. Both groups tend to treat technologies as socially 
neutral. They thus ovedook important connections between 
irrigation designs and managerial questions. 
One of the important ways in which irrigation systems shape 
irrigation management is through its spatial layout. The layout of 
the system structures farmers' access to water as well as the 
organisational processes in water management. The length and 
location of canals and the location of water division devices 
determine to a large extent which farmers and villages have good 
access to water, and which do not. The "head-tail' problem in canal 
irrigation seems to be unavoidable. Volumes of water are bigger in 
the head-ends of systems, and for head-enders it is relatively easy to 
take water from the canals in quantities and at times that go beyond 
their allotted volume or time-slot. As has been shown in the case of 
the District, fierce struggles over water between head and tail-
enders can often be observed in canal systems. Hence, much of 
irrigation management is about trying to deal with the spatial 
characteristics of the system. 
The spatial layout of canal systems is not just relevant for 
questions of management In the case of Sri Lankan settlement 
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schemes, rapid processes of socio-economic differentiation 
emerged between head-end and tail-end settlers. This happened not 
only because of unequal access to water. Contributing factors to 
these processes were that the systems were first developed and 
used in the head-ends, and that municipalities, government 
resources and support to farmers were all concentrated in the head 
reaches of systems (Moore a al. 7982). 
Similar processes were found in settler schemes in India. In that 
case, it was shown that farmers do not simply accept their spatial 
position in the system. Those who had the resources bought land 
in more favourable positions in the head of the system. Hence, 
over time, the wealthier farmers concentrated in the head-ends of 
the system, while the poorer farmers remained and/or moved 
towards the tail-ends (Mollinga 1998: 89-117). 
This book has two points to add to the insights on the spatial 
dimensions of irrigation management. The first point is that the 
spatial set-up of the canal system is not necessarily a fixed 'given'. 
To get better access to water, one does not necessarily have to buy 
land upstream, buy a pump, or fight harder in the struggle for 
water. As was shown in chapter 3, the canal layout itself changed 
over time. It had become an important issue of struggle between 
tail-end and mid-stream villages. By connecting re-use chains to 
upstream irrigation canals, tail-enders -often supported by NLA 
workers or even engineers - found ingenious ways to get around 
their tail-end position. Hence, by re-designing the layout, they 
managed to make a Virtual move in space', to a more upstream 
position. 
It is my hypothesis that this re-engineering of the layout is 
happening in more systems in the wodd. Many systems do have 
more or less elaborated re-use schemes. These are moreover being 
developed rapidly, as it is nowadays strongly pushed by donors and 
governments. It makes good sense - from a managerial point of 
view - to supplement re-use systems with irrigation water in times 
of scarcity. Hence, it is likely that re-use systems have become 
integrated into the management of the original irrigation system. It 
is thus also likely that the re-engineering of the layout in these 
systems has become part of the struggle for scarce water. 
My second contribution is that the spatial dimension of 
irrigation management is not just a physical matter. Much of the 
dynamics in the management of the District were shaped by 
political-administrative layout of the area covered by the system: 
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the boundaries between the villages, municipalities, Congressional 
Districts and the provinces. More precisely, the dynamics were 
shaped by the ways in which the physical layout intersected with 
the political layout. Space in irrigation thus has a combined 
sociotechnical, or more specifically a physical-political dimension. 
A straightforward example of this interconnection between 
physical and political space was the struggle over water within 
Zone 1. The position of the downstream farmers in that Zone was 
highly problematic. They found themselves in a disadvantaged 
position in a physical sense, i.e. at the tail-end of the lateral system. 
In addition, they were also at a distance in socio-political terms. 
They happened to be citizens of a municipality that carried 
relatively litde political clout in irrigation. Their political leaders did 
not care too much about the irrigation water as it only served a 
relatively minor part of its populace. Moreover, the NIA District 
office as well as the residences of most of the engineers happened 
to be located in the upstream municipality. Hence, their 
disadvantaged spatial position in physical terms was reinforced by 
the spatial configuration of political boundaries. 
These physical-political interconnections can be more 
complicated, as was shown in the discussion of the so-called 
'syndicate'. This was an informal organisation headed by the 
political leader of a village. This organisation was remarkably 
powerful, as it managed to control water supply to a large part of 
the tail-end of that Zone. Its power can only be understood by 
understanding the peculiar ways in which the system's layout 
intersected with political boundaries. A concentration of large 
headgates controlling water for the larger part of the tail-end, 
happened to be located within the boundaries of that village. This 
fact does not yet explain why this village leader could gain so much 
power. His village also happened to be located on the upstream 
side of a municipal and even provincial boundary. Being a political 
outsider, it allowed him to control water in the downstream 
municipalities. The farmer leaders of these downstream units could 
not easily get a hold over his doings; hence they had to strike a deal 
with him. 
These insights on the physical-political dimensions of space 
further challenge models that conceptualise accountability relations 
in irrigation management primarily in terms of an agency-user dyad 
(Small and Carruthers 1991; Malano and Hofwegen 1999). The 
farmers in an irrigation system cannot be seen as one single group, 
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but are spatially chfferentiated in their access to the NIA Hence, 
for questions of accountability, the distribution of physical and 
political space is highly relevant The NIA was very accountable to 
some parts of the system and some villages, but less so to other 
areas. 
Generally speaking, accountability was inversely related to 
distance: the further down the system, the weaker the (state-in-
society) ties between the NIA and the villages. This was partly 
caused by the problematic supply of water to tail-end areas. As the 
NIA had litde to offer to these areas, close relations between the 
two parties did not easily emerge. Moreover, it was -as outlined 
above - related to the socio-political clout and proximity of the 
farmers and politicians of upstream municipalities towards the NIA 
staff. 
It should be stressed, however, that there were exceptions to 
this general picture as well. Specific configurations made up of 
local socio-political as well as physical circumstances created 
diversity in the relations between die NIA and the villages in the 
system. As explored in chapters 4 and 6, the NIA's favoured area 
was a village in the mid-stream part of Zone 2. For specific 
historical reasons, a good part of the NIA's engineers and 
fieldworkers had developed strong ties of kinship and friendship as 
well as political relations with farmers and leaders of this area. 
These close ties had a positive effect on NIA-farmer relation in the 
larger part of that Zone. 
This example thus shows the complexity of the matter. 
Accountability relations between the NIA and water users had a 
strong spatial dimension. However, there were several reasons -
both socio-political and physical - that accounted for the 
differences in the NIA-farmer relations throughout the system. 
Notwimstanding its complexity, it shows the need for an analysis 
of irrigation management in canal systems that takes into account 
the physical-political climensions of spatially shaped relationships. 
The Impact of the Irrigation Management Reforms 
The above has already revealed the larger part of the findings and 
insights of this book. Nevertheless, this section gives a more 
straightforward answer to the main research question that guides 
this book. 
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How did local actors integrate irrigation reform policies (turn over, 
financial autonomy and streamlining) into the everyday politics of 
the irrigation management of a UPRIIS Irrigation District during 
the mid-nineties? 
The answer to this question reads as follows. 
The stteamlining policies as well as the policies following the 
NIA's financial autonomous status have undermined the capacity 
of the NIA to deliver its services. As a result of the financial crisis 
of the government and the adoption of structural adjustment 
programs, the NIA went through a period of steep decline. This 
started in the eady 1980s, and continued to the end of the 1990s. 
Reducing costs became the overriding agency objective. Both 
nationally and in the District, large reductions of field personnel in 
particular were the result 
Theory informed by neo-institutionalism predicted that the 
NIA's status of financial autonomy would improve its services to 
the farmers. More concretely, it would try to enlarge its income by 
maximising the number of satisfied farmers. This was expected to 
increase the actually irrigated area, and thus improve the equitable 
distribution of resources in the District (Svendsen et al 1990). 
However, this did not happen. 
Saving money rather than increasing income became the leitmotiv 
of the NIA leadership in the District. Increased inequity rather than 
a decrease was the result. The District concentrated its reduced 
capacity on the upstream areas. Services in the downstream 
declined and a decrease in the irrigated area was the result. The 
financial autonomy and streamlining policies were adopted in a way 
that led to spatial differentiation in the District, favouring the more 
upstream areas. 
The management turn over policies were given shape by two 
contrasting sets of ideas. On the one hand, it was a genuine and 
serious effort of institutional development officers, fieldworkers 
and a part of the engineers to involve farmers in irrigation 
management and to give them a say in derision-making. On the 
other hand, it was given shape in the context of saving money on 
service provision. The latter negatively affected the former effort. 
The remuneration of IAs for canal cleaning and fee collection were 
too low, while payments were delayed for months. More 
importandy, the loss of fieldworkers and the lack of funds for 
services negatively effected the willingness of farmer leaders to join 
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and/or stay with die NIA program. In short, the turn over 
program became a tool to solve the NIA's financial problems, 
rather than to re-organise the management set-up of the District. 
This is not to say diat the turn over program failed altogether. 
In the District it resulted in a failed case as well as a success story. 
The successful case brought forward an effective partnership 
between the NIA and IA leaders in the management of one of the 
Zones of the District. It is a case that fits all en vogue terms like a 
case of successful co-production (Ostrom 1996), of trust between 
two parties as it creates synergy crossing the private-public divide 
(Evans 1996), and that of'thickened social capital' (Fox 1996). The 
success and failure case are not unrelated. In a context of scarce 
resources and the need to save money, one cannot please all. 
Hence, the resources allocated to create and sustain the successful 
partnership decreased the chances of the other area to become a 
success as well. There are heads and tails in management reform 
too. 
It was shown also that both success and failure were not so 
much the result of appropriate or inappropriate formal 
interventions dike the content of training or the size of IAs). As 
was outlined above, success and failure were both strongly 
informed by the socio-political embeddedness of each of the two 
areas. In both cases, local politicians were key to the results of the 
turn over programs. 
All in all, the effects of the three policy programs on the 
management of the system point in different directions. On the 
positive side, the turn over program brought decision-making 
closer to farmer representatives. Frequent meetings at the NIA 
office of these leaders improved communication and may have 
induced more transparency. In the successful Zone, the policy 
programs indeed led to the emergence of an effective trust-based 
alliance between NIA workers and farmer leaders. The policies 
moreover allowed the NIA to survive a period of prolonged and 
steep decline of funds. The training and turn over program allowed 
the NIA to seek and to a certain extent find legitimacy on the side 
of its clientele for its difficult financial position. Moreover, it 
rationalised fee collection efforts, and made farmers more 
accountable to the NIA as far as their financial obligations were 
concerned. 
On the negative side, the loss of fieldworkers was clearly felt. 
The remaining NIA staff had great difficulty in remaining 
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motivated for their work. Apart from the success case, water 
management largely remained a time-consuming, politicised, messy 
and at times scary matter. Maintenance deteriorated, as die regular 
cleaning of canal stretches was simply abandoned. Fee collection 
efficiencies did hardly increase, and the District remained short of 
money. It thus could not replace worn-out equipment, nor could it 
pay its staff or the IA contracts on time. Political patronage in the 
allocation of works and the career perspectives of the engineers 
became more prominent. This was caused by changes in the socio-
political context - the increasing powers and funds of congressmen 
and the concurrent downfall of NLA funding - that went beyond 
the scope of the examined policies. The effect, however, was that 
farmer control over the performance of its service provider 
remained strongly bounded. 
The Progressive Image of the NIA 
Readers familiar with eadier publications on irrigation reforms in 
the Philippines might be rather surprised by this book. My findings 
deviate rather strongly from the widely spread progressive image of 
Philippine irrigation management reforms. This section explains 
this deviation. I have three explanations. 
Firsdy, time and space account for much of the difference. With 
regard to the time element, the progressive picture of the NIA and 
its reforms emerged around the participatory approach developed 
by the agency during the 1980s. What people perhaps assumed is 
that this 'progressive wind' carried on during the 1990s. This 
however, was not the case. The group around Ben Bagadion, the 
NLA's ' champion of change' had already lost much of its influence 
by the second half of the 1980s. After the downfall of Marcos and 
the different changes in the NIA leadership, the NIA central office 
became the locus of power struggles involving serious charges of 
graft and corruption (Gaffud 1994). The NIA leadership thus 
ceased to create a conducive environment for furthering 
progressive reforms. 
With regard to space, the NLA's progressive reforms concerned 
the way in which the NIA organised construction activities in 
communal systems. Though the spirit as well as some of the ideas 
of these reforms 'spilled over' into the NIA approach towards the 
management of its national systems, these effects were constrained. 
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The NIA reforms in the management of its national systems were 
confined to a narrowly focussed financial concern. Hence, 'the 
progressive wind' in the NIA approach to communal systems could 
not enter easily into the arena of national systems in which the 
vested interests of a large and well-established NIA bureaucracy 
was in place. 
With hindsight, these findings mean that the widely praised 
book edited by Korten and Siy (1989) was ovedy optimistic. As the 
tide Transforming a Bureaucracy' already suggests, the authors 
claimed that they found an effective and lasting way to change the 
very culture of a money and construction oriented, engineers-
dominated bureaucracy. Up to the present day, the book is a classic 
for students in development administration. This is probably 
because the book provides such a rare example of a detailed 
analysis of successful change of a Third Wodd bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately, the book suggests more than has happened in 
reality. With hindsight, the more appropriate tide should have been 
"how to initiate bureaucratic reform'. How to sustain it, is a 
completely different matter. 
The second explanation is to be found in different types of 
analysis of management reform programs. My focus was on how 
and why questions and I analysed management from a socio-
political perspective. This is a markedly different viewpoint to look 
at such reforms than is usually presented in consultancy evaluation 
reports. The latter type of studies is more narrowly focussed and 
only takes an interest in comparing policy inputs to outputs. 
I f I had applied such a kind of research in the District, my 
findings would have looked rather positive as well. Meetings were 
held, IAs were re-organised, and a substantial part of the IAs and 
federations might have responded that the management of the 
system as well as NIA-water users relations had improved. 
However, the standard deviation would have been rather large as 
well, reflecting the large differences in 'success' and 'failure'. I hope 
it goes without saying that such research would fail to explain these 
differences, nor would it be able to unravel the complexity of the 
organisational processes in the District. 
Also within academia there are strongly diverging analyses of 
irrigation phenomena. The work of Uphoff (1992) on irrigation 
management reforms in Sri Lanka serves as an interesting 
comparison. Uphoff s perspective is focussed on 'social energy' 
emerging out of change programs. He provides a very optimistic 
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and enthusiastic account of changes that happened in the system 
studied. It would be an interesting experiment if we would change 
research sites. He would probably find huge amounts of 'social 
energy' in 'my District', while I would probably also find intense 
power struggles and intricate socio-political networks in *his area'. 
Without trying to discredit his (or my own) work, it shows the 
importance of perspective. Given the very limited number of 
thorough studies on irrigation management it is unfortunately still 
the case that the perspective chosen by one researcher might go far 
in creating an image around policy reforms in a certain country. 
The third type of explanation is that the NIA's progressive 
image was instrumental to satisfy its financial interests. To 
understand why certain policies are being reproduced despite the 
fact that they are considered as 'failures', it is helpful to examine 
what 'failed' policies do achieve, i.e. the intended or unintended 
'side-effects' (Ferguson 1990). In the case of the NIA, the side-
effect of implementing financial autonomy and turn over reform 
was that it secured the NIA's access to funds from the Wodd Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank in particular. 
The Wodd Bank has pushed for the reform towards financial 
autonomy (Svendsen et aL /990). Since the mid-eighties, the Wodd 
Bank as well as the Asian Development Bank have made the 
adoption and further development of turn over policies 
conditionalities of their subsequent loan packages for national 
systems (Panella, forthcoming). The larger chunk of these loans is 
intended for the rehabilitation of existing schemes and the 
construction of new ones. A small percentage of these funds 
however, need to be used for 'institutional development', i.e. the 
organising of farmers and the turn over of management tasks to 
them (Raby 1997). 
Given the serious financial problems of the NIA and its 
financial dependency on WB and ADB loans, it makes perfect 
sense to this agency to 'do development' and thus follow the 
reform fashions prescribed by these lending institutions. The 
national level of the NIA was outside the scope of my research. 
Hence, I do not know the extent to which the adoption of these 
policies at that level was based on financial concerns rather than a 
genuine belief in the need for managerial reforms. 
However, such pragmatic line of reasoning was certainly present 
among the UPRLTS leadership. Whether they liked the institutional 
reforms or not was largely irrelevant. The overriding concern to 
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adopt these policies was simply because it was a requirement to get 
access to the IOSP rehabilitation and maintenance funds. To 
secure access to future funds, the UPRIIS leadership tried to 
reproduce the image of success (they at least partly failed to do so, 
see chapter 6). Institutional development performance reports and 
'functionality surveys' of the IAs and the federations were used to 
reproduce this image, without necessarily representing the realities 
in the field. Hence, the everyday politics of securing the physical 
works budget of the NLA has been a contributing factor to the 
reproduction of the NLA's image as a reform and farmer oriented 
agency. 
Recommendations: Strengthening the FrontUners 
This section outlines my ideas on how reform of the management 
of large-scale canal systems in the Philippines should proceed. This 
is not just a question of improving the actual management of the 
systems, but also a question of improving the wider governance 
structures that set the rules for the actual management of irrigation 
systems. 
Though I feel that the farmer federations need to be further 
empowered by giving them larger responsibilities (see below), I do 
not recommend here the full turn over of Irrigation Districts to 
farmer-controlled bodies. This might be somewhat surprising, 
given the present-day popularity of such radical turn over schemes 
in international policy making circles, and the actual - and 
apparendy successful - implementation of such schemes in 
countries like Mexico (Kloezen 2002) and Turkey (Svendsen and 
Nott (1997). I do not recommend this, mainly because I lack the 
knowledge to come up with a sensible assessment. Such a scheme 
might work very well, and there are indeed indications — from pilot 
schemes in Mindanao - that full turn over can be a successful 
option for the management of Philippine canal systems. However, 
such a set-up would offset too many unpredictable dynamics to be 
sensibly discussed here on its merits. It requires the study of actual 
pilot schemes to come up with a sensible assessment. 
The other reason why I do not recommend full turn over is 
substantive. Full turn over would imply that the NLA District 
management gives way to some sort of a farmer-elected body that 
is in charge of the management of an irrigation scheme. I am wary 
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of such a solution, as it might further weaken the Philippine state, 
and strengthen the already strong local society. As discussed in this 
book, the Philippine countryside is about little administration and 
much politics, partly because public officials are elected rather than 
appointed (cf. Fegan 1994). Given this situation, I doubt whether it 
is wise to make irrigation resource management subject to elected 
societal actors, rather than appointed state officials. In short, full 
turn over might be a good option, but there are good reasons to 
carefully monitor the impact of such changes on irrigation 
efficiency as well as equity in pilot schemes, before it is 
implemented on a larger scale. 
I first present my recommendations with regard to irrigation 
management. It is followed by a discussion of improving the wider 
governance environment for irrigation in the Philippines. 
Good management the need to empower the NIA and the IAs 
What if no new policy reforms are implemented and things just 
take their 'natural' course? In other words, is there really a need to 
change the present modes of conduct? What is *bad' about the 
present ways of irrigation management? 
As can be read in the epilogue, the District is not doing that 
badly. It is still being managed, the majority of the farmers do get 
their water and NIA does get around 60% of its fees. Moreover, 
the District has finally arrived at a situation that may be called 
'financial sustainability'. Cost cutting and increased fee collection 
have brought the NIA District to a situation where it can cover its 
expenses through the collection of fees (though it is still 
supplemented with a limited amount of O&M subsidies). 
The acute financial crisis in the District thus seems to be over 
and likewise the need to further to reduce the workforce. If 
managed well -and helped by nature in terms of a favourable river 
water supply - the District may even start to slowly recover some 
of its losses. It might buy a few new motorbikes for its work force, 
and at least might have the money to supply gasoline to its 
fieldworkers and pay the incentives to the IAs on time. It might 
even be able to raise the incentives to higher levels. 
In the longer run there is also a good chance that present service 
levels can be mamtained. As long as the central government does 
not run into a new fiscal crisis, political pressures will ensure that 
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the government -through its ADB and WB loans - will continue to 
supply UPRIIS and the other national systems with funds to 
maintain and rehabilitate the systems. In short, there are no urgent 
needs for reforms (which, I am afraid, also implies that the chances 
that reforms will happen are limited). 
Nevertheless, I do think that reform is needed for economic 
reasons. The UPRIIS District is being managed at sub-optimal 
levels, and I believe this to be true for other schemes in the 
Philippines as well. Cost cutting has made system management cost 
effective. As shown however, service levels to tail-end areas have 
suffered due to poor water management and poor maintenance. 
The larger economy would thus benefit from better management. 
More concretely it would help thousands of tail-end rice farmers to 
get access to a reliable water supply. 
Moreover, when developments are less favourable than sketched 
above, management levels will drop further. There are some real 
threats to sustainability. Firsdy, a new economic crisis will 
jeopardise future subsidies to the NLA, and will in turn cause 
further system deterioration. Secondly, the reduced NIA work 
force is ageing and retiring in the years to come. If financial 
setbacks occur - for instance due to unfavourable river supplies 
and rainfall - the NIA might not replace these people on time. 
Then, service levels will drop further. Thirdly, a future populist 
President of the Estrada type (see the epilogue) might jeopardise 
the NIA's fee income once again. The NLA might then respond by 
again following the path of cost cutting and further reduce service 
levels. 
Perhaps the more important reasons for reform are political in 
nature. To a large extent, actors that have no direct stake in the use 
of water or canal roads controlled irrigation management in the 
District. As shown in this book, local, mostiy political, power 
holders seriously challenge the authority of the NIA in water 
management. The same is true for maintenance and repair works. 
The severe reductions of the NIA budget, and the complementary 
rise of budgets of local government and the pork-barrel funds of 
congressmen and governors have caused this. Moreover, the 
higher-level politicians have furthermore strengthened their control 
over the NIA works budget. Consequendy, farmer leaders 
nowadays turn to politicians to get their roads or canals fixed, 
rather than to the NIA. It thus means that electoral considerations 
and political patronage govern irrigation management. 
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This situation is not good from a managerial point of view. As 
the NIA authority is undermined, both water management and the 
allocation of works become more contested and messy, and follow 
political considerations rather than technical need. There is a real 
danger that this process will further continue. For instance, more 
and more village governments are nowadays in possession of heavy 
equipment. Though this is a good development in itself, it further 
reduces the need for NIA services and thus further undermines the 
bargaining power of the NIA to make local power holders 
accountable to NIA rules and regulations. 
I also think it is an unwanted situation from a wider democratic 
point of view. Though politicians are elected, the Philippine 
political system is certainly no guarantee for democratic and just 
management of - in this case - natural resources. Obviously, in the 
Philippine context it is neither possible — nor necessarily beneficial 
- to simply remove electoral politics from irrigation management. 
However, I think it is necessary and possible to move towards a 
more balanced situation. 
My recommendations are thus geared towards a strengthening 
of the irrigation administration and a weakening of the power of 
local power holders. Concretely, this requires the empowerment of 
both the NIA and the IAs. I first discuss the NIA. Following 
Evans (1995), an effective bureaucracy is both embedded and 
autonomous. This book shows that the NIA engineers and workers 
are (more than) sufficiendy embedded in local society. Through 
multiple ties of political patronage, kinship and friendship they are 
responsive and accountable to local needs. However, they lack a 
sufficient degree of de facto autonomy to prescribe their rule over 
the NIA clientele and local politicians. 
The NIA authority needs to be strengthened. I thus depart from 
mainstream policy discourse that is mosdy focussed on 
empowering farmers to make irrigation agencies downwardly 
accountable to them. In the case of the Philippines, I believe that 
there is another and perhaps more pressing need: to empower the 
NIA to make farmers upwardly accountable to the agency, and to 
make NIA workers and engineers more accountable to the rules 
and regulations of the agency at large. At the most general level, 
organisational theory argues that there are three different belief 
systems with regard to questions of management: it should be 
organised through the state, the community or the market (Hood 
1998). In this case, I thus see the need for some Weberian-like 
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measures to strengthen a state bureaucracy to improve irrigation 
management (cf. Moore 1992). 
Secondly, there is a need to empower the federations of IAs. 
They need to be strengthened not (only) because of the need to 
make the NIA downwardly accountable, but because they 
represent a form of functional administration that may help to 
weaken political mechanisms of irrigation management At present, 
the discretionary power and resources of the IAs and federations 
are simply too limited to make a difference. By turning them into 
real' organisations with substantial duties, responsibilities and 
resources, they stand a chance against the political forms of local 
governance. 
First recommendation: the need for improvement of the merit 
system 
This book has given reason to believe that the present-day politics 
of works and work are one of the biggest obstacles for good 
management of the UPRIIS system. The rent- and position seeking 
alliances of engineers at UPRIIS as well as national level together 
with the high level politicians-atfff-contractors stand in the way of 
good management These alliances undermine the proper 
functioning of the merit system of promotion and transfer. It 
lessens the need for the UPRIIS managers to treat system 
management as a serious and demanding professional and 
intellectual activity. In short, these politics disrupt good system 
performance. 
How to deal with it? This is a problem that is not easily solved. 
One could hope that strengthened federations of IAs would ensure 
popular control over the works budget and the performance of the 
engineers. However, my findings show that much of these politics 
are way beyond the control of local farmer leaders. Also, the farmer 
leaders were - logically - struggling for the particular interests of 
the areas they represent, rather than the overall performance of the 
NIA engineers. Finally, the idea of increased popular control seems 
to be informed by the odd assumption that farmer leaders are 
scrupulously honest. It is equally possible that their increased 
participation will put forward people that wish to join such 
alliances, rather than to fight them. 
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Another option would be to increase the NIA budget and to 
decrease the pork-barrel funds. This might be the start of a process 
that could turn things around. However, as this requires legislation 
of congressmen that are directiy benefiting from the present modes 
of conduct, it is not clear to me who will press for such change, 
and in what forum. 
Perhaps the best possibility for improvement is increased 
control of the NIA's central office over the performance of the 
UPRIIS managers. I have two reasons to believe that it may be 
possible. Firsdy, there are many NIA managers who are 
performance-oriented and would like very much to reduce the hold 
of higher-level politicians over the works domain. Hence, people 
within the agency might support such changes. 
Secondly, the epilogue shows that central office did indeed push 
for such changes. Under the ruling of administrator Soriano in 
1997-98, the UPRLTS leadership was replaced by other managers, 
which was beneficial to system performance. In general, system 
performance will benefit from strengthening the upward 
accountability of system managers towards the central office by 
improving 'control through competition' (Hood 1998). By close 
monitoring of the performance of managers by the central office, 
and by regulady replacing managers with competitors on the basis 
of strict and well-defined performance criteria, the management of 
the systems will improve. 
Second recommendation: sanctioning farmers and the IAs to pay 
fees 
An important solution to many of the problems in the UPRIIS 
systems - and I think this is true for national systems throughout 
the Philippines - is an increase in the O&M budget of these 
systems. This is true for whatever type of organisational structure is 
designed to manage these systems. Even if the systems were turned 
over to farmers, they would also need higher level of funds to 
ensure proper system management. 
The NIA District offices barely raise enough income to pay the 
wages of their downsized personnel numbers. Anything else is 
postponed or abandoned. Hence, offices are worn out, field 
personnel do not have vehicles or sufficient gasoline, and the heavy 
equipment has become inoperable and is not replaced. To rectify 
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this situation, the District offices need a substantial increase in their 
income, to allow them to improve operation and maintenance and 
to buy sufficient vehicles and pieces of heavy equipment. 
The key to an increase in the District budgets is farmer fees. 
Fees, rather than government subsidies could tie management to 
local needs, even if there are many 'its' and "buts' in this. Moreover, 
I do not see why the general taxpayer rather than the direct 
beneficiaries would have to pay for irrigation. The farmers in the 
national systems - especially those in Central Luzon - are relatively 
privileged citizens. Government subsidies are thus better used for 
more deprived groups in society. There is also a practical reason. 
Central government has great difficulty in collecting taxes, more 
than the NLA does. Hence, the NLA better relies on its own source 
of income, i.e. fee payments from the farmer beneficiaries. 
The key to a higher fee income is the increase of collection 
efficiencies as well as the increase of the benefited areas (well 
served with water). For the time being, there is no need to raise the 
amount of fees to be paid. The Districts income will double if 
farmers were forced to actually pay their present-day dues. A 
doubling of the budget will be sufficient to turn around the 
downward spiral of the last two decades. 
The present-day collecting system is untenable. The NLA spends 
high amounts of time, money and energy, nagging and begging for 
fee payments in home-to-home visits of farmers. Through a variety 
of measures that are mosdy based on persuasion, the NLA tries to 
talk the farmers into payment. This strategy fails, as only around 
50% of the collectibles are actually collected. Moreover, the 
collection costs - notably the labour costs of the collectors and the 
costs of hauling, drying and selling wet palay - are so high that little 
is left for productive purposes (Wodd Bank 1996). Hence, farmers 
should be required to pay in cash, and - like their colleagues in 
Mexican (Kloezen 2002) or Peruvian (Vbs 2002) systems - should 
be the ones to remit their payments either in the bank or in a NLA 
office. 
The key to a more efficient collection system and higher 
collection efficiencies is the implementation of an effective 
sanctioning system. Farmers have to become financially 
accountable to the NLA. The 'fee-for-performance' principle 
should work two ways. Farmer fee payments should not only hold 
the NLA accountable. It should also be that without (full) fee 
payment, the NLA is not providing performance. Hence, the 
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challenge is to find mechanisms that put an end to the financial 
free riding of farmers (receiving water and other services without 
(fully) paying dues). This will not help to save water, but it will help 
to bring the quality of the NIA services at higher levels, and thus, 
eventually, might benefit tail-end areas. 
The NIA thus needs to take a tougher stand towards the 
farmers. There are two ways to do so. Firsdy, the NIA should 
expand its administrative and legal measures to make farmers pay. 
The present-day measures of demand letters and the annotation 
program are somewhat effective, but only focus on long time back-
accounts. The NIA needs to respond much faster to farmers who 
did not pay the full amount of their dues. Demand letters should 
follow within days after the closing date of fee payment for a given 
season. A system of fines and eventually the realistic threat of a 
court case should provide the incentives for farmers to remit their 
dues on time. As things stand now, farmers prioritise the payment 
of their debts to loan sharks that demand high interest rates, 
followed by the payment of services that can be cut of, like grocery 
supplies of local vendors and electricity and telephone services. 
Hence, the NIA competes with other institutions in the demand 
for payments, and at present is losing out. 
The second way is to cut off non- and partial payers from NIA 
services. This book shows that the present-day management 
realities are far away from such measures. Still, I think, it is a 
necessary requirement to establish the NIA's authority and to 
acquire sufficient budget. 
The most feasible measure is to link road and canal maintenance 
services to fee payments. The NIA Districts should prioritise those 
stretches of roads for resurfacing and stretches of canals for de-
silting that are serving groups of farmers that had relatively high fee 
collection efficiencies in the preceding season. To avoid that the 
NIA only serves upstream areas, the deal would have to become 
somewhat more sophisticated. For instance, the maintenance 
services should be prioritised to those areas in which collection 
efficiencies reached a - say - 5% increase compared to the attained 
efficiencies in previous seasons. The condition is that the allocation 
of works thus becomes a transparent and publicly announced 
process. As this book showed, this requires rather substantial 
changes in the present modes of conduct 
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Fees-for-water 
Water is of course the more difficult NIA service to cut Given 
field-to-field irrigation practices and the many legal and illegal 
passage points and re-use/first-use connections, it is hard to cut off 
individual farmers who did not pay their fees. 
This is not to say that it is impossible. It is being done in a large-
scale Peruvian system where farmers also grow rice and make use 
of field-to-field irrigation practices (Vbs 2002). Farmers do pay 
their fees because of the fact that the managing entity - in this case 
a farmer-controlled body - otherwise withholds water in the 
beginning of the season. Hence, before they get water to start land 
preparation, farmers go the office of the managing entity and pay 
their dues of the last season. This clear-cut moment - Vos calls it 
an 'obligatory point of passage' - gives the agency sufficient 
leverage over the farmers to enforce their payments. The UPRLTS 
farmers experience a similar clear-cut moment of starting irrigation 
for the preparation of their lands. 
A difference with the Peruvian case—which complicates matters 
for the NIA case - is that the NIA is not actually delivering the 
water at lower levels of the system. Due to the downsizing of the 
field personnel, the ditchtenders are no longer around at field level 
to give - or to withhold - water. The NIA would need to expand its 
number of fieldworkers to pose such a convincing threat. It would 
not be necessary to actually start taking control of field level 
management. It would need to have sufficient presence in the field 
to set examples. Hence, the idea is that at the start of every season 
the NIA selects a limited number of partial- or non-payers in each 
village, and ensures that water to these selected farmers is closed-
off until they pay. By publicly announcing such measures, the NIA 
shows it means business, which urges other farmers to pay as well. 
A more feasible option might be to relate fee payments to the 
water delivery of groups of farmers along the same sub-lateral. 
Under the present set-up of individual farmers paying fees to the 
NIA, the NIA lacks the legal ground to do such a thing. Individual 
farmers would probably start and win a court case, as they could 
rightfully claim that the NIA cannot hold farmers accountable for 
the (mal-) behaviour of others. However, the present-day pilot 
program of turn over opens up the way to relate group fee 
payments to water delivery. 
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Under this pilot scheme of so-called Irrigation Management 
Transfer (LMT), a federation of IAs - covering the area of a 
watermaster division of around 1000 hectares - is legally liable for 
the fee payments of the individual farmers. Hence, the NIA sends 
one bill to the federation, and it is up to the federation to collect 
fees from its farmer members (NIA UPRIIS District-IV 2003). 
This scheme, I think, might potentially improve irrigation 
management. Unlike the earlier type 1 and type 2 contracts, this 
scheme at least potentially gives the federations sufficient power, 
resources and duties to make it into a 'real' organisation. Under the 
present set-up, the federation is entitled to 36% of the collectible, 
and might even be increased to 50%. This seems to be a 
sufficiendy large budget for proper remuneration of workers 
cleaning the canals, office workers doing the billing and accounting, 
a water master to co-ordinate water management and to pay leaders 
managing the organisation. Moreover, if fee collection efficiencies 
are high enough, the federation will have the budget to buy its own 
equipment. In short, it is a scheme that at least potentially 
empowers farmers to be involved in system management 
However, the results so far indicate that the scheme is going to 
fail because of a too accommodating strategy on the side of the 
NIA. The turn over scheme lacks a credible sanctioning 
mechanism to become effective. The first results of the 2002-03 
dry cropping season showed that the federation in the 4 t h District 
of UPRIIS collected less than half of the collectible, far lower than 
the NIA used to collect in the area. As the farmer leaders lacked 
the urge to collect, collections went down. The NIA even decided 
to employ NIA collectors in the area, to avoid a significant drop of 
its income. 
Under the present conditions, the NIA cannot do very much to 
enforce the deal made with the federation. It could sue the 
federation in court for not paying their dues, but that would result 
in the resignation of the leadership of the federation and it would 
stop others from taking up such positions or accepting such a 
contract. The NIA could also threaten to end the contract as the 
federation does not meet its obligations, but it would not be 
considered a real threat as the farmers do not really consider such a 
contract as crucial for their well-being. 
It is a real possibility that this turn over scheme is going to lead 
to a further contraction of service levels in the UPRIIS Districts. It 
allows the NIA to further cut costs by reducing its field personnel, 
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and in return it will (have to) accept a further reduction of its 
income. The pilots have been introduced in upstream areas, which 
are the best paying areas of the Districts. As die turn over scheme 
allows the federations to keep 36% of the collectible, the NIA 
income will go down as long as partial or non-payment of farmers 
remains an acceptable option. 
The main problem of the present approach to turn over is that it 
is too much based on luring the farmer associations into a deal with 
the NIA. On the one hand, the NIA is too conservative with 
regard to turning over power and resources, which thus lead to 
rather powedess institutions. On the other hand however, it is too 
accommodating when it comes to the duties and responsibilities of 
these associations. 
Hence, I believe that the only way forward is that the NIA is 
going to take a tougher stand. In the case of these single billed turn 
over areas, the federation will only meet its obligations when 
credible sanction mechanisms are in place. The NIA would have to 
convincingly threaten the federations with cutting off water and 
other services to enforce full payments of the federations to be 
made. In line with Vos (2002), I believe that the best credible threat 
for the NIA is to seize the momentum at the start of the season. As 
long as a federation does not fully pay - in the first year it may be 
90% - of the dues of the preceding season, the deal should be that 
water will not flow into its canal system. 
Third recommendation: central control of economic viability 
As I show in this book, financial autonomy has brought a situation 
in which the NIA District's primary concern is focused on earning 
the wages of its personnel. It considers itself financially viable when 
it is able to pay the wages. Hence, this form of decentralised 
management has shaped the interests of the NIA District in ways 
that are not congruent with wider economic objectives. More 
concretely, the tail-end areas could be served better when wider 
economic rather than narrow financial interests structure the 
strategies of the NIA District 
The best actors to look after tail-end interests are of course the 
tail-end farmers and their leaders. This book has shown that they 
are indeed pretty good in defending their interests. They are well 
organised and have developed all kinds of legal and illegal ways to 
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bring water to the tail of the systems. However, it seems that they 
cannot do it alone. They are up against politically powerful head-
end farmer communities and municipalities, and they are up against 
a NIA management that is primarily concerned with saving money 
and attaining viability. 
This protection of tail-end interests, and in general die 
protection of the wider economic gains of canal irrigation, is the 
responsibility of the NIA's central office. The NIA's central level 
thus has to ensure that such negative side effects of 
decentralisation are prevented. This again, is a requirement that is 
not easily fulfilled. The NIA's central office has been the main 
culprit of the cost cutting and downsizing measures. Nevertheless, 
they do have to play such a role if things are to be improved. In 
line with Tendler (1997) I believe that decentralised management 
can only work it goes hand in hand with strict central control. 
To prevent spatial differentiation and a narrow focus on viability 
to happen, the NIA central office should develop regulations and 
ensure their implementation. Concretely, it should determine a 
more encompassing definition of viability, which ensures that the 
UPRIIS Districts can deliver sufficient levels of services to allow 
for the economic prosperity of the irrigated areas. 
Such 'economic viability' would require sufficient amounts of 
maintenance budget - for instance at least equal to the 
expenditures on personnel - to allow for proper maintenance and 
repair works and the timely repair and replacement of machinery. 
Such a more encompassing definition of viability would of course 
not direcdy solve the problems. It would simply show that the NIA 
Districts are not viable at all, and would perhaps have to double 
their income to attain 'real' viability. It would at least make the 
problems clear and thus strengthen the need to address them. 
Likewise, control of the NIA's central office would have to be 
safeguarded against the neglect of the tail-end areas. Concretely, the 
performance evaluation criteria of the Districts as well as the 
engineers should give much more weight to the size of the program 
and benefited area. Nowadays, much weight is given to financial 
viability and collection efficiencies. This book shows that both 
these indicators can be attained by serving upstream areas only or 
by cost cutting rather than by improving services. A better financial 
criterion for evaluation would for instance be the attainment of a 
targeted percentage increase in total income in a given year, 
compared to previous years. 
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Strict central control should go hand in hand with further 
decentralisation of powers to the NIA Districts. The Districts need 
to be given more autonomy to run their own affairs. As things 
stand now, the Districts are formally considered to be financial 
'responsibility centres', but in practice do have to 'surrender' to the 
NIA's central office all income that surpasses the amount needed 
to cover the operational expenses. I f they would be allowed to keep 
such income, it would allow them to re-strengthen their 
maintenance capacity, for instance by buying new equipment 
Likewise, the Districts should be allowed to hire or contract people 
without being stopped to do so by central NIA or central 
government Obviously, they can only do so if they can afford it. 
Such measures honour well-managed systems, while poody led 
systems will be more exposed and thus would be amenable for 
appropriate action to be taken by the NIA's central management. 
Fourth recommendation: empowering the Zone Engineers 
Future reform should be based upon trust in state workers and 
geared towards creating worker commitment. This departs from 
the present-day mainstream guiding principle in irrigation policy 
discourse, which is based on 'mistrust' with regard to public agents. 
Their alleged rent-seeking and shirking behaviour has to be 
controlled by either rolling back the state, or by fixing this bad 
behaviour through user or client control. This is the wrong 
starting-point Firsdy, one cannot do without these public servants. 
As this book shows, NIA actors were central in giving shape to 
policies that supposedly were 'rolling back the state'. Also after 
these policies were implemented, NIA actors still played key roles 
in the 'turned over' or financially autonomous system. 
Secondly, and more importantiy, 'mistrust' is a far too negative 
and one-sided starting-point NIA actors played constructive roles 
in the management of the District Rent-seeking and shirking were 
present and explored, but this was not the only or the most 
important kind of behaviour. There was a lot of commitment and 
genuine concern among NIA staff about the plight of farmers in 
getting water, and about proper management of the system. Many 
had lost at least part of their motivation for work. However, they 
had so for valid reasons. Given the difficult and deteriorating 
conditions, one should be surprised about the degree of 
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commitment still present to make the best of the situation, rather 
than the degree to which people gave up (see chapter 5). 
I am inspired by Judith Tendler's book on good governance in 
Brazil (1997). Her book provides detailed analyses of state 
programs that effectively provided good services to citizens. This 
happened in a Brazilian state that was known for its backwardness, 
political patronage and rent-seeking behaviour. Good governance 
emerged partly because public managers and workers were 
committed to make their work successful. In line with Tendler 
then, policy programs should not only -and not primarily- be 
guided by the need to create accountable public servants. Rather, 
they should be concerned about how to get them motivated and 
committed to their jobs. 
How to get committed fieldworkers? In line with Tendler, I 
believe that providing people with demanding tasks and discretion 
is the way to do so. One important measure would be to put the 
planning and implementation of the physical works at the 
discretion of the Zone Engineers and the watermasters. Each Zone 
should get a part of the works budget. Together with the water 
masters and the farmer leaders in the Zone federations, the Zone 
Engineer should plan how to make use of the money, and thus 
determine which problems need to be prioritised. As outlined 
above, this should be done in a way that enforces fee payments of 
farmers. 
Furthermore, the surpluses in fee collection should at least 
partly be retained by each Zone and should be used to replace 
vehicles and to buy pieces of heavy equipment (e.g. a number of 
'mini dump trucks', a grader and a backhoe). It is up to the Zone 
Engineer, together with the watermasters and the IA leaders, where 
to employ this equipment 
These measures would make the position of the Zone Engineer 
and watermasters a more challenging one, and would empower 
them vis-a-vis local power holders. As things stand now, they have 
little bargaining power. As the decisions over the allocation of 
works are made by the Maintenance Engineer and the District 
Chief, Zone Engineers have no formal influence. Moreover, as the 
NIA contracts out most of its works budget to contractors-a«w-
politicians, it are politicians rather than NIA officials who take the 
credit for equipment being employed in the system. By providing 
Zone Engineers and their fieldrnen with a works budget and 
equipment, the situation would change for the better. 
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Another advantage of these measures is that the decisions over 
the works budget would at least partly be pulled out of the 'back-
room' deals explored in the previous chapter. Obviously, it would 
increase the chances of the emergence of new forms of rent-
seeking at the Zone level. However, given the nearness of the field 
workers and IA leaders, there is reason to believe that such rent-
seeking behaviour is better checked than when left at higher levels. 
Fifth recommendation: empowering the watermasters 
If the NLA pushes through with the pilot Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT) schemes, there will be no more need for 
watermasters. Like the ditchtenders, they will be phased out As 
indicated above, I am in favour of this IMT scheme, provided the 
NIA becomes much stricter with regard to the duties and 
responsibilities of the federations. Under the present management 
set-up however, reforms should further empower the watermasters 
and thus give them reason to be more committed to their job. 
Under the present set-up, the watermasters find themselves in a 
Catch 22. On the one hand, they are expected to deliver services to 
the farmers following the 'pay-for-performance' principle: the NIA 
delivers the services in return for user fees. On the other hand 
however, the water masters can no longer deliver such services, as 
their fieldmen were phased out Instead, these services are to be 
delivered by the LAs under the contrasting principle of 'joint 
management'. Hence, these frondine workers have been put in the 
difficult situation that they have to deliver services by steering 
people (the IA leaders) who were hard to control. 
The very combination of these contrasting organisational 
principles made things complicated. For instance, as water users 
felt they were already paying for services, they were not easily 
motivated to take care of certain managerial tasks (e.g. canal 
cleaning). This was worsened by the fact that the contracts with the 
IAs were neither clear nor financially attractive. The responsibilities 
of the IAs with regard to fee collection were not well defined. 
Moreover, as the NIA needed the fees more badly than the IAs 
did, the IA leaders could easily take a free ride on the efforts of the 
fieldworkers. 
In the case of the canal cleaning contracts, remuneration for the 
IAs was low and payments often late. Hence, the IAs simply 
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refused to enter into such a contract, leaving canal sections 
unattended. Or the cleaning was done rather poody. As breaking 
the contract was hardly considered a punishment, die watermaster 
was not in a position to take a tough stand. The only option 
available was to try to motivate IA leaders to do it, albeit poody, 
and to help them in actually organising the farmers to conduct the 
job (for further detail, see chapter 5). 
I already presented my recommendations with regard to fee 
collection. With regard to canal cleaning, the way forward is for the 
NLA to turn the contract into a more production-oriented, 
business-like deal. This would mean that the NIA raises the 
remuneration for the canal cleaning to fair levels and ensures timely 
payment. The remuneration should be sufEciendy high to allow IA 
leaders to hire labourers to clean the canals. The original idea that 
payments can be low as farmers will clean canals based on 
voluntary labour and community spirit is unrealistic. In the highly 
monetarized economy of Central Luzon, money and not voluntary 
labour makes the world go round. 
To empower the watermasters vis-a-vis the IAs, it might be a 
good idea for the NIA to provide the watermaster with a monthly 
budget for canal cleaning in his division. In principal, canal cleaning 
should be organised through the contracts with the IAs. However, 
the watermaster should have the option to actually break the 
contract with the IAs when do not live up to the agreed conditions, 
and supply the services through other means. If the payments for 
these services meet market standards, then the area master would 
not have difficulty to hire local labourers to conduct canal cleaning. 
This alternative option provides the watermaster with control over 
the IAs through competition (cf. Hood 1998) This semi-market 
mechanism can thus help to establish a more straightforward 
relation between the IAs and the frondine workers. 
More straightforward measures could also boost morale among 
the NIA work force. For instance, the NIA should allow the 
promotion of fieldworkers to higher positions. These positions are 
the exclusive domain of people holding a degree in civil or 
construction engineering. Watermasters were acting as capable 
Zone Engineers and Hydrologists, but without receiving the 
official position (and related salaries and benefits). Hence, 
possibilities for upward mobility were de facto closed off. By 
accepting working experience as a qualifying criterion, this would 
give the more capable fieldworkers an attractive career perspective. 
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Good governance : the need for social auditors 
Who are the potential readers of this book? In other words, who 
are the actors who are concerned about Philippine irrigation 
management (reform)? In the Philippines, this group is largely 
limited to NIA officials, a few national and international irrigation 
experts and a few academics. This situation is a problematic one. 
There is no platform for a lively debate on the important issue of 
irrigation management. Now and then, NIACONSULT produces 
reports, but this organisation is too close to the NIA to play a more 
critical role. Consequendy, these reforms lack a leaming-by-doing' 
approach, or any approach that helps to systematically evaluate 
policy processes and outcomes, or allows for a careful design of the 
next step (Korten 1989). 
Hence, there is a need to strengthen the wider governance 
structures in the Philippines in which irrigation management issues 
are being discussed and decided upon. In particular, I believe there 
is the need to strengthen the involvement of so-called 'social 
auditors'. These are third actors in the governance of irrigation 
management, next to the NIA and water user organisations (see 
figure 8.1). 
FIGURE 8.1: A tri-polar set-up for good governance of irrigation systems 
Source-. Moench, Caspari et aL 1999: xa 
These social auditors could be NGOs, Rural Development 
Departments or academic institutions. They are the 
"watch dog" social activists as well as various organs of the state 
that are responsible for assuring appropriate justice. They are not 
users or managers, and their concerns often stem from different 
Managers 
(control) 
Users I 
(comfort) 
Social Auditors 
(caution) 
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callings - those of equity, sustainabflity and fair play. [They] often 
work together to assure proper functioning by the concerned water 
bureaucracy. They also often act as catalysts for change (Moench, 
Caspari#«£ 1999: xi) 
Such enabling tri-polar governance setting did exist around die 
development of the NIA's participatory approach applied in 
communal schemes during the first half of the 1980s. A steering 
committee composed of NIA top-level managers, the responsible 
program leaders as well as university researchers met frequendy to 
evaluate the policies, and to come up with intelligent moves in the 
wider policy environment Backing and actual involvement of the 
Ford Foundation gave further credit as well as seed money to this 
task group. The role of the Institute of Philippine Culture of 
Ateneo de Manila University is especially worth mentioning. For 
several years, it conducted detailed and applied action-research to 
support the policy reform programs. Being a relatively independent 
but committed research institute, it was instrumental in organising 
a constructive and informed process (de los Reyes and Jopillo 
1987). 
Unfortunately, such a committed but critical and scholady 
environment did not emerge around reforms in the management of 
the national systems (and it ceased to exist around the reforms for 
the communal systems). Formulated in positive terms, it seems to 
me that there are good opportunities for universities or research 
institutions to jump into this matter and to take up again the critical 
but constructive role of social auditor. 
Likewise, Philippine NGOs and people's organisations (POs) 
could also contribute a lot to the emergence of a more conducive 
governance environment for irrigation management. Philippine 
NGOs and POs are widely acknowledged to be a vibrant part of 
Philippine civil society (Lara and Morales 1990) and play pivotal 
roles in policy making and implementation around such politicised 
issues as land reform (Borras 2001) and the government protection 
of the rice price (Ramos 2000). 
At present, their role in the governance of irrigation is rather 
limited. Within the District studied, peasant organisations were 
active as local chapters in villages. However, they did not engage 
very much in irrigation management issues. They had a critical 
attitude towards fee payments, following a rather populist line of 
thought. Also each was involved in particularistic efforts to allocate 
Conclusions 325 
NIA resources to their local stronghold. However, there was no 
widely organised Teople's Organisation' (PO) or NGO active in 
the area, let alone one that was involved in matters of irrigation 
governance. 
At the Manila level, the situation was not very different Both 
more mainstream and more radical farmer organisations and 
NGOs critiqued government for its limited spending on irrigation 
systems (Montemayor 1995). Though this critique was valid (see 
chapter 6), these organisations scarcely took up - nor were they 
informed about - questions on how to re-organise the governance 
of irrigation management 
However, there are good possibilities for both national or 
regional NGOs and local POs to develop their roles as social 
auditors in irrigation governance. At the local level, they could play 
an important role in future reform efforts, either by organising 
farmer leaders, or by critically evaluating reform processes. Also at 
the national level, there are several NGOs that could in theory play 
such an important 'critically engaged' role. The least this book 
might do is to arouse the interest among these NGOs and POs. 
This book shows that the issue of irrigation is much more 
complicated - and interesting - than just being a matter of 
government funding and good engineering. 
Canal irrigation is — and remains to be — one of the most vital 
resources in rural Philippines. Furthermore, this book shows that 
all the larger issues that are high on the agenda of reform oriented 
organisations are present in the case of irrigation: it is about 
struggle and everyday politics, it is about democracy, local 
governance and (unequal) access to resources. Last but not least, it 
is about the search for more just and productive state-society 
interactions. 
9 
Somewhat to my surprise, I found the working morale of both 
NIA staff and LA. leaders to be intact when I re-visited the 4 * 
District of UPRIIS in January 2003. Things were a bit better than 
they were when I left the District at the end of 1997. This was 
partly because of nature. The 1998 dry season had been dramatic. 
However, since then the river water supply and local rainfall had 
been favourable. More important though had been the impact of a 
temporary change in the UPRIIS leadership. 
General Soriano, the tough ruler who administered the NIA 
from eady 1997 to mid 1998 did what few would have thought to 
be possible: he unseated the UPRIIS leadership that had been in 
charge of the system for a long period of time. The new 
Operations Manager was a former ranking officer in the 
Institutional Development Department (LDD) at the NIA's central 
office. He brought with him some of his trusted men who replaced 
the sitting District Chiefs. The new Chief of the 4 t h District, let me 
call him engineer Dizon, was formedy the LDD Chief in another 
province. 
This engineer Dizon, together with the new OM, brought a new 
spirit into the management of the system that could still be felt 
years after they were replaced in 1999. Both NIA staff and IA 
leaders were enthusiastic about Dizon's style of management. He 
boosted morale as he showed that things could be done differendy. 
He went out late at night to ensure that water would reach tail-end 
areas. He dealt with IA leaders rather than local politicians, and was 
keen on visiting IA-meetings and supporting the local LDD officer. 
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He was strict on his field workers but at the same time honoured 
their requests like renovating their field quarters. As he inspired his 
successor and was able to promote a few performance-oriented 
field workers to (acting-) engineering positions, the changes lasted 
beyond his departure. 
The everyday politics of works and work 
This is not to say that the politics of works and work suddenly 
ceased to exist, or really changed in character. History repeated 
itself as the OM and this engineer Dizon ran into a conflict with 
congressman Lopez over a physical works issue. Like the earlier 
Chief of the 4 * District, they also refused to bow their head to 
high-level politicians demanding control over the works contracts. 
Like the earlier Chief, they were both forced to leave in 1999. Since 
then, the OM position has been the subject of struggle between 
two politically-backed engineers who are both long-time managers 
in the UPRLTS system. 
These politics of work are still also at work at middle-
management level. On my very first day of visiting the NIA 
District office, I found myself invited to a lunch party organised by 
one of the District engineers. The party was not for me, but for a 
Joson-backed rich businessman who might run against 
congressman Lopez in the 2004 elections. This politician was 
building up his network of local vote brokers. In return, he might 
give favours when things would work out as planned. Hence, as 
before, befriending and allying with high-level politicians is an 
important way of furthering a career in the UPRLTS management 
High-level politicians are still also powerful players in the 
contracting of physical works. The Joson family - after the release 
from jail of its two most powerful members in 1998 following the 
inauguration of President Estrada - is fully back into the game. 
NIA engineers told me that the Josons - and their political 
following of contractors - dominate the 'bidding process' and get 
the best projects. Congressman Lopez and his related contractors 
were second in line, and had control over most of the projects in 
the southern part of the UPRLTS system. 
These politics of works are also present at field level. IA leaders 
and local politicians make a lot of use of the services of 
congressman Lopez in getting their roads and canals fixed. Since 
328 Water, Works and Wages 
the 2004 elections were getting closer, the congressman was 
considered mabait (kind), in lending his equipment like a grader or 
backhoe to these local leaders. A new phenomenon is that the 
larger barangays in the District nowadays also possess heavy 
equipment, which were used to maintain NLA facilities. The NIA 
itself no longer has such facilities. Despite the highly developed 
creative skills of the NLA repairmen, the worn-out equipment 
could no longer be kept alive. 
The everyday politics of water 
Main system water management in Zone 2 was largely still under 
the control of the NIA-IA partnership headed by the Zone 
Engineer. The everyday politics of water in Zone 1 had changed. It 
became less politicised and the NIA regained some of its authority. 
This was partiy because local politicians had less cause to intervene, 
as the latter years brought good water supply into the system. It 
was also caused by an improved performance of the NIA workers 
and engineers. 
For several years after 1997, Meneses Jr. remained an important 
actor in the water distribution of the Zone. He succeeded his father 
as the mayor of Victoria from 1998 -2001. Being the mayor, he no 
longer needed to go into the field. He simply ordered the NIA 
engineers to take care of the interests of his rice-farming citizens. 
Still, main system management became less contested. The NIA 
took care of his interests and at the same time - due to better water 
and hard work - was able to improve the water supply to the tail-
end. The unproved performance had a lot to do with the hard 
work and leadership capabilities of Argee, who had been promoted 
to acting Zone Engineer. He used his promotion to improve the 
water supply of his co-farmers and citizens in the downstream 
municipality of La Paz. 
The mobile phone facilities that became available in latter years 
also helped the NIA to re-take some of its authority. It gready 
facilitates communication between the dispersed field workers and 
their superiors as well as the farmer leaders. Argee's mobile phone 
was the nodal point in this network. During times of scarcity, he 
frequendy receives requests from different tail-end farmer leaders, 
questions from his superior officers, and 'text out' orders to his 
gatekeepers. He thus remains up to date without having to travel 
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on hardly passable canal roads and can quickly respond to changing 
circumstances. It also facilitates the reproduction of group identity 
among the strongly reduced NIA workforce. It is especially 
important to the NIA gatekeepers who are guarding gates at night-
time in remote areas. Through their mobile, they can text or call for 
back up in case of conflict with hot-headed farmer leaders or 
politicians. 
The struggle for scarce water was still very much present The 
difference was that the various rival alliances started to co-ordinate 
their efforts with the NIA field men and Zone Engineer. They did 
so, because their confidence in the NIA's doings to control and 
deliver water had grown. Moreover, the increase in power of the 
NIA in main system management also meant that it would be 
unwise to take the NIA for granted, as this might harm their own 
interests. In short, the acting Zone Engineer had attained the upper 
hand. His rule was however a fragile and probably a temporary one. 
Future seasons of scarce water might again change the situation. So 
far, die new power holders in Victoria showed little interest in 
water distribution. However, future scarcity and electoral 
campaigns may well change that situation. 
Another development of recent years is the neady finished 
Casecnan project. Under a so-called "Build, Operate and Transfer' 
(BOT) scheme, an international contracting firm has constructed a 
trans-basin canal that supplements water to the Pantabangan 
reservoir from a neighbouring watershed. For 20 years this 
contracting firm will be selling the water to the NIA for irrigation 
and electricity, which presumably allows it to profit from its earlier 
investments in the construction of the trans-basin. 
So far, District 4 has not yet benefited from this project as 
upstream checking diverted the extra available water. It is highly 
questionable if this will change for the better in the near future. At 
present, The NIA is constructing the irrigation facilities of the 5 t h 
District of UPRIIS that will be served with the enlarged capacity of 
the Pantabangan reservoir. As this 5 t h District is going to serve the 
presentiy non-irrigated lands of the very heart of the bailiwick of 
the Joson family, new political pressures will enter inter-District 
water distribution. As long as the political map of Nueva Ecija 
remains unchanged, it seems to be rather predictable where water 
will and will not flow in the years to come. 
Machismo and violence are still trademarks of the Nueva 
Ecijanos. In the area of the 4 t h Irrigation District, a brother of 
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Meneses Jr. - and rival mayoral candidate - was killed in 2001. In 
2002, 40 bullets ended the life of a barangay kapitan in Zone 1. 
Recent years were also bloody as unknown people opened a "war 
on drugs'. In a few months time, more than 20 alleged drug 
pushers in Victoria and neighbouring municipalities were shot 
dead, 6 of them being found in the morning in die rice field of the 
father of one the NIA engineers. 
Since then, the act of killing drug pushers spread to other 
municipalities throughout the southern part of Nueva Ecija. Some 
believe the killings are conducted by a so-called Tied Vigilante 
Group', as part of a new strategy of the New People's Army (NPA) 
to re-gain popularity in the plains of Central Luzon. Others suspect 
that such a group may be operational, but rather as hired goons of 
mayors who want to show that they are 'tough on crime'. The third 
theory is that it is the work of a drug syndicate that is forcefully 
taking over the market of a rival syndicate. 
Although this violence is not irrigation related, it does set the 
scene in which people have to operate. Toughness still counts 
along the NIA canals. As a counter-measure, several NIA 
fieldworkers in recent years joined the Philippine reserve army 
and/or a military brotherhood. By doing so, they feel safer as 
toughguys might not so easily dare to harm them. 
The everyday politics of fees (wages) 
President Estrada did not do the NIA a favour when he made the 
issue of irrigation service fees part of his pro-poor populist politics. 
In his first State of the Nation Address in mid-1998 he announced 
that fanners would no longer have to pay irrigation fees. He 
repeated this statement in a speech delivered in one of the towns of 
the UPRIIS 4* District in September 1998. When he delivered the 
speech, he already knew that he would not be able to keep his 
promise. By that time he had already signed a presidential order 
that called for so-called 'socialised' fees instead of the abolishment 
of the fees. Under the new structure, fee payment was related to 
the size of farmer's landholdings (see table 9.1). 
This gready affected the fee income of the District, as around 
80% of the farmers had (or reported to have) landholdings smaller 
than 2 hectares. Moreover, the speech of the President gave 
farmers the idea that they did not have to pay fees at all. 
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Wet season 
cavans a/palay/jto. 
Thy season 
cavans ofpday/ba. 
Old rate 2.5 3.5 
0 - 2 h a 1.5 2 
2 - 5 h a Z5 3.5 
> 5 h a 4 5 
Source-. NIA (1998), in: Panefla, forthcoming 
Since that time, the NIA District became even more pre-
occupied with fee collection and cost cutting, and financial viability 
has been the result A massive information drive of the NIA 
District in 1998 helped to convince the farmers that irrigation 
services were not for free, and that the District needed their 
payments more than ever before. The union struggle of the NIA 
employees made the government release funds for O&M subsidies 
that also helped to attain financial viability of the District. The 
improved work morale discussed above and the favourable water 
supply helped the NIA to attain higher fee incomes. In addition, 
the new administration of President Arroyo abolished the 
socialised fee system, and thus gave further rise to an increase in 
the District's fee income. Cbntinuing reduction of the work force 
allowed the District to further cut costs. As a result, the District 
has attained financial viability since 1999 onwards. 
This brought a new situation. From a strictiy financial point of 
view, the District's position has become sustainable. Two decades 
of continuous downsizing, cost-cutting and fee-raising strategies 
have made this possible. The District is no longer in acute financial 
problems and it seems no longer necessary to further reduce the 
workforce (although future water scarcity, poor management or the 
loss of government subsidies might again jeopardise that income). 
It is even able to hire some extra people, though rulings of the 
national office forbid addition to the regular work force. This is 
good news. Nevertheless, the District's contraction has negatively 
affected its level of services, which it has not been able to turn 
around in latter years. For instance, cleaning of large parts of the 
canal system is still not being taken care of (see chapter 6). 
Consequently, fee income plunged in 1998 and 1999 and NIA 
workers were faced with delays of salary payments up to 5 months. 
TABLE 9.1: The socialised fee rate system in reservoir systems 
during 1998 -2000 
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The everyday politics of turn over 
The NIA is furthering its turn over program, though indeed still at 
the pace of a turtle (Sun and Groenfeldt 1995). At the end of2002, 
the UPRIIS Districts started a pilot program of the so-called 
Irrigation Management Transfer scheme. In the 4 * District, a 
federation covering the area of a water master division of around 
1200 hectares in the upstream part of Zone 2, entered into the LMT 
contract. 
The deal is that the IA farmer federation takes full charge of 
water management, maintenance and fee collection in its area, 
while the NIA ensures water delivery to the different sub-laterals. 
The biggest change is that the federation is being billed by the 
NIA, and thus needs to fully take care of fee collection in its area. 
Moreover, the federation is now sharing the fee income with the 
NIA, rather than receiving incentives. 
It took a lot of discussions with the IA leaders, and organising 
work of the institutional development officer and a number of 
temporary NIA-hired organisers. Progress was slow, as the 
promised funds for rehabilitating the area before transfer did not 
come. Also, the organisers had great difficulty to attain sufficient 
attendance in the meetings held at village level. Apparendy, farmers 
were not very enthusiastic about the new governance scheme, or 
took it for granted. Also the IA leaders lacked enthusiasm, and the 
downstream federation of Zone 2 refused to enter into the new 
type of contract. The involved IA leaders considered it as hilaw, 
half-baked. They felt that the transfer scheme was still set-up with 
the intention to help out the NIA, rather than that it would really 
bring a new form of governance. 
Nevertheless, the oudook of IA leaders towards turn over - or 
LMT as it is called now - has changed somewhat in comparison to 
1997. The IA leaders demanded a 50-50 sharing system, rather than 
the 36-64 deal pushed for by the NIA. If they would get the 50%, 
they indeed thought it to be a scheme that might work. The above-
mentioned engineer Dizon might have brought part of this zeal. 
Field trips to show case schemes in other parts of the Philippines 
that already had implemented far-reaching turn over schemes, had 
also impressed several IA leaders. Though the majority of the NIA 
work force was still very sceptical of rum over and negative about 
the changes of the last two decades, some had become more 
positive about the idea of transfer. They even played with the idea 
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that one-day, they might be hired as a water master or manager of a 
future farmer-controlled management organisation in charge of 
irrigation management at Zone level. 
This short update on developments in the UPRIIS District 
shows two things. Firsdy, it re-emphasises the fact that irrigation 
management cannot be understood in managerial or administrative 
terms only. The socio-political dimension is far too pervasive to be 
considered as 'context'. Whether one likes it or not, politics is at he 
heart of irrigation management (reform) and thus needs to be a 
central element of analytical as well as policy making frameworks. 
Secondly, it proves that in 2003 the irrigation management in 
UPRIIS is still best described as a fascinating mixture of different 
forms of organisation, based on co-operation and conflict, as well 
as the threat of violence and friendship. 
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Samenvatting 
(Dutch Summary) 
Water, Werken & Loon. De dagelijkse strijd 
over irrigatie waterbeheer hervorrningen in de 
Filippijnen 
Dit boek onderzoekt het publieke management van een 
grootschalig irrigatie systeem in de Filippijnen en hoe beleid hierop 
inwerkt. Hervorrningsbeleid in de Filippijnen was een voorbeeld 
voor de rest van Azie gedurende de jaren tachtig en negentig. 
Zowel de hervorrningen van de irrigatiedienst, de NIA (National 
Irrigation Administration) alsmede de participatie van gebruikers in 
het management van het stelsel werden als succesvol beschouwd. 
Dit boek bestudeert het effect van dit beleid en is kritisch ten 
opzichte van de vermeende beleidssuccessen. 
Beleidsstudies van management hervorrningen kennen vaak een 
nogal functionalistische aanpak. Zulke studies vergelijken wat 
vooraf de bedoeling was met de resultaten achteraf. Het 
implementatie proces zelf blijft vaak onbesproken. De Studie in dit 
boek kent dit manco niet. Het is gebaseerd op 18 maanden 
intensief veldwerk en bespreekt in detail hoe mensen zieh 
organiseren, hoe ze een systeem managen, hoe ze omgaan met 
hervorrningsbeleid en waarom ze bepaalde keuzes maken. 
Bovendien laat deze Studie zien hoe deze praktijken zijn gerelateerd 
met de organisatie van de Filippijnse ovetheid en samenleving. 
Met deze aanpak komt een fascinerende wereld tot leven. Het is 
wereld waarin NIA managers (Ingenieurs) en veldwerkers, boeren 
leiders en politici dagelijks strijden over de verdeling van schaarse 
middelen. Meest zichtbaar is de strijd over Schaars irrigatie water 
die essentieel voor de landbouw productie van duizenden kleine 
boeren. Om water veilig te stellen intervenieren boeren veelvuldig 
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en actief in het management van het stelsel. Ze organiserai zieh en 
hun leiders sluiten allianties met politici, bestuurders en 
ambtenaren in deze strijd rond water. De formele structuren en de 
scheidslijnen tussen bestuur en politiek en tussen gebruikers en 
overheid blijken in de praktijk van weinig waarde. In plaats daarvan 
bestaan een aantal min of meer permanente rivaliserende allianties 
die op basis van interpersoonlijke relades van verwantschap, 
vriendschap en politieke patronage zijn georganiseerd. Tenslotte 
blijkt ook de dreiging met geweld en in mindere mate omkoop 
praktijken de organisatie van het irrigatie waterbeheer vorm te 
geven. 
Een andere hot issue is de organisatie van het onderhoud van 
het stelsel. Zowel geld als machines voor onderhoud zijn Schaars, 
en de besluitvorming over welke wegen en kanalen wel en welke 
niet worden onderhouden is in hoge mate gepolitiseerd. Het 
management van het stelsel levert dus zowel goede oogsten als 
misoogsten, goede wegen en onbegaanbare wegen en zowel 
geslaagde en mislukte politieke of bestuurlijke carrières op. 
Dit boek exploreert ook hoe de wereld van de aannemerij - die 
strijd over de verdeling van lucratieve opdrachten - het 
management van het stelsel vormgeeft. Het is een complexe wereld 
waarin hoge politici door middel van hun contrôle over 
benoemingen en promoties van ambtenaren een flinke vinger in de 
pap hebben. Allianties van gouverneurs en afgevaardigden van het 
Congres met hoge NIA bestuurders en aannemers speien hier een 
ingewikkeld, risicovol maar lucratief steekspel. 
Tenslotte is er de dagelijkse strijd over loon. Als 
verzelfstandigde overheidsdienst draagt de NIA zorg voor zijn 
eigen inkomen dat wordt verdient via het heffen van water leges 
aan gebruikers. Dit blijkt geen sinecure. NIA veldwerkers en 
managers hebben allerlei ingenieuze strategieën en methoden 
ontwikkeld om de boeren te bewegen tot betaling van deze leges, 
en om op die manier tijdig hun eigen safaris te verdienen. Dit levert 
een merkwaardige maar boeiende relatie tussen burgers en overheid 
op. 
De strijd over deze schaarse goederen is onderzocht in relatie 
tot drie verschillende soorten van hervorrningsbeleid die het 
management van het systeem sterk heeft veranderd. Ik laat zien 
hoe de verschillende actoren zin geven aan dit beleid, en hoe ze het 
inzetten, aangrijpen, tegenhouden en/of veranderen. Ten eerste 
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kregen de locale actoren te maken met saneringsbeleid van de 
overheid dat sinds het begin van de jaren tachtig de NIA 
bureaucratie sterk heeft verkleind. Ten tweede dwong de financiele 
verzelfstandiging van de NIA tot alledei bezuinigingsmaatregelen 
alsook pogbgen tot vergroting van het inkomen van deze publieke 
organisatie. Tenslotte werd er zogenoemd 'turn over' beleid 
uitgevoerd waarin watergebruikers werden georganiseerd en geacht 
verschillende management taken van de NIA over te nemen. 
Het bestudeerde systeem ligt in de rijst viaktes van Centraal 
Luzon, ongeveer honderd kilometer ten Noorden van Manila. Het 
is een van de 4 irrigatie districten van het grootste irrigatie stelsel 
van de Filippijnen, het Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation 
System (UPRIIS). Een groot stuwmeer en lokale rivieren leveren 
het gehele jaar water voor rijstteelt op een kleine 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 hectare in 
de vruchtbare valleien van de provincies Nueva Ecija, Bulacan en 
Pampanga. 
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